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ABSTRACT 
In Australia, there is growing interest in the potential for voluntary initiatives by 
industry to contribute to environmental policy objectives. This dissertation reviews 
the manner in which three different voluntary approaches (environmental 
management systems, the Greenhouse Challenge and the mining industry's Code for 
Environmental Management) have functioned, to assess whether or not voluntary 
approaches can lead to improved environmental outcomes compared to other policy 
instruments, and to define the conditions under which these improved outcomes can 
be achieved. 
The research indicates that the contribution of voluntary approaches is likely to be 
limited in situations where voluntary approaches are adopted as the sole policy 
instrument. That is, there is a need for other policy instruments such as command 
and control or economic instruments to ensure that organisations meet minimum 
standards of performance. However, voluntary approaches can make a significant 
contribution in situations where they provide a transitional function (for example, as 
a precursor to the implementation of legislation) or where they are used as a tool to 
assist organisations meet the goals specified in policy or regulations. 
While the proponents of voluntary approaches have argued that voluntary approaches 
offer the potential for economic efficiency, reduced administration costs, competitive 
advantage and innovation, there is limited evidence from the three case-studies to 
suggest that these benefits are achieved in practice. Soft effects such as education, 
placing environmental issues on the business decision-making agenda, and 
improving relationships between business and regulatory authorities appear to be the 
most important direct outcomes from successful voluntary approaches. 
The research indicates that, for voluntary approaches to be effective policy 
instruments, they should contain specific objectives and targets, clearly define the 
business as usual scenario, include credible monitoring and measuring processes, and 
be underpinned by suitable enforcement mechanisms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three decades there has been a dramatic increase in public concern 
regarding the quality of the environment. One of the most visible consequences has 
been that, in most countries, industry is now subject to a complex web of legislation, 
standards and rules. These `command and control' instruments have been criticised 
on the grounds that they are inefficient and inflexible, and impose unnecessarily high 
costs, expensive monitoring and record-keeping requirements on industry. These 
criticisms have created considerable interest in regulatory alternatives such as 
economic instruments (e. g. tradable permits, environmental taxes), infonmation- 
based strategies (e. g. public environmental reporting, product labelling) and 
voluntary approaches (e. g. industry codes of conduct). There is a significant body of 
knowledge and experience concerning the design and implementation of economic 
instruments and information-based strategies. While voluntary approaches are less 
well understood, there is increasing interest in their potential to enable environmental 
policy objectives to be met at a lower cost that other environmental policy 
instruments. 
This dissertation reviews the manner in which three different voluntary approaches 
(namely, environmental management systems, the Greenhouse Challenge and the 
mining industry's Code for Environmental Management) in Australia have 
functioned. The objectives of the research are to assess whether or not voluntary 
approaches can lead to improved environmental outcomes compared to other 
approaches to environmental regulation, and to define the conditions under which 
these improved outcomes can be achieved. The research also contributes to the 
empirical understanding of voluntary approaches through the documentation and 
evaluation of the three case-studies. 
This dissertation comprises four main sections, namely the description of the 
methodology and scope (Chapter 2), the literature review (Chapters 3,4 and 5), the 
three case-studies (Chapters 6,7 and 8) and the discussion and conclusions (Chapters 
9 and 10). Chapter 3 discusses the concept of sustainable development and its role in 
defining the scope and objectives of environmental policy. Chapter 3 also details the 
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analytical framework used for the assessment of the voluntary approaches considered 
in Chapters 6,7 and 8. Chapter 4 discusses the implications of environmental issues 
for business and the manner in which business responds to environmental pressures. 
Chapter 5 is a detailed review of the literature regarding voluntary approaches. The 
aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical and empirical background for the three 
case-studies. The case-studies considered in Chapters 6,7 and 8 have been chosen 
because (a) all three programmes have met their stated objectives, thereby enabling an 
assessment to be made of the reasons why they have continued to be effective and 
relevant over an extended period of time, (b) they were all introduced in 1995 or 1996, 
which means that they have been developed and implemented against the same 
backdrop of regulation and public policy on the environment, and (c) all three 
programmes have an international dimension, with the Greenhouse Challenge and 
the mining industry's Code being promoted as models for international voluntary 
initiatives on greenhouse and mining respectively, and EMSs being discussed as a 
means for harmonising environmental requirements between different countries. The 
selection of the case-studies is discussed further in Chapter 2. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
This Chapter discusses and assesses the study methodology. The Chapter is divided 
into two parts. The first part relates to the scope of the research, including issues such 
as the literature and information sources reviewed the use of case-studies and the 
reasons for the selection of the case-studies considered in Chapters 6,7 and 8. The 
second part of the chapter (Section 2.2) discusses the framework used for the evaluation 
of the case-studies. 
2.1 SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
The overall objectives of this research are to evaluate whether and how voluntary 
approaches can contribute to achieving environmental policy objectives compared to 
other approaches to environmental regulation, and to define the conditions under 
which these improved outcomes can be achieved. These questions were addressed 
through (a) a review of the literature and published information on voluntary 
approaches, (b) interviews with practitioners (e. g. government employees, industry 
representatives, environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics) 
with experience in the design, implementation or operation of voluntary approaches' 
and (c) the detailed assessment of the three case-studies. As voluntary approaches do 
not fit comfortably into the `traditional' areas of legal scholarship (e. g. there is 
limited case law that refers to voluntary approaches), the literature review considered 
not only the legal writing on voluntary approaches but also the literature from other 
disciplines (e. g. environmental science, politics, sociology, business) and the `grey' 
literature (e. g. non-peer reviewed articles, industry position statements). The aims of 
the interview process were to ensure that all of the relevant literature and information 
had been identified and to gather opinions and perceptions on both voluntary 
approaches in general and on specific voluntary approaches with which the 
interviewees had been involved. 
1 Some of the interviews were face-to-face interviews and others were in the form of telephone 
interviews or email exchanges. A full list of interviewees is provided in Appendix I. 
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Limitations of the Published Literature 
There are two significant limitations in the writing on environmental policy. The 
first is that there is limited agreement on the criteria that should be used for the 
evaluation of policy. Section 2.2 considers this issue in some detail and develops a 
framework and a standard set of criteria for the evaluation of the three voluntary 
approaches considered in the case-studies. The second limitation is that much of the 
writing does not account for the manner in which organisations respond in practice to 
environmental policy instruments. Therefore, Chapter 4 discusses the manner in 
which environmental issues affect organisations and the manner in which 
organisations respond to environmental pressures. The purpose is to develop the 
writing on the operation of policy instruments to account for issues such as why 
organisations do or do not comply with specific policy instruments, the contextual 
influences on organisational behaviour and the implications of these factors for 
policy instrument design and implementation. 
The Use of an Interdisciplinary Approach 
A socio-legal and interdisciplinary approach has been adopted for the research. The 
reason is that the assessment of environmental policy instruments is not confined to a 
single measure of success (such as environmental effectiveness or economic 
efficiency2) but, rather, requires that attention be paid to factors such as politics, 
equity, and competitiveness at the domestic and international levels. A related issue 
is that this research has treated the law as being of concern in its social context rather 
than for its own intrinsic value as legal text3. That is, the emphasis of the research 
has been on voluntary approaches in an instrumental context (i. e. the manner in 
2 It has been suggested that economists tend to favour economic instruments, lawyers tend to prefer 
traditional regulatory approaches, scientists prefer research, and business-people prefer voluntary 
approaches or self-regulation (Gunningham, N. and Sinclair, D. (1999a), 'Regulatory Pluralism: 
Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection', Law and Policy, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 49-76 at 
50). While such an assessment is probably over-polarised, it is fair to note that much of the literature 
on environmental policy tends to reflect the specific discipline of the authors, rather than reflecting the 
broader range of issues or factors that may be relevant. 
3 Environmental law itself is widely seen as an intra-disciplinary form of legal research, encompassing 
commercial, corporate and regulatory law and research in these areas (Baldwin, R., Scott, C. and 
Hood, C. (eds. ) (1998), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK) at 35; Ogus, 
A. (1999), `Evaluating Alternative Regulatory Regimes: The Contribution of "Law and Economics"', 
Geoforum, Vol. 30, pp. 223-229). 
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which voluntary approaches can or could contribute to environmental policy), rather 
than considering voluntary approaches as an end in themselves. 
The research has adopted a broad definition of `regulation'. Regulation is seen not 
only in terms of the formal processes and sanctions associated with traditional 
regulation (which, generally, envisage a central role for governments) but as 
encompassing the process of `social regulation' (e. g. expectations that organisations 
will meet certain `social norms') and `social punishment' (e. g. the role of the public 
in enforcing environmental regulation through consumer pressures or damage to 
corporate reputation). That is, regulation is broadly defined as the social control of 
activities judged detrimental to the interests of specific parties, and can be seen as an 
effort to specify, either formally or informally, how social benefits and costs will be 
distributed4. In this context, voluntary approaches represent an alternative form of 
social control to traditional command and control approaches. 
The Use of Case-Studies 
Before considering the specific case-studies, there are two overarching comments to 
be made regarding the role of case-studies in addressing the overall objectives of this 
research. The first is that the research also included a detailed literature review and 
the overall evaluation (Chapter 9) relies on both the published literature and the 
specific case-studies. The second is that there have been few detailed evaluations of 
specific voluntary approaches and, therefore, this study represents an important 
addition to the empirical literature on voluntary approaches. 
The three case-studies considered are the Australian Greenhouse Challenge, the 
Australian Minerals Industry's Code for Environmental Management and 
environmental management systems (EMSs) in Australia. There were a number of 
reasons for selecting these case-studies. The first is that all were `officially' 
launched in 1995 or 1996 and, therefore, all three are mature programmes, with 
information available on the outcomes that have been achieved. The second is that 
° Expressed another way, regulation can be seen as a social instrument for the redistribution of power 
(see, for example, Black, J. (1996a), 'Constitutionalising Self-Regulation', The Modem Law Review, 
Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 24-55 at 47). 
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all three are Australian-based programmes, which means that they have been 
developed and implemented against the same backdrop of regulation and public 
policy on the environment (i. e. many of the external factors that affect the 
performance of the voluntary approaches can be considered as being `held 
constanti). The third is that there is considerable overlap between the three case- 
studies. For example, many of the companies that have signed the Australian 
Minerals Industry's Code for Environmental Management are also members of the 
Australian Greenhouse Challenge and/or have developed and implemented EMSs. 
These overlaps enable questions such as whether multiple voluntary approaches can 
be applied to the same environmental problem (or different aspects of the same 
problem) and the order in which voluntary approaches should be introduced (or the 
order in which firms join different approaches) to be assessed. The fourth reason is 
that all three programmes have an international dimension. The Greenhouse 
Challenge has been widely discussed and promoted as a potential mode for voluntary 
initiatives on greenhouse issues in other countries, the Australian Minerals Industry's 
Code is seen as a potential model for the international mining industry and EMSs 
have been widely adopted internationally and have been discussed as a means for 
harmonising environmental requirements between different countries. The 
consequence is that the three case-studies offer the potential for lessons and 
conclusions to be drawn beyond the Australian context. The fifth reason is that the 
case-studies cover a significant cross-section of organisations (ranging from 
multinational enterprises through to single facility organisations, producing 
exclusively for the domestic market), industry sectors (although much of the analysis 
focuses on primary and secondary industry), and environmental issues (both process 
issues, such as environmental management and reporting, and outcome issues, such 
as emissions of greenhouse gases and resource consumption). Finally, the three 
voluntary programmes have met their objectives, thereby enabling the objectives of the 
research (i. e. whether and how voluntary approaches can contribute to achieving 
environmental policy objectives and under what conditions) to be met. 
S It is recognised that, by focusing solely on Australia, the ability to transfer the results of this research 
to other countries may be limited (as factors such as climate, geography, demographic trends, resource 
base, political and institutional structures, economic composition, trading relationships, energy 
production and consumption profile all influence the policy measures that are adopted and the manner 
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The focus of the dissertation is on the general subject of industrial pollution control 
and resources management. Therefore, the conclusions drawn may be less relevant 
to other environmental issues (e. g. biodiversity conservation or land management) or 
other sectors of the economy (e. g. measures that work for industry may be less 
effective for sectors such as agriculture). For example, biodiversity loss may involve 
rare (or even unknown) species and frequently exhibits threshold effects (i. e. beyond 
a certain level of pollution or other environmental stress, an ecosystem may 
collapse). The consequence is that public policy approaches relating to biodiversity 
frequently need to provide, or aim for, a very high level of dependability. Another 
relevant example is that certain types of industrial environmental management 
initiatives (e. g. waste reduction) often provide significant short-term financial 
benefits and longer-term efficiency or reputation benefits, whereas these benefits 
may not be applicable to other sectors. 
The use of case-study evaluation techniques is a time-delimited process. That is, the 
evaluation process commences at a specific time and ends at a specific time. For this 
research, the fieldwork and interviews were conducted in the period September 1999 
to August 2001. August 2001 has, therefore, been chosen as the cut-off date for the 
evaluation of the various policy instruments. The use of the same cut-off date for all 
three case-studies has the advantage of ensuring that the broad political context for 
all three instruments is the same. It is recognised that by defining an arbitrary cut-off 
date changes in the policy context from that point may not be accounted for in the 
case-studies. The likely changes in the policy context are discussed in Chapter 9. 
2.2 POLICY INSTRUMENT EVALUATION 
The evidence used to evaluate environmental policy instruments can be derived from 
one or a combination of three sources, namely theoretical arguments, ex ante analysis 
and ex post analyses. 
Theoretical arguments are statements on the effectiveness, costs and benefits of 
policy instruments that are derived from theoretical or conceptual economic models. 
in which these policy instruments are implemented or function in practice). The transferability of 
lessons from Australia to other countries is discussed in Chapter 9. 
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Such analyses can indicate the range of relevant costs and benefits that may arise in 
the choice between different policy instruments, subject. to the given assumptions 
about the polluters' behaviour and the policy context. While it may be possible to 
derive unambiguous results about the merits of particular policy instruments, it is 
more common to find that the results of -such analyses generally only 
indicate the 
broad range of conditions under which one set of policy instruments would be 
preferable to another set of instruments. The results produced from such models are 
critically dependent on the assumptions made in the models and caution is required 
in the use and interpretation of the results from such models. A particular issue is the 
manner in which. such models rely on the assumption that firms are profit- 
maximising agents. This assumption does not appear to hold in practice with the 
available evidence indicating that firms are unlikely to be fully optimised6. A further 
issue with theoretical models is that the results may only be valid within specific 
areas of application. For example, predictions about the response of one industry 
sector to a policy instrument may not apply to other industry sectors or to other 
countries. 
Ex ante analysis involves the quantification of the costs and benefits of specific 
policy instruments on the basis of data about the relevant environmental problems 
and the economic context. Ex ante analysis may enable some of the key outcomes 
from a policy instrument to be predicted in advance of actual experience, based on 
historic experience with similar instruments or based on polluter behaviour in similar 
circumstances 7. While ex ante analysis is similar to theoretical evaluations (and 
suffers from similar limitations), ex ante analysis can allow for a more case-specific 
or context-specific analysis than theoretical evaluations. 
Ex post evaluations involve the assessment of the costs and benefits of a policy 
option, once the policy instrument has been implemented. Both theoretical and ex 
ante approaches can only suggest the likely consequence of using policy instruments, 
based on defined assumptions, whereas ex post analysis can show the actual pattern 
6 These issues are considered in greater detail in Section 4.3.3. 
7 OECD (1997a), Evaluating Economic Instruments for Environmental Policy (OECD, Paris, France) at 
23. 
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of responses to a policy instrument and can provide other data (e. g. administrative 
and compliance costs) that are not readily evaluated using the other approaches. 
This research is primarily an ex post evaluation of three case-studies but (where 
available) ex ante or theoretical predictions regarding the effectiveness of the 
voluntary approaches have been used to provide a context or frame of reference for 
the evaluation of the voluntary approaches. 
2.2.1 Evaluation Framework 
In the literature on policy instrument evaluation, there is a general lack of 
consistency in the criteria used by different authors to evaluate the policy 
instrument(s). There are two different approaches. The first is where certain 
variables are held constant (e. g. the desired environmental outcome is specified) and 
then the evaluation seeks to assess different instruments in terms of a single criterion 
(e. g. economic efficiency). The consequence of reducing the evaluation of 
environmental policy instruments to a single criterion is that potentially important 
dimensions may be omitted or excluded from consideration. For example, the fact 
that a specific policy instrument is the most economically efficient does not mean 
that the instrument will be acceptable to business (e. g. business many be unwilling to 
incur the transaction costs associated with the implementation of the new instrument 
or the instrument may have the effect of stifling innovation). The second approach is 
where the analysis considers a range of criteria, such as environmental effectiveness, 
economic efficiency and political acceptability. Such approaches can enable the 
various dimensions and implications of policy instruments to be identified and 
assessed. These approaches, however, can complicate the decision-making process, 
as it is rare for a policy instrument to be the `best' against all of the specified criteria. 
It is generally the case that the results of such analyses are not clear cut. For 
example, while a specific instrument may be the most economically efficient, it may 
not be as dependable or as politically acceptable as the available alternatives. 
As discussed in Section 2.1, this research has assessed voluntary approaches in a 
multidimensional manner, taking account not only of environmental and economic 
impacts (which are the most common frames of reference in the literature and which 
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also tend to be the easiest to quantify) but -also qualitative outcomes such as soft 
effects, innovation and viability. By making these non-quantifiable aspects an 
explicit part of the evaluation framework, the intention is to ensure that, as far as 
practicable, these issues are considered with the same degree of rigour and depth as 
those issues that are more amenable to quantification. 
There is limited agreement in the literature on the criteria that should be used for 
policy instrument evaluation. Therefore, the approach adopted for this research was 
to, first of all, review the criteria that have been proposed by different authors and 
use this process to define the framework within which voluntary approaches were 
evaluated for the purposes of this research. As indicated in Table 2.1, different 
authors and organisations have proposed different criteria for the evaluation of 
environmental policy instruments8. While Table 2.1 seems to offer limited guidance 
on the criteria that should be used for the evaluation of environmental policy, a 
restructuring of these criteria (see Table 2.2) indicates that there is actually a 
significant degree of agreement on the criteria that should be used. 
a The specific sources cited in Table 3.1 are: OECD (1999), Voluntary Approaches for Environmental 
Policy: An Assessment (OECD, Paris, France) at 89-95; OECD (1997a) at 23; Hundloe, T. (1997), 
'Achieving Environmental Objectives by the Use of Economic Instruments - Fisheries', in 
Environment Australia (1997a), Environmental Economics Round Table Proceedings 10 July 1997 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia), pp. 33-45 at 35; Stanford, J. (1997), 'Australian 
Energy Sector: Structure and Sustainability', in Environment Australia (1997a), pp. 57-75 at 65; 
James, D. (1997), 'Economic Instruments and Wastewater Management', in Environment Australia 
(1997a), pp. 101-126 at 107-108; Young, M., (1997), 'Mining or Minding: Opportunities for Australia 
to Improve Conservation of Remnant Vegetation and to Alleviate Land Degradation', in Environment 
Australia (1997a), pp. 135-152 at 138-139; Barber, J. (1998), 'Responsible Action or Public 
Relations? NGO Perspectives on Voluntary Initiatives', UNEP Industry and the Environment, 
January-June 1998, pp. 19-22 at 21; Environment Australia (1997b), Environmental Incentives: 
Australian Experience with Economic Instruments for Environmental Management (Environment 
Australia, Canberra, Australia) at 105; Byron, N. (2000), 'Economic Instruments and Taxation Measures 
for Natural Resources Management', in Environment Australia (2000a), Proceedings of the Second 
Environmental Economics Round Table. Environmental Economics Research Paper No. 7 (Environment 
Australia, Canberra, Australia), pp. 57-66 at 61; Dovers, S. (1995), 'Information, Sustainability and 
Policy', Australian Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 2, pp. 142-156 at 151; Panayotou, T. 
(1998), Instruments of Change: Motivating and Financing Sustainable Development (Earthscan, 
London, UK) at 103-109; Schmidheiny, S. (1992), Changing Course: A Global Business Perspective on 
Development and the Environment (The MIT Press, London, UK) at 29-30. 
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Table 2.1: Environmental Policy Evaluation Criteria 
OECD 
(1999a) 
OECD 
(1997a) 
Hundloe 
(1997) 
Stanford 
(1997) 
James 
(1997) 
Young 
(1997) 
Environmental Environmental Technical Dependability Efficiency in Dependability 
effectiveness effectiveness feasibility management 
Economic Precaution 
Economic Economic Economic efficiency Efficiency in 
efficiency efficiency efficiency protecting the Equity 
Information environment 
Administration Administration Innovation requirements Economic 
and compliance and compliance Effectiveness in efficiency 
costs costs Flexibility Ease of protecting the 
monitoring and environment Dynamic and 
Competitiveness Soft effects Management enforcement continuous 
costs° Incentives for incentives 
Soft effects Dynamic effects Flexibility improved 
and innovation Distributional efficiency and Administrative 
Dynamic effects effects Equity environmental feasibility and 
and innovation Revenues performance costs 
Acceptability Ongoing 
Viability and Wider economic incentives Equity Community and 
feasibility effects' political 
Compatibility acceptability 
with existing 
institutions 
Administration 
costs 
Community 
acceptance 
'Including competitiveness, prices, income distribution and economic growth. 
b Including management agency costs and negotiation and transaction costs. 
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Table 2.1: Environmental Policy Evaluation Criteria (continued) 
Barber 
(1998) 
Environment 
Australia 
(1997b) 
Byron 
(2000) 
Dovers 
(1995) 
Panayotou 
(1998) 
Schmidheiny 
(1992) 
Substance` Environmental Cost Information Environmental Efficiency 
effectiveness requirements effectiveness 
Incentives for Efficiency Flexibility of 
adoption Efficiency Dependability Cost response 
Flexibility effectivenessf 
Integration and Acceptable Corrective or Confidence in 
internalisation of burden of costs Incentives antidotal Flexibility the regulatory 
environment into environment 
policies and Equity Dependability Timing Dynamic 
operations efficiency$ Gradual 
Compatibility Effectiveness Adaptability introduction 
Independent with existing Equity 
verification instruments Certainty Flexibility A 'level' playing 
Ease of field 
Inclusiveness Acceptable Acceptability Cost and introduction 
and public administrative Efficiency Transparency of 
participation costs Equity Ease of compliance 
Cross-sectoral monitoring 
Transparency Community Information effectsd 
acceptance requirements Predictability 
Accountability Equity 
Acceptability 
Political and 
institutional 
feasibility 
Feasibility of 
monitoring impact 
of instrument 
Enforcement 
Communicability` 
`The instrument should solve and not avoid problems and, therefore, the instrument needs to be 
substantive, unambiguous and undiluted. 
d The potential for the policy instrument to offer other benefits or costs aside from the achievement of 
the environmental policy goal. 
Can the particular details of the instrument and the reasons for its use be adequately communicated? 
f Will the instrument achieve the specified target at the minimum possible cost to society? 
8 Does the instrument provide incentives for developing and adopting new, environmentally cleaner 
and economically more efficient technologies? 
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Table 2.2 synthesises the criteria proposed by the various institutions and authors, 
with two exceptions. The first is that revenue raising is not generally an objective of 
voluntary approaches and, therefore, is not considered in this research. The second is 
that `wider economic effects' are treated as part of the assessment of competitiveness 
(domestic and international). 
For the purposes of this dissertation, equity issues (i. e. the manner in -which the 
economic costs and benefits of policy instruments are distributed) is considered as 
part of economic efficiency and implementation feasibility is considered as part a 
general criterion called `Law and Public Policy Issues' (see further below). 
Therefore, the eight criteria that are used in the assessment of policy instruments are 
as follows: 
" Environmental effectiveness; 
" Economic efficiency; 
" Administration and compliance costs; . 
" Competitiveness; 
" Soft effects; 
" Dynamic effects and innovation; 
" Viability and feasibility; and 
" Law and public policy issues. 
2.2.2 Environmental Effectiveness 
Overview 
The environmental effectiveness of a policy instrument can be expressed in terms of 
two main questions, namely whether the objective is ambitious or modest (i. e. ex 
ante analysis) and to what extent is the specified objective being achieved (i. e. ex 
post analysis)? It is important that the two are distinguished as the objectives of a 
policy instrument may be affected by factors such as regulatory capture and 
bargaining (see further Section 5.3.1), whereas the attainment of goals may be 
affected by factors such as whether the instrument is binding or non-binding and the 
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manner in which investigation, enforcement and sanctioning are implemented. The 
assessment of the ambition of the targets specified is a country-specific issue, 
requiring consideration of factors such as the past and current state of the 
environment, natural resource endowment, economic structure and development 
levels, and demographic trends. The case-studies in Chapters 6,7 and 8 identify the 
features of the Australian economy, environment and political context that influence 
the manner in which the voluntary approaches have functioned in practice. Chapter 
9 assesses the implications of these country-specific factors for transferring the 
lessons from the Australian experience with voluntary approaches to other countries. 
Environmental effectiveness also requires that consideration be ' paid to the 
dependability of the policy instrument. Dependability encompasses issues such as 
(a) whether there is a sufficient information base to allow effective design and 
implementation of the policy instrument, (b) whether the desired goals will be 
achieved, (c) when will the instrument take effect compared to when it needs to take 
effect, and (d) the potential for the instrument to be effective or continue to require 
modification in the face of changing social or economic circumstances9. That is, the 
environmental effectiveness of policy instruments needs to be considered both in 
terms of the outcomes (actual or potential1°) and the likelihood (or reliability) of 
those outcomes". Consideration must also be given to the specific goals of policy. 
For example, pollutant emissions can be considered in terms of bulk totals of 
emissions (e. g. greenhouse gas emissions) or in terms of emissions from individual 
facilities (where the issue of concern may not be a global issue such as climate 
change but local public health or nuisance issues). That is, depending on the specific 
subject of the policy instrument, individual compliance or non-compliance may be 
more or less important and non-compliance may even be acceptable if overall targets 
are achieved. 
The environmental effects of a specific policy instrument may not only be those that 
were originally planned or predicted. The unplanned (or unintended) consequences 
9 Dovers (1995) at 151. 
10 There may not be any identified effects, the effects may be counter to the original objectives of the 
policy instrument or the policy instrument may have led to organisations adapting or innovating in 
response to the instrument (Hutter, B. (ed. ) (1999), A Reader in Environmental Law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, UK)). 
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may include environmental benefits (e. g. sulphur dioxide emissions as a result of 
greenhouse gas emission reductions), transfers from one medium to another (e. g. 
requirements to install air pollution control equipment may lead to the production of 
solid wastes that may require disposal or treatment) and adverse impacts (e. g. the 
installation of pollution controls may entail energy penalties). 
Measuring Environmental Effectiveness - Pollution 
The quantity of pollution released is often a key measure of the effectiveness of 
environmental policy instruments, and many organisations use pollutant emissions as 
a primary measure of success of their environmental management efforts. The 
consequences (e. g. public health effects, impacts on local air quality) of such releases 
depend not only on the quantity of pollutants released but on a range of factors such 
as other sources of pollution, pre-existing (or background) pollution levels, the 
number of people exposed to the pollutant, the sensitivity of exposed populations and 
local meteorology 12. These factors are, generally, not directly controllable by 
individual organisations. That is, organisations focus on those aspects that they can 
control (e. g. pollutant emissions). As a consequence, the manner in which pollutant 
releases are characterised represents an extremely important issue, both for policy 
evaluation and for the evaluation of the performance of individual organisations. 
Characterising pollutant emissions is not an absolute science and even direct 
measurement can have significant uncertainties. The techniques that are generally 
used by organisations to characterise their releases to air or water are continuous 
monitoring, predictive emissions monitoring (where the release rate of a particular 
substance is related to operational parameters that are already available), source 
sampling (where emissions are sampled at discrete intervals), mass balance (where 
emissions are determined based on the amount of material that enters a process, the 
amount that leaves the process and the amount shipped as part of the product itself), 
mathematical models that describe the chemical and physical properties of processes 
and activities, emission factors (which relate the release of a pollutant to a measure 
11 Jacobs, M. (1991), The Green Economy (Pluto Press, London, UK) at 152-153. 
12 See further Ormerod, R. and Sullivan, R. (2000), `Indicators for Measuring Policy Performance 
Against Sustainable Targets', in Proceedings of the Queensland Environmental Law Association 
Conference 2000 (Queensland Environmental Law Association, Brisbane), pp. 33-40. 
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of activity that can be readily measured, such as the amount of fuel used) and 
engineering judgements 13. The decision on which techniques are used involves 
trade-offs between the desired accuracy and factors such as cost, data availability and 
the purposes to which the data are to be put. It is frequently the case that the best (or 
most accurate) estimation technique is not the technique that is used. In practice, 
monitoring data are frequently only available for a small subset of the pollutants that 
are of concern and companies tend to use a combination of the techniques above to 
characterise their pollutant releases'4. 
All of the techniques for characterising pollutant releases contain uncertainties, with 
consequent implications for the evaluation of policy instruments. While the potential 
errors and uncertainties associated with measurement techniques can range from a 
few percent to an order of magnitude or more, these uncertainties generally cannot be 
described statistically and it is frequently difficult to obtain more than a `ballpark 
estimate' of uncertainty 15. A further issue is that the default emission factors (which 
are widely used in environmental reporting) while allowing companies to determine 
their emissions without conducting additional monitoring are, generally, very poor 
predictors of the performance of an individual facility and the uncertainty associated 
with emission factors, in general, cannot be described using conventional statistical 
techniques 16. These uncertainties mean that supplementary data are required to 
ensure that pollutant emissions data are understood and placed in context. To enable 
a complete picture to be obtained, these data should include information on the 
estimation techniques used, the suitability of these techniques for the sources 
considered (i. e. what is the applicability and reliability of the release estimation 
13 Sullivan, R. and Woods, I. (2000), 'Using Emission Factors to Characterise Heavy Metal Emissions 
from Sewage Sludge Incinerators in Australia', Atmospheric Environment, Vol. 34, pp. 4571-4577. 
14 For example, the majority of Australian facilities that have air pollution monitoring requirements 
are only required only to monitor for the so-called 'criteria pollutants' (oxides of nitrogen, oxides of 
sulphur, carbon monoxide, lead, particulate matter with a mean diameter of less than ten microns 
(PMio)). However, the Australian National Pollutant Inventory requires facilities (depending on 
specific reporting thresholds) to report from a list of ninety substances (Sullivan, R., Smith, J. and 
Zeise, K. (1998), 'Establishing Emission Estimation Techniques for the Australian Context', in 
Proceedings of the 14" International Clean Air and Environment Conference (Clean Air Society of 
Australia and New Zealand, Mitcham, Victoria, 1998), pp. 148-152). 
15 These uncertainties include inherent variability within a source (i. e. the measurement process may 
not capture variations in emissions over time), inappropriate measurement techniques, calibration and 
drift in the instrumentation (i. e. producing the 'wrong reading'), sampling errors, miscalculation and 
errors in data handling and manipulation (Sullivan et al (1998); Hanssen, 0. and Asbjornsen, 0. 
(1996), `Statistical Properties of Emission Data in Life Cycle Assessments', Journal of Cleaner 
Production, Vol. 4, No. 3-4, pp. 149-157). 
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techniques), details of the sources included or excluded, what is the site boundary for 
reporting purposes, whether it is only releases to a single environmental medium 
(e. g. air) or multiple media that are reported, the time scale of relevance (e. g. 
monthly, seasonally, annually etc. ), the geographical area to be included and the 
pollutants considered. Care is also required to ensure that data are not 
inappropriately interpreted or taken out of the context for which they were 
developed. Much of the data reported by organisations (e. g. in environmental 
reports) is a bulk total of emissions and these data do not, generally, provide any 
indication of the temporal variations in these emissions (e. g. where there may be 
concern about the short term effects of such releases) or the sources of emissions 
(e. g. through a stack or through a low level vent). Release conditions, such as 
temperature, height of release and location of release, the environmental medium to 
which substances are released, the presence or absence of receptors which are 
affected by the release and other sources of pollutants all influence the actual impacts 
of a release. 
Business as Usual 
When assessing the environmental effectiveness of a policy instrument, the key 
question is the instrument's ability to induce concrete and additional impacts beyond 
the business as usual scenario17. That is, what would have happened had the policy 
or instruments not been implemented18? Ex post evaluations of the effectiveness of a 
policy instrument must also account for changes in circumstances (e. g. economic 
conditions, changes in market sector) that may have reduced pollution below what 
would have been expected or increased pollution above what would have been 
expected from the policy. There are many practical issues involved in trying to 
distinguish the effects of one instrument from others, as policy instruments are rarely 
implemented in isolation and it is rarely possible to find a sound empirical basis that 
allows for the statistical isolation of a single policy instrument or to identify the 
factors that led to the identified changes19. For example, the analysis of a policy 
16 Hansen and Asbjornsen (1996); Sullivan et al (1998). 
'7 Krarup, S. and Ramesohl, S. (2000). Voluntary Agreements in Energy Policy - Implementation and 
E Iciency (AKF Institute of Local Government Studies, Copenhagen) at 33-36. ' Or, perhaps more harshly, `Does it make a difference if the instrument is in place or not? ' 19 Krarup and Ramesohl (2000) at 36; Hutter (ed. ) (1999) at 16-17. 
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instrument targeted at greenhouse gas emissions from transport would also need to 
consider the effects of pressures for emissions controls on motor vehicles, fuel 
pricing policy, taxes on new and existing vehicles, broader transport 'policy 
initiatives. Furthermore, policy instruments are also generally implemented against a 
background of broader social and political changes such as structural change within 
an industry sector and technology improvements. To enable the environmental 
performance of a policy instrument to be assessed requires that a suitable `business 
as usual' scenario can be defined. However, the question of what is `business as 
usual' is contentious. Possible approaches for assessing the business as usual 
scenario are considered further in the case-studies. 
2.2.3 Economic Efficiency 
The purpose of environmental regulation could be defined as promoting the 
economically efficient use of environmental goods and services within the relevant 
institutional constraints20. The evaluation of the costs and benefits of a programme 
or a specific policy instrument can be considered as either the least cost to achieve a 
defined policy outcome (i. e. the policy goal is specified) or as the least/optimal 
societal cost where all costs and benefits are considered. In the first instance, 
economic assessment seeks to assess the gross demand on economic resources for 
the implementation of the instrument and whether the chosen instrument can achieve 
the specified environmental goal for the least possible cost, within the relevant 
institutional constraints21. While such an approach provides a standard framework 
for the assessment of different policy instruments, it says nothing about the specific 
goal that is to be achieved. For example, the specified goal may not provide an 
adequate degree of protection for the environment or may not represent the societally 
(rather than the privately) optimal level22. 
20 Jubb, C. (1996), `International Competitiveness and Environmental Regulation: Distinguishing Fact 
from Fiction', in DEST (1996c), Environmental Policy and International Competitiveness (DEST, 
Canberra, Australia), pp. 14-19 at 14. 
21 Dovers (1995) at 151; Jubb (1996) at 14. 
22 It has been argued that defining environmental targets is essentially a political process rather than an 
economic issue and, therefore, the specific goals defined are of less interest than the means whereby such 
goals are to be achieved (see, for example, Baumol, W. and Oates, W. (1992), 'The Use of Standards 
and Prices for the Protection of the Environment', in Markandya, A. and Richardson, J. (eds. ) (1992), 
The Earthscan Reader in Environmental Economics (Earthscan, London, UK), pp. 229-239). 
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The second instance requires that some means of balancing the costs of 
environmental impact and the costs to those required to take action (the private costs) 
is found. There are significant uncertainties involved in characterising the costs of 
environmental impacts and finding a point of balance between private costs and 
social costs is extremely difficult (see further Section 3.1). As a consequence, the 
approach that has been adopted in the case-studies has been to look at the 
environmental targets that have been defined for the issue in question (both by 
reference to the targets set within the voluntary approach as well as external targets 
or expectations) and to then look at the efficiency of the solutions that have been 
adopted to meet these requirements. In this context, the focus of the economic 
efficiency assessments for each of the voluntary approaches has been on the direct 
and indirect economic costs of achieving the changes in behaviour that the various 
voluntary approaches seek to achieve. These costs could include the costs of 
pollution control equipment and the costs of operating more costly but less polluting 
production techniques. In principle these costs are directly measurable by the 
businesses concerned (i. e. the costs of equipment, raw materials and other input 
costs, other costs associated with production), although there - are considerable 
practical difficulties associated with definition and measurement23. - There may also 
be benefits associated with such efforts. For example, the requirement to monitor 
certain emissions or waste streams may enable organisations to identify opportunities 
for cost-savings, for example, through cleaner production and similar initiatives. It is 
these costs and benefits that are the primary focus of this research, although where 
data are available on other economic impacts (e. g. costs to government) these data 
are included in the analysis. 
Indirect economic effects are more difficult to characterise than direct economic 
effects. For example, changes in price may cause demand to move to an alternative 
product, may lead businesses to reduce costs by reducing quality or safety or through 
`creative compliance' with the letter if not the spirit of the law, or may lead to 
responses that were not predicted when the instrument was first implemented24. 
23 For example, in response to proposals for a new policy instrument, industry frequently overstates 
the costs of compliance whereas governments and environmental groups may have an interest in 
understating these costs. 
24 Ogus, A. (1998), `Regulatory Appraisal: A Neglected Opportunity of Law and Economics', 
European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 53-68 at 63. 
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Other economic effects that need to be considered include the impacts of the policy 
instrument on prices (or inflation), income distribution and economic growth25. In 
practice, governments tend to implement other policy measures such as'tax breaks 
that compensate for adverse economic impacts. These supplementary instruments 
may have implications both for the consequences of the policy instrument adopted as 
well as for the overall efficiency of the instrument (e. g. not all of the economic 
efficiencies will occur as a consequence of the costs of the other policy measures). 
Finally, the meaning of `economic efficiency' varies, depending on the perspective 
being adopted. Depending on the author, the term may refer to minimising capital costs, 
minimising capital and operating costs or optimising costs and benefits or minimising 
the total societal (i. e. economic and environmental dimensions) cost26. It is also 
pertinent to note that the scope of the term depends on the purpose to which the data are 
to be put (e. g. industry may use certain analyses to demonstrate that the costs of a 
specific policy instrument outweigh the benefits). 
2.2.4 Administration and Compliance Costs 
From the perspective of the economy as a whole, administration and compliance 
costs (or transaction costs27) absorb potentially useful resources. As a general rule, if 
all other things are- equal, policy measures with lower administration and compliance 
costs are to be preferred. When evaluating policy instruments, administration costs 
encompass all of the costs associated with the policy instrument (including 
measurement, monitoring, information, enforcement, etc) while compliance costs are 
those costs borne by the regulated entities and other parties to comply with the policy 
instruments28. 
u OECD (1997a) at 93; Dovers (1995) at 151. 
26 These differences are of particular importance at the organisational level when considering the 
manner in which decisions are made. For example, project costing processes frequently focus on 
capital costs with limited consideration of ongoing operating costs (see, for example, the discussion in 
Sullivan, R., Sullivan, J., Kolominskas, C., Sullivan, J. and Ormerod, R. (2000), `Where are the 
Engineers? ', The Environmental Engineer, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 23-24). See, also, Note (b) on Table 3.2 
above. 
27 See further the discussion in Section 3.1. 
28 OECD (1997a) at 91-92. 
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In some cases, part of the administrative burden may be borne by the regulated 
subjects rather than by the government (e. g. where self-reporting of emissions is 
required). The question is then whether firms can carry out these tasks more 
efficiently than regulatory bodies. From a distributional perspective, the polluter 
pays principle implies that companies should internalise the costs associated with 
pollution control. The transfer of costs (including administrative costs) from the 
public sector to the polluting companies is consistent with this principle. 
An important issue is the extent to which various administrative requirements can be 
combined. For example, it may be possible to combine economic instruments with 
existing taxation systems (where administration costs associated with payments can 
be reduced by simply having a single payment) or by combining monitoring and 
reporting requirements with pre-existing monitoring and reporting requirements 29. 
The question then becomes how are these costs to be allocated between existing and 
new policy instruments? There is no clear answer to this question and the allocation 
of such costs in policy evaluation is problematic. 
Administrative and compliance costs are, frequently, difficult to assess30. The 
common issues are accounting for the time of relevant parties, the manner in which 
this time is calculated in financial terms (i. e. what rates are to be used - salaries or 
consultancy rates? ) and cost allocation (e. g. reporting tasks are frequently combined, 
monitoring may meet a number of different objectives). One of the approaches used 
in this dissertation has been to look at how the requirements of the different 
voluntary approaches compare to the requirements that would be imposed if it were a 
government programme. That is, while it may not be possible to assess the relative 
efficiency of the public versus the private sector, it is possible to make some general 
comments about the scope of the programmes under consideration and to assess 
whether tasks such as data acquisition, reporting and performance assessment are 
comparable to those that would be imposed in a mandatory programme. 
Finally, there are costs associated with the development of policy instruments. 
Negotiation and bargaining processes can be extremely resource intensive but such 
29 OECD (1997a) at 92. 
30 Environment Australia (1997b) at 4,11. 
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costs are difficult to characterise and it is not generally possible to assess their 
importance relative to the overall administrative and compliance costs 31 
2.2.5 Competitiveness 
Competitiveness has been defined as relating to the ability of a country to produce 
goods and services that meet the test of international markets while its citizens earn a 
standard of living that is both rising and sustainable over the long run32. 
At the domestic level, the issues that need to be considered are whether policy 
instruments have adverse effects on competitiveness through, for example, providing 
firms with the opportunity to collude and develop anti-competitive behaviour (e. g. 
price fixing, creating barriers to entry to markets). The issue of domestic 
competitiveness is also related to the issue of equity as certain firms may bear undue 
compliance costs or meeting certain performance requirements may become a 
precondition for accessing certain markets. 
International competitiveness concerns are frequently highlighted by firms as an 
argument against new legislation. At the macro level, there appears to be no 
systematic link between environmental policy and competitiveness nor do low 
environmental standards appear to have led to significant industrial migration33. The 
reason appears to be that environmental costs are a relatively low component of total 
31 There has been limited systematic evaluation of the costs associated with the negotiation and 
bargaining processes for the development of policy instruments. One of the few examples available 
for Australia is the assessment of the costs associated with the development of a guidance manual to 
assist the mining industry meet its reporting requirements under the National Pollutant Inventory. 
While some of the costs could be measured directly (e. g. consultant fees, direct travel costs), many of 
the costs were not recorded (e. g. hours for government and industry representatives to review 
documents, attend meetings) and standard 'hourly rates' or other measures of opportunity cost could 
only be crudely measured (Collins, D., Sullivan, R., Beudeker, B. and Glazebrook, P. (1998), 
`Developing Industry Handbooks for the National Pollutant Inventory: A New Model for Government 
/Industry Consultation'. In Proceedings of the 23`d Annual Environmental Workshop, Melbourne, 
Australia, 25-30 October 1998 (MCA, Canberra, Australia), pp. 429-442). 
32 OECD (1993), Summary Report of the Workshop on Environmental Policies and Industrial 
Competitiveness. OCDE/GD(93)83 (OECD, Paris, France) at 3. This definition of competitiveness 
may conflict with those definitions of sustainability that see sustainability as including some 
commitment to constraining or reducing growth. 
33 It has been noted that '... study after study has concluded that differences in environmental 
compliance costs are rarely a serious competitiveness factor' (Esty, D. (1994), Greening the GATT: 
Trade, Environment and the Future (Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, USA), at 
159). 
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costs and so are unlikely to affect competitive advantage34. However, there may be 
negative impacts in specific industry sectors, in particular sectors that compete 
primarily on the basis of relative price, such as agriculture and resources35. Both of 
these sectors are major components of the Australian economy and, as discussed in 
the case-studies, the debate around international competitiveness is an important 
influence on the Australian environmental policy debate. 
2.2.6 Soft Effects 
Soft effects refer to the behavioural, attitudinal and awareness changes that result 
from the implementation of policy instruments. Soft effects are difficult to quantify 
and evaluate, as they tend to be non-specific, long-term rather than short-term and 
are, frequently, quite diffuse. The soft effects that may be associated with the 
development or implementation of policy instruments include the integration and 
internalisation of environment into policies and operations36, the stimulation of self- 
organisation and self-regulation of firms37, the development of capacity and expertise 
within organisations and within government on environmental management, and the 
facilitation of industry and government collaboration (e. g. in the design and 
implementation of the policy instrument). 
2.2.7 Innovation 
Innovation can be defined as a process involving the search for and the discovery, 
development and adoption of new products, processes or organisational structures, 
34 It has been suggested that Australia firms spend, on average, between one and two per cent of their 
revenues on environmental issues (AHearn, T. (1996), `Environmental Management and Industry 
Competitiveness', in DEST (1996c), pp. 38-43 at 41). Similar data have been reported for other 
developed countries (Bhat, V. (1998), `Does Environmental Compliance Pay? ', Ecotoxicology, Vol. 7, pp. 
221-225 at 221; Rugman, A. and Verbeke, A. (1998), `Corporate Strategies and Environmental 
Regulations: An Organizing Framework', Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, pp. 363-375 at 
363). It has been suggested that environmental policy tends to have minor impacts on competitiveness 
as (a) policies tend to be designed to minimise negative impacts (through rebates, subsidies, time 
deferrals), (b) environmental costs are economically insignificant, (c) benefits are frequently not 
accounted for and, (d) the offsetting of positive and negative effects at the macro level (e. g. improved 
efficiency, reduced clean up, increased production efficiency, production of environmental goods) 
may counter balance the environmental and compliance costs for industry (OECD (1993) at 4). 
35 Jubb (1996) at 17. 
36 Barber (1998) at 21. 
37 Gunningham, N. (1999), `Integrating Management Systems and Occupational Health and Safety 
Regulation', Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 192-214 at 213. 
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and may refer to either radical changes or incremental change through continuous 
improvement to existing technologies and techniques38. In the context of 
environmental policy, innovation refers to a move away from traditional end of pipe 
controls to more innovative approaches to pollution control, encompassing the 
adoption of cleaner technologies, the integration of environmental concerns into 
existing management systems and processes or the integration of environmental 
issues into strategic decision-making processes39. Environmental policy instruments 
may encourage or stimulate innovation through providing incentives for improved 
efficiency and environmental performance, such as encouraging information and 
experience sharing between firms (thereby helping promote the diffusion of 
innovation) or enabling organisations to overcome the barriers that prevent them 
from exploiting economically attractive opportunities for environmental 
improvementao. 
Measuring innovation is difficult for a number of reasons. First of all, the relevant 
time horizon is likely to be long and, as with long-term macro economic effects, 
there are practical difficulties in assessing issues over long time periods41. Secondly, 
the pace of innovation in pollution control technologies is unlikely to be driven by 
the pollution control policies in any one country42. Thirdly, the influences on 
technical change are many and complex and environmental policy is only one of 
these influences. That is not to suggest that policy instruments cannot stimulate 
innovation or that some policy instruments are likely to be more effective than others 
at stimulating innovation. Rather, the issue is that detecting or assessing innovation 
in the economy and attributing this innovation to a specific policy measure or 
instrument is extremely difficult. 
38 Gouldston, A. and Murphy, J. (1998), Regulatory Realities (Earthscan, London, UK) at 25-29; 
Wakelin, K. (1997), Trade and Innovation (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK) at 4-5; Wallace, D. 
(1995), Environmental Policy and Industrial Innovation: Strategies in Europe, the US and Japan 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, UK) at 11; Porter, M. and van der Linde, C. (1995), 
`Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship' in Hutter (ed. ) (1999), pp. 
365-391 at 368-369. 
39 Christie, I. and Rolfe, H. (1995), Cleaner Production in Industry (PSI Publishing, London, UK) at 
70-71. 
40 Stanford (1997) at 65; James (1997) at 107-108; Byron (2000) at 61; Jacobs (1991) at 152; Krarup 
and Ramesohl (2000) at 41-42. For example, it has been argued that firms are more comfortable with 
innovation when risks are reduced and risks are reduced when environmental policy is stable and 
credible over the long term (Wallace (1995) at x, 221). 
41 OECD (1994), Supply Side Policies to Augment Government Support for Promoting Cleaner 
Technologies. OCDFGD(94)31 (OECD, Paris, France) at 7. 
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2.2.8 Viability and Feasibility 
Viability refers to the social and political acceptance of the policy instrument43. That 
is, certain policy approaches may be more or less acceptable to certain parties to the 
environmental policy process. Apart from the direct impacts of a policy instrument 
(e. g. environmental, economic), the viability of a specific policy instrument is likely 
to be affected by its impacts on the democratic process (e. g. adequacy of public 
participation processes, information asymmetries) and the manner in which input to 
the decision-making process is structured. Feasibility refers to the various 
institutional obstacles that may impede or affect the implementation of the policy 
instrument". Feasibility is partly a function of the likelihood of effectiveness of the 
proposed measures. However, feasibility also depends on the impacts of proposals 
on the interests of those who may have influence over the policy process45. That is, 
viability and feasibility are related concepts and it is frequently difficult to 
distinguish the two. 
2.2.9 Law and Public Policy Issues 
This category is intended to capture issues around the design of specific voluntary 
approaches (e. g. information availability, flexibility), the interaction between voluntary 
approaches and other policy instruments, and the broader influence of voluntary 
approaches on public policy. For example, in the evaluation of the Greenhouse 
Challenge, the specific issues addressed in this category are: (a) what information is 
used by government and industry to assess the economic impacts of climate change 
policy on Australian business, (b) the nexus between voluntary industry initiatives to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and broader energy policy and energy security 
debates, (c) the implications of economic growth on greenhouse gas emissions. 
42 See, further, the discussion of energy-intensive industries in Section 7.5.8. 
43 James (1997) at 107-108; Environment Australia (1997b) at 105. 
44 OECD (1999a) at 102. 
45 Dovers (1995) at 151. 
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3. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
This chapter is divided into three sections, namely a discussion of the concept of 
sustainable development, which is generally agreed as providing the overarching 
framework for environmental policy, a discussion of Australian approaches to 
sustainable development and an assessment of the barriers to the integration of the 
concept of sustainable development into public policy. 
3.1 DEFINTIONS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
International bodies such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank and the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) have agreed that current global patterns of human 
activity, consumption, population growth and inappropriate use of technology are 
unsustainable and are likely to have profound adverse consequences for human 
health and the environment'. It is widely agreed that the planet's capacity to absorb 
pollution and waste is limited, there are growing signs of ecosystem degradation and 
collapse and the world's renewable resources such as water, soil, forests, fish and 
biodiversity are under increasing pressure2. 
These pressures on the environment led to the development of the concept of 
`sustainable development', which is now widely accepted as providing the overarching 
framework for environmental policy formulation3. In 1987, the World Commission 
on Environment and Development (WCED), an independent body established by the 
Solskone, C. and Bertollini, R. (1998), Global Ecological Integrity and 'Sustainable Development': 
Cornerstones of Public Health (WHO European Centre for Environment and Health, Rome, Italy); 
UNDP (1998), Human Development Report 1998 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK); Topfer, Y- 
(2000), 'An Environmental Agenda for the 21' Century' in World Bank (2000) Environment Matters at 
the World Bank: Annual Review (World Bank, Washington DC, USA), pp. 4-5. 
2 Solskone and Bertollini (1998) at 7-9,21; Meadowcroft, J. (2000), 'Sustainable Development: A 
New(ish) Idea for a New Century', Political Studies, Vol. 48, pp. 370-387; UNDP (1998) at 4,46-65. 
3 The UN Conference on the Human Environment (frequently referred to as the Stockholm 
Conference), held in 1972, marked the beginning of serious international cooperation on the 
environment and the Stockholm Declaration (the formal outcome of the conference), including the 
first official recognition of the concept of sustainable development (UN (1972), Declaration of the UN 
Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972, reprinted in Birnie, P. and Boyle, A. 
(1995), Basic Documents in International Law and the Environment (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, UK), pp. 1-8)). The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (hereafter the Rio 
Declaration) produced at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1992 was based on the concept of sustainable development (UN (1992), Declaration of the 
UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, reprinted in 
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UN to address global environmental issues, defined sustainable development as 
`... development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs i4. WCED emphasised that sustainable 
development required that the essential needs of the world's poor must be met, and that 
there are limitations imposed by the state of technology and societal organisation on the 
environment's ability to meet present and future needs5. While the definition proposed 
for sustainable development recognised the need to integrate environmental issues and 
development needs, the exact point of balance was not defined, and subsequent policy 
discussions have been characterised by disagreement regarding the exact definition of 
sustainable development6. The reasons for these disagreements are that science 
cannot tell us definitively what levels and types of economic activity are sustainable 
and there is no consensus about whether economic growth is consistent with 
environmental protection and, if so, under what conditions. The issue of 
sustainability presents particularly difficult research and public policy problems for a 
number of reasons: (a) the spatial scale of interest can range from local to global, (b) 
the temporal scale (e. g. the health consequences of certain pollutants) can be 
hundreds or thousands of years), (c) there is pervasive uncertainty (e. g. the science is 
far from settled, global problems and their consequences are poorly understood, we 
do not know with much precision what levels and types of economic activity are 
sustainable), (d) there may be ecological limits and thresholds that have not yet been 
identified (in particular, how much longer the environment can withstand present 
trends, which particular change is the greatest threat, irreversible ecological effects 
may be involved), (e) there are poorly defined policy and property rights and 
responsibilities, and (f) there are increased demands for public participation in 
environmental-decision making7. 
Birnie and Boyle (1995), pp. 9-14). 4 WCED (1987), Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK) at 43. 
s WCED (1987) at 43. 
6 Boer, B. (1995), 'Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development: The Roles of National, 
State and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategies into Action', Williamette Law Review, 
Vol. 31, pp. 307-358 at 317-318; Dovers, S. (1999), 'Adaptive Policy, Institutions and Management: 
Challenges for Lawyers and Others', Griffith Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 374-393 at 375. 7 Helm, D. (1998), 'The Assessment: Environmental Policy - Objectives, Instruments, and 
Institutions', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 1-19 at 3-5; Brunton, N. (2000), 
'Environmental Regulation: The Challenge Ahead', Alternative Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 137- 
143,149 at 137; Stewart, A. (1999), 'Scientific Uncertainty, Ecologically Sustainable Development and 
the Precautionary Principle', Griffith Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 350-373 at 362-364. 
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The following sections consider the different approaches (definitional, economic and 
target-based) that have been proposed for defining sustainable development. This 
analysis also provides a useful insight into some of the sources of tension between the 
different parties involved in environmental policy debates. 
Sustainability: Definitional Versions 
Sustainable development is generally taken as encompassing the principles of 
precaution, polluter pays, intergenerational and intragenerational equity, and the 
conservation of biological diversity. The principles are interconnected and rely on the 
other principles also being achieved. 
The precautionary principle recognises that, while it may not be possible to accurately 
predict the full environmental consequences of a proposed activity or programme, this 
lack of certainty should not be used as a reason for `postponing cost-effective measures 
to prevent environmental degradation'8. The principle has developed in response to the 
fact that all scientific. assessments include uncertainties as well as subjective 
assessments (such as what constitutes damage and whether this damage is acceptable or 
unacceptable?. The precautionary principle has been interpreted as reversing the 
traditional burden of proof from `assumed not harmful until proven otherwise' to 
`assumed harmful unless proven otherwise"°. However, it does not require that no 
actions ever be taken, as some impact (whether positive or negative) is an inevitable 
part of any action or any decision not to take action. That is, the principle is intended 
to provide a guide to action, but not to imply that specific outcomes are to be 
achieved or that there will be no harm to the environment". In this context, the 
greater the emphasis placed on the environment and the less on qualifying economic 
means, the more precautionary the regulatory regime. There are other ambiguities in 
the precautionary principle that make its application, in practice, problematic. For 
example, the principle raises questions such as what is a non-negligible risk, what 
8 Rio Declaration, Principle 15. 
9 Dovers, S. (1995), 'Information, Sustainability and Policy', Australian Journal of Environmental 
Management, Vol. 2, pp. 142-156 at 143; Gullett, W. (1998), 'Environmental Impact Assessment and 
the Precautionary Principle: Legislating Caution in Environmental Protection', Australian Journal of 
Environmental Management, Vol. 5, pp. 146-158 at 146-147. 
to Stewart (1999) at 369. 
11 Stein, P. (2000), `Are Decision-Makers too Cautious with the Precautionary Principle? ', Environmental 
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regulatory action is required or justified, how long should one wait for uncertainty to 
be resolved and how the answers to these questions should be determined'2 . 
Ultimately, the precautionary principle provides a step forward in the development of 
a framework within which scientific data can be integrated with the political 
economic and social processes and considerations on which policy ultimately rest. It 
can also, at least to some extent, be seen as changing the underlying presumption 'of 
decisions from one of freedom of exploitation to one of conservation. 
The polluter pays principle implies that those who generate pollution and waste or those 
who purchase goods and services that cause pollution and waste should bear the cost of 
containment, avoidance or abatement as well as the costs of any environmental impacts 
associated with the residual pollution effects 13. The principle requires that `unvalued' 
or `free' resources (such as clean air) be given appropriate economic values, thereby 
permitting these issues to be incorporated into business and policy decision-making 
process in a similar manner to other economic costs14. While the statement of the 
polluter pays principle appears straightforward, there are many difficulties associated 
with its application in practice (discussed further below). 
Intergenerational equity requires that the health, diversity and productivity of the 
environment is maintained or enhanced for future generations". In this context, the 
`environment' encompasses natural capital (renewable and nonrenewable resources), 
human capital (including cultural, social and educational aspects) and human made 
capital (such as buildings and infrastructure). Implementing the concept of 
intergenerational equity is made more difficult with the recognition that it cannot be 
assumed that advances in technology and knowledge will enable all environmental 
problems to be solved. Therefore, intergenerational equity is frequently interpreted to 
and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 3-23 at 6-7,2 1. 
12 Cameron, J. (1999), `The Precautionary Principle', in Sampson, G. and Chambers, B. (eds. ) (1999), 
Trade, Environment and the Millennium (United Nations University Press, Tokyo, Japan), pp. 239-269 at 
242. 
13 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] (1992), The Polluter Pays 
Principle (OECD, Paris, France) at 5,14. 
14 Boer (1995) at 323. 
15 Harding, R. (1994), Sustainability: Principles to Practice. Outcomes of the Fenner Conference on 
the Environment, Canberra, 13-16 November 1994 (Department of the Environment, Sport and 
Territories [DEST], Canberra, Australia) at 13; Brown Weiss, E. (1992), Environmental Change and 
International Law: New Challenges and Dimensions (United Nations University Press, London, UK), pp. 
385-412. 
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require that we should not pass onto future generations the externalities of development 
by this or past generations 16. A specific issue is that we cannot pass onto future 
generation the same stock of non-renewable resources and this has led to much debate 
about the exact nature of our obligations to future generations and the extent to which 
built capital can be regarded as an appropriate substitute for natural capital (these issues 
are discussed further below). Intragenerational equity requires that the inequalities 
faced by the current generation be addressed and that the economic, social and 
environmental costs and benefits of development are shared equitably within the 
community (at local, national and international levels)17. Equity is related to 
environmental issues as the burdens of environmental problems are generally borne 
disproportionately by the poor, poverty may lead to environmental degradation, 
measures to protect the environment may have disproportionate impacts on particular 
sectors of society and unsustainable practices by specific groups may degrade national 
or public resources18. On a global level, there are environmental issues (such as climate 
change, ozone depletion, and biodiversity loss) that cannot be addressed or solved by 
countries acting alone and, therefore, the principle of intragenerational equity requires 
that countries cooperate to address these global issues. 
The protection of biodiversity and the maintenance of ecological processes are central 
goals of sustainable development as the loss of biodiversity is, in the vast majority of 
cases, irreversible and non-substitutable'9. Biodiversity can be defined as the variety of 
the life forms, the genes they contain and the ecosystems they form20. The maintenance 
of biodiversity is important for both anthropocentric reasons (i. e. for the maintenance of 
vital life support functions as well as for other uses such as medicinal purposes21) and 
ecocentric reasons (i. e. the rights of nonhuman species to exist)sz. 
Sustainability: The Perspective from Economics 
16 Brown Weiss (1992) at 395-396. 
17 Boer (1995) at 320; Harding (1994) at 14. 18 Renner, M. (1997), Fighting for Survival (Earthscan, London, UK) at 52-75. 
19 Wilson, E. (1993), The Diversity of Life (Penguin Books, London, UK) at 203-230. 20 Harding (1994) at 16. 21 Wilson (1993) at 269-296. 
22 Singer, P. (1990), Animal Liberation (Random House, New York, USA). 
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To date, voluntary approaches have been given limited treatment in the law and 
economics literature. As a consequence, there is no generally agreed economic model 
of how voluntary approaches work. However, the law and economics literature 
provides important insights into issues such as the goals for environmental policy 
(discussed further below), the manner in which firms respond to pressures such as 
regulation (see further Section 4) and the manner in which voluntary approaches 
operate in practice (see further Section 5). Before discussing economic approaches to 
sustainability, a brief overview of two of the key concepts from the law and economics 
literature is provided, namely market failures and transaction costs. 
The traditional economic approach to environmental policy was to maximise social 
welfare by correcting for the market failures which environmental problems 
present23. Welfare economics emphasises externalities and market failures in relation 
to public goods, while the theory of imperfect competition focuses on the inefficiency 
of monopoly power and imperfect information24. Externalities are where the benefits or 
costs of an exchange spill over onto other parties25. Negative externalities occur when 
the actions of one party impose costs (as opposed to benefits for positive externalities) 
on another party. An example of a negative externality is environmental pollution. The 
presence of externalities may result in market failure, as the price of a good may not 
reflect its social value. Firms set their production levels based, in part, on the costs of 
production. If the cost to society of pollution is not included in that costing, the firm 
will produce more than it should of the good which causes the pollution. In this 
context, there is a difference between the private marginal cost and the social marginal 
cost. The private marginal cost is the marginal cost of production for the facility, 
whereas the social marginal cost is the sum of the private marginal cost and the 
additional marginal costs involuntarily imposed on third parties by each unit of 
production26. From a public policy perspective, the aim is to restrict the output to the 
23 Helm (1998) at 8. 
24 Rose-Ackerman, S. (1988), 'Progressive Law and Economics - And the New Administrative Law', 
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 98, pp. 341-368 at 343-345; Cooter, R. and Ulen, T. (2000), Law and 
Economics (Addison-Wesley, New York, USA) at 40-43; Black, J. (1996b), 'An Economic Analysis of 
Regulation: One View of the Cathedral', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 699-711 at 
700. 
u Expressed another way, external costs arise because polluting sources bear no pecuniary responsibility 
for the costs or damages resulting from their emissions (Oates, W. (2000), 'From Research to Policy: 
The Case of Environmental Economics', University of Illinois Law Review, (2000), No. 1, pp. 135-153 
at 137). 
26 Cooter and Ulen (2000) at 41. 
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socially optimal, not privately optimal, leve127. Much of the thinking on externalities 
(and the public policy solutions that may be adopted to address externalities) is based 
on Pigou's The Economics of Welfare (first published in 1920). According to Pigou, 
in the presence of such externalities, the market cannot provide the right price signals 
to economic agents and, as a consequence, the market fails to maximise social 
welfare. The policy solutions to externalities (i. e. to force firms to internalise the 
costs of the externality into their production decision-making) include imposing 
emission standards, emission fees or tradable emission permits. 
The other dimension of welfare economics is market failure in relation to public goods. 
In environmental policy, the key issue is the depletion of open access (or common 
property) resources by overuse28. This occurs because no one party has the incentive 
to concern themselves with (i. e. pay for) the effect of their activities on others. Public 
goods have two closely related characteristics, namely non-rivalrous consumption 
(where consumption of a public good by one person does not leave less for any other 
person/consumer) and nonexcludability (i. e. where the costs of excluding non paying 
beneficiaries are so high that no private profit maximising firm is willing to supply the 
good29. The consequence is that it is difficult for markets to provide public goods in a 
way that does not benefit everybody and, therefore, people have no incentive to pay 
what the goods are really worth to them. A possible policy solution could be to allow a 
single owner to manage the resource and set a fee for use which takes account of the 
costs of depleting the resource. However, common property resources are frequently 
too large for single ownership and, therefore, government ownership or direct 
regulation (i. e. licensing) may be required. 
As noted above, the theory of imperfect competition focuses on market failures as a 
consequence of the inefficiency of monopoly power and imperfect information. From 
an economic perspective, monopolies tend to lead to prices being too high and/or the 
quantity of goods produced being too low. The general public policy solutions are to 
either replace monopoly with competition or to regulate the prices charged by 
monopolies. Severe informational asymmetries can disrupt markets so much that a 
27 Cooter and Ulen (2000) at 42-43. 
28 Often referred to as the `tragedy of the commons' after Hardin's famous article (Hardin, G. (1968), 
'The Tragedy of the Commons', Science, Vol. 162). 
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socially optimal solution cannot be achieved by voluntary exchange and it may be 
necessary to implement policy measures to overcome this issue (e. g. through making 
certain types of disclosure mandatory). 
An important feature of voluntary approaches is that they are frequently private 
solutions (i. e. undertaken without the state's intervention). The welfare economics 
tradition emphasises the importance of government intervention to remedy externalities. 
However, this view has been challenged by some economists who have argued that 
there may be private alternatives to public intervention, in particular when bargaining in 
relation to property rights30. Bargaining occurs through communication between 
different parties, and these communications have associated costs. Coase used the term 
`transaction costs' to refer to all of the impediments to bargaining and argued that, when 
transaction costs are zero, an efficient use of resources results from bargaining, 
regardless of the legal assignment of property rights. A corollary to this is that if 
transaction costs are high enough to prevent bargaining, the efficient use of resources 
will depend on how property rights are assigned31. While the original Coase theorem 
led to a large literature regarding whether there was any need for government 
intervention at all, it has been recognised that the market bargaining argument cannot be 
relied on for reasons ranging from difficulties in identifying affected parties through to 
potentially prohibitive transaction costs32. Transaction costs can be divided into three 
broad elements, namely (a) search costs (in the context of voluntary approaches, this 
could include finding suitable parties to negotiate with), (b) bargaining costs 
(addressing private information, the costs in communicating with multiple parties, and 
unreasonable behaviour) and enforcement costs (such as information gathering, 
monitoring and sanctioning)33. In the specific context of voluntary approaches, 
transaction costs may be of greater or lesser importance depending on the specific aims 
and purpose of the voluntary approach. For example, if the voluntary approach results 
in the participating parties incurring significant capital or operating costs (e. g. the 
purchase and installation of new equipment), transaction costs may be relatively minor. 
Transaction costs may act as an obstacle to efficiency (in the particular context of 
29 Cooter and Ulen (2000) at 43. 
30 Coase, R. (1960), `The Problem of Social Cost', Journal of Law and Social Cost, Vol. 3, pp. 1-44. 
31 Cooter and Ulen (2000) at 85. 
32 Markandya and Richardson (eds. ) (1992) at 13. 
33 Cooter and Ulen (2000) at 87-88. 
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voluntary approaches, this refers to socially efficient outcomes rather than privately 
efficient outcomes) as they may obstruct bargaining by preventing affected parties from 
participating in negotiations or where affected parties adopt an approach of rational 
ignorance in situations where the costs of obtaining information exceeds the expected 
34 benefit from being informed. 
In contrast to the welfare economics approach to public policy analysis (where the 
concept of market failure is central), the neoliberal economic view is that sustainability 
will happen `naturally' and, as the prices of non-renewable resources rise, the 
development of substitutes will be encouraged. The argument is premised on the 
assumption that technological change can overcome any constraints imposed by nature 
and that the market can resolve all problems through pricing mechanisms35. This 
approach suggests that there can be unlimited economic growth, unrestricted by the 
scale of human activities or the implications of these activities for the health and 
integrity of ecosystems, and is frequently used to argue that more growth or 
development is required to address the issue of intragenerational equity36. However, 
these arguments suffer from a number of important limitations. The first is that the 
arguments presuppose an infinite (or effectively unlimited) source of resources whose 
exploitation is only limited by technology or cost-benefit boundaries37. The second is 
that the resources that are presently most threatened are those without markets, such as 
the oceans, the atmosphere and the stratosphere (the public goods discussed above)38. 
It is relevant to note that even though these resources may not have markets per se, 
there may be markets for the products (e. g. birds, fish) produced from these resources. 
That is, certain of these resources may have an instrumental value that may mean they 
are not perfect public goods. The third is that the price of many commodities (e. g. coal, 
oil) does not actually reflect the scarcity or remaining reserves of the commodities but is 
much more closely correlated with production rates39. The fourth is that financial 
34 Cooter and Ulen (2000) at 207-212. 
35 Brunton (2000) at 139. This assumption underpins business' lobbying positions for the increased 
use of economic instruments in environmental policy (see further Chapter 5). 
36 Hamilton, C. (1996), `Thinking About the Future: Equity and Sustainability', in DEST (1996a), 
Equity and the Environment (DEST, Canberra, Australia), pp. 16-21. 
37 Daly, H. and Cobb, J. (1994), For the Common Good (Beacon Press, Boston, USA, 2od ed. ). 38 Pearce, D. (1993), Blueprint 3: Measuring Sustainable Development (Earthscan, London, UK) at 5. 
These are the global public goods referred to above (see Note 28). 
39 Pearce (1993) at 5-6. 
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values may not cover all relevant values and it may not be possible to reduce some 
values to simple economic terms40. 
The weaknesses of the neoliberal approach led to interest in accounting for 
intergenerational issues in economic modelling. Earlier approaches relied on the 
adjustment of the discount rate (that is, the relative value of a dollar (or other 
resource) received today compared to the value of a dollar received at some time in 
the future) used in economic modelling to account for intergenerational equity 
issues41. However, positive discount rates lead to the preferences of future 
generations being discounted and, the higher the interest rate, the more the 
preferences of future generations are discounted42. Modem approaches have tried to 
define sustainable development in a way that overcomes the moral objections to 
discounting the preferences of future generations. One approach is to require that 
consumption in the future is at least as great as at present43. This approach ignores 
the role of natural capital (i. e. maintaining consumption rates could be at the long- 
term expense of the resource base) and could be interpreted as presupposing that 
present patterns of consumption are, or are close to, being sustainable (whereas there 
is increasing evidence that it is the sheer amount of consumption that is 
unsustainable). Another approach is to require that the next generation is left with a 
stock of capital no less than this generation has now, where capital encompasses man- 
made capital (houses, roads, equipment, infrastructure), the stock of knowledge and 
skills (i. e. human capital) and the stock of natural capital such as natural resources, 
40 Rogers, M., Sinden, J. and De Lacy, T. (1997), 'The Precautionary Principle for Environmental 
Management: A Defensive-Expenditure Application', Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 
51, pp. 343-360 at 347. See further the discussion of cost-benefit assessment below. 
41 Helm (1998) at 5; Jacobs, M. (1991), The Green Economy (Pluto Press, London, UK) at 80-82; 
Hamilton (1996) at 18. 
42 In the economics literature, it is generally suggested the discount rate should be between two and 
four per cent for developed countries, higher for fast growth developing countries and lower for 
countries experiencing declining per capita consumption growth (Kunte, A., Hamilton, K., Dixon, J. 
and Clemens, M. (1998), Estimating National Wealth: Methodology and Results. Environment 
Department Paper No. 57 (World Bank, Washington DC, USA) at 5). Assuming a discount rate of four 
per cent and that each generation is twenty years, the preferences of the next generation account for 
just 45 per cent of the present generation, the second generation (i. e. grandchildren) 20 per cent and 
the generation that is born 100 years from now just two per cent. If a higher interest rate is used (e. g. 
eight per cent for developing countries), the preferences of the next generation account for just 21 per 
cent of the present generation and the generation that is born 100 years from now 0.04 per cent. Using 
a lower interest rate of one per cent, the preferences of the next generation account for 82 per cent of 
the present generation and the generation that is born 100 years from now 37 per cent. 
43 Helm (1998) at 5. 
44 See, for example, the references cited in Note 1 above. 
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biological diversity, habitat, clean air and water etc45. A weak form of this requirement 
is where the aim is to pass on an aggregate capital stock no less than the one that exists 
now but where we are indifferent to the form in which the capital is passed on. This 
assumes that the forms of capital are, completely substitutable for one another where 
there is no `special' place for the environment. The assumptions around 
substitutability are not widely supported". Stronger approaches regard sustainability 
as adding something more to the optimisation framework, by making other 
interventions subsidiary to environmental concerns47. One such approach is to define 
as `critical natural capital' those aspects of the environment (such as the carbon cycle, 
biodiversity, the ozone layer) that are critical to either well-being or survival and to 
require that the weak sustainability rules described above be strengthened to require 
that, at the least, this critical capital stock is preserved48. The strongest conception of 
sustainability argues that while markets can determine an optimal allocation of 
resources, they cannot of themselves determine the optimal scale. This position argues 
that the economy/environment equation needs to be completely reconceived and that 
economic and population growth ought to be close to zero. While this paradigm seeks 
to limit the scale of human activities, it still allows for development through social 
preferences, community values and generalised obligations to future generations49. 
There are two major problems with the stronger conceptions of sustainability. The 
first is that there are fundamental differences between the supporters of the neoliberal 
economic view and those who argue in favour of stronger conceptions of 
sustainability as the necessary frame of reference for public policy50. The second is 
that, even where the need to value the environment is accepted, the environmental 
literature gives little guidance on how the environment should be valued or on how 
the trade offs between produced and natural (non renewable) capital are addressed or 
whether such trade offs should be permitted. Cost-benefit assessment is widely 51 
45 Pearce (1993) at 15. 
46 Hamilton (1996) at 18; Helm (1998) at 5. 47 Helm (1998) at 6. 
48 Pearce (1993) at 16-17; Brown Weiss (1992) at 408. 
49 Brunton (2000) at 140. 
50 Helm (1998) at 6; Foran, B. (1996), `Ecological Footprints and Challenging the Assumption of 
Growth Forever', in DEST (1996b), Consumption and the Environment (DEST, Canberra, Australia), 
pp.. 19-26 at 19. 
Helm (1998) at 6; Hodge, I. (1995), Environmental Economics (Macmillan Press, London, UK) at 58- 
82. 
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used to characterising the economic costs and benefits of specific courses of action 
and to provide a structured framework for trading off risks and benefits52. Optimal 
pollution is then characterised by the application of cost-benefit assessment which 
essentially has two elements, namely the monetisation of costs and benefits and 
reliance on consumer demand to establish valuations53. However, these two 
elements have not been widely accepted, with many non-economists of the view that 
environmental assets cannot (or should not) be monetised54. In addition, there are 
technical limitations in cost-benefit assessment, which mean that the results from 
cost-benefit assessments tend to be very uncertain answers S5. These uncertainties 
include questions around how non-market goods are valued, how distorted prices are 
to be corrected, what are the correct discount rates to be used and how distributional 
effects are characterised 56. These criticisms are not intended to argue that cost- 
52 Cost-benefit assessment builds on the work of Pigou, where the optimal level of pollution consistent 
with maximising social welfare is the level where the marginal costs of abatement equal the marginal 
benefits. In this view, environmental policy is about the pragmatic business of measuring marginal 
costs and benefits and then using appropriate instruments to internalise the externalities. The general 
assumption underpinning this approach is that the free market will enhance the general welfare if all 
customers have perfect information about goods and services and all producers have perfect 
information about the costs of production. However, free markets tend to fail to produce the 
environmental quality that people want because market prices communicate little or no information 
about the environmental effects of producing or using a product, as these costs are external to the 
market. As a consequence, neoclassical economists support systems that will put a price on 
environmental externalities and this then allows market mechanisms to maximise general welfare 
(including environmental quality) and not just the production and consumption of goods and resources 
(see, generally, Baumol W. and Oates, W. (1988), The Theory of Environmental Policy (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2d ed. ); Driesen, D. (1997), 'The Societal Cost of Environmental 
Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis'. Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol. 24, pp. 545- 
617). 
53 Helm (1998) at 8. The general approaches to the economic measurement of environmental benefits 
can be broadly classed as those based on direct and indirect market valuation (property values, wage 
rates, expenditures on related goods), those based on stated preferences in the absence of markets (e. g. 
through questionnaires or contributions to charities), and those based on dose-response functions 
linking environmental changes to pollutants. For an overview of the techniques and an assessment of 
the strengths of each, see Markandya, A. (1992), 'The Value of the Environment: A State of the Art 
Survey', in Markandya and Richardson (eds. ) (1992), pp. 142-166; DEST (1995), Techniques to Value 
Environmental Resources: An Introductory Handbook (Australian Government Publishing Services, 
Canberra, Australia). 
54 Froud, J. and Ogus, A. (1996), "Rational" Social Regulation and Compliance Cost Assessment', 
Public Administration, Vol. 74, pp. 221-237 at 222; Jacobs (1991) at 195-211; Oates (2000) at 147-151; 
Sen, A. (2000), 'The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis', Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, pp. 931- 
952; Driesen (1997) at 558-563. 
55 Helm (1998) at 9. 
56 Ogus, A. (1998), `Regulatory Appraisal: A Neglected Opportunity of Law and Economics', 
European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 53-68 at 56,63; Norgaard, R. (1997), 
'Keynote Speech - Economic Instruments for Achieving Environmental Goals', in Environment 
Australia (1997a), Environmental Economics Round Table Proceedings 10 July 1997 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia), pp. 11-28 at 15; Sen (2000) at 946; Oates (2000) 
at 149; Blais, L. (2000), 'Beyond Cost/Benefit: The Maturation of Economic Analysis of the Law and its 
Consequences for Environmental Policymaking', University of Illinois Law Review, (2000), No. 1, pp. 
237-253 at 246-247; Driesen (1997). 
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S- 
benefit studies should not be conducted. The reason is that it is almost always 
relevant to know which outcome is the most economically efficient and the 
efficiency costs of pursuing sustainability goals57. However, it is important to 
recognise the uncertainties and other limitations with cost-benefit assessment when 
making decisions based on the results of such assessment. 
Sustainability: An Environmental Target-Based Approach 
An alternative approach to sustainability is to define specific requirements or targets 
that must be met for an economy or a society to be considered sustainable. From the 
`environmental' literature, there is a broad consensus on the magnitude of the 
changes that are required to achieve a sustainable society. It has been argued that 
improvements in total resource productivity of a factor of two are required globally (i. e. 
to reduce raw materials and energy consumption by fifty per cent over present levels) 
and improvements of a factor of ten in industrial countries are required within one 
generation58. These translate into annual reductions of three per cent for energy use and 
4.5 per cent for raw materials59. Other studies have suggested that, if the world is to 
reach social and ecological sustainability, energy and material use must be reduced by 
about 50 per cent overall and by up to 90 per cent in the high income countries60. Even 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development has agreed that `... industrial 
world reductions in material throughput, energy use, and environmental degradation of 
over 90% will be required by 2040 to meet the needs of a growing world population 
fairly within the planet's ecological means'61. While the specific numbers vary, there 
is a broad consensus that significant reductions in resource consumption, energy use 
and pollution are required, with consequent implications for patterns of growth, 
57 Helm (1998) at 6-8; Hahn, R. (1990), `The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: 
Towards a Unifying Framework' in Hutter, B. (ed. ) (1999), A Reader in Environmental Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, UK), pp. 189-217 at 191; Adler, M. and Posner, R. (1999), `Rethinking 
Cost-Benefit Analysis', The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 169, pp. 165- 247; Froud and Ogus (1996). 
58 Stiller, H. (2000), `Visions, Management, Tools and Emerging Issues: Towards an Ecoefficient and 
Sustainable Enterprise', in Environment Australia (2000a), Proceedings of the Second Environmental 
Economics Round Table. Environmental Economics Research Paper No. 7 (Environment Australia, 
Canberra, Australia), pp. 33-41 at 35-36. These figures are similar to those of Hawken who argued that 
the absolute consumption of energy and natural resources must be reduced by 80 per cent between 1990 
and 2040 (Hawken, P. (1993), The Ecology of Commerce (Phoenix, London, UK) at xii). 
59 Stiller (2000) at 35-36. 
60 Solskone and Bertollini (1998) at 7; Trainer, T. (1998), Saving the Environment (University of New 
South Wales Press, Sydney, Australia) at 46-48. 
61 Cited in Solskone and Bertollini (1998) at 7-8. 
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development, activity, industry, transport and agriculture. Such reductions would 
represent significant challenges to present paradigms of growth and development, as 
well as necessitating drastic increases in the efficiency of material and energy use. 
Although there is an increasing consensus around the magnitude of the changes that are 
required, it is common to find that the targets proposed lack specificity, in a number of 
important areas. First of all, the starting point against which reductions are assessed is 
rarely made explicit. For example, in a world economy that grows at rates of between 
two and five per cent per annum, a difference of ten years in the starting year (e. g. if 
2000 rather than 1990 is taken as the starting point) could mean that the baseline is 
between 21 and 62 per cent higher. Therefore, when looking at the specific numbers 
quoted, care is required to understand the starting or reference point. The second issue 
is that there are a variety of paths that can be chosen to achieve these targets. It is here 
that many of the tensions between `business' interests and `environmental' interests 
occur. It is frequently argued by business interests that meeting strong environmental 
targets will lead to huge economic dislocation. This is something of an overstatement 
as most of the writing on the issue of sustainability recognises that there is a need to 
allow time for business and society to adjust, where the time required is generally 
considered in years rather than months62. However, inaction or slow progress on 
moving towards sustainability is likely to increase the dislocation associated with the 
necessary moves towards sustainability. That is, the choice can be described as one 
between steady and staged progress towards sustainability over a reasonable period of 
time or a drastic change in response to extreme pressures. 
3.2 AUSTRALIAN APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
In 1992, the Australian Commonwealth government published the National Strategy for 
Ecologically Sustainable Development to provide the framework for government action 
62 An project between Statistics Norway and Friends of the Earth to simulate the effects of various 
environmental demands on Norway's environmental and economic development over a forty year 
period found that there appeared to be substantial resilience in the economy when allowed forty years 
to adjust and adapt. Even with harsh policy measures (such as rapidly increasing environmental 
taxes), there would still be sustained economic growth, albeit at a somewhat slower pace (Hansen, S. 
(1996), Towards a Sustainable Economy: Can We Survive Green Advice. Environment Department 
Papers No. 36 (World Bank, Washington DC, USA). 
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for the implementation of sustainable development in Australia63. The stated objective 
of the Strategy is to enhance individual and community well-being through a path of 
economic development that (a) supports the well being of future generations, (b) 
provides equity within and between generations, and (c) protects biological diversity 
and maintain essential ecological processes and life support systems. The guiding 
principles for the Strategy are the precautionary principle, the need for decision-making 
processes to effectively integrate both long-term and short-term economic, 
environmental, social and equity considerations, the need to recognise the global impact 
of decisions, the need for a strong, growing and diversified economy, and the need for 
broad community involvement. 
Sustainable development is now an accepted principle of environmental policy in 
Australia and has been adopted in a range of other policy measures and initiatives 
(such as State of the Environment Reporting, the Intergovernmental Agreement on 
the Environment, National Heritage Trust, the Council of Australian Governments' 
working groups on water and salinity, the National Greenhouse Strategy, the 
National Strategy on Biological Diversity, the Regional Forest Agreements and the 
Oceans Policy)64. These national level initiatives have been paralleled by legislative 
developments in the States and Territories, many of which refer to the principles of 
sustainable development65. 
Despite these initiatives, Australia's legal and policy frameworks are struggling to 
reverse environmental degradation. The major environmental concerns for Australia 
include waste and pollution issues (e. g. urban air pollution, waste disposal, air 
pollution, greenhouse gas emissions), resource depletion (e. g. energy, native flora 
63 Commonwealth of Australia (1992a), National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia). The Strategy sets objectives for agriculture, 
fisheries, forestry, manufacturing, mining, urban and transport planning, tourism, energy, biological 
diversity, nature conservation, native vegetation, environmental protection, land use planning, 
environmental information, environmental impact assessment, changes to government institutions and 
processes, coastal zone management, water resource management, waste management, pricing and 
taxation, industry and environmental policy, aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, gender, 
public health, occupational health and safety, education and training, employment, international aid, 
population, research and development, conflict management, community awareness, and monitoring 
and review. 
64 For further details on the implementation of the Strategy, see the Environment Australia website 
httpJ/www. ea. gov. au (last visited 22 March 2002) 
65 Stein (2000). 
52 
and fauna, depletion of forests, soil erosion) and conservation and heritage issues66. 
These problems are compounded by the dependence of the Australian economy on 
agriculture, energy and minerals67. The policy approaches for industry outlined in 
the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development are aimed at 
minimising adverse economic impacts on Australian businesses. The objectives are 
for Australian industry to (a) move towards embedding the principles of sustainable 
development in day to day operations, and (b) adopt best practice in environmental 
management and whole life cycle analysis68. Since the release of the strategy, the 
policy initiatives adopted have focussed on education and information sharing, 
including initiatives relating to eco-efficiency69 and cleaner production70, as well as 
71 complementary activities at the State and Territory levels. 
The 1998 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
review of Australia's environmental performance praised Australia's efforts in the 
areas of air quality, protecting the ozone layer, managing mining and conserving 
biodiversity but highlighted numerous shortcomings in environmental policies and 
practices72. The priority areas for improvement were waste management, water 
protection, corporate environmental reporting, integrating environmental 
considerations into economic decisions and putting sustainable development 
principles into practice. The OECD noted that there had only been a weak 
66 State of the Environment Advisory Council (1996), Australian State of the Environment Report 
(Australian Government Printing Services, Canberra, Australia); Australian Academy of 
Technological Sciences and Engineering (1997), Urban Air Pollution in Australia (Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, Australia). For example, Australia has the world's highest rate of mammal 
extinction, one of the highest greenhouse gas emission rates on a per capita basis and generates more 
municipal waste than any other country (State of the Environment Advisory Council (1996) at 1-14). 
67 See, further, Commonwealth of Australia (2002), Climate Change: Australia's Third National Report 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Summary. November 1997 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia), pp. 13-26). 
68 Commonwealth of Australia (1992a). 
69 For example, on 27 July 2001, nine State and Territory Chambers of Commerce and business 
associations signed agreements with the Commonwealth government to promote eco-efficiency 
among their members (from the Environment Australia website, http: //www. ea. gov. au/industry/eecp, 
visited on 15 November 2001). 
70 See, for example, the Cleaner Production Demonstration Project (Environment Australia (1998), 
Environment and Business: Profiting from Cleaner Production (Environment Australia, Canberra, 
Australia) and the materials and case studies provided at the Environment Australia website, 
http: //www. ea. gov. au (lasted visited on 15 March 2002). 
71 Commonwealth of Australia (2000d) Australia's National Report to the UN Commission on 
Sustainable Development 2000 (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia. 
72 OECD (1998a), Environmental Performance Review - Australia (OECD, Paris, France). See 
http: //www. ea. gov. au (visited on 7 June 2000) for the Australian government's response to the review 
findings. 
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decoupling of environmental pressures and economic growth in the Australian 
economy, with environmental pressures growing more slowly than GDP but not 
decreasing. 
3.3 BARRIERS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
Despite the policy commitments to sustainable development, there are practical 
barriers that have limited the progress made in Australia towards a `sustainable 
society'. Perhaps the most fundamental issue is that continued growth is seen as not 
only necessary but also inevitable73. In Australia, economic decisions have tended to 
take precedence over environmental concerns and most decision-makers subscribe to 
the view that the wealth created by economic activities will overcome environmental 
effects74. Despite the indications of harm to the environment there is no consensus 
about whether economic growth is consistent with environmental protection and, if 
so, in what form and at what leve175. These uncertainties have been used by the 
opponents of sustainable development as arguments for delaying the implementation 
of `sustainability policies'76. 
A further issue is that the world's population is expected to grow and there is a general 
expectation that people in the less developed countries will have economic growth to 
enable them to satisfy their basic needs. These changes will create demand for 
increased energy and other resources as well as potentially requiring developed 
countries to reduce consumption even further to compensate for growth in the 
developing countries. These directly impact on Australia as a major source or provider 
73 Hamilton (1996) at 17; Dovers (1999) at 374; OECD (1998a). 
74 This issue is explored in more detail in the case-studies in Chapters 6-8. 
75 For example, it has been argued that the level of environmental protection and regulation tends to 
grow steadily with per capita income (Dasgupta, S., Mody, A., Roy, S. and Wheeler, D. (1995), 
Environmental Regulation and Development: A Cross-Country Empirical Analysis (World Bank Policy 
Research Department, Washington DC, USA); Vogel, D. (2000), `Environmental Regulation and 
Economic Integration', Journal of International Economic Law, (2000), pp. 265-279 at 265-266) and that 
environmentalism (i. e. the public's interest and involvement in environmental debates) tends to follow 
economic cycle (Caimcross, F. (1995), Green Inc. (Island Press, Washington DC, USA) at 16-17). See 
also Notes 6-8 above. 
76 Boyden, S. (1996), `The Need to Change Our Consumption Habits', in DEST (1996b), pp. 12-18 at 
15-16. For example, in the Australian context, there are significant uncertainties around the 
interlinked nature of ecosystems, the specific impacts that result from specific courses of action, 
synergistic effects, threshold effects and the interaction between physical and biological systems (e. g. 
the effects of altering water flows on ecosystems) (Brunton (2000) at 137). 
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of these raw materials77. For example, international efforts to reduce Australia's 
greenhouse gas emissions could have significant impacts on Australia's mining industry 
through (a) constraining the ability of the industry to develop new projects (or 
necessitating the closure of existing mines), (b) reducing demand for products such as 
coal (of which Australia is one of the major international producers), or (c) imposing 
additional costs which could make the Australian mining industry uncompetitive 
against countries that are not subject to the same constraints. These issues are discussed 
further in the case-studies in Chapters 6,7 and 8. 
The political structure of Australia is also a major barrier to sustainable development. 
Australia is a Federation of States and the States and Territories are dependent on 
revenue distribution from the Commonwealth government78. The consequence has 
been that the States have tended to be strongly pro-development and less inclined to 
consider the broader environmental implications of their actions79. This issue is 
considered further in Chapters 6,7 and 8, in particular in relation to the Greenhouse 
Challenge (Chapter 7). 
The consequence of these barriers is that any shift towards sustainability will require 
major cultural, institutional, attitudinal and behavioural changes in Australia. The 
notion of a sustainable society confronts the heart of the modern Australian economy, 
requiring a move away from the idea of the environment as an add-on issue to be 
considered in policy towards integrating environment into the core of public policy80. 
As discussed in Chapters 6,7 and 8, such a change in policy emphasis could have 
significant impacts on the Australian economy and faces strong opposition from 
Australian business and governments. 
" OECD (1998a); Commonwealth of Australia (2002). 
78 Brunton (2000) at 141. 
79 Hunt, C., Bobeff, P. and Palmer, K. (1991), 'Legal Issues Arising from the Principle of Sustainable 
Development', Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 1-25 at 6. While the 
States and Territories do regulate emissions to air, water and land, less consideration tends to be given to 
issues such as resource depletion or greenhouse gas emissions. 
80 Dovers (1999) at 374. 
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4. BUSINESS AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOUR 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the literature on businesses responses to environmental issues to 
develop an understanding how organisations respond to these pressures. The chapter 
includes a discussion of some of the current debates around business in society (such as 
the ideas of the `stakeholder organisation' and the `social licence to operate'), as these 
debates provide both a frame of reference for analysing corporate behaviour as well as 
informing the manner in which businesses have used voluntary approaches. 
The general model that is used in this chapter is a pressure-state-response model'. 
That is, this model proposes that environmental issues create pressure on 
businesses/firms. These pressures may or may not lead to firms responding in some 
way (e. g. taking action to reduce pollution). The specific manner in which a firm 
responds is driven by factors such as the importance of the specific pressure to the 
firm, the nature of the firm (encompassing factors such as size, knowledge of 
environmental issues, activities carried out by the organisation, environmental 
impacts, organisational constraints) as well as the broader social, political and 
economic context within which the firm is operating. These are all covered by the 
term `State'. That is environmental `Pressures' act on an organisation (or 
organisations, depending on the issue in question) that is in a specific `State' and 
produce a `Response' or `Responses'. This is clearly a simplified representation of 
reality, in that all of the terms are related and the delineation between Pressure, State 
and Response is not clear-cut. For example, in response to new legislation, a firm 
may establish a pollution monitoring system. This may be described as either a 
Response (even if there is no change in the firm's environmental performance) or an 
alteration in the firm's State (i. e. through changing the information that is available 
to the firm) or even as a Pressure (i. e. the acquisition of new information may create 
either organisational or regulatory pressure to take action on pollution). In addition, 
1 The pressure-state-response model was originally developed by the OECD to provide a framework 
for its work on environmental policy indicators (OECD (1993b), OECD Core Set of Indicators for 
Environmental Performance Reviews (OECD, Paris, France); OECD (1997c), OECD Environmental 
Performance Reviews: A Practical Introduction (OECD, Paris, France)). 
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the acquisition of such information may be used to eliminate certain pressures (e. g. 
through demonstrating that certain pollutants are not of concern). 
4.2 ENVIRONMENTAL PRESSURES 
The environment has become an important influence and constraint on the manner in 
which firms operate. These influences and constraints have manifested themselves 
in various forms, including, environmental regulations and policies, consumer 
pressures to provide `environmentally friendly' products and pressures from insurers 
and financiers to manage environmental risks and liabilities. Regulation is discussed 
further in Chapter 5. Apart from regulation, financial opportunities, marketing 
benefits, shareholder expectations, consumer expectations, competitive advantage, 
ethical values, critical events and investor requirements have all created pressure for 
firms to effectively manage their environmental issues2. Reductions in waste, 
pollution and the amounts of raw materials and energy required to produce a product 
can provide direct financial benefits to companies (e. g. the reduction or elimination 
of liability, reductions in waste disposal costs) as well as broader business benefits 
(e. g. improved image, improved employee morale)3. Customers are increasingly 
looking at the environmental performance of their suppliers4. It is difficult to gauge 
how significant this pressure is but there is evidence that firms are taking an increased 
interest in the products that they purchase and the manner in which these products are 
produceds. Furthermore, the public may exert pressure directly on companies (e. g. 
through publicising poor environmental performers, litigation) as well as through 
exerting pressure on governments (e. g. to ensure that regulatory bodies enforce 
legislation, calling for new legislation). Initiatives such as government purchasing of 
2 Henriques, I. and Sadorsky, P. (1996), `The Determinants of an Environmentally Responsive Firm', 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 30, pp. 381-395; Bansal P. and Roth, K. 
(2000), 'Why Companies Go Green: A Model of Ecological Responsiveness', Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 717-736; Grabosky, P. (1994), 'Green Markets: 
Environmental Regulation by the Private Sector', in Huffer, B. (ed. ) (1999), A Reader in Environmental 
Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK), pp. 272-304 at 282-29 1. 
3 DeSimone, L. and Popoff, F. (1998), Eco-Efficiency: The Business Link to Sustainable Development 
(MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA) at 21-25; Christie, I. and Rolfe, H. (1995), Cleaner Production in 
Industry (PSI Publishing, London, UK); Environment Australia (1998), Environment and Business: 
Profiting from Cleaner Production (Environment Australia, Canberra, Australia). 
For examples of measures being adopted by Australian organisations to influence the environmental 
performance of their suppliers, see Sullivan, R. and Wyndham, H. (2001), Effective Environmental 
Management: Principles and Case Studies (Allen and Unwin, Sydney, Australia) at 94-227. 
5 Grabosky (1994) at 281-292; Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 228-234. 
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green products and information programmes (e. g. green labelling, community right 
to know) create further pressures for firms to address their environmental issues6. In 
addition to more conventional measures such as profit and turnover, investors are 
taking a more active interest in the environmental and social implications of their 
investments. This interest is driven not only by the `ethical investment' market but 
also by the recognition that proactive approaches to environmental management can 
help save money and reduce the risk of accidents7. The finance and insurance 
industries, in particular, are increasingly important influences on the environmental 
performance of companies. Their interest is driven by the large payouts that have 
been made for issues such as contaminated land clean up, accidental pollutant 
releases and asbestosis and the threats of even greater liabilities associated with 
global warming8. That is, these industries have recognised that environmental 
damage caused by or contributed to by their clients may have direct bottom-line 
impacts. 
Apart from the specific pressures that are exerted, a critical determinant of the 
manner in which firms respond is the context within which pressures are exerted. It 
has been argued that the three main contextual dimensions that influence the 
motivations of firms are issue salience, field cohesion and individual concern9. For 
an issue to be salient requires that there is certainty (i. e. can the issue be measured or 
characterised), transparency in the sources of the issue (i. e. can pollution be assigned 
to specific firms) and emotivity (i. e. degree of concern). The underpinning premise 
is that the greater the degree of concern, the greater the interest in regulation, fines, 
complaints or other measures that could impact directly or indirectly on the 
performance of the firm. Field cohesion relates to the intensity and proximity of 
concern, and whether the firms decide to work together to address a specific issue. 
An example could be a `dirty' (or targeted) industry banding together to respond to 
6 Wilmshurst, T. and Frost, G. (1997), 'Environmental Management: Evidence of an Australian Corporate 
Response', Eco-Management and Auditing, Vol. 4, pp. 127-134 at 128. 
7 Blumberg, J., Korsvold, A. and Blum, G. (2000), Environmental Performance and Shareholder 
Value (World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland) at 24. 
$ Henderson, S. (2000), `Frontiers and Challenges for Insurers and Brokers', The APPEA Journal, 
Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 628-634; Schmidheiny, S., Chase, R. and DeSimone, L. (1997) Signals of Change: 
Business Progress Towards Sustainable Development (World Business Council on Sustainable 
Development, Geneva, Switzerland) at 44. 
9 Bansal and Roth (2000) at 730-731. 
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an external threat1°. In such situations, the business actions are less likely to be 
motivated by financial or competitive concerns, and more by the need for legitimacy 
or survival. Typical responses in such situations are to define industry norms or 
standards and to ensure that other members of the industry are not seen as `bad' (or 
used as examples to tar the entire industry with a bad reputation). Finally, the 
concerns or values of individuals may lead to these individuals promoting 
environmental issues, either internally or externally. These issues are discussed 
further in Section 4.3. 
4.3 ORGANISATIONAL STATES 
The existence of environmental pressures does not necessarily mean that firms will 
respond by improving their environmental performance. There are three specific issues 
that need to be considered, namely (a) the variation in motivations, (b) the barriers to 
environmental management within firms, and (c) the fact that firms often do not 
respond to environmental pressures in a manner that optimises their short-term or long- 
term financial performance. 
4.3.1 Motivations 
An understanding of the motivations for corporate environmental management can 
assist in identifying the mechanisms that foster environmentally responsive 
organisations. Environmental responsiveness can be defined as the set of corporate 
initiatives (both the measures that are adopted and the effectiveness of these 
measures) aimed at mitigating a firm's impact on the natural environment". The key 
motivations for such initiatives have been identified as competitiveness, legitimation 
and ecological responsibility 12. 
Firms that are motivated by competitiveness tend to focus on the costs and benefits 
of environmental initiatives. For such firms, the actions taken are generally those 
10 This has been a common driving force for voluntary approaches, including both the Greenhouse 
Challenge and the Australian Minerals Industry Code for Environmental Management, described in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
" Banal and Roth (2000) at 717. 
12 Barisal and Roth (2000) at 717. 
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that secure the highest returns, independent of the environmental consequences". 
One of the key debates in environmental policy has been whether better environmental 
performance can lead to better financial or business performance. It has been argued 
that innovative companies are those that reap the maximum benefit from environmental 
actions'4, although such arguments are not universally acceptedis. Ultimately, the 
reality is more complex than the view that the environment either conflicts with or 
complements business performance as there are circumstances where profit and 
environmental protection do not coincide, where business is not likely to respond 
voluntarily to halt environmental degradation, where certain actors are particularly 
disadvantaged or face substantial transaction costs, and where concepts such as the 
precautionary principle and intergenerational equity are not in the short-term 
economic interests of business16 
Legitimation refers to the desire of an firm to improve the appropriateness of its 
actions within an established set of regulations, norms, values or beliefs, where 
threats to the firm's legitimacy may undermine its `licence to operate' or its long- 
term survival'7. Legitimacy theory argues that companies' right to exist depends on 
compliance with appropriate laws and public policy. Therefore, organisations 
motivated by legitimation tend to focus on complying with institutional norms and 
regulations and avoiding sanctions (e. g. fines, reduced demand, adverse publicity, 
clean up)18. In legitimacy theory, firms operate by means of a social contract 
(usually implicit) that allows them to survive and grow so long as they provide some 
13 Bansal and Roth (2000) at 724 
14 Porter, M. and van der Linde, C. (1995), 'Toward a New Conception of the Environment- 
Competitiveness Relationship' in Hutter (ed. ) (1999), pp. 365-391 at 366; Wallace (1995), 
Environmental Policy and Industrial Innovation: Strategies in Europe, the US and Japan (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, London, UK) at 3-4. 
15 Walley, N. and Whitehead, B. (1994), 'Its Not Easy Being Green', Harvard Business Review, May- 
June 1994, pp. 46-52 at 48; Wallace (1995) at 4-5. 
16 For a range of perspectives on the issue, see the special issue of the Harvard Business Review in 
1994 (Vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 41-50); Bhat, V. (1998), 'Does Environmental Compliance Pay? ', 
Ecotoxicology, Vol. 7, pp. 221-225; Levy, D. (1995), "The Environmental Practices and Performances of 
Transnational Corporations', Transnational Corporations, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 44-67. 
" Banal and Roth (2000) at 726-727; Rikhardsson, P. and Welford, R. (1997), 'Clouding the Crisis: 
The Construction of Corporate Environmental Management', in Welford, R. (1997), Hijacking 
Environmentalism (Earthscan, London, UK), pp. 40-62 at 56; Deegan, C. (1998), 'Environmental 
Reporting in Australia: We're Moving Along the Road but There's Still a Long Way to Go'. 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 246-260 at 256-257; Wartick, S. and 
Wood, D. (1998), International Business and Society (Blackwell, Oxford, UK) at 71-80. 
18 Post, J., Frederick, W., Lawrence, A. and Weber, J. (1996), Business and Society: Corporate 
Strategy, Public Policy, Ethics (McGraw Hill, New York, 8`" ed, USA) at 239; Deegan (1998) at 257. 
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socially valuable or desirable ends'9. The broad strategies that firms adopt to ensure 
their legitimacy include educating and informing their publics about actual changes 
in their performance and activities, changing perceptions (e. g. through public 
relations (PR)) without necessarily changing activities or performance, manipulating 
20 perceptions or changing expectations. 
An alternative conception of legitimacy theory is that of stakeholder theory. 
Stakeholder theory argues that, when business interacts with society, a shared interest 
and interdependence develops between a company and other social groups and that 
this interaction, in turn, leads to the creation of corporate stakeholders (i. e. those 
groups that are affected by, or can affect, a firm's decisions, policies and 
operations)21. These stakeholders include those parties (i. e. consumers, investors, 
financiers) identified in Section 4.2 as exerting pressure on the firm as well as parties 
such as government, industry associations, industry members, regulators, 
environmental groups and workers. Stakeholder theory argues that all of these 
parties require environmental information or have a right to be involved in corporate 
decision-making22. 
While different stakeholders may have an interest in the manner in which a firm 
operates and may have some ability to influence the manner in which the firm 
operates, the specific interests and the magnitude of influence vary between 
companies and between issues. For example, employees may use tactics such as 
strikes or publicity to achieve their aims, whereas creditors may use legal processes 
to repossess property or assets. Ultimately, stakeholders exert pressure but it is the 
differences in the source and extent of such pressures that determines business 
responses. The stakeholders that are identified as powerful in management textbooks 
are creditors, customers and employees but these stakeholders appear less influential 
19 Herremans, I., Welsh, C., Kane, D. and Bott, R. (1999), 'How an Environmental Report can Help a 
Company "Learn" About its Own Environmental Performance', Eco-Management and Auditing, Vol. 
6, pp. 158-169 at 159; Rikhardsson and Welford (1997) at 56. 
20 Deegan (1998) at 257. 
21 Post et al (1996) at 8. For a useful overview of stakeholder theory, see Halal, W. (2001), `The 
Collaborative Enterprise: A Stakeholder Model Uniting Profitability and Responsibility', Journal of 
Corporate Citizenship, No. 2, pp. 27-42. 
22 Schaltegger, S. and Burritt, R. (2000), Contemporary Environmental Accounting: Issues, Concepts 
and Practice (Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield, UK) at 31-36; Fineman, S. and Clarke, K. (1996), 
'Green Stakeholders: Industry Interpretations and Response', Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 
33, No. 6, pp. 715-730 at 716-717; Wartick and Wood (1998) at 16-17,94-115. 
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on corporate environmental performance23. For example, it has been argued that for 
proactive companies, stakeholders such as the community and environmental NGOs 
are significant influences whereas for less proactive companies, government agencies 
and the media are significant influences24. It also appears that the phenomenon of 
globalisation may be causing stakeholder and company expectations to diverge as the 
power of communities and employees to influence corporate behaviour may be 
eroded (as companies may have the choice to go elsewhere or to target new markets) 
but that the power of customers and shareholders may be increased25. 
In stakeholder theory, one of the key debates is the manner in which the rights of 
shareholders versus the rights of stakeholders should be taken into account in 
business decision-making processes. A focus on stakeholders relies on the 
assumption that shareholders will give up their rights to a return on their investment 
in return for some sort of social outcomes26. It has been argued that systematic 
management attention to stakeholder issues is critical to an organisation's success but 
this hypothesis has not been robustly tested in the literature (with most articles 
focussing on the question of how rather than on if)27. 
The third element of responsiveness is environmental or ecological responsibility, 
which reflects the value that the firm places on its social obligations28. This idea is 
being captured in terms such as corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship 
and the triple bottom line29. The opinions on the social and environmental 
23 Henriques, I. and Sadorsky, P. (1999), 'The Relationship Between Environmental Commitment and 
Managerial Perceptions of Stakeholder Importance', Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 42, No. 
1,87-99; Fineman and Clarke (1996) at 725. 
24 Henriques and Sadorsky (1999) at 95-97. 
25 Julius, D. (1997), `Globalization and Stakeholder Conflicts: A Corporate Perspective', International 
Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, pp. 453-468 at 460-466. 
Ireland, P. (1999), `Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership', The Modern Law 
Review, Vol. 62, pp. 32-57 at 32-33,53-54. 
27 Harrison, J. and Freeman, R. (1999), `Stakeholders, Social Responsibility and Performance: 
Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Perspectives', Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 42, No. 5, 
pp. 479-485 at 479-480; Berman, S., Wicks, A., Kotha, S. and Jones, T. (1999), 'Does Stakeholder 
Orientation Matter? The Relationship between Stakeholder Management Models and Firm Financial 
Performance', Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 42, No. 5, pp. 488-506. 
28 Bansal and Roth (2000) at 728. 
29 Nobel, P. (1999), `Social Responsibility of Corporations', Cornell Law Review, Vol. 84, pp. 1255- 
1265; Holme, R. and Watts, P. (2001), 'Making Good Business Sense', Journal of Corporate 
Citizenship, No. 2, pp. 17-20; Ward, H. (2000), 'Corporate Citizenship: International Perspectives on 
the Emerging Agenda. Conference Report June 2000' (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
London, UK), 6 pp; Andriof, J. and McIntosh, M. (eds. ) (2001), Perspectives on Corporate 
Citizenship (Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield, UK) at 13-20. 
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responsibilities of organisations vary from the view that profit is the sole responsibility 
of organisations3° through to perspectives that business must be socially responsible. It 
has been argued that, in the context of a particular business sector in a particular 
country, the most appropriate definition of social responsibility is to comply with 
legislation31. In this frame of reference, social responsibility can be considered as 
profit maximisation, where the only constraint is to comply with the law. However, 
given their power and responsibility, it has been argued that businesses are also 
subject to a social contract. In a social contract, the primary responsibility of firms is 
to conduct their economic tasks (i. e. to produce goods and services, make a profit), 
but where firms must also address the consequential effects and impacts of their 
activities and operations32. An alternative conception of social responsibility is that 
business has a social purpose, where this purpose is consistent with and necessary to 
its long-term financial interest and, that organisations must, therefore, consider the 
interests of all stakeholders, not just narrow shareholder needs33. An extension to 
this conception of corporate social responsibility is that a company should (a) be held 
accountable for any of its actions that affect people, their communities or the 
environment, (b) that negative impacts should be acknowledged and corrected if at all 
possible, and (c) that profit may be foregone if social impacts are harmful to certain 
stakeholders or if these funds can be used to promote a social good34. Of course, these 
altruistic statements are likely to conflict with the need for organisations to make a 
profit and the `desire for survival' that drives all organisations 35. 
In practice, firms (and the individuals within firms) are a mix of motivations and 
some or all of competitiveness, legitimation and ecological responsiveness may 
apply at any point in time. From a policy perspective, this means that the targeting 
of policy instruments at a specific motivation may not address all categories of firms. 
30 Most famously articulated by Milton Friedman that the social purpose of business is to increase its 
profits (Friedman, M. (1970), 'The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits', New 
York Times (Magazine), 13 September 1970). 
31 McGee, J. (1998), 'Commentary on "Corporate Strategies and Environmental Regulation: An 
Organizing Framework" by A. M. Rugman and A. Verbeke', Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, pp. 
377-387 at 379. 
32 McGee (1998) at 380. 
33 Nobel (1999) at 1260-1263. 
34 Post et al (1996) at 37. A related concept is that of the 'triple bottom line' which argues that 
business has three goals, namely economic prosperity, environmental quality and social justice 
(Elkington, J. (1997), Cannibals with Forks (Capstone Publishing Limited, Oxford, UK)). 
35 Schaltegger and Burritt (2000) at 37. 
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At the micro level (i. e. when predicting the effects of policy measures on individual 
organisations or identifying the reasons why firms operate in a certain way), the 
motivations for a specific course of action may not be clearly defined or it may not 
be reasonable to assume that the same motivations will apply again. 
4.3.2 Barriers to Environmental Initiatives 
The first, and probably most critical, barrier to environmental management is the 
emphasis of most firms on short-term returns over longer-term business 
sustainability36. It is common to find that environmental expenditures with payback 
periods of greater than one to two years are not implemented, even if such 
investments provide significant longer-term financial or other benefits, such as 
marketing, improved community relations or reduced risk37. That is, there may be 
significant opportunities for energy or environmental performance improvements 
that are economically viable (and which are relatively risk free) that are not being 
implemented. While, as noted above, investors may be able to positively influence a 
firm's environmental performance, in practice the pressures to provide short-term 
returns are the overwhelming influence on corporate behaviour. Furthermore, as 
discussed in Section 3.3, while the polluter pays principle requires that firms should 
pay for the full social and environmental costs of their activities, environmental 
resources are rarely priced at their full value. This means that there is little incentive 
for firms to internalise these costs (unless compelled by legislation or other pressures 
to do so). 
The second barrier is the manner in which individual performance within firms is 
measured. Employees are, in the main, judged on their contribution to short-term 
profits, rather than long-term business sustainability38. This barrier is compounded by a 
significant degree of scepticism and lack of knowledge surrounding the economic 
benefits of environmental protection39. Some firms have tried to overcome this issue by 
36 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 22-23; Gunningham, N. and Rees, J. (1997), `Industry Self- 
Regulation: An Institutional Perspective', Law and Policy, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 363-414 at 375-376. 
37 This issue is considered further in Chapters 6,7 and 8. 
38 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 23. 
39 DeSimone and Popoff (1998) at 93; Gouldston, A. and Murphy, J. (1998), Regulatory Realities 
(Earthscan, London, UK) at 24. In a recent survey, 31 per cent of respondents from Australian industry 
indicated that they saw no financial benefits associated with improving environmental performance (New 
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integrating environmental performance into overall performance assessment for 
individuals. The success of such approaches is dependent on the overall importance of 
environmental issues to the firm. In many firm such incentives have tended to be of 
limited influence because of the overwhelming weight placed on financial 
performanceao 
Organisational culture and personal relationships can be significant barriers to effecting 
environmental improvements. The role of trade unions within a firm, relationships 
between managers and employees, the history of discussions and disputes and any 
previous environmental or similar (e. g. health and safety, quality) initiatives in the 
organisation all influence the manner in which the organisation behaves41. These 
factors all influence the openness of employees to new initiatives and the degree of 
support or opposition to such initiatives. 
In firms without a history of managing environmental issues (such as small and medium 
sized companies, firms that have traditionally been outside the environmental 
regulatory framework), it is common to find that there is limited knowledge among 
employees or managers regarding the importance of environmental issues42. This lack 
of awareness may translate into inaction on or inappropriate responses to specific 
environmental issues43. 
4.3.3 Why Are Organisations Not Fully Optimised? 
Nearly all of the law and economics literature on business organisations is based on 
rational choice theory (i. e. the assumption that firms will attempt to maximise their 
financial well-being or monetary compensation subject to the constraints imposed on 
South Wales Environment Protection Authority [NSWEPA] (1997a), Industry and the Environment 
(NSWEPA, Sydney, Australia)). 
40 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 23. 
41 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 23-24. 
42 Gouldston and Murphy (1998) at 24. 
43 It has been argued that many firms do not invest in developing green capabilities as they fear 
uncertainty (e. g. how will regulation evolve, how influential will green consumers will be) and are 
concerned about the organisational impacts, such as the disruption of operations (e. g. loss of 
production), technical difficulties, and limitations in labour and management resources (DeSimone 
and Popoff (1998) at 93-94; Rugman, A. and Verbeke, A. (1998), `Corporate Strategies and 
Environmental Regulations: An Organizing Framework', Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, pp. 
363-375 at 368). 
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them by consumer demand and the technology of production)«. In this literature, it 
is generally assumed that decision-makers can calculate the costs and benefits of the 
alternatives available to them and they choose to follow the alternative that offers the 
greatest net benefit45. However, there is a growing body of empirical evidence that 
firms do not act to maximise their financial well-being. This evidence is reviewed 
briefly here. 
There are two major limitations with the wealth-maximisation hypothesis. The first 
is that firms often fail to maximise their expected utility. Instead, firms tend to make 
sub-optimal choices among competing options, where the courses of action chosen 
tend to be those that are satisfactory (or good enough in the circumstances) and avoid 
uncertainty46. Bounded rationality captures the insight that actors often take short 
cuts in making decisions that frequently result in choices that fail to satisfy the utility 
maximisation prediction. In addition, actors tend use a range of heuristics (rules of 
thumb) to assist in their decision-making processes47. Such approaches are not 
necessarily incompatible with rational choice theory. For example, the costs of 
acquiring information may be prohibitive compared to the benefits of obtaining the 
information (or, as discussed in Section 3.1, ignorance may be a rational approach 
where transaction costs are high), and the uncertainties that are of concern may relate 
to the long term survival of the business (e. g. short term concerns may dominate 
decision-making processes). 
The second limitation of rational choice theory is that context is important to 
behaviour. Decisions are often influenced by factors such as how an actor perceives 
choices relative to the status quo (see further below), whether choices are consistent 
or inconsistent with an actor's habits, norms or traditions, and the temporal distance 
of the rule's effects48. The implication is that the law needs to address contextual 
44 Cooter, R. and Ulen, T. (2000), Law and Economics (Addison-Wesley, New York, USA) at 26-27; 
Blais, L. (2000), 'Beyond Cost/Benefit: The Maturation of Economic Analysis of Law and its 
Consequences for Environmental Policymaking', University of Illinois Law Review, (2000), No. 1, pp. 
237-253 at 244. 
45 Cooter and Ulen (2000) at 330. 
46 Weihrich, H. and Koontz, H. (1993), Management: A Global Perspective (McGraw Hill, New 
York, 10th ed, USA) at 200. 
47 Korobkin R. and Ulen, T. (2000), 'Law and Behavioural Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics', California Law Review, Vol. 88, pp. 1051-1144 at 1075- 
1076,1085. 
48 Mitchell, L. (1999), 'Understanding Norms', University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 49, pp. 177-248. 
66 
issues such as the framing effect (i. e. uncertainty depends not only on the absolute 
values of the competing options but also on the direction in which these preferences 
deviate from a baseline or reference point), the endowment effect (or status quo 
bias), habits and traditions, time inconsistencies49 and sunk costs 50 
The issue of status quo bias is a particularly important feature of environmental 
policy debates in Australia. The general principle of status quo bias is that 
individuals often place a much higher value on items that they own than on those that 
they do not ownsl. This is of relevance to environmental issues as organisations tend 
to place a lower value on external effects (e. g. impacts on the environment) than on 
effects that directly affect their activities or business52. Furthermore, organisations 
place a higher value on any state that they consider to be the status quo (or the `way 
things are') than they would place on the same state of affairs if it were not the status 
quo. In the context of environmental policy, current patterns of consumption are 
considered the status quo and changes from this point need to justified. This is one 
of the reasons why defining baselines (see Section 3.1) is so important, as delays in 
defining baselines or starting points means that the status quo changes (in general, 
leading to increases in rates of consumption). The consequence is that the required 
reductions in consumption are likely to be greater, and there is also likely to be 
greater opposition (e. g. the economic dislocation may be much more severe) to such 
changes. 
It has been argued that firms that do not make rational choices cannot survive in a 
competitive world. This assumption is unlikely to be true in most circumstances as, 
while firms that make sub-optimal decisions routinely or in extremely important 
circumstances may be driven out of business, the competition in product or capital 
markets is rarely so perfect that firms that occasionally make decision that fail to 
maximise profits will face bankruptcy or be taken over by organisations that do 
maximise profits53. Even if the assumption were true, such results would not occur 
49 Many decisions involve comparing short-term versus long-term benefits and rational actors will 
discount future income. 
so Cooter and Ulen (2000) at 90-110; Thompson, B. (2000), 'Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to 
Governing the Commons', Environmental Law, Vol. 30, pp. 241-278 at 262-265. 
51 Cooter and Ulen (2000) at 87. 
52 See the discussion of externalities in Section 3.1. 
53 Korobkin and Ulen (2000) at 1070. 
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instantaneously and, at any given moment in time, a substantial number of 
participants in markets would probably be imperfectly rational actors that have not 
yet learned their lessons. 
Legal rules create incentives or disincentives for actors subject to the legal system to 
act. While the wealth-maximisation hypothesis has value in modelling the responses 
of companies to legal rules, care is required in the application of hypothesis. Apart 
from the specific limitations above, the manner in which organisations define 
`wealth-maximisation' also needs to be understood. Depending on the firm, the term 
wealth-maximisation needs to account for issues such as corporate reputation, the 
time-frame over which costs and benefits are to be assessed54, the willingness to 
borrow money, and employee recruitment and retentionss. 
4.4 RESPONSES 
Even when firms are solely motivated by economic factors, there will be at least 
some degree of compliance with legislation. An example could be the situation 
where a failure to address specific issues could reduce productivity or increase tort 
liabilityS6. In such situations, the firm will `naturally' comply with legislation, 
because the benefits of complying outweigh the costs. This is clearly an 
oversimplification as it does not account for the manner in which firms calculate the 
costs and benefits of environmental expenditures (as discussed in Section 3.1) or the 
potential barriers associated with acquiring information (i. e. transaction costs may 
impede a perfectly rational decision). Notwithstanding this limitation, this analysis 
enables a useful categorisation for regulated firms to be developed. That is, the 
regulated community can be divided into those organisations that are (a) naturally 
compliant (i. e. where compliance costs are less than zero), (b) conditionally 
compliant (where costs are greater than zero but less than the penalties that may 
' For example, the economics of major projects such as power stations and mines are usually 
calculated over twenty or thirty years, whereas small firms tend to focus on far shorter time horizons 
(between one and twelve months in most cases). 
ss For example, both Fortune magazine and Business Week have observed that the single most reliable 
predictor of overall excellence in a company is the ability to attract and retain talented employees (as 
cited in Frankental, P. and House, F. (2000), Human Rights: Is it Any of Your Business? (Amnesty 
International/The Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, London, UK) at 26). 
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imposed for non-compliance), and (c) naturally non-compliant (i. e. where the costs 
exceed the penalties that may be applied)57. 
This categorisation is somewhat simplistic as it ignores all of the other factors that 
affect firms' propensity to comply (such as the threat of inspection and punishment, 
self-interest, worry about compensation, reputation, organisational pressures for 
compliance, moral pressures) or not to comply (such as deliberate evasion, 
ignorance, inadequate supervision, poorly trained operators, indifference)". 
Furthermore, in response to regulation, firms can adapt, comply, over-comply, 
comply in form but not in substance, evade or bargain with agencies to comply with 
some or all of the provisions of legislation59. That is, the possibly of non-compliance 
can never be eliminated, irrespective of the form of the regulatory framework. There 
may also be over-compliance with regulations. This could be when firms anticipate 
stricter regulations, see longer-term financial or reputation benefits, or wish to send 
signals to regulators to tighten up standards for industry as a whole. The analysis of 
whether or not firms will comply with a specific regulatory regime leads to the 
important point that there are firms for whom compliance is not a `natural' option. 
Ensuring that those firms that are naturally non-compliant do comply with legislation 
is a particular issue in voluntary approaches60, and has been an important issue in the 
design and operation of the case-studies considered in Chapters 6,7 and 8. 
One of the business responses to environmental pressures has been to become 
actively involved in environmental policy debates, arguing that the world's 
environmental problems can be solved through responsible business practices, on the 
basis that being green can be good for business (or that win-win solutions are 
'6 Fenn, P. (1993), 'Business Response to Regulation: An Economist's Perspective', Law and Policy, 
Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 243-251; Mehta, A. and Hawkins, K (1998), 'Integrated Pollution Control and its 
Impact: Perspectives from Industry'. Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 61-77. 
57 Fenn (1993) at 249; Lorei, M. (1995), Financing Pollution Abatement: Theory and Practice. 
Environment Department Paper No. 28 (World Bank, Washington DC, USA) at 7. 
58 Hutter (ed. ) (1999) at 18-19; Henriques and Sadorsky (1999) at 87-88; Post et al (1996) at 64-67. 59 Macauley, S. (1993), `Business Adaptation to Regulation: What Do We Know and What Do We Need 
to Know? ', Law and Policy, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 257-271 at 259; Arora, S. and Gangopadhyay, S. (1995), 
'Towards a Theoretical Model of Voluntary Overcompliance', Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organization, Vol. 28, pp. 289-309 at 290-291; DiMento, J. (1989), `Can Social Science Explain 
Organizational Noncompliance with Environmental Law? ', in Hutter (ed. ) (1999), pp. 218-248 at 219. 60 The issue of free-riders is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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possible)61. However, the empirical evidence is much less convincing and it has been 
argued that few businesses have made any real efforts to significantly alter their 
environmental performance and that most of the changes to date have been piecemeal 
and marginal62. These issues are considered in more detail in the case-studies in 
Chapters 6,7 and 8. The lobbying of business interests has emphasised (a) economic 
growth, (b) open markets and full environmental costing, (c) the technological, 
organisational and financial resources of the private sector, (d) voluntary 
partnerships, (e) flexible market-based techniques, and (e) the application of 
environmental management techniques as the essential components of solving the 
world's environmental problems63. It is relevant to note that business and corporate 
entities generally benefit when the pursuit of economic growth is the organising 
principle of public policy. In this context, the purposes of business' involvement in the 
environmental debate can be seen as promoting `business as usual' approaches, arguing 
that radical changes are not required in the way in which business operates and rejecting 
interventionist approaches by government. 
Business, clearly, has an influence on the manner in which government operates and 
makes decisions. However, this influence is dependent on factors such as the 
economic power of business, the influence of economic issues and values on 
government decision-making, the nature and extent of relationships between business 
and the state and the influence of third parties on the bargaining process. In 
particular, large companies and their industry associations are able to exert their 
influence effectively because of their well organised nature, their ability to provide 
detailed cost-benefit assessments and other information to support its negotiating 
position, and their ability to refute alternative (frequently less sophisticated) analyses 
supplied by less well-resourced groups65. The influence of business on government 
61 See, for example, the views expressed in Currie, D. (1999), 'The Global Corporation: Sharing the 
Regulatory Responsibility', Business Strategy Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 19-24. 
62 Welford (1997) at 6. 63 Welford (1997) at 7,29; Schmidheiny et al (1997) at 5; Schmidheiny, S. and Zorraquin, F. (1996), 
Financing Change: The Financial Community, Eco-efficiency and Sustainable Development (MIT 
Press, Massachussets, USA) at 68-69. 
6' Rikhardsson and Welford (1997) at 57-61; Schmidheiny and Zorraquin (1996) at 68-69. 65 Hancher, L and Moran, M. (1989), `Organizing Regulatory Space', in Baldwin, R., Scott, C. and 
Hood, C. (eds. ) (1998), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK), pp. 93-147 at 
149-151; Keohane, N., Revesz, R. and Stavins, R. (1999), `The Positive Political Economy of 
Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy', in Panagariya, A., Portney, P. and Schwab, R. (eds. ) 
(1999), Environmental and Public Economics (Edgar Elgar, Cheltenham, UK), pp. 89-125 at 91; 
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policy is discussed further in Chapter 5 (where the issues of bargaining and 
regulatory capture are considered) and in the case-studies in Chapters 6,7 and 8. 
There is also a broader debate around the contribution of business to the world's 
environmental problems. One argument is that business (either as an individual 
organisation or as a collective group) is a passive player and, so long as pollution is 
prevented and resource utilisation optimised within each business' operations and 
activities, then business is playing its part. That is, the argument is that business has 
no influence over the nature and pattern of consumption and is simply responding to 
demand. An alternative argument is that business, through advertising (e. g. 
promoting increased consumption) and its influence on government (e. g. working to 
oppose or forestall regulation), is the primary cause of the world's environmental 
problems66. These arguments represent the extremes of the perspectives on the role 
and responsibility of business for the world's environmental problems. Independent 
of the specific merits of either of these arguments or positions, it is a common 
perception that many of the environmental problems that are faced by the world are 
as a direct consequence of the actions and activities of companies and that, therefore, 
one of the aims of public policy should be to address or correct the environmental 
problems caused by activities of business. 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
From the discussion above, there are a number of broad conclusions that can be 
drawn. The first is that there are various pressures on firms, including legislation, 
financial pressures and shareholder, investor, customer and consumer expectations. 
For each firm, one or more of these pressures will be the primary driver (or drivers) 
of response. However, in the case of individual firms, it is not possible to predict the 
specific responses that will be adopted or the key pressures that need to be applied to 
motivate the appropriate response. That is, some organisations will be extremely 
proactive and responsive whereas others will not. The reasons for the responses will 
vary, reflecting not only the specific issue in question but also broader issues such as 
James, 0. (2000), 'Regulation Inside Government: Public Interest Justifications and Regulatory 
Failures', Public Administration, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 327-343 at 333. 
66 Korten, D. (2000), The Post-Corporate World (Pluto Press, Annandale, Sydney, Australia); 
Athanasiou (1998). 
71 
the firm's attitude to the environment and organisational barriers. The variations in 
response are of particular concern in situations where regulations or policy apply to a 
range of actors (e. g. to all companies or to specific industry sectors) but where it is 
the performance of individual firms that is the key concern. Equally, there are no 
guarantees that more specifically targeted pressures will lead to any better outcomes, 
at either the micro or the macro level. These themes are developed in more detail in 
Chapter 5. 
The second conclusion is that there are barriers to implementing sustainable 
development within firms. Some of these barriers relate to the manner in which 
firms operate or make decisions, some are related to the law and policy context, 
while others reflect the lobbying positions adopted by business and the manner in 
which business influences the debate around environmental issues. 
The third conclusion is that firms have multiple levels of motivation and response to 
pressures. Much of the literature is a stalemate between theories assuming economic 
rationality on the part of actors and theories assuming motivations such as complying 
with norms, self-identity, doing good or habitual behaviour. In practice, the reality is 
that all of these descriptions are simultaneously both true and false. The 
consequence is that regulatory strategies need to reflect these motivations and 
responses. Specifically, better (more robust) policy solutions are likely to be found 
when areas of convergence between these approaches are identified and adopted. 
What is required in the policy design and implementation process is to recognise the 
need for the multiple targeting of pressures and to take a more holistic view of tools 
and sanctions. This issue is considered further in Chapter 5, when the role of 
voluntary approaches in public policy is considered. 
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5. VOLUNTARY APPROACHES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter, which provides an overview of the literature on voluntary approaches, 
is divided into four sections. The first (Section 5.2) is a broad overview of each of 
the major policy instrument types (i. e. command and control, economic instruments, 
information-based strategies and voluntary approaches). The second (Section 5.3) is 
a detailed assessment of voluntary approaches, using the evaluation framework 
developed in Section 3.2, while the third (Section 5.4) identifies the factors that 
influence the likely success or failure of voluntary approaches. Section 5.5 then 
combines the material in Sections 5.2 to 5.4 with the business pressure-state-response 
model (presented in Chapter 4) to develop a model for the role of voluntary 
approaches in public policy. 
5.2 POLICY INSTRUMENTS: AN OVERVIEW 
Public policy can be defined as a plan of action (or a decision not to take action) 
undertaken by a government to achieve some broad purpose affecting a substantial 
segment of a nation's citizens'. In this context, policy instruments are the tools used to 
implement policy (or to meet the objectives set in policy)2. Environmental policy 
instruments may be divided into four generic categories, namely command and 
control instruments, economic instruments, information-based strategies and 
voluntary approaches. An overview of each is provided in Sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.4. 
t Hill, M. (1997), The Policy Process in the Modem State (Prentice Hall, Sydney, 3'd ed., Australia), 
at 8-10. 
2 Helm, D. (1998), `The Assessment: Environmental Policy - Objectives, Instruments, and 
Institutions'. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 1-19 at 1; DeJong, P. and Captain, 
S. (1999), Our Common Journey: A Pioneering Approach to Cooperative Environmental Management 
(Zed Books, London, UK) at 34-39. As a general premise, for environmental policy instruments to 
address the root causes of environmental degradation requires that they are designed and implemented in 
the context of broader strategies for sustainable development (i. e. at local, regional, national and 
international levels) (see, further, Irwin, F. (1991), `An Integrated Framework for Preventing Pollution 
and Protecting the Environment', Environmental Law, Vol. 22, pp. 1-76). 
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5.2.1 Command and Control Instruments 
Historically, `command and control' regulation has been the dominant government 
response to environmental issues3. At its simplest, command and control regulation 
involves the promulgation of a set of rules, together with mechanisms (e. g. 
monitoring requirements, enforcement processes) for ensuring that the rules are 
complied within. In the context of environmental regulation, command and control 
instruments can be divided into three broad categories, namely design standards, 
performance standards and process standards5. Design standards require that an 
approved technology be used for a particular process or for a specific environmental 
problem. Performance standards define the outcomes that must be achieved, but do 
not generally define the design or process which must be utilised, whereas process 
standards specify the procedures to be followed to achieve a defined result but do not 
specify the exact outcomes to be achieved. To illustrate the difference between the 
three categories, consider a facility that emits a certain pollutant (`X') through a 
stack. A design standard could require that a specific type of pollution control 
equipment be fitted, whereas a performance standard could specify a maximum 
emission rate for pollutant X but not specify how this emission limit is to be met. 
That is, the facility operator would have the flexibility to decide how the pollutant is 
to be controlled to meet the specified limit. A process standard could require that the 
facility takes every reasonable action to minimise or eliminate emissions of 
substance X. In practice, it is not uncommon to find that more than one type of 
command and control requirement is specified. For example, a facility may be 
required to use a specific type of pollution control and also to have a formal system 
of environmental management in place to control emissions of the pollutant. 
Command and control approaches have the advantages of providing a consistent 
assessment framework, being transparent, minimising `arbitrary' decisions and having 
3 Sinclair, D. (1997), `Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies', 
Law and Policy, Vol. 19, No. 4,529-559 at 529; Baldwin, R., Scott, C. and Hood, C. (eds. ) (1998), A 
Reader on Regulation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK) at 14; Wagner, W. (2000), `The 
Triumph of Technology-Based Standards', University of Illinois Law Review, 2000, No. 1, pp. 83-113 
at 84-86. 
4 Baldwin, Scott and Hood (eds. ) (1998) at 3. 
s Gunningham, N. and Sinclair, D. (1999a), 'Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for 
Environmental Protection', Law and Policy, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 49-76 at 53; Richardson, G., Ogus A. 
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high predictability and high dependability, if adequately enforced6. However, 
command and control approaches have been criticised on the grounds that they are 
costly and inefficient, stifle innovation, inflexible, lead to enforcement difficulties, 
create expensive monitoring and record keeping requirements, focus on single 
environmental media rather than an integrated view of the environment, and focus on 
end-of-pipe solutions rather than cleaner production. These criticisms have created 
pressures for alternative approaches to policy instrument that are more efficient, 
provide flexibility and encourage the internalisation of environmental costs. These 
pressures have been reinforced by broader changes such as the withdrawal of 
government from many areas of social policy, the shrinking tax base in many countries, 
and political concerns regarding domestic productivity and international 
competitiveness8. 
5.2.2 Economic Instruments 
Private fines, if left unregulated, generally do not choose a `socially efficient' level of 
environmental protection as they are rarely, if ever, required to pay the full social costs 
of their actions9. The aim of economic instruments is to ensure that organisations 
undertake pollution control efforts in precisely the manner and the degree that will (a) 
result in the most efficient allocation of the overall pollution control burden, and (b) 
ensure that levels of pollution are reduced to the societally most efficient levello. 
and Burrows, P. (1982), Policing Pollution: A Study of Regulation and Enforcement (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, UK) at 35-40. 
6 Wagner (2000) at 94-107. 
7 Sinclair (1997); Schmidheiny, S. (1992), Changing Course: A Global Business Perspective on 
Development and the Environment (The MTT Press, London, UK) at 20; DeSimone, L. and Popoff, F. 
(1998), Eco-Efficiency: The Business Link to Sustainable Development (MIT Press, Massachusetts, 
USA) at 18-20; Stigson, B. (1998), `Business Makes the Case for Voluntary Initiatives', UNEP Industry 
and the Environment, January-June 1998, pp. 16-18 at 17; Panayotou, T. (1998), Instruments of Change: 
Motivating and Financing Sustainable Development (Earthscan, London, UK) at 182; Altham W. and 
Guerin, T. (1999), 'Environmental Self-Regulation and Sustainable Economic Growth: The Seamless 
Web Framework', Eco-Management and Auditing, Vol. 6, pp. 61-75 at 63-64. 
8 Keohane, N., Revesz, R. and Stavins, R. (1999), 'The Positive Political Economy of Instrument 
Choice in Environmental Policy', in Panagariya, A., Portney, P. and Schwab, R. (eds. ) (1999), 
Environmental and Public Economics (Edgar Elgar, Cheltenham, UK), pp. 89-125 at 110. 
9 Hahn, R. and Stavins, R. (1991), `Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an 
Old Idea? ', Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol. 18, pp. 1-42 at 4. See further the discussion of private and 
social costs in Section 3.3. 
10 That is, the objective is to ensure that pollution is controlled to the level at which the marginal benefits 
(or marginal costs of damage avoided) are equal to the marginal costs of control (Hahn and Stavins 
(1991) at 4-7; James, D. (1997), `Economic Instruments and Wastewater Management', in 
Environment Australia (1997a), Environmental Economics Round Table Proceedings 10 July 1997 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia), pp. 101-126; Tietenberg, T. (1990), 'Economic 
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Economic instruments can be divided into broad-based economic instruments (e. g. 
emission permits, pollution or resource taxes), supply-side incentives (i. e. subsidies) 
and liability regimesl1. 
Economic instruments are seen as promoting environmental protection at a lower cost 
than conventional command and control approaches, through allowing decentralised 
and flexible decision-making, and providing incentives for the development of new 
pollution control technologies12. Other potential advantages of economic instruments 
include soft effects such as motivating change, raising the awareness of specific 
environmental issues, stimulating beyond compliance approaches, and generating 
revenue for government 13. From the perspective of sustainability, economic 
instruments provide a vehicle for the implementation of the polluter pays principle in 
environmental policy14. 
In practice, the outcomes that have been achieved from economic instruments have not 
generally lived up to the theoretical predictions. Much of the literature on economic 
instruments relies on the assumptions that (a) business responds to incentives and 
pressures in an economically rational way (although, as discussed in Section 4.3, this 
is not necessarily the case), and (b) the charges imposed (whether by government or 
as an outcome from market trading or other negotiation processes) equal to the 
societal costs of the damage caused by the activity (i. e. polluter pays)ls. However, 
fees or charges are generally set at levels that do not account for the full `externality' 
associated with the activity. One common situation is where economic instruments 
Instruments for Environmental Protection', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 17-31 at 
17). 
11 A useful overview and analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of different economic instruments 
is provided in Panayotou (1998) at 15-45. 12 Schmidheiny (1992) at 14-33; Schmidheiny, S. and Zorraquin, F. (1996), Financing Change: The 
Financial Community, Eco-efciency and Sustainable Development (MIT Press, Massachussets, 
USA). 
13 Hahn and Stavins (1991) at 12; Environment Australia (1997b), Environmental Incentives: Australian 
Experience with Economic Instruments for Environmental Management (Environment Australia, 
Canberra, Australia) at 4,12; Norgaard, R. (1997), 'Keynote Speech - Economic Instruments for 
Achieving Environmental Goals', in Environment Australia (1997a), pp. 11-28 at 11; Tietenberg 
(1990) at 17. 
14 Hutter, B. (ed. ) (1999), A Reader in Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK) at 23; 
Norgaard (1997) at 12. 
15 The other common assumptions are that all firms are technically efficient, cost minimisers, all firms 
are price takers, the regulatory body has complete information about abatement costs in each firm, 
input and output prices are all determined through competitive market and administration and 
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may be an important source of revenue for governments16. The consequence is that 
government's interest may be in maximising revenue rather than reducing pollution 
(i. e. the level of pollution that maximises government revenue may not correspond to 
the societally optimal level of pollution control, when all costs and benefits are taken 
into account). The consequence of setting fees or charges at a level that does not fully 
account for externalities is that the level of pollution abatement may not be optimal 
when all impacts (including externalities) are accounted for'7. That is, building on the 
material presented in Section 3.1, pollutant emissions will be reduced to the privately 
optimal level (taking account of the fees or charges imposed), which may not be the 
societally optimal level. 
Even if the fees were set at the correct marginal cost of abatement, the consequences of 
economic instruments may not be the same as the desired policy outcomes. An 
interesting example is the emissions trading permit system introduced in the United 
States for the control of acid rain'8. When the system was established, industry 
estimated that the costs would be US$1000 per tonne of sulphur dioxide, while the 
Environment Protection Agency estimated a cost of US$400-1000 per tonne. The 
actual costs have been approximately US$90-100 per tonne. The reasons for the 
lower costs have been that the initial estimates excluded the lower cost options (e. g. 
fuel switching) available for the reduction of emissions of sulphur dioxide and the 
presence of market forces that forced companies to find lower cost options. 
However, the environmental outcomes of reducing emissions of sulphur dioxide were 
not all positive as the use of lower sulphur context coal, in some cases, meant that 
facilities also used coal with a lower calorific value (which meant that more coal was 
burnt to produce the same amount of electrical energy). That is, while the policy goal 
(i. e. the reduction of sulphur dioxide emissions) was achieved at a significantly lower 
cost than originally predicted, the use of emissions trading also appears to have had the 
transaction costs (e. g. emissions monitoring, enforcement) are zero (Common, M. (1996), 'Background 
Paper', in DEBT (1996d), Taxation and the Environment (DEBT, Canberra, Australia), pp. 7-15 at 8). 
16 Environment Australia (1997b) at 14-16. 
17 Stoneham, G. (2000), 'Policy Mechanism Selection for Environmental Management', in Environment 
Australia (2000a), Proceedings of the Second Environmental Economics Round Table. Environmental 
Economics Research Paper No. 7 (Environment Australia, Canberra, Australia), pp. 75-86 at 80-82; 
Norgaard (1997) at 16-19; Hahn and Stavins (1991) at 7-8. For a discussion of externalities and 
welfare economics, see Section 3.1. 
18 Munton, D. (1998), 'Dispelling the Myths of the Acid Rain Story', Environment, July-August 1998, pp. 
4-7,27-34. 
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consequence of increasing both the quantity of coal burned and the quantity of 
greenhouse gas emissions produced. 
Apart from the difficulties in setting the correct level of fees, other factors that affect 
whether economic instruments are a viable policy option are (a) economic instruments 
may not be suitable for application in all situations, (b) administrative and compliance 
costs may be significant and may negate the efficiency gains that result from the 
introduction of the economic instrument, (c) there may be significant equity issues (e. g. 
the introduction of a carbon tax on certain fuels may particularly affect lower socio- 
economic groups who may not be able to afford the increased costs or who may not be 
able to transfer to lower cost (or `cleaner') alternatives), (d) existing pollution control 
and other legislation may mean that not all of the theoretical benefits will eventuate, 
and (e) economic instruments can be perceived as `licences to pollute' 19. 
5.2.3 Information-Based Approaches 
Access to information is widely recognised as an essential prerequisite for effective 
community input into environmental decision-making. Information-based approaches 
(e. g. public reporting, community right to know programmes, product certification and 
ecolabelling, education and training, environmental impact assessment, state of the 
environment reporting) are increasingly being implemented as an integral part of overall 
policy approaches to environmental management20. The provision of more 
information to the public has three major consequences. The first is that public 
participation and interest in environmental policy decision-making processes may be 
broadened through providing a basis for dialogue with reporting firms. For example, 
environmental groups have used publicly available information to lobby firms to 
reduce emissions, and to make the general public aware of the potential 
consequences of pollution21. The second is that there is increased pressure on 
government and on reporting facilities to ensure that emissions are minimised or 
19 Hahn and Stavins (1991) at 14,38-42; Norgaard (1997); James (1997) at 107-108; Tietenberg (1990) 
at 21-22,27,31. 
20 Haughton, G. (1999), 'Information and Participation Within Environmental Management', 
Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 51-62 at 55-59; Environment Australia (2000b), 
NP!: Summary Report of First Year Data (Environment Australia, Canberra, Australia). 
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eliminated. For example, the United States Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) is widely 
considered to have been successful at reducing emissions of toxic substances at a 
much lower cost than traditional regulatory approaches. The success has been 
accounted for by a combination of public empowerment/lobbying, internal 
management and learning processes, opportunities for win-win outcomes, the 
pressure of environmental blacklisting and the pressures for regulation or other 
action22. The third is that reporting processes can help improve business decision- 
making processes through encouraging firms to improve their monitoring and data 
acquisition processes, thereby identifying priority areas for pollution prevention and 
waste reduction23. 
However, information-based strategies suffer from a lack of dependability and there 
is no guarantee that information alone will lead to improved environmental 
performance24. As discussed in Chapter 4, the public availability of environmental 
information represents just one of the influences on the decisions made by companies. 
Furthermore, the provision of information relies on consumers or other parties who 
are able to check the quality of the reported data and/or take action25. The reliance 
on third parties for enforcement raises questions about the legitimacy of these parties 
who may, effectively, be taking over some of the functions of government. In 
addition, the right to information frequently does not translate into a `right to act'. 
For example, requirements to report information are often accompanied by legal 
protections that mean that companies cannot be sued on the basis of this 
information26. Finally, there are costs associated with the collection and processing 
21 Fung, A. and O'Rourke, D. (2000), 'Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the Grassroots 
Up: Explaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release Inventory', Environmental 
Management, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 115-127. 
22 However, the exact magnitude of the reductions and the costs of the reductions remain unclear due 
to the effects of under- or over-reporting, changes in definitions (or what has to be reported) and the 
effects of other regulations (Fung and O'Rourke (2000) at 116-118). 
73 Barrera-Hernandez, L. (1997), 'Access to Information and Sustainable Development: Friend or 
Foe', International Journal of Environment and Pollution, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 55-70 at 59-60; Young, 
C. and Rikhardsson, P. (1996), 'Environmental Performance Indicators for Business', Eco- 
Management and Auditing, Vol. 3, pp. 113-125; Panayotou (1998) at 57. 
24 Gunningham N. and Cornwall, A. (1994), 'Legislating the Right to Know', Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal, Vol. 11, pp. 274-288 at 283-284; Harrison and Antweiler (2001) at 1. 
25 Machado, P. (1997), 'Information and Participation: Required Instruments for the Improvement of 
Environmental Rights', Environmental Policy and Law, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 285-288 at 285. 
26 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999a) at 55. 
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of environmental information and the public disclosure of this information may limit 
the ability of organisations to profit from this information27. 
5.2.4 Voluntary Approaches 
Voluntary approaches can be defined as schemes where organisations agree to 
improve their environmental performance beyond legal requirements28. The 
potential advantages of voluntary approaches include better relationships with public 
authorities and other stakeholders, optimised regulatory requirements, increased 
business flexibility, and the meeting of environmental goals more cost-effectively 
and more quickly than traditional command and control approaches29. Voluntary 
approaches may also provide collective benefits to industry such as reduced pollution 
control costs, collective approaches to the resolution of specific issues, reduced 
administrative burdens and, in certain cases, avoiding the need for regulation30. 
However, the implications of voluntary approaches can include reduced government 
control over the environmental dimensions of business, reduced accountability for 
business, the weakening of legal frameworks and the risk of reductions in 
environmental quality31. The critics of voluntary approaches have argued that 
voluntary approaches tend to contain weak standards, have ineffective enforcement 
27 Barrera-Hernandez (1997) at 62-65. 
28 OECD (1999), Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy: An Assessment (OECD, Paris, 
France) at 21,46. The term `voluntary' may not be strictly accurate as voluntary approaches are often 
implemented in response to consumer and community pressures, industry peer pressure, competitive 
pressures or the threat of new regulations or taxes. That is, voluntary approaches may better be 
described as 'encouraged' or 'quasi-mandatory', where such programmes operate within and rely on 
elements of the existing legal system (Gunningham, N. and Rees, J. (1997), `Industry Self-Regulation: 
An Institutional Perspective', Law and Policy, Vol. 19, No. 4,363-414 at 398; Khanna, M. and 
Damon, L. (1999), 'EPA's Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on Toxic Releases and Economic 
Performance of Firms', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 37, pp. 1-25 at 
2). 
29 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999a) at 50; Kennedy, N. (1998), `The ICC Business Charter for 
Sustainable Development and other Voluntary Initiatives: More Relevant than Ever in a Globalizing 
World', UNEP Industry and the Environment, January-June 1998, pp. 23-26 at 24; Rehbinder, E. 
(1995), `Self Regulation by Industry' in Winter, G. (ed. ) (1995), European Environmental Law: A 
Comparative Perspective (Dartmouth, Aldershot, UK), pp. 239-267 at 242-243,254-255; Segerson, 
K. and Micelli, T. (1998), `Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for 
Environmental Protection? ', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 36, No. 2, 
pp. 109-130 at 110; Ogus, A. (1995), `Rethinking Self-Regulation' in Baldwin et al (eds. ) (1998), pp. 
374-388 at 375. 
30 OECD (1999) at 29-30,46; Sugiyama, R. and Imura, H. (1999), `Voluntary Approaches in Japan: 
Proven Record of Pollution Control and New Industrial Initiatives for the Protection of the Global 
Environment', Eco-Management and Auditing, Vol. 6, pp. 128-134 at 130. 
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and lack many of the virtues of conventional regulation in terms of visibility, 
credibility, accountability and compulsory application32. 
Voluntary approaches can be divided into four categories, namely (a) unilateral 
commitments, (b) private agreements made by direct bargaining between polluters 
and those affected by pollution, (c) agreements negotiated between industry and 
public authorities and (d) voluntary programmes developed by public authorities33. 
Unilateral commitments (also widely referred to as self-regulation) involve 
organisations defining their own environmental objectives and then communicating 
this information to stakeholders. Collective unilateral commitments involve an 
organised group (generally an industry association or working group) establishing 
and implementing rules and standards relating to the conduct of firms in the industry, 
whereas individual unilateral commitments involve individual firms taking action 
independently of the actions of other firms within the industry sector34 . Unilateral 
commitments include company codes of conduct, systems of environmental 
management, corporate environmental reporting, environmental accounting and 
environmental auditing35. Private agreements are contracts or other forms of 
agreement between polluting firms and those affected by (e. g. workers, local 
community, other firms), or with an interest in (e. g. community organisations, 
environmental groups, trade unions, business associations), the emissions from the 
facility36. Private agreements may cover issues such as the actions to be taken to 
minimise or control emissions or the payment of compensation, and are generally 
underpinned by contract law. Negotiated agreements are contracts between public 
authorities and industry and generally include targets and a timeframe within which 
31 A specific concern has been that voluntary approaches may be a `... a facade to give the appearance 
of regulation and thereby ward off government intervention, to serve private interests at the expense of 
the public... ' (Gunningham and Rees (1997) at 370). 
32 Barber, J. (1998), 'Responsible Action or Public Relations? NGO Perspectives on Voluntary 
Initiatives', UNEP Industry and the Environment, January-June 1998, pp. 19-22 at 19. 
33 OECD (1999) at 16-18. 34 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999a) at 54. It could be argued that the concept of 'independently 
taking action' is misleading as, inevitably, the decisions taken by companies do, at least in part, reflect 
the actions of others (e. g. seeking competitive advantage). 
35 Hillary, R. and Thorsen, N. (1999), `Regulatory and Self-Regulatory Measures as Routes to 
Promote Cleaner Production', Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 7, pp. 1-11 at 3; Sinclair (1997) at 
530-532; Brophy, M., Netherwood, A., Starkey, R. (1995), 'The Voluntary Approach: An Effective 
Means of Achieving Sustainable Development?, Eco-Management and Auditing, Vol. 2, pp. 127-132 at 
127. 
36 OECD (1999) at 16-17; Bailey, P. (1999), 'The Creation and Enforcement of Environmental 
Agreements', European Environmental Law Review, June 1999, pp. 170-179 at 171. 
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the target is to be met37. These are often underpinned by a threat of regulatory action 
if the conditions of the negotiated agreement are not met. In public voluntary 
programmes (e. g. challenge programmes, ecolabelling, award or prize programmes, 
research and development or innovation programmes) organisations agree to meet 
standards developed by public bodies. 
While the typology above is useful for classification purposes, it says little about the 
features of voluntary approaches, specifically, (a) the degree of government 
involvement, (b) whether the voluntary approach is individual or collective, (c) 
whether the approach is local or global in scope, (d) whether the approach is binding 
or non-binding, (e) whether there is open or closed access to third parties, (f) whether 
the approach is target or implementation based. Each of these is considered briefly 
here. 
Voluntary approaches can be described in terms of the degree of government 
involvement in the process. The extreme situations are where both rule-making and 
enforcement are carried out by the industry participants and where both rule-making 
and enforcement are carried out by government agencies. In addition, there may be 
hybrid forms of voluntary approaches, e. g. where the targets are negotiated between 
government and the industry participants. That is, there is no strict dichotomy 
between voluntary approaches on one hand and government regulation on the other. 
It is generally the case that even the strictest forms of government regulation will 
include some voluntary elements, while voluntary approaches are frequently 
implemented with either some form of government sanction or some threat of 
regulation. However, the general term `voluntary approach' does not imply any 
specific relationship with the state38. 
The number of organisations involved in a voluntary approach affects the scope (e. g. 
geographic coverage, industry sector coverage, pollutant specific coverage) and 
influence (e. g. if only a few companies are involved there may be limited impact on 
broader industry behaviour) of the approach. The outcomes achieved are strongly 
37 For a detailed discussion of negotiated agreements see DeJong and Captain (1999). 38 Black, J. (1996a), `Constitutionalising Self-Regulation', The Modern Law Review, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 
24-55 at 27. 
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influenced by the number of participants. If only a few firms are involved, it may be 
possible to set more stringent targets at the level of the individual firm than if it is 
desired to have a greater number of firms participate (where there may be pressure to 
have lower targets)39. While increasing the number of firms that participate may 
reduce the administrative cost per participating organisation, it may also mean that, 
because of concerns regarding free-riding (see further Section 5.3.1), there is a 
significant increase in monitoring and enforcement costs. 
Voluntary approaches can apply from the local level (e. g. the individual firm or a 
specific local government region) through to the global level (e. g. multinational 
codes of conduct). Global voluntary approaches can create an environmental policy 
whose effect is extra-territorial. For example, companies can require their suppliers 
and subsidiaries in other countries to meet defined standards (as specified in 
corporate policies and codes). The effect may be to create international norms 
around specific issues and to create an enforcement mechanism (through company 
purchasing power) to ensure compliance with these norms. 
Voluntary approaches are `binding' where there is some form of enforceable sanction 
if the requirements of the voluntary approach are not met40. It has been argued that 
binding agreements are more likely to be effective than non-binding agreements41. 
However, the fact that a regime is mandatory may make firms reluctant to commit to 
the regime, may undermine some of the potential benefits of voluntary approaches 
(e. g. flexibility, better relationships with regulatory bodies) and may lead to the 
standards being set at a lower level than they would otherwise have been. 
Voluntary agreements are generally developed outside the standard regulatory 
framework and, therefore, the level of consultation with external stakeholders such as 
environmental groups varies. Where there is limited consultation or transparency, 
concern has been expressed about issues such as the credibility of the objectives and 
targets that are defined, the monitoring and reporting processes, data interpretation 
and processes for ensuring the performance of participants in the regime. 
39 Gunningham and Rees (1997) at 363. 
40 Bailey (1999) at 172. 
41 OECD (1999) at 19-20. 
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Finally, voluntary approaches may involve defining either the targets to be met 
('target based') or the measures that will be taken (`implementation based'). The 
distinction is important as an emphasis on process may mean that the desired 
outcomes are not achieved, whereas an emphasis on outcomes alone may mean that 
due process is not followed or that the broader aims of voluntary approaches (e. g. 
changing organisational culture) may not be achieved. 
5.3 DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF VOLUNTARY APPROACHES 
5.3.1 Environmental Effectiveness 
The environmental targets specified in voluntary approaches are generally suspected 
of being less stringent than those that would have been established in command and 
control regimes. The reason is that most voluntary approaches give a central role to 
industry in the goal-setting process, and tend to exclude non-industrial stakeholders 
such as environmental groups and trade unions. However, it is difficult to prove this 
argument as there is no guarantee that the targets in command and control 
approaches would be more stringent. The targets set in regulation reflect the relative 
bargaining power between the public authority and the industry (see further the 
discussion of regulatory capture below) and it is extremely difficult to assess whether 
the targets specified in legislation differ from business as usual (or the actions that 
would have been taken anyway). 
The published evaluations of voluntary approaches are inconclusive on the ambition 
underpinning the specific targets that are adopted, although it appears that the 
outcomes from voluntary approaches often do not deviate significantly from business 
as usual. For example, an assessment of the US chemical industry's Responsible 
Care programme for the period 1990-1996 concluded that there was no evidence that 
membership of Responsible Care had positively influenced the rate of performance 
among the chemical industry (and, in fact, members seemed to be improving their 
performance more slowly than non members)42. Some public voluntary programmes 
42 King, A. and Lenox, M. (2000), 'Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical 
Industry's Responsible Care Program', Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 698- 
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do appear to have achieved substantial outcomes, where the programmes succeeded 
in aligning a range of pressures (e. g. public concern, financial benefits, reputation 
benefits, the desire of industry to avoid regulation)43. It has been argued that the 
voluntary approaches that have achieved the most substantial outcomes are those that 
have established an effective system of sanctions or have offered the greatest rewards 
(e. g. tax rebates, collective benefits, simplicity of licensing arrangements)44. 
However, as discussed in Section 5.2.4, the creation of a very strong regime may 
undermine support for the voluntary approach, either by increasing the reluctance of 
organisations to participate or by creating pressure for the targets to be lowered 
before organisations will participate. From an economic perspective, the gain from 
voluntary approaches depends on the relationship between the number of 
participating organisations and the net individual pollution abatement cost-benefit 
curves. For example, in some situations the maximum net benefits results when all 
firms participate in the voluntary approach (an example could be a voluntary 
approach to avoid regulation) whereas in other situations, the maximisation of net 
individual benefits relies on excluding certain organisations from the voluntary 
approach (an example could be where the -voluntary approach allows for product 
differentiation). It may also be that focussing specifically on targets is too narrow an 
approach as it has been argued that the main benefits resulting from voluntary 
approaches result from the `continual improvement' philosophies that often underpin 
such approaches45. 
716. From the discussion in Section 3.3 and assuming that firms behave as wealth maximisers, firms 
participating in voluntary approaches aim to undertake actions to the level at which firms maximise 
their net private benefit (which may be either the collective net private benefit or individual net private 
benefit, depending on the specific issue in question). This level may be different to the societally 
efficient level of action. 
43 A commonly cited example is the 33/50 programme in the United States. However, there is some 
debate regarding the emissions reductions that were achieved as (a) while 60 per cent of the 600 
largest chemical companies participated in the 33/50 program, only thirteen per cent of small and 
medium sized enterprises participated, (b) the evaluation of the program suffered from difficulties in 
assessing the reasons for the reductions and it was not possible to isolate the effects of the 33/50 
programme from other pressures (e. g. regulatory, liability) on industry, (c) limitations in the data used 
to evaluate performance (e. g. exemptions, changes in reporting processes, based on estimates rather 
than measurement). For further information on the 33/50 programme see OECD (1998b), The Use of 
Voluntary Agreements in the United States: An Initial Survey ENV/EPOC/GEEI(98)27/FINAL 
(OECD, Paris, France) at 28-29; Khanna and Damon (1999)). 
44 Krarup, S. and Ramesohl, S. (2000), Voluntary Agreements in Energy Policy - Implementation and 
Eficiency (AKF Institute of Local Government Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark) at 57. 
45 It has been argued that voluntary approaches can be more effective than command and control 
provided that they stimulate innovation and encourage industry to change its approach to 
environmental management (DeHoag, M. (1998), `Environmental Agreements in the Netherlands: 
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Industry has been suspected of using voluntary approaches to capture environmental 
policy46. There are two dimensions to regulatory capture, namely the low targets that 
are set in voluntary programmes and the manner in which such programmes are used 
to avoid or forestall regulation. The existence of a voluntary approach is often used 
by companies to argue that regulation is not required or, if regulation is seen as 
necessary, that the targets specified in the voluntary approach represent acceptable 
targets for industry47. If organisations succeed, the policy is said to have been 
`captured' by industry. While capture is relatively easy to describe in qualitative 
terms, it can be very difficult to assess in practice as every form of regulation 
involves some degree of negotiation or dialogue between industry and government. 
Bargaining may lead to better outcomes being achieved, as well as enhanced 
communication between regulatory bodies and regulated parties48. As a 
consequence, it is difficult to demonstrate that voluntary approaches lead to lower 
targets being imposed on industry than would otherwise have been the case49. The 
reality is that the most powerful groups will be most able to affect government's 
decisions and, therefore, public policies are most likely to be biased towards these 
groups50. In this context, voluntary approaches can be seen as a tool for industry to 
communicate its preferences to government. Ultimately, the potential for regulatory 
capture relates less to the choice of policy instrument than to the manner in which the 
regulatory approach is organised. Of particular importance are the rules that frame 
Sharing the Responsibility for Sustainable Industrial Development', UNEP Industry and the 
Environment, January-June 1998, pp. 27-30). See also the discussion of innovation in Section 5.3.6. 
46 The theory of regulatory capture has emerged from the political science literature which suggests 
that regulation favours industry at the expense of other interest groups, even though the original 
intention may have been different (see further Stigler, G. (1971), 'The Theory of Economic 
Regulation', Bell Journal of Economic and Management Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 3-21). 
47 OECD (1999) at 25; Sugiyama and Imura (1999) at 133; Maxwell, J., Lyon, T. and Hackett, S. (2000), 
'Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism', The 
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 43, (October 2000), pp. 583-617 at 583. 
°B See, for example, Black, J. (1998), 'Talking About Regulation', Public Law, Spring 1998, pp. 77-105 
at 104; Hawkins K. (1984), Environment and Enforcement - Regulation and the Social Definition of 
Pollution (Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK) at 200. 
49 This is of particular relevance when looking at those voluntary approaches that go 'beyond 
compliance'. In such situations, it could be argued that voluntary approaches clearly represent an 
advance over existing regulations. Such arguments need to be treated with caution as they ignore the 
role of voluntary approaches in public policy debates (e. g. where voluntary approaches are used to 
forestall proposed regulations). 
50 Walker, K. (1994), The Political Economy of Environmental Policy: An Australian Introduction 
(UNSW Press, Sydney, Australia) at 279; Eden, S. (1999), 'We Have the Facts - How Business Claims 
Legitimacy in the Environmental Debate', Environment and Planning A, Vol. 31, pp. 1295-1309 at 1298; 
OECD (1999) at 33; Hahn, R. (1990), 'The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: Towards a 
Unifying Framework' in Hutter, B. (ed. ) (1999) at 197-206 at 191. 
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the regulatory process, in particular those that ensure that all vested interests are 
represented, control the discretionary power of the regulatory agency, require the 
abatement objectives and the schedule for their achievement to be made explicit, 
mandate ex post public policy evaluation and ensure credible systems of sanctions 51 
In this context, voluntary approaches present a specific issue as many of the 
necessary safeguards (e. g. groups that are sufficiently organised and resourced to act 
as effective watchdogs, the availability of sufficient information to differentiate 
between commitments that represent genuine abatement efforts and those that are 
simply business as usual, the ability to limit collusion between agencies and industry 
interests) are frequently not available. Finally, policy can also be captured by 
stakeholders other than industry. While much of the literature focuses on the 
influence of business, other well-organised groups, such as trade unions, can also 
move to capture policy or have an influence on the decision-making process52. This 
can be of particular relevance in situations where business is not greatly interested in 
53 an issue or where business opinion is divided 
The other question is whether the targets set in voluntary approaches will be 
achieved? While many voluntary approaches have failed, there is evidence that 
voluntary approaches can meet their defined goals, in situations where the voluntary 
approaches are administered appropriately and have the support of those involved54. 
Of course, this may be a trivial argument in that it may be seen as arguing that 
`voluntary approaches either work or they don't work'. A more positive conclusion 
is that, where there is commitment to achieving the goals or objectives of a voluntary 
programme, the goals or objectives can be met. This conclusion should be treated 
with caution as the fact that targets are achieved may reflect the limitations of the 
targets that are set (e. g. the targets may represent business as usual outcomes). 
51 OECD (1999) at 36-38. 52 Pildes, R. and Sunstein, C. (1995), `Reinventing the Regulatory State', University of Chicago Law 
Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 1-129 at 99. 
53 Perhaps the most high profile examples have been the recent protests against the international trade 
and investment regime, including the campaigns against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
and protests at various meetings of the World Trade Organisation (Goodman, J. and Ranald, P. (eds. ) 
(1999), Stopping the Juggernaut: Public Interest Versus the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(Pluto Press, Sydney, Australia); Balanya, B., Doherty, A., Hoedeman, 0., Ma'anit, A. and Wesselius, 
E. (2000), Europe Inc. (Pluto Press, London, UK) at 109-139; Gamble, J. and Ku, C. (2000), 
'International Law - New Actors and New Technologies: Center Stage for NGOs? ', Law and Policy 
in International Business, Vol. 31, pp. 221-262 at 253-262). 
54 Gunningham and Rees (1997) at 406; OECD (1999) at 105-106; Krarup and Ramesohl (2000) at 
34-36. 
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The credibility of many voluntary approaches has been affected by the `free-rider' 
phenomenon55. That is, even though individual organisations may benefit from 
collective action, organisations that do not participate ('free-riders') may also 
benefit. The main forms of free-riding are (a) where all parties agree to the terms 
and conditions of the voluntary programme but some merely feign compliance, and 
(b) where part of the relevant industry refuses to sign on to the programme56. The 
greater the number of organisations involved in a voluntary approach, the greater the 
temptations to free-ride, as there is a lower likelihood of detection and the benefits of 
cheating are likely to be greater. The ability to control free-riders depends on factors 
such as whether organisations are aware of each other's behaviour and are able to 
detect non-compliance, the history of cooperative action, the ability to punish or 
sanction non-compliant behaviour and the presence of market or other pressures to 
ensure that organisations comply. As discussed in Section 4.3.3, the assumption that 
business is invariably rational and self-interested (and, therefore, has a propensity to 
free-ride) may be too strict. There is evidence that firms are willing to shoulder their 
fair weight (e. g. as part of voluntary programmes), providing that other firms are 
prepared to do the same. However, this requires that there is some assurance that 
other firms will contribute and, therefore, effective monitoring and enforcement are 
seen as necessary prerequisites to ensure the effectiveness of voluntary approaches. 
A further issue is that (depending on the issue in question) individual non- 
compliance or free-riding may be of more or less concern. For example, if dealing 
with acute local pollution effects, individual non-compliance may be important57 
whereas, if dealing with a broader scale problem such as global warming, individual 
non-compliance may be of less concern than whether or not the broader goals of the 
programme are met. Even if individual non-compliance is not of concern from the 
perspective of the outcomes achieved, it may be that individual non-compliance 
undermines the credibility of the entire regime. This issue is discussed further in the 
case-studies in Chapters 6,7 and 8. 
55 In the economics literature, free-riders are those who benefit from but do not pay for the consumption 
of a public good (Cooter, R. and Ulen, T. (2000), Law and Economics (Addison-Wesley, New York, 
USA) at 106-108). In the context of voluntary approaches, the 'public goods' are the collective 
benefits that accrue from the voluntary approach. 
56 Gunningham and Rees (1997) at 393. 
57 Expressed another way, voluntary approaches should not be used where unacceptable risks are 
involved (Rehbinder (1995) at 243). 
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Finally, voluntary approaches tend to suffer from a lack of information 58. Common 
issues are ambiguous targets and monitoring results, the unavailability of monitoring 
data, the lack of suitability of reported information and the absence of interim targets. 
These limit the transparency and, hence, the accountability of participating firms and, 
as a consequence, may also undermine the credibility of the voluntary approach with 
external stakeholders. 
5.3.2 Economic Efficiency 
While voluntary approaches potentially offer significant economic benefits, there 
have been almost no published economic analysis of voluntary approaches, and those 
analyses that have been completed have tended not to account for the level of 
environmental protection achieved59. It appears that the primary economic benefits 
accrue to participating organisations through their ability to forestall or influence 
regulations. That is, even though voluntary agreements from the perspective of the 
individual organisation (or organisations) can lead to privately efficient outcomes, 
these may not be the same as the societally efficient outcomes. A further benefit may 
be that voluntary approaches can provide greater stability for firms, thereby enabling 
organisations to take a longer-term perspective on the costs and benefits of 
environmental expenditures60. While voluntary approaches appear to have little 
impact on investment criteria and planning, there is evidence that, if analyses and 
management systems are explicit requirements, organisations do consider potential 
savings in more detail than would otherwise have been the case61. 
A further issue is the manner in which pollution abatement efforts are allocated 
among different pollution sources in a voluntary regime. In practice, organisations 
tend to adopt a rule of equal burden sharing based on uniform standards, rather than 
ss Bailey (1999) at 175-176; OECD (1999) at 92. 59 Segerson and Micelli (1998) at 110. In the United States, it has been argued that the most 
significant economic benefits of voluntary approaches have been reduced insurance premiums and 
reduced workers compensation costs, but abatement costs do not appear to have been affected given 
that voluntary programmes operate within the existing regulatory framework (OECD (1998b) at 29, 
36; OECD (1998c), The Use of Unilateral Agreements in the United States: The Responsible Care 
Initiative ENV/EPOC/GEEI(98)25/FINAL (OECD, Paris, France) at 20). 
60 Bailey (1999) at 173. 
61 Krarup and Ramesohl (2000) at 41. This issue is discussed further in the case-studies. 
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differentiating based on lowest or most economically efficient abatement costs62. 
However, voluntary approaches may provide economic benefits at the level of the 
individual firm. This may be through allowing individual firms to allocate pollution 
efforts among their facilities or through allowing for time flexibility in reaching the 
final target (e. g. where firms can arrange for their pollution abatement efforts to fit 
with their investment cycles)63. The one exception to the rule of equal burden 
sharing appears to be public voluntary programmes which can work well from the 
perspective of economic efficiency. The reason is that, while the rules are set by 
public authorities, firms are free to choose to join if they see fit. Therefore, public 
voluntary programmes will tend to attract those firms with the lowest marginal 
abatement costs. Moreover, public voluntary approaches generally include 
information-sharing and technical support programmes to help firms identify and 
implement cost-effective solutions. The arguments regarding the economic 
efficiency of public voluntary programmes appear less robust in situations where 
membership of a public voluntary programme is `compulsory' (or, in practice, where 
there are substantial threats or incentives to joints). In such situations, firms beyond 
those with the lowest marginal abatement costs may join the programme, potentially 
resulting in economically sub-optimal outcomes being achieved. 
5.3.3 Administrative and Compliance Costs 
It has been argued that the administrative and compliance costs associated with 
voluntary approaches are lower than those for command and control instruments. 
Two main reasons have been advanced to support this argument. The first reason is 
that the participating organisations are better informed about their operating practices 
and processes than regulatory bodies and so can design and implement better 
compliance management systems. In practice, many voluntary agreements include at 
62 OECD (1999) at 109. It has been noted that it is not necessarily the case that industry prefers 
economically `optimal' solutions and, in fact, emission standards or other measures that provides 
other benefits to the industry (e. g. creating a barrier to new entrants to the market) are frequently 
F3referred (Hahn (1990) at 191). 
Industry has argued that the flexibility inherent in voluntary approaches enables environmental 
improvements to be made without forcing the early retirement of capital stock, with the potential 
economic or job losses that such changes could otherwise entail (OECD (1999) at 46). It could be 
argued that this is simply an excuse to avoid capital expenditure or indicates a lack of commitment to 
changing practices and activities. 
64 It could be argued that membership of the Australian Greenhouse Challenge (Chapter 7) is de facto 
a mandatory requirement for many organisations. 
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least some prescriptive elements on how compliance is to be assessed (e. g. by 
reference to standard methods for measuring pollution, reporting requirements) 
which mean that the flexibility for organisations to optimise these activities is 
limited65. It may be that the major difference is that voluntary approaches involve 
the transfer of administrative and compliance costs from government to private firms 
or to industry associations 66. That is, while the cost to government of such 
programmes may be less than traditional command and control approaches, this does 
not necessarily mean that the overall costs are less. Furthermore, there is no inherent 
reason why tasks such as monitoring are necessarily cheaper when conducted by 
government or by industry. For example, it is frequently the case that both 
organisations and governments use private testing organisations to conduct specific 
monitoring activities. 
The second reason why administration and compliance costs may be lower is that it 
has been argued that the monitoring and reporting requirements associated with 
voluntary approaches are less onerous than those of traditional regulation67. 
However, this appears to be a rhetorical argument rather than a general truth. For 
example, the reporting costs of a voluntary approach based on exceptions-based 
reporting (i. e. where firms only report when there is non-compliance) would be 
expected to be lower than a command and control type system that requires all 
performance data to be reported. This does not imply that voluntary approaches are 
inherently more efficient than the command and control approach but, rather, that 
there may be the potential for the administrative and compliance costs associated 
with the command and control approach to be reduced. Care is required with this 
conclusion as there may be other reasons the additional information is required by 
government (e. g. to track changes in performance over time). 
65 Even for a mature system such as the Responsible Care programme in the United States, it has been 
noted that the transaction costs may be positive or negative but there are no systematically gathered 
data to enable such an assessment to be made (OECD (1998c) at 19). 
66 In fact, in cases where there are no pre-existing government regulations, industry may end up imposing 
additional costs on itself (OECD (1997b), Proceedings of the OECD Workshop on Non-Regulatory 
Initiatives for Chemical Risk Management. OCDE/GD(97)197 (OECD, Paris, France) at 129). 
67 OECD (1999) at 110. 
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5.3.4 Competitiveness 
The competitiveness impacts of voluntary approaches need to be considered at both 
the domestic and international levels. At the domestic level, the key question is 
whether voluntary approaches have adverse effects on competitiveness through 
providing firms with the opportunity to collude and develop anti-competitive 
behaviour. Negotiated agreements and unilateral commitments have been suspected 
of promoting collusive behaviour amongst participating firms, possibly leading to 
competition distortions (e. g. through denying market access, price fixing, phasing out 
products which may be competitors to new products)68. While the potential for 
collusion exists, there is limited evidence available to enable its level to be judged69. 
Unlike collective negotiated agreements, public voluntary programmes do not 
involve negotiations among a group of firms. It has, therefore, been argued that such 
programmes cannot promote collusive behaviour and are unlikely to lead to 
competition adverse effects70. This may not be correct given that industry generally 
has an input to the design of public voluntary programmes and may use this input to 
promote its preferred approaches. 
International competitiveness effects may apply in two directions. The first is that 
certain voluntary approaches (in particular, public voluntary programmes) may 
involve the provision of subsidies to participating firms. In practice, these subsidies 
are minor and tend to have minimal impact on international competitiveness71. The 
second (and the greater concern in the literature on voluntary approaches) is the 
potential for voluntary approaches (in particular, unilateral commitments) to be a 
68 Ogus (1995) at 376-377; Rikhardsson, P. and Welford, R. (1997), `Clouding the Crisis: The 
Construction of Corporate Environmental Management', in Welford, R. (1997), Hijacking 
Environmentalism (Earthscan, London, UK), pp. 40-62 at 54). 
69 About twenty cases of negotiated agreements were considered in 1997 by the Competition Section 
of the European Commission. Only a few of these cases were settled, with the consequence that even 
a preliminary assessment of the extent of the problem cannot be made (OECD (1999) at 112). 
Furthermore, many countries have antitrust legislation that provides a legal remedy in the event of 
anti-competitive behaviour. While such legislation does not guarantee that anti-competitive behaviour 
will be eliminated, such legislation frequently contains strong penalties to discourage collusion. 
70 OECD (1999) at 124. 71 As yet, such programmes have not been the subject of complaints (e. g. to the World Trade 
Organisation). This may reflect the low levels of direct financial support associated with such 
programmes or the fact that, if membership of a public voluntary programme is open to all firms, then 
the programme cannot be considered as a trade barrier. 
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non-tariff trade barrier (i. e. preventing market access to foreign firms)72. However, 
there is limited evidence to say whether or not this occurs in practice or the 
magnitude (or significance) of the issue. 
5.3.5 Soft Effects 
Soft effects refer to the behavioural, attitudinal and awareness changes that result 
from the implementation of policy instruments. Soft effects are a particularly 
important feature of voluntary approaches and are often a stated objective of 
voluntary programmes. Voluntary approaches can provide a forum for the 
dissemination of information on pollution abatement techniques and collective 
learning, and for the development of new and improved forms of social interaction, 
leading to improved trust and relationships between the members of the industry73. 
Soft effects are highly programme-specific and, beyond identifying these general 
outcomes, the only firm conclusion that can be drawn from the literature is that soft 
effects are a potentially important outcome of voluntary approaches. 
5.3.6 Innovation 
The potential for voluntary approaches to stimulate innovation is unclear. While 
learning processes (e. g. education, provision of information, experience sharing, 
technical support) are common objectives, it has been argued that, because of the 
limited targets set in voluntary approaches, there is limited incentive for firms to 
innovate74. However, this depends on the context in which voluntary approaches are 
introduced. For example, if voluntary approaches are seen as the precursors to 
legislation, they may help firms anticipate regulatory developments by developing 
innovative technologies. An alternative perspective is that the soft effects associated 
with voluntary approaches, together with the continual improvement philosophies 
underpinning many voluntary approaches, may enable organisations to adopt 
innovative approaches to environmental issues. These outcomes are difficult to 
72 OECD (1999) at 112. 73 Rees, J. (1997), 'Development of Communitarian Regulation in the Chemical Industry', Law and 
Policy, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 477-528 at 494-504; Sugiyama and Imura (1999) at 130-131; Krarup and 
Ramesohl (2000) at 41-42; Sinclair (1997) at 534; OECD (1999) at 90-91. 
74 OECD (1999) at 11,112,124. 
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detect or to separate from business as usual performance (or the ongoing 
improvements in performance that occur in the routine conduct of business)75. 
5.3.7 Viability and Feasibility 
Opinions on the acceptability of voluntary approaches differ. The broad views can 
be divided into those of industry or business, government and environmental 
NGOs76. 
Industry groups have supported voluntary approaches because of the potential 
financial savings and flexibility, the potential for industry to define its own standards 
and the reputation and public relations benefits of such approaches77. This support is 
not universal, in particular where voluntary approaches are seen as the precursors of 
regulation or as ratcheting up the performance expectations of companies78. 
Governments have expressed interest in voluntary approaches as a means of reducing 
cost burdens on government and industry, accelerating the implementation of policy 
and creating the potential for win-win outcomes. However, there are institutional 
factors (e. g. existing regulatory frameworks79) and concerns regarding the 
dependability of voluntary approaches and the implications for democratic processes 
that may undermine this support. The effect on democratic processes may be 
positive (i. e. enhancing or maintaining the ability of governments to pursue 
appropriate and effective environmental policies) or negative (undermining the 
ability of governments to enact or implement appropriate environmental regulations). 
This debate is of particular concern given that a primary objective of many voluntary 
75 See, for example, the comments made on the United States 33/50 programme in Note 43. 76 This is an over-simplification as it implies homogeneous perspectives within each of these groups 
(which is not the case in practice) and excludes other important stakeholders such as employees and 
trade unions. However, the categorisation does enable broad perspectives on the viability and 
feasibility of voluntary approaches to be sketched out. 
77 OECD (1998b) at 13; OECD (1997b) at 128. 
78 Altham and Guerin (1999) at 62. 
79 It has been argued that the effectiveness of negotiated agreements in the United States has been 
hampered because the EPA has not been given permission to give firms relief from existing 
regulations and laws (Beardsley, D., Davies, T. and Hersh, R. (1997), 'Improving Environmental 
Management: What Works, What Doesn't', Environment, Vol. 39, No. 7, pp. 6-9 and 28-35 at 9; OECD 
(1998b) at 36). 
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approaches is to reduce the involvement of government in business decision-making 
processes80. 
Voluntary approaches have been criticised by environmental groups on the grounds 
of weak standards, ineffective enforcement, the exclusion of stakeholders and 
government, lack of credibility and transparency and the potential of voluntary 
approaches to weaken the regulatory framework or to delay the implementation of 
regulations81. These arguments may reflect a lack of trust in business rather than 
necessarily being inherent flaws in voluntary approaches as NGOs have been 
involved in voluntary approaches where such approaches enable their specific issues 
and agendas to be advanced or as a complement to existing legal frameworks82. 
5.4 INFLUENCES ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VOLUNTARY 
APPROACHES 
The literature on voluntary approaches has identified two key factors that influence 
the effectiveness of voluntary approaches, namely the role of mediating institutions 
and the development and institutionalisation of an industrial morality83. 
Much of the literature on voluntary approaches has been critical of the potential for 
industry associations to contribute to the enforcement of voluntary programmes, 
given that the primary purpose of such associations is to serve their members or to 
advance their members' interests, rather than to regulate their members84. Such a 
perspective may be overly harsh and may not apply in those instances where the 
industry benefits from voluntary approaches. It appears that the key factors 
influencing the effectiveness of mediating institutions are the existence of strong 
80 Pildes and Sunstein (1995) at 99; Ogus (1995) at 376; Sugiyama and Imura (1999) at 133. $1 Altham and Guerin (1999) at 62; Ruchel, M. (1998), 'Greenpeace Comments on the Australia and 
New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council Draft National Strategy for Cleaner Production' 
(Greenpeace, Melbourne, Australia), 14 pp at 12-13. For example, while the chemical industry sees 
its Responsible Care programme as a leading self-regulatory scheme, environmental groups remain 
sceptical regarding Responsible Care as having '... more to do with resuscitating the industry's image 
rather than working towards a clean and better environment' (Karliner, J. (1997), The Corporate 
Planet: Ecology and Politics in the Age of Globalization (Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, USA) at 
185-186). It has been suggested that NGOs see that they have to defend regulations from '... an 
overzealous attack from the corporate sector... ' (Barber (1998) at 19-20). 
82 OECD (1999) at 46-47. 83 Gunningham and Rees (1997) at 370; King and Lenox (2000) at 701-702. 
84 Gunningham and Rees (1997) at 372. 
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pressures for the industry group to adopt a voluntary approach and the existence of a 
sense of community within the industry, such that the industry is willing to work 
together to respond to a common pressure85. Even where these conditions are met, 
mediating institutions tend to only have weak incentives (e. g. education, promotion) 
and weak sanctions (e. g. peer pressure) at their disposal86. This, of itself, may not be 
an issue as, in practice, there are likely to be other parties involved in the process and 
there may be a backdrop of regulation that can be used to ensure performance. These 
issues are considered further in Section 5.5. 
It has been argued that voluntary approaches may lead to the development of 
industry-wide (or company-wide) normative frameworks (i. e. the principles and 
practices that define right or moral conduct in relation to the industry's operations)87. 
The problem is that many voluntary programmes are seen as setting an upper limit 
for industry behaviour. It has been argued that the process of developing a voluntary 
programme may be as important as the outcomes achieved, as the process of 
developing such a regime frequently represents a challenge to existing ways of 
operating and may lead to the creation of a normative framework with an expectation 
of compliance with this framework88. The question is, then, how can the values 
presented in a voluntary approach be institutionalised. These can be considered from 
the perspectives of (a) moral logic, and (b) accountability and transparency. One of 
the outcomes from the process of developing voluntary approaches is that industry 
may define its notions of right and wrong, which, in turn, creates moral pressure to 
actually meet the values or targets specified. Accountability and transparency are 
85 The development of a sense of community within the chemical industry has been identified as one 
of the major reasons for the success of Responsible Care. The reasons why this sense of community 
developed in the chemical industry (but not, for example, in the American petroleum industry which 
attempted to develop a similar programme to Responsible Care) were that the chemical industry is 
characterised by a degree of mutual dependence (e. g. product swapping, technology transfer, cross- 
licensing, marketing and manufacturing partnerships) and it appears that the effect of these 
relationships has been to temper competition and encourage cooperation. Furthermore, one of the 
major driving forces for the Responsible Care programme was the need for the industry to respond 
effectively to threats (regulation, demands of the environmental movement) to the industry's 'licence 
to operate' (Hoffman, A. (1999), 'Institutional Evolution and Change: Environmentalism and the U. S. 
Chemical Industry', Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 351-371 at 351-353; Rees 
(1997) at 486-504). Of course, the development of community is also dependent on whether or not 
the pressures act to drive organisations together or apart, and it is a moot point whether Responsible 
Care would have been so effective if the major pressure was a reduction in the total market for the 
chemical industry's products. 
86 Rees (1997) at 506; Aalders, M. (1993), 'Regulation and In-Company Environmental Management in 
the Netherlands', in Huffer (ed. ) (1999), pp. 249-271 at 264; King and Lenox (2000) at 701. 
87 Rehbinder (1995) at 255; King and Lenox (2000) at 701. 
96 
interrelated concepts. Accountability involves defining objectives and targets, 
specifying who will be responsible for ensuring the objectives and targets will be 
met, and specifying the mechanisms that will be used to ensure the objectives and 
targets are met. Transparency relates to manner in which accountability can be 
demonstrated. In this context, monitoring and verification (and the release of these 
data) are critical aspects of any voluntary approach89. This raises questions such as 
how will the monitoring be structured, how will it be financed and who will carry out 
the monitoring. Independent monitoring is generally not the norm in voluntary 
approaches. For example, in the Responsible Care programme, only ten of the one 
hundred and ninety participating organisations have chosen to include third party 
reviews90. A further issue is that while transparency can enhance accountability by 
enabling the performance of organisations to be subject to scrutiny, the provision of 
information does not necessarily imply that there is a requirement to take action91. 
While the development of a moral framework for action and the building of 
transparency and accountability have been seen as necessary elements for 
institutionalising responsibility within organisations (through defining standards of 
behaviour and enabling organisations to be called to account for their conduct and 
activities), these do not necessarily guarantee that the norms have been 
institutionalised . (or that the voluntary approach will be complied with). It is, 
therefore, necessary to look at the manner in which voluntary approaches can be or 
are introduced into the regulatory space to see if this provides an indication of how 
their performance can be ensured in practice. 
5.5 MODELLING THE REGULATORY SPACE 
Sections 5.2 to 5.4 have considered the manner in which policy instruments 
generally, and voluntary approaches in particular, operate. However, the analysis has 
considered each of the instrument types in isolation from the rest of the regulatory 
space. While single instrument analysis has value, such analysis fails to account for 
the reality that instruments generally exist in combination with each other, that no 
88 Gunningham and Rees (1997) at 376-380. 
89 OECD (1997b) at 128-129; Ruchel (1997) at 4. 
90 OECD (1999) at 90-91. 91 See the discussion of information-based approaches in Section 5.2.3. 
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single instrument will solve all problems (or, possibly, even any single problem) and 
that regulatory variables have a significant influence on the choice, design and 
operation of policy instruments92. In addition, environmental problems are complex. 
Therefore, policy makers need a range of instruments at their disposal. This is not 
intended to imply that all instruments should be used in all situations as there are 
practical limits to the ability of industry to comply, the costs may be excessive and 
not all instruments will be complementary93 
This section is divided into two parts. The first (Section 5.5.1) is a general overview 
of the issues in instrument combination (i. e. sequencing of instruments, instruments 
in combination and the regulatory pyramid). The second (Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3) is 
a focus on the manner in which voluntary approaches fit in the regulatory space. 
5.5.1 Policy Instruments in Combination 
While the selection of policy instruments is a highly context-specific issue, some 
broad comments and conclusions can be made about the manner in which 
instruments may be combined. First of all, environmental information is a critical 
element of environmental policy and virtually all environmental policy instruments 
rely on environmental information to underpin their implementation 94. This relates 
to issues such as providing a basis for the targets or outcomes to be achieved, 
enabling performance to be monitored by firms and by other stakeholders (e. g. 
government, local communities) and providing a basis for enforcement. 
Secondly, voluntary approaches are considered to lack dependability and, therefore, 
such approaches are likely to be more effective when used in combination with other 
instruments. Voluntary approaches can be combined with most forms of command 
and control legislation, as voluntary measures can encourage companies to move 
beyond the minimum performance benchmarks established in legislation but non- 
participating firms (or free-riders) must still comply with the baseline. That is, the 
92 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999a) at 49-50; Aalders (1993) at 258-259. 
93 As a corollary, it cannot be assumed that any combination of instruments will be better than a single 
instrument approach and, in fact, the introduction of new instruments may have a variety of effects, 
not all of which are positive (Gunningham, N. and Sinclair, D. (1998), 'Designing Smart Regulation' in 
Hutter (ed. ) (1999), pp. 304-334 at 307-309). 
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combination provides some dependability whereas, on their own, voluntary 
approaches would not guarantee that companies would meet minimum performance 
standards95. Voluntary approaches may also be used in conjunction with economic 
instruments, for example in situations where different aspects of the same problem 
are addressed to provide mutually supportive signals. 
Thirdly, the sequence in which instruments are introduced may have an effect on the 
overall effectiveness of policy. Sequencing could refer to the introduction of a 
completely new instrument where another instrument had failed or could refer to the 
enforcement components of a specific piece of legislation. It has been suggested that 
such sequencing should follow a progression of increasing levels of intervention96. 
Care is required in adopting this as a general rule, as the issues in question (e. g. acute 
public health effects) may demand a more interventionist approach or may mean that 
the time required to trial less interventionist approaches is not available. 
In conclusion, when implementing policy, the broad principles that should be 
followed are that complementary instruments rather than single approaches should be 
preferred, it should not be assumed that all instruments apply97, preference should be 
given to less interventionist approaches, escalating responses should be used, third 
parties should be empowered and the opportunities for win-win outcomes should be 
maximised98. 
94 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999a) at 60. 
95 It has been suggested that it is not appropriate to combine technology-based command and control 
approaches with voluntary approaches (Gunningham and Sinclair (1999a) at 56). This is not 
universally true as, with technology-based approaches, it is not uncommon to find that organisations 
have significant freedom in terms of how the equipment is operated. In this context, voluntary 
approaches can complement technology-based standards through, for example, defining and 
implementing good operating practices. 
96 The credibility of a self-regulatory regime could be bolstered by underpinning the regime with the 
threat of introducing command and control legislation if the self-regulatory regime fails to meet its 
objectives. 
97 While combining instruments can assist in overcoming the weaknesses of specific instruments, the 
process of instrument combination may lead to sub-optimal outcomes in certain areas (e. g. the 
'combined instrument' may be less efficient than the theoretical ideal, less dependable than required, 
or entail higher administrative and compliance costs). 
98 Gunningham and Sinclair (1998) at 306-307. 
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5.5.2 A Broader Model for Environmental Policy 
This section develops the discussion of policy instruments in combination to provide 
a model for the manner in which policy instruments fit together in the regulatory 
space. The model is based on the enforcement pyramid model developed by Ayres 
and Braithwaite99. The key principle underpinning the enforcement pyramid is that 
defection from cooperation is less attractive for a business when multiple deterrents 
are available, rather than when only a single deterrence option is available10°. For 
example, while it is not uncommon for regulatory bodies to have the power to 
withdraw licences, this sanction is so drastic that there would be heavy ethical and 
political opposition to such a solution for all but the most extraordinary offenceslol 
The consequence is that, if this is the only enforcement tool available, the regulatory 
body may not be able to enforce compliance. Equally, regulatory strategies based 
totally on persuasion and self-regulation will probably be exploited when the actors 
are motivated by economic rationality102. However, it is rarely possible to be 
confident in advance of which classification a firm falls into 103 
The enforcement pyramid provides a framework for combining instruments as well 
as providing guidance on the order in which instruments can be introduced into the 
regulatory space. The first principle is that the regulator should escalate responses 
when lower levels of intervention fail. The second is that the regulatory process 
99 Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. (1992), Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK). The enforcement pyramid builds on the literature on game- 
theory (where participation in a voluntary approach can be seen as a prisoner's dilemma game, where 
cooperation is the optimal strategy until one of the parties defects from cooperation, often referred to 
as the tit-for-tat approach) and well as the literature on organisational motivations and responses 
(discussed in Section 4). In practice, many business relationships and relationships between regulators 
(including stakeholders) and organisations often endure for years. However, conditions change over the 
life of the relationship and parties must respond to these changing conditions as they pursue their own 
interests through the relationship. These long-term relationships require commitment. The experimental 
evidence is that the tit-for-tat approach is an efficient equilibrium to a repeated agency game. However, 
this assumes that the players can observe each others' moves (which is an important issue in the 
enforcement of voluntary approaches) and that they do not discount the future too heavily (see, further, 
Cooter and Ulen (2000) at 213-223). 
100 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) at 36. 
101 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) at 36; Macauley, S. (1993), `Business Adaptation to Regulation: What 
Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know? ', Law and Policy, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 257-271 at 264- 
265. 
102 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) at 19. 
103 As discussed in Chapter 4, much of the literature is a stalemate between theories assuming economic 
rationality on the part of actors and theories assuming motivations such as complying with norms, self- 
identity, doing good or habitual behaviour whereas, in practice, the reality is that all of these descriptions 
are simultaneously both true and false. 
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should begin by assuming virtue on the part of regulated entities but, if this 
expectation not met, progressively more punitive measures may be adopted. The 
third is that the instruments available to regulatory bodies should be suitable for 
escalation (i. e. pyramidal enforcement relies on a range of sanctions being available 
to the regulatory body). While the exact form of pyramid will vary from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction, depending on factors such as existing modes of regulation, activities or 
offences covered etc, the principle is that actors are most likely to comply if they know 
that enforcement is backed by sanctions that can be escalated in response to non- 
compliance'04. Under the enforcement pyramid, voluntary approaches are preferred 
as they tend to be the least burdensome approach from the point of view of taxpayers 
and the regulated industry'05. This appears to be particularly true in situations where 
the state negotiates the goal to be achieved with the regulated industry and then 
leaves the industry the discretion and responsibility to decide how best to achieve 
this goal. Given that industry will be tempted to exploit the privilege of self- 
regulation, the state must also communicate its willingness to escalate its regulatory 
strategy to another level of intervention, should this be required'°6. 
There are some practical issues that limit the usefulness of the enforcement pyramid 
as an analytical tool, and mean that a more robust model for the environmental policy 
process is required. While the enforcement pyramid model focuses on the 
relationship between regulated entities and the regulatory agency, the pressures on 
business to address environmental issues go beyond those requirements specified in 
legislation. In practice, business may be accountable to a range of `regulators' 107, 
including not only traditional regulatory bodies but groups as diverse as other 
members of the industry, industry associations, financial institutions, local 
communities, environmental groups and customers. That is, the enforcement 
pyramid model may be better described as the `multiple enforcement pyramids 
model', where each pyramid relates to the different `regulators'. At any point in 
time, the different regulators will be at different degrees of involvement or at 
104 For example, the tiers of the pyramid could be persuasion, warning letters, civil penalties, criminal 
penalties, licence suspension and licence revocation (Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) at 35-36). 
05 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) at 38. 
106 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) at 38; Bailey (1999) at 172. 
107 While some of the literature describes these as stakeholders, the term 'regulators' is used to 
emphasise that this discussion relates to those parties that can exert pressure on organisations (or, at 
least in part, fulfil some of the functions of traditional regulatory agencies). 
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different levels of `enforcement'. For example, in the case of an organisation 
emitting pollutants that may lead to public health or environmental effects, it may be 
that (a) the regulatory body is considering moving from self-regulation to licensing 
emissions, (b) other members of the industry are discussing the emissions with the 
organisation, (c) local communities are seeking compensation or looking for the 
facility to be shut down, (d) other members of the local community want the facility 
to continue because of the local economic or employment benefits, (e) other 
government agencies want the facility kept open to maintain local employment, and 
(f) financial institutions may be threatening to withdraw insurance if the problem is 
not addressed immediately. That is, each stakeholder has its own pyramid with a 
hierarchy of sanctions available in its pyramid' °8. The different stakeholders have 
different degrees of influence on the organisation. As an illustration, while local 
community concerns (even if at the peak of their enforcement pyramid) may have a 
limited influence on the decisions made by an organisation, regulatory concerns 
(even if only at the level of dialogue) may be extremely important to the 
organisation. That is, the pyramids are not necessarily `equal in size' and the 
incentives or sanctions available to different stakeholders are different and will be of 
different importance to different organisations109. A related issue is that the 
regulatory pyramids model relies on there being an ongoing relationship between the 
organisation and stakeholders. In situations where there is unlikely to be an ongoing 
relationship (e. g. a one-off customer, a regulatory body that rarely if ever conducts 
site inspections), the incentives for cooperation may be less''°. 
Even though the multiple enforcement pyramids model enables a more considered 
approach to policy design and implementation to be adopted than the single 
108 For example, the hierarchy of sanctions available to an insurance company may be dialogue and 
education (to encourage improved performance), the offer of lower or higher premiums, the 
imposition of specific conditions on the insurance policy, specifying activities or outcomes that are 
excluded from the scope of the insurance and the refusal to grant insurance. Of course, there is also 
the reality that even though one company may refuse to provide insurance (or provide insurance on 
reasonable terms to the company), there are also other insurers in the market or the company may 
decide to accept certain risks. 
109 This reflects the discussion in Chapter 4, where it was noted that organisations have multiple levels 
of motivation and multiple responses to pressure, and regulatory strategies need to reflect these 
motivations and responses. 
do From the literature on game theory, these situations may be modelled as one-off games or (as in the 
insurance example in Note 108) as a game that is played a fixed number of time (see, further, Cooter 
and Ulen (2000) at 34-38). In such situations, the tit-for-tat approach (see Note 99) may not be the 
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enforcement pyramid of Ayres and Braithwaite, the model suffers from some of the 
same limitations. Specifically, the model is reasonable in situations where there is 
unlimited time available. However, for many environmental issues, the time 
available is limited (e. g. irreversible environmental effects may be involved or there 
may be significant pressures for a development to proceed) and there may not be the 
time available to ascend the pyramid or to ensure that the optimal balance between 
flexibility and prescription is achieved. The consequence may be that voluntary or 
less intrusive approaches are not viable. A further issue is that the pyramids do not 
necessarily apply consistently between different facilities or even for different issues 
at the same facility. For example, emissions to air may not be of great concern to a 
local community whereas releases to water may be of great concern. Another 
example could be where different government departments have responsibility for 
different environmental issues. The consequence may be that broader policy 
objectives such as consistency and fairness are not met. Finally, the enforcement 
pyramid is simply a tool to assist in the design of policy or to assist in understanding 
the role that specific policy instruments can play in the regulatory space. Therefore, 
care is required to ensure that the pyramid is not treated as an absolute framework for 
policy design and implementation but rather as a tool to help structure discussions 
around environmental policy. There are a number of dimensions to this. The first is 
that there is the potential for the pyramid model to be seen as implying a linear 
ordering of sanctions and approaches. Enforcement behaviour rarely follows such 
linear frameworks and, in practice, the choice of regulatory mechanisms is a dynamic 
process and the instruments and approaches selected must take account of a range of 
factors including the regulatees' conduct, the availability of options other than 
command and control, and the urgency of the issue in question. The second is that 
the pyramid is not a detailed behavioural model and does not predict the manner in 
which organisations respond to external pressures. The strength of the multiple 
pyramids model is that it explicitly recognises the pressures that can act on 
organisations and enables policy design and development to account for these 
pressures and for the `regulators' that exert these pressures. In situations where there 
is a need for highly prescriptive legislation or strict sanctions, the more flexible parts 
of the enforcement pyramid may be excluded or not applied. The third issue is that, 
best strategy and it may be that an alternative strategy (e. g. defection from cooperation) is the most 
profitable. 
103 
in practice, the available policy instruments may be constrained by existing laws and 
not all of the alternatives may be viable" 
5.5.3 Voluntary Approaches in the Policy Mix 
Despite its limitations, the enforcement pyramid model does enable some broad 
conclusions to be drawn about the manner in which voluntary approaches can be 
introduced into the policy mix or into the regulatory space. In the specific context of 
this dissertation, voluntary approaches occur against a backdrop of existing 
regulation and policies. Therefore, the design and implementation of a voluntary 
approach must account for the specific legal and political context within which the 
12 
. Voluntary approaches 
do not necessarily provide instrument is to be implemented' 
industry with total freedom to determine the terms and conditions of its regulatory 
response and voluntary approaches will be developed in the shadow of the law 
(existing or proposed) and existing broad policy objectives. There may be barriers to 
the implementation of voluntary approaches such as a crowded regulatory space (i. e. 
there may be limited room for the introduction of new policy instruments) or 
regulatory inertia (e. g. public opposition to the weakening of the regulatory state, 
industry preferences for regulation in situations where regulation protects existing 
markets), which may mean that incremental changes are much more likely to be 
accepted' 13 
In addition to understanding the regulatory space, it is also necessary to understand 
the different `regulators' that may be involved. While the primary regulator may be 
an industry association, other regulators could include other members of the industry 
or the public. If these regulators are ineffective, the fallback position may be for the 
government to regulate or to prosecute those that do not meet a certain standard of 
performance. One of the interesting issues in the debate around voluntary 
approaches is that it is frequently envisaged that parties other than government 
111 See Note 79. 
112 Sinclair (1997) at 552; Hahn and Stavins (1991) at 14-15,35; Black, J. (1996b), `An Economic 
Analysis of Regulation: One View of the Cathedral', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, 
pp. 699-711 at 710. This does not say anything about the form, effectiveness or outcomes of the 
existing regulations or the existing policy framework. 
113 Fiorino, D. (1990), 'Can Problems Shape Priorities? The Case of Risk-Based Environmental 
Planning', Public Administration Review, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 82-90 at 83. 
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agencies and the nominated mediating institutions will act as regulators114. This 
raises important issues in terms of public policy. The legitimacy of non-government 
regulators could be questioned and it may not be reasonable or fair that the public or 
NGOs (or other non-democratic parties) are allowed to regulate companies. It is also 
questionable whether such parties have the ability to effectively police the actions or 
activities of companies and, even though markets may have a role to play, there is 
limited empirical evidence that customers will boycott companies or products 115 . 
Finally, consumer pressures have tended to be focused on very large or high-profile 
organisations, with the majority of companies tending to escape attention. The 
consequence is that it is generally agreed that the state needs to retain the right to 
intervene where necessary. 
Subject to the caveats above, the multiple regulatory pyramid model does provides 
some guidance on the role that may be played by voluntary approaches in 
implementing public policy. Voluntary approaches may add to the levels of 
enforcement that are available (i. e. providing a further step (or increment) that can be 
used by regulators), add another pyramid to the regulatory space, involving different 
actors (e. g. industry associations), or add different pressures (e. g. reporting 
processes). That is, voluntary approaches can provide greater depth to the regulatory 
space by broadening the range of pressures and influences that can be brought to bear 
on companies 116 
Another way of considering the role of voluntary approaches is to consider the 
different situations where voluntary approaches may be introduced. The first is 
where voluntary approaches are the sole or primary policy approach. While there are 
concerns regarding the dependability of voluntary approaches, it may be that, in 
particular in countries with reasonably well-developed systems of environmental 
law, there are other sufficiently robust mechanisms (e. g. tort law, contract law) 
114 It has been argued that public access to information is required if the public are to assume their 
`... share of the responsibility for environmental protection... ' (Rowan-Robinson, J. (1998), 'Non- 
Regulatory Instruments and Public Access to Environmental Information', New Zealand Journal of 
Environmental Law, Vol. 2, pp. 25-37 at 28). See also Roach-Anleu, S., Mazenolle, L. and Presser, L. 
(2000), 'Third-Party Policing and Insurance: The Case of Market-Based Crime Prevention', Law and 
Policy, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 67-87 at 69-72). 
115 Bailey (1999) at 177. 
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available to ensure compliance with the voluntary approach or to enable action to be 
taken in the event of adverse environmental outcomes. The second is where 
voluntary approaches provide an early policy introduction tool or are used to provide 
a transitional function (e. g. where legislation is planned or being contemplated and 
where it is in industry's interest to take early action or to prepare for the introduction 
of legislation). That is, an alternative conception of the enforcement pyramid can be 
in terms of staged implementation, where voluntary approaches form the early part of 
the development of a more comprehensive regulatory pyramid, where the remainder 
of the pyramid takes account of experience with the voluntary approach (or, it may 
even be the case that the remainder of the pyramid is not required). The third is 
where voluntary approaches are used as a supplement to existing regulations, through 
adding a tier to existing regulatory pyramids or adding a new pyramid to the 
regulatory space. 
116 For example, it has been argued that, in the United States, voluntary programmes have mainly been 
used to extend the scope of existing laws and, therefore, are a `soft' means for achieving incremental 
environmental performance (OECD (1999) at 89). 
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6. ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, a pilot programme was conducted in Australia to trial the International 
Standards Organisation's (ISO's) IS014001 Standard for Environmental Management 
Systems'. Although some firms in Australia had previously been certified to the British 
Standards Institution's Specification for Environmental Management Systems, 
BS77502, the pilot programme represented, in many ways, the `official' adoption of 
formal environmental management systems (EMSs) in Australia. Since 1996, many 
Australian companies have developed and implemented EMSs to manage their 
environmental issues, and IS014001 has provided the framework for the majority of 
these EMSs. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first (Section 6.2) is a brief overview of 
the driving forces for Australian firms to manage their environmental issues. The 
second (Section 6.3) is a description of IS014001 and the related issue of EMS 
certification. The third (Section 6.4) is a detailed evaluation of EMSs in Australia, 
using the evaluation framework presented in Chapter 3. 
6.2 DRIVING FORCES 
While the growing knowledge and understanding of the broader business benefits of 
environmental management such as cost reduction and competitive advantage have 
been important incentives for companies to manage their environmental issues, the 
key factor in Australia has been the manner in which environmental legislation has 
evolved over the past thirty years3. 
1 ISO (1996), International Standard ISOIDIS 14001, Environmental Management Systems 
Specification with Guidance for Use (ISO, Geneva, Switzerland). 
2 British Standards Institution (1994), British Standard: Specification for Environmental Management 
Systems BS7750: 1994 (British Standards Institution, London, UK). 
3 NSWEPA (1997a), Industry and the Environment, (NSWEPA, Sydney, Australia) at 25; 
Wilmshurst, T. and Frost, G. (1997), 'Environmental Management: Evidence of an Australian 
Corporate Response', Eco-Management and Auditing, Vol. 4, pp. 127-134; Sullivan, R. and Wyndham, 
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The environment first became a political issue in Australia in the early 1970s, with 
many of the States passing basic air and water pollution control legislation. 
Historically, common law in Australia had separated the acts of corporations from the 
acts of individuals working for the corporation, which meant that individuals could not 
be held responsible for the actions of a corporation. However, in the early to mid- 
1980s, the Australian States and Territories all overhauled their environmental 
legislation. The major changes were that fines and/or prison sentences could be 
imposed on corporate directors and managers for the offences of their corporations and 
the introduction of strict liability for certain pollution offences. These changes were 
accompanied by a greater willingness on the part of regulatory bodies to use 
prosecution as an enforcement strategy. Each of these changes is discussed briefly 
below. 
All of the States now have environmental legislation which imposes liability on both 
corporations and on corporate directors and managers for the offences of their 
corporations4. The penalties which can be imposed include significant fines for 
corporate entities and fines (typically up to A$250,000) and prison sentences (up to 7 
years) for individuals, and the directors and managers of firms can be prosecuted even if 
the firm has not been prosecuted. The general defences available to individuals are that 
the firm contravened the provision of the Act without the constructive knowledge of the 
person, the person was not in a position to influence the actions of the firm or, if the 
person was in a position of influence, the person took reasonable precautions and 
exercised due diligence to avoid the contraventions. 
The introduction of strict liability for certain pollution offences has meant that the 
standard of care expected of firms is increasingly beyond that which is specified in 
legislation. An example is a case involving the oil company, Ampol6. Ampol was the 
owner and lessor of a fuel depot containing underground tanks, which were used for the 
storage of petroleum products. While filling one of the tanks, an employee of the lessee 
H. (2001), Effective Environmental Management: Principles and Case Studies (Allen and Unwin, 
Sydney, Australia) at 5. See also Section 4.2. 
4 Bates, G. (1995), Environmental Law in Australia (Law Book Company, Sydney, Australia, 5's ed. ); 
Howard, T. (2000), `Liability of Directors for Environmental Crime: The Anything-but-Level Playing 
Field in Australia', Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 250-27 1. 
S Howard (2000); Sullivan, R. (2001), 'Environmental Management Systems: Theory, Practice and 
Implications for Law and Policy', Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 6, pp. 594-603. 
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allowed the underground tank to overflow into the stormwater system, leading to 
pollution of a nearby river. It was alleged that Ampol, as the owner of the land, had 
been negligent in not providing suitable emergency systems to ensure that such a 
spillage would be contained. This was despite the fact that the spill control system was 
in compliance with all regulatory requirements at the time. Ampol was charged with an 
offence under the NSW Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989. In evaluating 
the case, it was noted that the Act obliged all persons to prevent or minimise harm. 
Given that the site held products which were potentially harmful to the environment, it 
was held that it was necessary to contain any spill which had the potential to cause 
environmental harm. As Ampol had failed to take steps to contain such a spill and 
because serious environmental harm had ensued, Ampol was, therefore, held to have 
fallen below the standard of conduct required of it. 
In addition to the changes in environmental legislation, there have also been changes in 
the approach of regulatory bodies to the enforcement of environmental legislation. 
Traditionally, there has been relatively lax enforcement of legislation with regulatory 
bodies preferring to address compliance issues through negotiation rather than 
prosecution. While the preference amongst regulatory bodies is still for cooperation 
and negotiation, most of the States have improved the funding of their regulatory 
bodies. There appears to be a greater willingness on the part of regulatory bodies to use 
prosecution as an enforcement strategy. There have been two significant cases (in 
Western Australia and in New South Wales) in recent years where individuals have 
been prosecuted and custodial sentences imposed for pollution offences. 8 
63 IS014001 
Section 6.3.1 provides an overview of the IS014001 Standard while Section 6.3.2 
discusses the EMS certification process. 
6 Described in Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 5-6. 
7 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 6-8. 
8 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 6-8. 
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6.3.1 Overview of IS014001 
IS014001 has been adopted as an Australian Standard?, 10. IS014001 provides a model 
for EMSs to enable firms to meet, and continue to meet, their legal and policy 
obligations, based on a model of policy development, planning, implementation and 
operation, checking and corrective action and management review. The following 
paragraphs provide an overview of the requirements of ISO14001. The material is 
based on ISO14001 unless otherwise indicated. 
The Standard does not specify absolute requirements for environmental performance, 
other than requiring policy commitments to compliance with applicable legislation and 
regulations, pollution prevention, and continual improvement. An environmental 
policy is a statement of the firm's desired outcomes from environmental management 
activities' 1. The issues covered by environmental policies can include waste 
minimisation, materials consumption, pollutant releases, product design, purchasing, 
planning and development, education and training and community relations. 
The first stage in planning is for firms to identify those aspects of their activities, 
products or services that give rise to environmental impacts and over which the firm can 
be expected to have an influence. ISO14001 defines environmental aspects as those 
elements of a firm's activities, products or services that can interact with the 
environment, while environmental impacts are any changes to the environment, 
9 Standards Australia (1996a), Australia/New Zealand Standard: Environmental Management Systems 
- Specification with Guidance for Use. AS/NZ. S ISO 14001: 1996 (Standards Australia, Homebush, 
NSW, Australia). 
10 Worldwide, certifications to IS014001 were expected to be over 20,000 by the end of 2000 
(Hillary, R. (ed. ) (2000), ISO14001: Case Studies and Practical Experiences (Greenleaf Publishing, 
Sheffield, UK) at 11). Hillary has argued that, by virtue of its popularity, ISO14001 has `... de facto 
become the EMS Standard'. Useful overviews of the development of ISO14001 and of the work of 
ISO are provided in Krut, R. and Gleckman, H. (1998), ISO 14001: A Missed Opportunity for 
Sustainable Global Industrial Development (Earthscan, London, UK) at 8-10; Murray, P. (1999), 
`Inching Towards Environmental Regulatory Reform - IS014001: Much Ado About Nothing or a 
Reinvention Tool? ', American Business Law Journal, Vol. 37, pp. 35-71 at 40-49. 
11 Brophy, M., Nether-wood, A. and Starkey, R. (1995), `The Voluntary Approach: An Effective Means of 
Achieving Sustainable Development? ', Eco-Management and Auditing, Vol. 2, pp. 127-132 at 129. 
While an environmental policy is only a starting point for addressing environmental issues within an 
organisation, it has been argued that the absence of an environmental policy suggests that the 
environment is not a priority issue for the organisation (Henriques, I. and Sadorsky, P. (1999), `The 
Relationship Between Environmental Commitment and Managerial Perceptions of Stakeholder 
Importance', Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1,87-99 at 89). 
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whether positive or negative, wholly or partially resulting from an firm's products, 
activities or services. The term aspect is used in IS014001 to emphasise that firms 
should focus on those issues that are under their direct control. Depending on the 
firm, control could be exercised at the level of individual items of equipment, at the 
level of a unit process, or at the level of a complete process or a combination of a 
number of unit processes. 
Firms also need to develop a procedure to identify and update legal and other 
requirements relevant to their environmental aspects. Based on the environmental 
policy, the identified legal requirements and the firm's significant aspects, the firm must 
develop objectives and targets and an environmental management plan to ensure these 
objectives and targets are met. 
The process of implementing the EMS should involve the definition of roles, 
responsibilities and authorities and the provision of the resources necessary for the 
effective implementation of the system. Firms should ensure that all employees whose 
work may create a significant impact on the environment are competent on the basis of 
appropriate, education and/or experience. In addition, all employees should be aware of 
the importance of conformance with the firm's environmental policy and procedures, 
the significant environmental impacts of their activities, their roles and responsibilities 
for environmental management and the potential consequences of departing from 
specified procedures. Firms should develop and implement procedures for the control 
of those activities that could have a significant impact on the environment (including 
accidental or emergency events) and should also develop procedures for internal and 
external communications. These procedures and the overall management system 
should be appropriately documented, and should be reviewed and revised at 
appropriate intervals. 
The checking processes encompass monitoring and measuring the key characteristics 
of the firm which can have a significant impact on the environment, the tracking of 
performance against the firm's objectives and targets, assessing compliance with 
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relevant environmental legislation and regulations, system auditing and corrective 
action 12. Records should be kept of all of these activities. 
Finally, the firm's senior management should, at suitable intervals, review the overall 
management system to ensure its ongoing effectiveness, adequacy and suitability. The 
management review should consider the need for changes to policy, objectives and 
other elements of the EMS, based on the results of system audits, changing 
circumstances and the firm's commitment to environmental improvement. IS014001 
emphasises the importance of senior management commitment to establishing the 
system and ensuring the system is developed, implemented and maintained. This 
commitment must include the provision of suitable resources for the planning, 
implementation and maintenance of the system, as well as maintaining an active interest 
in the performance of the system and the effectiveness of the system in meeting the 
firm's goals for environmental management13 
ISO has issued a number of additional documents relating to environmental 
- management. These include ISO14004, which provides further guidance on EMS 
development and implementation, as well as general guidelines relating to 
environmental auditing principles (ISO14010), EMS audit procedures (ISO14011) 
and qualification criteria for environmental auditors (ISO 14012)14. 
6.3.2 The EMS Certification Process 
12 The checking processes should enable organisations to monitor their performance improvements over 
time, benchmark themselves against their competitors, help set priorities for action, confirm that financial 
resources are being used to the best effect and meet the demands of external stakeholders for information 
(Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 42-43; Sinclair, D. (1997), 'Self-Regulation Versus Command and 
Control? Beyond False Dichotomies', Law and Policy, Vol. 19, No. 4,529-559 at 551). 
13 See, further, Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 20-28,53-55; Wilmshurst and Frost (1997) at 133-134. 
14 Standards Australia (1996b), Australia/New Zealand Standard: Environmental Management 
Systems - General Guidelines on Principles, Systems and Supporting Techniques. AS/NZ. S ISO 
14004: 1996 (Standards Australia, Homebush, NSW, Australia); Standards Australia (1996c) 
Australia/New Zealand Standard: Guidelines for Environmental Auditing - General Principles. 
AS/NZS ISO 14010: 1996 (Standards Australia, Homebush, NSW, Australia); Standards Australia 
(1996d), Australia/New Zealand Standard: Guidelines for Environmental Auditing - Audit 
Procedures - Auditing of Environmental Management Systems. AS/NZS ISO 14011: 1996 (Standards 
Australia, Homebush, NSW, Australia); Standards Australia (1996e), Australia/New Zealand 
Standard: Guidelines for Environmental Auditing - Qualification Criteria for Environmental 
Auditors. AS/NZS ISO 14012: 1996 (Standards Australia, Homebush, NSW, Australia). 
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The EMS certification process involves four main parties, namely national standards 
associations, accreditation bodies, certification bodies and client organisations. In 
Australia, the national standards body is Standards Australia, which has (amongst other 
publications) issued IS014001 as an Australian Standard. Accreditation bodies have 
national government body authorised to set operating criteria for the operation of 
certification bodies. The Joint Accreditation System for Australia and New Zealand 
(JAS-ANZ) is the accreditation body for Australia and New Zealand. Certification 
bodies audit the management systems of client organisations to assess their 
conformance with the relevant standards". The role of the certification bodies is to 
assess whether (a) the client's EMS complies with the requirements of ISO14001, (b) 
the client meets its own objectives (as articulated in policy statements and set objectives 
and targets), and (c) the client meets external requirements (e. g. licence conditions). 
In Australia, the general process for the certification of an EMS has been specified by 
JAS-ANZ and is described briefly here 16. The first stage in the process is for the firm 
seeking certification to submit a formal application (including copies of the 
management system procedures and other core documentation of the EMS) to its 
chosen certification body. The certification body compares this documentation with the 
requirements of IS014001, and provides a report of the review to the client 
organisation. 
The audit of a firm's EMS should take place in at least two stages at the firm's premises 
(although the JAZ-ANZ requirements recognise that alternative approaches can be 
adopted if this can be justified, e. g. when dealing with a very small firm)17. The first 
stage involves reviewing the adequacy of the firm's process for identifying and 
assessing the significance of environmental aspects and impacts, confirming that 
environmental licences are in place, confirming that the EMS is designed to achieve the 
firm's environmental policy and confirming that the internal audit process conforms to 
the requirements of IS014001. That is, the first stage is intended to confirm that the 
15 As at November 2001 twelve organisations had been accredited by the JAS-ANZ to certify EMSs to 
ISO14001 in Australia and New Zealand. Current details of certification bodies can be obtained from the 
JAS-ANZ website, http: //www. jas-anz. com. au (last visited 15 November 2001). 
16 JAS-ANZ (1998), General Requirements for Bodies Operating Assessment and Certification of 
Environmental Management Systems (EMS). Draft Procedure Number 08, Issue No 2,8 September 1998. 
(JAS-ANZ, Canberra, Australia). 
17 JAS-ANZ (1998). 
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basic elements of an EMS have been implemented and are functioning effectively. The 
second stage (the certification audit) should confirm that the firm adheres to its policies, 
objectives and procedures, that the management system meets all of the requirements of 
the standard and that the firm is achieving its stated policy objectives. Any major 
system failures will mean that certification cannot be granted. Certification will not be 
granted until the certification body has established that effective corrective action has 
been undertaken to address these failures. 
Based on the information gathered during the audit process, the certification body 
makes a recommendation on whether or not to register the firm's EMS. This 
recommendation, together with supporting documentation, is provided to JAS-ANZ to 
assess (and, generally, approve) the recommendation. Following certification, 
certification bodies are required to conduct periodic surveillance and reassessment to 
verify that the firm's EMS continues to comply with the certification requirements. In 
general, surveillance audits should be conducted at least once per year and 
reassessments at least once every three years. 
6.4 EVALUATION 
The evaluation of the outcomes from EMSs that have been adopted in Australia is 
presented in Sections 6.4.1 to 6.4.8. The evaluation uses the eight evaluation criteria 
developed in Chapter 2, namely, environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, 
administration and compliance costs, competitiveness, soft effects, dynamic effects 
and innovation, viability and feasibility, and law and public policy issues. For certain 
of the criteria, the indicators and data used in the evaluation are also assessed. 
6.4.1 Environmental Effectiveness 
The evaluation of environmental effectiveness is divided into five parts. The first part 
is a discussion of the data that are available or that can be used in assessing 
environmental effectiveness. The next two parts are an assessment of the performance 
of firms with EMSs in terms of regulatory compliance (or whether EMSs influence the 
rate of compliance) and environmental performance more generally. The fourth part is 
a discussion of whether the performance indicators (i. e. regulatory compliance and 
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environmental performance) are relevant tests for EMSs or whether an evaluation 
should simply focus on the quality of the management system. The fifth part is a 
discussion of the incremental benefits of EMS certification relative to an uncertified 
EMS. 
Data Availability 
There is a general lack of information on the environmental performance of 
Australian firms, even those with certified EMSs18. The reasons relate to the manner 
in which environmental management has evolved in Australia. It was only in 1996 
that the first EMS certifications were awarded. For the majority of firms, the initial 
priorities for environmental management efforts were to achieve compliance, and to 
stay there. The consequence is that much of the information that has been collected 
by firms has been for the purposes of assessing compliance. As the assessment of 
compliance is generally a `yes/no' question (e. g. were emissions greater or less than 
a specified limit), gathering information on broader environmental performance has 
been a lower priority for firms. It is only following the achievement of regulatory 
compliance that firms . have started to consider, more broadly, the concept of 
continual improvement and how this can be achieved and demonstrated19. 
Public environmental reporting is widely seen as a means for firms to communicate 
their environmental performance to stakeholders. There are a range of statutory and 
voluntary programmes that require firms to report on their environmental performance. 
The statutory programmes include the National Pollutant Inventory (which requires 
facilities to report on their emissions of specific pollutants to air, water and land)20, 
Section 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law (which requires public and private 
companies that satisfy two of (a) gross revenue over A$10 million, (b) gross assets 
more than $5 million, or (c) more than 50 employees, to report on their compliance 
with environmental regulation and on other significant environmental issues)21, 
18 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 233-234. 
19 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 233-234. 
20 Sullivan, R. (1999b), 'The National Environment Protection Measure for the National Pollutant 
Inventory: Legal, Technical and Policy Issues', Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5, 
pp. 365-371. 
A review of the Corporations Law in 2000 recommended that Section 299(1)(f) be deleted on the 
grounds that (a) environmental reporting should be covered by environmental law requirements, (b) 
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national, State/Territory and local government State of the Environment reporting, and 
State and Territory-specific licensing or regulatory programmes22. Voluntary 
programmes include the Minerals Council of Australia's Code of Environmental 
Management23, the Australian Greenhouse Challenge24, the Electricity Supply 
Association's Code of Environmental Practice and the Plastics and Chemicals 
Industries' Responsible Care Programme. 
The potential benefits of environmental reporting include meeting community right to 
know expectations, creating market opportunities by promoting the environmental 
advantages of products, goods and services, accessing funding and insurance, raising 
staff awareness of the firm's commitment to environmental management, enhancing the 
firm's credibility with regulators and the community, and providing greater control of 
environmental disclosures25. Despite these potential advantages, the majority of 
Australian firms have chosen not to publish reports on their environmental 
performance. At the end of 2000, only 80 companies had issued public 
environmental reports26. A range of reasons have been advanced for this lack of 
interest in reporting, including (a) the perceived lack of demand for such reports, (b) the 
costs of reporting, (c) the absence of strong regulatory pressures (outside those statutory 
programmes identified above), (d) the potential that self-reporting may open up the risk 
mandatory reporting could lead to lowest common denominator reporting whereas a voluntary system 
would encourage companies to achieve best practice, (c) the provisions of the clause were vague and 
uncertain and lacked protection for self-incrimination, and (d) there would be duplication of existing 
Commonwealth and State environmental reporting requirements (Commonwealth of Australia 
(2000c), Matters Arising From The Company Law Review Act 1998: Government Response to the 
Report of the Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee On Corporations And Securities 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia) at 5,9-10). 
u Despite these various regulatory requirements, it has been noted that the requirements for public 
disclosure of company information in Australia are much more limited than in many other developed 
countries (Deni Greene Consulting Services (2001), A Capital Idea: Realising Value from Environmental 
and Social Performance (Environment Australia, Canberra, Australia) at 32-34). 
23 See Chapter 7. 
24 See Chapter 8. 
u NSWEPA (1997b), Corporate Environmental Reporting: Why and How (NSWEPA, Sydney, 
Australia) at 1-3,6-7; Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation/Australian Industry Group (2000), A 
Framework for Public Environmental Reporting -An Australian Approach (Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, Australia) at 6-7,10-12. 
26 See the Environment Australia website, 'Public Environment Reporting' 
http: //www. ea. gov. au/industry/sustainable/per/ausper. html (last reviewed on 15 November 2001). 
The mining industry has tended to provide more extensive disclosures than other industry sectors (see 
further Chapter 8). 
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of prosecution, (e) the perceived absence of financial or other benefits, and (f) 
scepticism regarding the benefits of stakeholder engagement27. 
Despite the relatively low rates of public environmental reporting in Australia and the 
potential business benefits of reporting, there has been strong industry opposition to 
proposals for mandatory public reporting. Industry has argued that voluntary reporting 
initiatives can meet all community-right-to-know expectations requirements28. Given 
the limited number of firms that actually report, this seems a debateable proposition. 
Apart from the question of whether or not companies report, there is also the issue that 
there are no generally agreed requirements on the scope and content of 
environmental reports (with the exception of some of the statutory requirements for 
reporting on specific pollutant emissions). In practice, public environmental reports 
have been of widely varying quality and rigour. One survey of environmental 
reporting in Australia has indicated that firms tend to focus on good news rather than 
bad and, somewhat ironically, that there has been a tendency for those firms that 
have been prosecuted to report significantly more favourable information than firms 
that had not been prosecuted29. While most reports provide quantitative data, few 
provide any indication as to the reliability of the data, although an increasing number 
of firms provide supplementary data (e. g. through company websites) to help in the 
assessment and interpretation of corporate reports. Some companies employ external 
auditors to review and confirm the accuracy of the information presented in their 
environmental report. However, verification processes vary enormously in rigour 
and, in practice (at least to date), independent auditors have tended to take the firms 
numbers on trust and to focus on issues such as comparing reported data against 
objectives and targets and conducting broad overviews of the implementation and 
effectiveness of the system of environmental management30. 
27 Baird, R. (2000), 'The Inglorious Existence of s299(1)(f) - Is This the End of Mandatory 
Environmental Reporting? ', Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 81-88 at 
82; Deegan, C. (2000), 'Environmental Reporting in Australia: The Past, the Present and the Future', The 
APPEA Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 617-627 at 618. 
28 The report of the review of the Corporations Law noted that there was almost total opposition from 
industry to Section 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law (Commonwealth of Australia (2000c) at 9-10). 
29 Deegan, C. (1998), 'Environmental Reporting in Australia: We're Moving Along the Road but There's 
Still a Long Way to Go', Environmental and Planning Law Journal Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 246-260 at 247. 
30 Deegan (1998) at 250. 
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Environmental Performance: Regulatory Compliance 
The development and implementation of EMSs appears to have resulted in 
significant improvements in the regulatory performance of Australian firms31. 
IS014001 requires firms to explicitly identify their legal requirements and to ensure 
that this information is kept up to date. There is evidence that this structured 
approach to identifying regulatory requirements has enabled firms to put their 
regulatory compliance systems on a more formal basis than had been the case in the 
past32. Furthermore, the standardisation of practices and processes through an EMS 
provides assurance that activities are being carried out as planned (i. e. in accordance 
with procedures). In the context of regulatory compliance, where the aim is to ensure a 
defined performance on a consistent basis, these standardisation processes are seen as 
one of the most important outcomes from developing and implementing an EMS33. 
From discussions with firms with formal EMSs (whether or not certified), regulatory 
compliance now appears to be taken for granted34. 
`In our company, compliance with regulations is a given. We still have to 
report on compliance issues to our board and to the EPA [Environmental 
Protection Authority]. However, our real interest is in going beyond 
compliance. ' [Environmental manager, electricity industry] 
`Our EMS has enabled us to get into compliance and to stay there. ' 
[Environmental manager, electricity and water utility] 
31 Gunningham, N. and Sinclair, D. (1999b), 'Environmental Management Systems, Regulation and the 
Pulp and Paper Industry: ISO 14001 in Practice', Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 
1, pp. 5-24 at 8; Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 233-234. 
32 See, for example, the case-studies in Sullivan and Wyndham (2001), pp. 94-227. It has been argued 
that self-auditing is more thorough and efficient than periodic audits by regulators as corporate 
auditors frequently have a greater depth of knowledge and the ability to investigate in much greater 
detail than government inspectors (Pfaff, A. and Sanchirico, C. (2000), 'Environmental Self-Auditing: 
Setting the Proper Incentives for Discovery and Correction of Environmental Harm', Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 189-208 at 190). 
33 Altham, W. and Guerin, T. (1999), 'Environmental Self-Regulation and Sustainable Economic Growth: 
The Seamless Web Framework', Eco-Management and Auditing, Vol. 6, pp. 61-75 at 66; Rehbinder, E. 
(1995), 'Self Regulation by Industry' in Winter, G. (ed. ) (1995), European Environmental Law: A 
Comparative Perspective (Dartmouth, Aldershot, UK), pp. 239-267 at 255. 
34 It is difficult to determine whether these changes can be attributed to the established EMSs or to the 
changes in the regulatory framework. In practice, it appears that regulatory change provided the 
pressure and that EMSs were the vehicle for achieving the objective of regulatory compliance. 
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The majority of firms that have developed and implemented EMSs have taken the 
scope of regulatory compliance as encompassing all of the environmental obligations 
that the firm has agreed to meet (i. e. not only regulation but also industry codes and 
other voluntary initiatives). This emphasis is also reflected in the manner in which 
the certification bodies treat compliance with these codes and other requirements as 
part of certification processes35. This issue is returned to in Chapters 7 and 8, as the 
contribution of EMSs to ensuring that the requirements of other voluntary 
approaches are complied with is an important outcome of EMS implementation. 
A final issue on regulatory compliance is that it is not clear is exactly how 
compliance has been achieved. For most firms, this appears to have been through 
better management of their performance (e. g. ensuring pollution control equipment is 
well maintained and operated) together with some investments (in pollution 
controls). However, some of the environmental managers interviewed for this 
research indicated that they had used their EMS to demonstrate their firm's 
commitment to environmental management and to support their negotiations with 
regulatory bodies. The credibility associated with having an EMS was seen as 
enabling them to negotiate a form of compliance that minimised the costs of 
compliance (e. g. through meeting lower standards or by being granted longer lead 
times to achieve compliance). This is not necessarily a negative consequence as the 
negotiation process may enable firms to ensure that environmental expenditures are 
affordable and incurred at an appropriate time (e. g. at the end of equipment life). 
The environmental manager of a construction company described these benefits as 
follows36: 
`Having an EMS is a positive demonstration of our commitment to 
environmental management. It means that we are recognised as credible and 
as knowing and understanding the environmental dimensions of our business. 
We are able to tell the EPA [Environmental Protection Authority] what the best 
solutions and best approaches to specific issues are and we can manage these 
negotiations to provide benefits that are good for our business as well as good 
for the environment. ' 
35 Switzer, J., Ehrenfeld, J. and Milledge, V. (2000), 'IS014001 and Environmental Performance: The 
Management Goal Link', in Hillary (ed. ) (2000), pp. 262-272. 
36 Interview, 7 February 2000. 
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Environmental Performance: Beyond Compliance 
As discussed above, Australian companies have, to date, viewed compliance with 
legislation as the primary goal for environmental management. Given the, 
historically, relatively poor rates of compliance in many firms, such an emphasis was a 
necessary starting point for organisational environmental management efforts. 
However, IS014001 also emphasises the need for continual improvement. As the 
term `continual improvement' is not defined, a range of interpretations could be 
adopted (e. g. improvements in the operation of the management system, 
improvements in operations, improvements in emissions) and there is the risk that 
firms will adopt very limited interpretations of this term37. Even if very narrow 
definitions are adopted, continual improvement may provide important cumulative 
benefits, in particular where the lessons from environmental initiatives are 
propagated through other projects and developments 38. That is, environmental 
management can provide significant long-term benefits, resulting from incremental 
changes that, individually, may not appear significant. 
Because of the relative immaturity of many of the EMSs that have been developed 
and implemented in Australia, these longer-term environmental benefits have yet to 
appear in many firms 39. However, many of the firms that have implemented EMSs 
(even those that have focused on regulatory compliance), have achieved significant 
benefits from adopting a structured approach to environmental management, 
including improved financial performance (through reduced raw materials 
consumption, reduced losses, reduced licence fees) and broader, if less tangible, 
benefits relating to the long-term sustainability and viability of the firm40. In many 
37 Altharn and Guerin (1999) at 70; Krut and Gleckman (1998) at 28-30; Gouldston, A. and Murphy, J. 
(1998), Regulatory Realities (Earthscan, London, UK) at 23; Barber, J. (1998), `Responsible Action or 
Public Relations? NGO Perspectives on Voluntary Initiatives', UNEP Industry and the Environment, 
January-June 1998, pp. 19-22 at 21. 
38 See, for example, Jenkinson (2001), `Abigroup', in Sullivan and Wyndham (2001), pp. 191-211; 
Stoll, W. (2001), `Bonlac Foods', in Sullivan and Wyndham (2001), pp. 212-227. It has been argued 
that EMSs can create an incentive for management to develop improvement cycles and that this 
process can take organisations far beyond the outcomes required by command and control legislation 
or market mechanisms (Altharn and Guerin (1999) at 67). 
39 See, further, Section 6.4.6. 
40 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 231-232. It has been argued that one of the key factors driving 
business interests in environmental sustainability has been the availability of more and better 
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cases, these broader benefits were not identified at the start of the process of 
developing and implementing the EMS. This reflects the experience in other 
countries that have adopted EMSs. The experience has been that, in the first few 
years, firms achieve initial environmental improvements through good housekeeping 
and other relatively simple measures. However, such improvements are not infinite 
and there, inevitably, comes a time where `easy wins' are no longer achievable and 
attention needs to be focussed on larger projects, more extensive investigations of 
available opportunities, possibly investment in new technology and pilot plant, 
changes in production or product design, etc41. It appears, however, that without 
regulatory drivers, the incentive to implement such systems would not have been as 
strong42. That is, regulation provided the key driver for firms to achieve these 
benefits. 
Internationally, the debate around whether or not EMSs actually lead to improved 
environmental performance has been inconclusive. A recent study concluded that 
there was no evidence that firms with EMSs performed better than those without 
EMSs43. This study also suggested that there was no systematic evidence that large 
firms were consistently better performers than small firms, or that firms with EMSs 
had better financial performance. The study noted that the results need to be treated 
with caution, given the difficulty in comparing the environmental impacts of firms 
due to the absence of a universally accepted weighting approach, the absence of 
standardised approaches to environmental reporting, the inherent variation between 
firms and the limited availability and poor quality of environmental data. 
To date, the focus of most EMSs has been on site environmental performance, in 
particular issues such as regulatory compliance, resource conservation and pollution 
environment information resulting from the development and implementation of EMSs (Schaltegger, 
S. and Burritt, R. (2000), Contemporary Environmental Accounting: Issues, Concepts and Practice 
(Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield, UK) at 30-57). 
41 Pedersen, C. and Nielsen, B (2000), 'Maintaining the Momentum: EMS After the Certifier Has 
Left', in Hillary (ed. ) (2000), pp. 31-38. 
42 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 231-232. 03 Berkhout, F. and Hertin, J. (2001), 'Towards Environmental Performance Management' (SPRU, 
University of Sussex, Brighton, UK); Berkhout, F., Hertin, J., Carlens, J., Tyteca, D., Olsthoorn, X., 
Wagner, M. and Wehrmeyer, W. (2001), 'Environmental Indicators in Industry - The MEPI 
Experience' (SPRU, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK), 19 pp. 
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control". That is, firms have focussed their efforts on those environmental issues 
that are of greatest importance to the firm as measured in terms such as financial 
impact, compliance status of the firm, corporate reputation and external 
expectations45. One of the consequences is that broader environmental impacts 
associated with firms' activities may not be fully considered in decision-making, 
meaning that the decisions made, which may be optimal at the site level, may not 
minimise overall life-cycle environmental impacts. This is not a limitation of 
IS014001 per se but rather a reflection of the manner in which firms have seen 
environmental issues primarily as important because of the business implications of 
these issues. 
Is Environmental Performance a Relevant Measure? 
It could be argued that a focus on the environmental outcomes achieved from EMSs is 
inappropriate. The basis for such an argument is that IS014001 does not set 
performance standards, it is simply a tool to enable firms to reach the goal of improved 
performance where the performance requirements that are to be met come from 
legislative requirements and from the goals defined in the fine's policy46. That is, 
IS014001 can be seen as a tool to assist firms to develop a systematic, preventive and 
holistic approach to environmental management through providing a framework for 
managing environmental risks47. As noted by one environmental manager interviewed 
in the course of this research48: 
IS014001 is not a magic tool. It simply forces one to write down what is done, 
but does not require specific outcomes to be achieved. ' 
44 Brophy et al (1995) at 129; Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 26-28. This emphasis is supported by the 
guidance documents on environmental reporting that have been prepared in Australia which emphasise 
site or operational performance as the key area for public environmental reporting (see Note 25). It is 
pertinent to note that leading companies appear to be gradually expanding the scope of environmental 
work from site operations to the entire product life-cycle (Pedersen and Nielsen (2000) at 33), 
although it is probably too early to see substantial evidence of this occurring in Australia. 
as Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 94-227,230-231. 
46 Stenzel, P. (2000), `Can the IS014001 Series Environmental Management Standards Provide a Viable 
Alternative to Government Regulation? ', American Business Law Journal, Vol. 37, pp. 237-298 at 284, 
295; Gunningham and Sinclair (1999b) at 9-10; Krut and Gleckman (1998) at 8,33-35,40-62. 
47 Stenzel (2000) at 295; Gouldston and Murphy (1998) at 22-23. 
48 Interview, 11 February 2000. 
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Ultimately, the outcomes that are defined for environmental management are a firm- 
specific issue. That is, environmentally proactive firms will set challenging targets for 
themselves, whereas others will adopt a more minimalist approach, aiming for 
compliance or somewhere beyond compliance. While benefits have been reported from 
EMS implementation, there is limited evidence that Australian firms are drastically 
changing their performance to significantly reduce their consumption of resources 
(energy, water, raw materials) or to significantly reduce their emissions49. However, 
this does not mean that IS014001 does not influence business decision-making. 
IS014001 can contribute to the definition of corporate goals, through specifying 
minimum requirements in terms of regulatory compliance, pollution prevention and 
continual improvement. In addition, by requiring senior management to review 
environmental performance and through the various data acquisition and recording 
processes, EMSs can enable environmental issues to be integrated into overall 
decision-making processes. These are all important and necessary parts of enabling 
firms to improve their environmental performance. In the specific context of 
Australia, it was common for senior managers not to consider environmental issues 
at all in their decision-making processes. This benefit was commented on by one 
environmental manager who saidso: 
'1S014001 should not be seen as an end in itself but rather as a tool to aid in 
improving environmental performance. There is no doubt that a system 
complying with the Standard will lead to continuous improvement but the 
Standard by itself will not necessarily deliver superior environmental 
performance. That outcome will only be achieved with the support of top 
management, supported by an aware workforce that is given the necessary 
resources and support to achieve. However, by forcing our managers to at 
least consider environmental issues in their decisions, our EMS has helped 
remove a great barrier to improving our environmental performance. ' 
Certification 
The certification of an EMS to a standard such as IS014001 can help improve 
environmental performance through independent auditing of the EMS and through 
provision of a focus (and key performance measure) for environmental management 
49 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 237; Brophy et al (1995) at 130; Krut and Gleckman (1998) at 40- 
62. 
50 Interview, 11 February 2000. 
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efforts51. The certification process is, essentially, an independent audit of the system 
and can help identify areas of weakness in the management system or in the processes 
for managing environmental issues. The fact that the audit is independent also means 
that the identified issues are more likely to be treated seriously by an firm52. 
Certification can also be a key performance indicator for environmental management 
efforts, through enabling firms to confirm the ongoing effectiveness of their EMSs. 
An undue emphasis on certification can mean that certification becomes the primary 
goal of environmental management. The implicit assumption is that, once an EMS is 
certified, the EMS will continue to ensure environmental outcomes are achieved53. 
However, certification to IS014001 is simply a third party verification that every 
requirement of the IS014001 Standard has been met. The certification process does not 
guarantee that all of the firm's environmental aspects are being effectively managed or 
that specific levels of environmental performance have been achieved54. A related issue 
is that the scope of certification is limited to the declared scopes, activities and 
locations55. That is, it is only those parts of the firm that have been nominated for, and 
subject to, the certification process that can be certified. In practice, some firms have 
had part of their organisation certified and have used this in their advertising and 
publicity material. The point that the certification may not apply to all aspects of the 
firm's operations is frequently not explicitly highlighted. 
Finns are not required to be in compliance with all legislation in order for certification 
to be granted. All that is required is for firms to have a policy commitment to 
compliance, to have identified legal requirements and, where these are considered 
51 Hammerschmid, K. and Uliana, L. (1998), 'Environmental Management Systems - The IS014001 
Certification Process and its Benefits to the Industry', The Quality Magazine, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 54-57 at 
54; Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 90-91. 
52 Hammerschmid and Uliana (1998) at 54. 
53 A common issue is that, once certification is received, many organisations tend relax their efforts on 
environmental management, perceiving that the system is now implemented and that there is nothing 
more to be done (Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 92; Pedersen and Nielsen (2000); Gouldston and 
Murphy (1998) at 24). 
54 The emphasis of the certification process is on assessing the conformance of the organisation with 
the requirements of ISO 14001 and with the organisation's policy and objectives and targets. So long 
as organisations meet the continuous improvement dimensions of ISO 14001, no further comments can 
be made (e. g. are the objectives and targets a real challenge or are they merely designed to continue 
business as usual approaches). That is, it is not possible to differentiate between 'good' and `bad' 
performers solely on the basis of certification (Gunningham and Sinclair (1999b) at 18; Krut and 
Gleckman (1998) at 98-99; Switzer et al (2000) at 262-264). 
55 JAS-ANZ (1998) at 13. 
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significant, for objectives and targets to be defined to address these requirements56. 
That is, firms can be out of compliance but still be certified, so long as the non- 
compliance has been identified and steps are in place to address the non-compliance. 
It could be argued that this is not necessarily a bad thing as the fact that regulatory 
non-compliance has been identified and that corrective mechanisms have been 
implemented can be taken as signs of an effective environmental management 
system (i. e. that appropriate self-corrective measures are place). This perspective has 
been criticised on the grounds that such approaches undermine the credibility of 
EMSs57. 
6.4.2 Economic Efficiency 
Data Availability 
Somewhat surprisingly, there are limited data available on either the costs and 
benefits of EMS implementation, or the costs and benefits of environmental 
expenditures (e. g. in relation to specific projects) more generally. To an extent this 
reflects the reluctance of firms to release potentially confidential information into the 
public domain. It also reflects (a) the limitations in the data acquisition and analysis 
systems within firms, and (b) the difficulties in separating out environmental 
expenditures from other business expenditures. 
On EMS development and implementation, while most firms have reasonable data 
on external costs such as consultants fees (as these data are generally captured by 
financial systems), there are limited data available regarding internal EMS 
development and implementation costs such as the time requirements of employees 
and managers for system development, implementation and maintenance58. These 
56 JAS-ANZ (1998). Whereas NCS International does not require that an organisation is in complete 
compliance with legislation for certification to be granted (so long as the organisation has identified the 
non-compliance and is acting to remedy the non-compliance), DNV requires that organisations are in 
compliance or that programmes to achieve regulatory requirements have been agreed with the appropriate 
regulators (NATA (1996), Understanding the 1SO14(100 Series (NATA, Sydney, Australia); DNV (1996), 
'Classification of Nonconformities' (DNV, Sydney, Australia)). 
57 Krut and Gleckman (1998) at 95-97. 
58 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 234. 
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issues were recognised by interviewees who had gone through the EMS development 
and implementation process S9: 
The financial aspects of the corporate EMS have traditionally been absorbed 
within the operational benefits of affected branches, divisions and corporate 
areas. As a consequence, we are unable to place an accurate figure on the 
costs of implementation and subsequent system maintenance. ' 
`We see the environment as another cost of doing business. Separating costs 
out may make an interesting study but we have to look at our projects in 
totality, that is where all costs are considered in the decision-making 
process. ' 
On environmental projects more generally, as discussed above, the initial priority for 
the majority of Australian firms has been regulatory compliance. Most firms have 
seen regulatory compliance as `a cost of doing business' and have tended not subject 
such investments to cost-benefit assessments (other than lowest cost assessments). 
This was confirmed by a number of the environmental managers interviewed for this 
research. While the process of implementing EMSs has led to firms incurring costs 
(i. e. to ensure regulatory compliance) that may not otherwise have been incurred, it 
can be argued that these costs should have been incurred anyway (i. e. that these costs 
should not be seen as part of the costs associated with establishing an EMS). 
The limitations in the available data make it difficult to draw firm conclusions on the 
costs and benefits of environmental management initiatives, although some 
comments can be made (see further below). In the specific context of EMSs, it can 
be concluded that the establishment of such systems has not substantially enhanced 
the acquisition of financial data relating to environmental initiatives. This is an 
important conclusion as one of the critical debates around voluntary approaches (as 
discussed in Chapter 5) is that voluntary approaches can offer significant financial 
benefits over other approaches to regulation (in particular, command and control 
approaches). The paucity of information not only means that this debate cannot be 
resolved but also demonstrates the difficulty in drawing firm conclusions about the 
economic efficiency of different environmental policy instruments. 
59 Interviews on 8 February 2000 and 27 February 2001 respectively. Similar comments were made 
by interviewees interviewed on 7 February 2000,11 February 2000 and 27 November 2000. 
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Costs and Benefits of EMS Implementation 
It has been estimated that the total cost of developing and implementing an EMS is 
typically in the range of A$50-250,000, including staff costs60. As discussed above, 
Australian firms do not appear to have conducted a systematic evaluation of the 
overall costs and benefits of their environmental management initiatives. From the 
interviews conducted for this research, in particular of environmental managers, 
there is general agreement that well-designed EMSs can provide business benefits 
through enabling more strategic and structured decisions to be made61. For example, 
the environmental manager of a construction company said62: 
`Our EMS has enabled us to not only better understand the environmental 
requirements that are an integral part of all of the jobs that we tender for but 
also to demonstrate that we are able to meet these requirements. ' 
Another perspective raised by some of those interviewed is that the business costs 
associated with the environment are so significant that a formal management system 
is essential to manage these issues (i. e. an EMSs can be seen as a necessary cost 
associated with running a business). These business costs can include63: 
" Regulatory costs (e. g. reporting, monitoring, investigations and studies, training, 
inspections, manifesting, labelling, protective equipment, emergency response 
equipment, medical surveillance, insurance, stormwater management, waste 
disposal, taxes, licence fees); 
60 Hammerschmid and Uliana (1998) at 57. The first EMSs that were implemented in Australia were 
frequently kept separate from other organisational processes and systems, whereas it is now recognised 
that it is important that an EMS is fully integrated with existing management systems, practices and 
processes. The consequence is that the costs of developing and implementing EMSs quoted may be 
overstated as they reflect the historic approach of treating the environment as a separate management 
issue. 
61 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 234; Gunningham and Sinclair (1999b) at 8. There has been concern 
that systems that are not appropriate to the needs of an organisation can actually lead to organisations 
not realising the full benefits of environmental management (e. g. through administrative inefficiency 
or poor links between environmental management and broader business activities). There have been 
no systematic evaluations of the efficiency losses associated with poorly designed or suboptimal 
EMSs. 
62 Interview, 7 February 2000. 
63 DeSimone, L. and Popoff, F. (1998), Eco-Efficiency: The Business Link to Sustainable Development 
(MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA) at 26; Schaltegger and Burritt (2000) at 99-102. 
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Environmental projects (e. g. site studies, site preparation, licensing, research and 
development, engineering, installation, capital and operating costs, project 
closure and remediation); 
" Voluntary initiatives (e. g. community programmes); 
" Contingent costs (e. g. future compliance costs, remediation); 
" Image and relationship costs. 
Given that EMSs may enable many millions of dollars of issues to be managed, they 
can be seen as a cost-effective initiative, where the value of the issues to be managed 
substantially exceeds the system establishment costs64 . For example, an assessment 
of the economic effects of European Union's Eco-Management and Auditing Scheme 
(EMAS) in Germany found that the costs of developing and implementing a system 
to meet the requirements of EMAS'were US$100,000 on average. Of the firms that 
developed and implemented such systems, one third reduced their costs by up to 
US$80,000 per year and one third reduced their costs by up to US$320,000 per year 
(a further one third of participating organisations did not provide data)65 
Costs and Benefits of Environmental Projects 
An alternative approach to the assessment of economic efficiency is to look at the costs 
and benefits of the decisions (e. g. environmental projects) that are made as a 
consequence of the implementation of an EMS. 
As noted above, most Australian firms have seen regulatory compliance as `a cost of 
doing business' and have tended not subject such investments to cost-benefit 
" Hammerschmid and Uliana (1998) at 57. For example, an assessment of the economic effects of 
European Union's Eco-Management and Auditing Scheme (EMAS) in Germany found that the costs 
of developing and implementing a system to meet the requirements of EMAS were US$100,000 on 
average. Of the firms that developed and implemented such systems, one third reduced their costs by 
up to US$80,000 per year and one third reduced their costs by up to US$320,000 per year (a further 
one third of participating organisations did not provide data). The average payback of system and 
improvement measures was less than 1.5 years (Schaltegger and Burritt (2000) at 377). 
65 Schaltegger and Burritt (2000) at 377. 
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assessments (other than lowest cost assessments). While the process of 
implementing EMSs has led to firms incurring costs to ensure regulatory compliance, 
it could be argued that these costs should have been incurred anyway. That is, these 
costs should not be seen as part of the costs associated with establishing an EMS. 
Apart from regulatory compliance initiatives, the majority of environmental 
management initiatives have been `no regrets' measures (i. e. where there are clear 
financial benefits to the firm). From interviews with environmental managers, the 
expected rate of return on environmental or energy investments (other than those that 
relate to regulatory compliance) is typically 50 per cent. That is, the initial capital 
investment has to be paid back within two years66. These investment thresholds and 
their appropriateness are discussed further in Chapter 7. In the context of this 
chapter, there is limited evidence that the implementation of EMSs has altered the 
investment hurdles that firms set for themselves. That is, EMSs can be said to be 
economically efficient as that they do not require firms to take any actions beyond 
those that can be clearly justified in economic terms, nor do they require firms to 
change their internal investment hurdles. 
The one clear contribution of EMSs to improved efficiency is through making 
environmental issues an explicit part of firms' decision-making processes. That is, 
while the investment hurdles may not have altered, the placing of environmental 
issues on the business decision-making agenda does appear to have enabled firms to 
identify financial opportunities associated with environmental initiatives. 
6.4.3 Administration and Compliance Costs 
Data Availability 
For the purposes of this chapter, administration and compliance costs are those costs 
associated with the EMS certification process. While data are available on the costs 
66 van Berkel, R. (2000), `Cleaner Production in Australia: Revolutionary Strategy or Incremental 
Tool? ', Australian Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 132-146; Environment 
Australia (1998), Environment and Business: Profiting from Cleaner Production (Environment Australia, 
Canberra, Australia). Payback periods for environmental and energy projects are discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 7. 
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of certification (i. e. the fees of the certification body), firms also invest resources in 
preparing for audits (e. g. ensuring that all documents and records are up to date) and 
assisting the certification body (e. g. responding to queries, providing guides for site 
inspections). There are no data available on these costs. According to one 
environmental manager interviewed for this research (presenting a typical 
perspective on the issue of administration costs)67: 
`Its just part of my job. We all get paid salaries to do what is necessary to 
meet the organisation's aims. EMS certification is one of those things. Its up 
to me to make sure that we stay certified. Others, for example, our procedure 
custodians and those who are interviewed by the certifiers, also contribute. 
But we don't keep a record of our hours on the certification process. ' 
In a similar manner to the assessment of economic efficiency in Section 6.4.2, it can 
be concluded that EMSs have not enhanced the acquisition of financial data relating 
to administration and compliance costs. This is an important conclusion as one of 
the potential advantages of voluntary approaches (as discussed in Chapter 5) is that 
they may have lower transaction costs than other approaches to regulation (in 
particular, command and control approaches). The limitations in the available 
information mean that it is not possible to derive a firm conclusion on this issue. 
Assessment of Administrative and Compliance Costs 
Depending on the specific industry and the complexity of the environmental issues 
that need to be managed, the costs for certification are typically in the range 
A$5,000-25,000 for the initial certification process and A$3,000-5,000 per annum 
after that68. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, administrative and compliance costs are difficult to assess 
directly and, therefore, the approach used in this dissertation is to look at how the 
requirements of the voluntary approach compares to the requirements that would be 
imposed if it were a government programme. In the context of EMSs, a relevant 
comparison is between IS014001 certification and the requirements of European 
67 Interview, 9 February 2000. 
68 Hammerschmid and Uliana (1998) at 57. 
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Union's Eco-Management and Auditing Scheme (EMAS)69. The certification 
processes for the two schemes are broadly similar with the only major difference is 
that, under EMAS, firms are required to prepare an public environmental statement 
detailing how the firm has performed in meeting its stated objectives and targets70. 
Apart from the EMAS requirement for public reporting, the compatibility between the 
standards is such that if a firm has been certified to one of the standards, the firm should 
also satisfy certification requirements for the other standard7l. 
The private sector certification process means that governments do not need to establish 
their own certification processes and, therefore, certification can be seen as a transfer of 
administrative and compliance costs to the private sector. Furthermore, EMSs may 
allow governments to make more efficient use of their resources by focussing 
enforcement efforts on those companies that do not choose to adopt an EMS. For 
example, under the Victorian Environment Protection Act 1994, licensees who 
demonstrate an ability and commitment to environmental management (which includes 
the implementation of an EMS) can be accredited, where the benefits of an accredited 
licence include simplified licensing requirements, a reduction in licence fees and 
simplified approval requirements for most new works72. 
When considering administrative and compliance costs, it is important to note that 
certification may provide business benefits such as marketing/PR, access to new 
markets, meeting the requirements of customers, reduced regulatory compliance costs, 
savings on insurance and enhanced relationships with financial institutions, regulators 
69 European Community (1993), Eco Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 1836193,29 June 1993. 
70 Honkasalo, A. (1998), 'The EMAS Scheme: A Management Tool and Instrument of Environmental 
Policy', Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 6, pp. 119-128 at 121. In some of the literature comparing 
ISO14001 with EMAS, it has been argued that that ISO14001 is much weaker than EMAS as EMAS 
involves compulsory validation, public reporting, legal proceedings, compliance and environmental 
performance assurance (Krut and Gleckman (1998) at 16-22; Gunningham and Sinclair (1999b) at 
10). Apart from the issue of public reporting, these differences reflect the fact that EMAS is part of 
the administrative and regulatory structures of the European Union whereas IS014001 is simply a 
specification and not, of itself, part of a specific regulatory system. Therefore, care is required to 
ensure that 'like is compared with like'. 
71 Robinson D. and Clegg A. (1998), 'Environmental Leadership and Competitive Advantage through 
Environmental Management System Standards', Eco-Management and Auditing, Vol. 5, pp. 6-14. 
72 A'Heam, T. (1996), `Environmental Management and Industry Competitiveness', in DEST (1996c), 
Environmental Economics Seminar Series: Environmental Policy and International Competitiveness 
(DEST, Canberra, Australia), pp. 38-43. 
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and other stakeholders73. That is, for many firms, the transaction and administrative 
costs may actually be negative (i. e. there may be net benefits associated with 
certification). However, as a consequence of the limitations in the available data, it is 
not possible to draw a firm conclusion on this issue. 
6.4.4 Competitiveness Implications 
At the domestic level, given that there are no mandatory requirements for EMS 
certification, the decision on whether or not to implement an EMS is a decision for 
each individual company. That is, it is a matter for firms to decide on how to trade 
off the benefits (e. g. cost savings, improved environmental performance) and costs of 
developing and implementing an EMS. Furthermore, for the majority of firms, the 
costs associated with obtaining and maintaining certification are relatively low 
compared to other business costs and, therefore, the cost of certification should not 
be a barrier to obtaining certification. 
The international competitiveness implications of EMS certification are less clear. 
When it was first issued, there was discussion that firms would be required to be 
certified to IS014001 before gaining access to certain markets74. As yet this has not 
eventuated, although the recent debates around the integration of environmental 
concerns into international trade rules may yet lead to ISO 14001 certification being a 
prerequisite for access to certain markets75. This raises important issues regarding 
the certification process. Some of the environmental managers interviewed for this 
research expressed concern about the potential variation in certification requirements 
in different countries. It has been suggested that it may be easier to obtain 
certification in some countries rather than others76. The issue is less the costs of 
certification (which are relatively minor) but rather the costs associated with the 
development, implementation and maintenance of EMSs. In Australia, there is a 
broad consensus that the systems in place to ensure the independence of auditors and 
73 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 90-91; Stenzel (2000) at 264-273; Sunderland, T. (1997), 
`Environmental Management Standards and Certification: Do They Add Value? ', in Sheldon, C. (ed. ) 
(1997), 15014001 and Beyond: Environmental Management Systems in the Real World (Greenleaf 
Publishing, Sheffield, UK), pp. 127-137 at 131-133. 
74 Robinson and Clegg (1998) at 7; Honkasalo (1998) at 120; Gunningham and Sinclair (1999b) at 12. 
75 Altham and Guerin (1999) at 62; Stenzel (2000) at 289-290; Gunningham and Sinclair (1999b) at 8; 
Krut and Gleckman (1998) at 63-74. 
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the skills and experience of auditors are reasonably robust77. Equally, however, it 
should be noted that perfect independence cannot be assured given the dependence of 
the certification bodies on their clients for fee revenue (for auditing and certification) 
which creates at least the potential for auditors to `go easy' on their clients78. While the 
national accreditation bodies do work together to ensure that accreditation and 
certification requirements are consistent, these do not necessarily address the manner 
in which auditing is carried out in practice, the degree of scrutiny that firms are 
subjected to or the manner in which non-conformances are addressed79. The 
consequence is that the requirements for certification may become a de facto trade 
barrier (where the differences in the certification process may provide certain 
companies or countries with a competitive advantage). 
6.4.5 Soft Effects 
ISO 14001 offers the potential for promoting change in corporate environmental cultures 
(e. g. through enabling better performance, encouraging the integration of environmental 
performance into corporate decision-making)80. Despite this potential, there is limited 
evidence that EMSs have led to Australian firms adopting more holistic approaches to 
environmental management. This may reflect the emphasis placed on regulatory 
compliance rather than a specific limitation of ISO 14001. It may be that the future will 
see more proactive approaches to environmental management being adopted, through 
firms learning from their experience and integrating this experience into their decision- 
making processes81. These learning processes have been recognised by environmental 
managers interviewed for this research82: 
76 Stenzel (2000) at 286. 
77 JAS-ANZ has issued criteria for auditors (JAS-ANZ (1998) at 27-33) and the JAZ-ANZ website is a 
public register of EMS auditors (httpJ/www. jas-anz. com. au). ? ublic 
certification bodies are not permitted to provide consultancy services (JAS-ANZ (1998) at 15-18). 
79 This appears to have been the case in IS09000 (for quality management systems) where 
organisations had 'paper systems' that met the requirements of the relevant standard and certification 
was granted, even though the system was not implemented in practice (see, for example, the views 
expressed in Krut and Gleckman (1998) at 76). 
80 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999b) at 9. 
81 There are some early signs of this occurring in Australia. A recent study of twenty-six firms in Western 
Australia (twelve of whom were certified and fourteen of whom were not certified) indicated that the 
certified firms had implemented approximately 1.5 times as many new technologies (e. g. energy 
conservation, water conservation, waste reduction technology) as non-certified firms (Marinova, D. and 
Altham, W. (2000), 'IS014001 and the Adoption of New Technology: Evidence from Western 
Australian Companies', in Hillary (ed. ) (2000), pp. 182-199)). 
82 Interviews on 10 February 2000 and 8 February 2000 respectively. 
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`Having an EMS has been great for us as an organisation as it has meant we 
have improved our performance, in particular through a systematic approach to 
identifying our environmental issues and through getting into compliance. With 
hindsight, I think that we were too focussed on compliance. What happened 
was that we saw each compliance issue, and there were a few, as an isolated 
problem to be solved, whereas if we had taken a more holistic approach and a 
bit more time we could have identified better environmental solutions at lower 
cost. One example was where we installed a chemical dosing system to meet 
the conditions of our trade waste agreement. With hindsight, I suspect we could 
have eliminated the waste stream completely by separating the lines and 
rerouting the wastes back into the process. ' 
'On each new project, we now explicitly look at environmental issues. We've 
found that the waste avoidance and waste minimisation philosophies of 
environmental management have given us new tools to look at environmental 
problems. ' 
There is evidence that EMSs can stimulate the self-organisation and self-regulation of 
firms and many firms have reported management and cultural changes, in particular 
in the way decisions are made83. The processes of developing and issuing an 
environmental policy help create accountability and an expectation that the firm will 
follow through on the commitments defined in the policy. Furthermore, the 
processes of identifying environmental aspects and impacts and legal requirements 
have the potential to build the capacity within firms to assess environmental 
management options and to place these options in a broader business context84. 
These changes are being reflected in the manner in which individuals within firms see 
their responsibilities85: 
`We know that we are all responsible for environmental performance. ' 
`The register of environmental aspects and impacts and the electronic database 
of legal requirements have meant that we have been able to formalise 
responsibilities for regulatory compliance. ' 
`All of our employees went through a two hour environmental awareness 
programme and all new employees have the environment as a specific issue in 
their induction training. We also include the environment in meetings, from the 
ten minute toolbox meeting to our senior management review meetings. This 
93 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 94-227. 84 Gunningham, N. (1999), `Integrating Management Systems and Occupational Health and Safety 
Regulation', Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 192-214 at 213; Stenzel (2000) at 280,296. 85 Interviews on 27 February 2001,7 February 2000 and 8 February 2000 respectively. 
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training and high profile for the environment has provided a lot of benefits. For 
example, we encourage our employees to come up with new ideas for 
improvements. It also means that our employees see us as an environmentally 
responsible company. ' 
6.4.6 Innovation 
The major effects of implementing EMSs appear to have been to enable Australian 
firms to address their regulatory compliance issues and to implement those measures 
that provide clear financial returns. For many firms, these are tangible benefits. While 
there are some early signs that EMSs may be resulting in innovation or encouraging 
firms to adopt new technologies and management measures, it is too early to say 
whether EMSs will provide a strong driver for innovation86. One of the reasons is the 
absence of performance requirements in ISO14001. That is, the fact of having an EMS 
does not necessarily provide a driver for change in environmental performance. Even 
though ISO 14001 is not a performance standard it can support beyond compliance 
initiatives through providing companies with a framework for managing environmental 
risks, through self-examination and self-correction of environmentally harmful practices 
or conditions87. For example, as noted by the environmental manager for, an electricity 
utility88: 
`The auditing and corrective action procedures of our EMS have proven to be 
an effective and highly proactive mechanism to encourage staff to identify 
deficiencies and potential improvements in our operations. This has 
delivered significant bottom line benefits through efficiency gains and 
performance improvements. ' 
6.4.7 Viability and Feasibility 
Business Perspectives 
66 While the data presented in Marinova and Altham (2000) indicate that certified firms are more 
innovative, care is required in drawing firm conclusions from these data, due to the limited number of 
firms considered, the fact that the specific technologies adopted may differ, the lack of differentiation 
in the data (e. g. two separate technologies may have been adopted for a specific problem). However, 
the certified firms appeared to see environmental improvements in a much more holistic manner than 
those firms that had not been certified and saw that certification (and the actions resulting from their 
EMSs) provided broader business and competitive advantages. 
87 Stenzel (2000) at 295 
88 Interview, 11 February 2000. 
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Industry has argued that EMSs can enable firms to substantially improve their 
environmental performance, demonstrate their social responsibility, move towards 
sustainability and provide flexibility in responding to environmental issues89. EMSs 
are also seen as enabling the burden on regulatory bodies to be reduced, on the 
grounds that fewer investigations are required for firms with certified EMSs90. 
Despite the rhetoric, the relatively low number of Australian firms that have been 
certified to IS014001 indicates that the advantages of certification are not 
unambiguous. As of 15 November 2001,1,085 Australian firms with certified EMSs 
were listed in the JAS-ANZ register91. An inspection of the register indicated that 
some firms had multiple certifications (for discrete parts of their business or for 
different geographic sectors). In some cases, it appeared that firms had their details 
recorded twice. In total, approximately four hundred firms had some or all of their 
organisation certified to IS014001. 
There are a number of reasons why the uptake of certification has been so low. The 
first, and perhaps most important, is that certification is not a requirement for 
winning government contracts. Some of the concerns over EMS certification have 
resulted from the Australian experience with quality management systems. At the 
end of 1995, almost 9,000 Australian companies had been certified to IS09000. In 
many cases the main reason for certification was to meet government purchasing 
requirements. The problem was that many firms simply implemented a system that 
would get them certification, without necessarily considering the organisational 
implications of such an approach (in terms of inefficiencies, inappropriate coverage, 
lack of staff support, excessive documentation, etc)92. In 1996, the Australian 
government decided that companies would no longer be required to conform with 
IS09000 to secure government contracts93. It may be that demand from customers 
may actually become the key determinant of whether or not EMSs are more widely 
adopted94. For example, Ford has advised all of its suppliers that they will need to be 
89 Altham and Guerin (1999) at 61,66-67; Stenzel (2000) at 252-258; Gunningham and Sinclair (1999b) 
at 8. 
90 Altharn and Guerin (1999) at 66; Stenzel (2000) at 239,252-258,28 1. 91 See further the JAS-ANZ website, http: //www. jas-anz. com. au (last visited 15 November 2001). 
92 See Note 79. 
93 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 91-93. 94 Toffel, M. (2000), 'Anticipating Greener Supply Chain Demands: One Singapore Company's Journey 
to ISO14001', in Hillary (ed. ) (2000), pp. 182-199 at 183; Jenkinson (2001). 
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certified to IS014001 as a precondition for being a supplier to Ford95. There is 
evidence that Australian companies are starting to look at the environmental 
performance of their suppliers and contractors, and may increasingly start to require 
IS014001 certification as a tender requirement96. 
The second reason for the limited number of certifications is that industry sees that 
there is a general lack of public recognition for the efforts of firms with certified 
EMSs97. For example, NGOs have been sceptical of the credibility of the ISO 14001 
certification process (see further below). 
The third issue is the lack of consistency between the requirements of ISO 14001 and 
other government requirements and industry programmes98. The consequence has 
been that firms that have signed up to other programmes have been reluctant to also 
go through the IS014001 certification process". The potential consequence is that 
the market for certification to IS014001 may be undermined. A representative of the 
Australian chemical industry arguedloo: 
`It may be that IS014001 is on its way out. Many companies feel that they have 
enough systems and processes and that IS014001 simply duplicates these other 
systems. ' 
Despite these concerns, IS014001 is increasingly referred to in other programmes (e. g. 
the Greenhouse Challenge and the Minerals Industry's Code for Environmental 
Management) as providing the framework or model for an EMS. As a consequence, 
this problem of multiple standards may decline over time. 
95 Anon (2001), 'Ford Urges Suppliers to Hasten EMS Uptake', The Environmental Engineer, Vol. 2, 
No. 1, pp. 3-4. Concern has been expressed that the requirement for suppliers to be certified to ISO14001 
may become a trade barrier preventing non-certified companies from supplying certified multinationals 
(Marinova and Altham (2000) at 251-252; Davy, A. (1997), 'Environmental Management Systems: 
IS014001 Issues for Developing Countries', in Sheldon (ed. ) (1997), pp. 169-182 at 173-176). 
96 See, for example, Jenkinson (2001). 
97 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999b) at 15. 
98 For a practical example of difficulties faced by organisations in aligning the requirements of 
IS014001 and, in this case, requirements to develop an Integrated Environmental Management 
System under the Queensland Environmental Protection Regulation (1995), see Photinos, G. and 
McKim, R. (2001), `Redland Shore Council', in Sullivan and Wyndham (2001), pp. 157-176. 
99 That is, the reluctance of industry to have their EMSs certified is not a rejection of EMSs, but rather 
a sign that IS014001 may not be the preferred management tool (Gunningham and Sinclair (1999b) at 
16). 
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The fourth reason for the lack of uptake is the concern that the implementation of EMSs 
will be the precursor of regulation, either through making EMSs mandatory or, through 
the continual improvement component of IS014001, leading to a rising floor of 
regulationlol It is unclear if this will happen as a consequence of IS014001 or whether 
any such changes will reflect broader pressures for improved environmental 
performance anyway. 
The fifth reason is that the legal status of environmental audits and other data gathered 
for environmental management purposes remain unclear (i. e. there are issues around 
privilege, disclosure and self-incrimination) and this is a potential barrier to the broader 
adoption of auditing within Australia102. 
While none of these problems are insurmountable, they have led to industry opinion 
being divided on the benefits of IS014001 and of IS014001 certification. The 
following comments by one environmental manager reflect the views of many of those 
interviewed for this research103: 
`Tailoring our management system to be aligned with IS014001 has been 
worthwhile and has added value. However, the IS014001 Standard is seen 
very much as a tool rather than an end in itself. 
Government Perspectives 
Australian government agencies have broadly welcomed and encouraged the 
development of EMSs as the improved rates of compliance and improved 
environmental performance that appear to be associated with the implementation of 
such systems can enable government agencies to focus their attention on more 
serious polluters104. The certification process may also mean that governments do 
10° Interview, 26 February 2001. 
101 Murray (1999) at 49. 
102 Lowe, P. (1997), 'How Green is my Company? An Examination of Curial and Statutory Processes 
Protecting Environmental Audits from Disclosure', Environmental Planning and Law Journal, Vol. 15, 
No. 6, pp. 473-480 at 474-479. 
103 Interview, 11 February 2000. 
104 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999b) at 8,17. An interesting perspective is that advanced by Bell who 
has argued that, while it cannot change laws, ISO14001 may have a positive effect on the degree to 
which existing laws are implemented as, even in countries where environmental legislation is 
unevenly enforced, IS014001 requires companies to demonstrate their commitment to compliance, 
irrespective of the actual enforcement practices in a country (Bell, C. (1997), 'The IS014001 
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not need to establish their own processes for the certification of EMSs. Both Victoria 
(the Accredited Licensing initiative) and Western Australia (Best Practice Licensing 
Scheme) have incorporated a commitment to EMSs as a central component of their 
licensing programmes, with accredited facilities being provided with benefits such as 
reduced fees, licence bubbles and exemptions from regulatory monitoring and site 
inspections by EPA105. Despite these benefits, the uptake of accredited licences has 
been very slow, probably reflecting the realities that regulatory requirements are not so 
onerous or so complex as to require firms to implement an EMS, and that the benefits 
of regulatory relief do not outweigh the costs of implementing an EMS1°6. 
NGO Perspectives 
Environmental groups have been critical of EMSs for a number of reasons. The first 
is that EMSs are voluntary and, for at least some groups, there is a preference for a tool 
that is part of the regulatory framework. This issue is compounded by the absence of 
requirements for public reporting in IS014001107. Public reporting is seen as creating a 
framework of accountability for companies (although this clearly depends on the 
quality of the reported data108). 
The second reason is that the focus of the certification process is on the conformance of 
systems of environmental management with IS014001, rather than on the specific 
outcomes that are achieved from environmental management processes. That is, it is 
not possible to differentiate between good and bad performers solely on the basis of 
certification and there is no guarantee that firms with certified EMSs will have a better 
environmental performance109. This concern is compounded by the fact that the 
certification process is a private sector arrangement where the certifiers are paid by their 
clients, which may lead to capture or less lenient auditing' 10. 
Environmental Management Systems Standard: One American's View', in Sheldon (ed. ) (1997), pp. 
61-92 at 69). 
'°5 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999b) at 18. See also Section 6.4.2. 
1°6 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999b) at 20 
107 Honkasalo (1998) at 121; Stenzel (2000) at 284; Barber (1998) at 21. 108 Gouldston and Murphy (1998) at 146. 109 See further Note 54. 
1° Gouldston and Murphy (1998) at 146. 
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The third reason is that there is general scepticism regarding the purpose of IS014001, 
as the corporate agenda is perceived as aiming to replace mandatory national standards 
with voluntary standards (i. e. the corporate agenda has been portrayed as deregulatory 
rather than complementary to legislation)"'. Furthermore, certified EMSs may enable 
firms to develop enhanced relations with regulators, which may also enable them to 
influence the behaviour of regulators or to influence the regulatory process' 12 
Finally, NGOs are concerned that the emphasis of ISO 14001 on standardisation (of 
processes, activities) may actually act as a barrier to the necessary radical changes that 
are required to achieve sustainability113. This argument has an element of truth and also 
an element of inaccuracy. EMSs can be seen as a tool for achieving defined outcomes. 
That is, their role is to enable corporate goals and objectives to be achieved and, from 
the discussion of environmental effectiveness in Section 6.4.1, it does appear that EMSs 
are an effective tool for enabling corporate objectives to be achieved. In this context, 
the key issue is the external (e. g. regulation, consumer demand) or internal drivers (e. g. 
corporate ethics) for change. Clearly, the strong drivers for sustainability are not in 
place to effect this change and, therefore, it could be argued that the criticism should be 
aimed at the regulatory and policy framework rather than at EMSs. An alternative 
perspective is that EMSs, through their success (e. g. in enabling firms to comply with 
legislation, enabling industry to demonstrate its ability to self-regulate) have actually 
acted as a barrier to the stronger regulatory and policy changes necessary to achieve 
sustainability. The representative of one environmental group interviewed for this 
research argued that' la: 
`The problem is not IS014001 itself - it is just a management tool and the 
evidence is that it does help organisations manage their environmental issues. 
The problem is that IS014001 and IS014001 certification are being used to 
argue against the more fundamental changes that are needed for us to move 
towards sustainability. Of course regulatory compliance and finding easy wins 
are key parts of organisations' performance. But these must be seen as just the 
starting point not as the endpoint or the upper limit of performance. ' 
111 Stenzel (2000) at 257-25 8,285. 112 Stenzel (2000) at 268,281; Gouldston and Murphy (1998) at 23; Barber (1998) at 21. 113 Rikhardsson, P. and Welford, R. (1997), 'Clouding the Crisis: The Construction of Corporate 
Environmental Management' in Welford, R. (1997), Hijacking Environmentalism (Earthscan, 
London, UK), pp. 40-62 at 51-56. 
114 Interview, 26 February 2001. 
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6.4.8 Law and Public Policy Issues 
One of the specific questions that need to be considered is whether EMSs should be a 
mandatory requirement. The broad arguments in favour of mandatory EMSs are that 
they offer the potential for improved corporate performance in relation to regulatory 
compliance and that they ensure that there are processes and systems in place for 
firms to manage their environmental issues. However, the creation of mandatory 
requirements may lead to firms emphasising compliance with the law, rather than 
using EMSs as a tool for business improvement or for achieving better business 
outcomeslls Furthermore, it is doubtful that EMSs lend themselves to blanket 
adoption as each firm is unique (with different aspects and impacts, management 
structures, levels of skill, expertise and resources and corporate cultures) and the 
approach adopted for environmental management will be defined by these factors 116 . 
Having noted these limitations, it may be that the increasing use of IS014001 as a 
model for an EMS means that regulatory requirements can be aligned with the 
systems and structures proposed in ISO14001. For example, the requirement of 
ISO 14001 that there are management representatives with responsibility for ensuring 
that the EMS is maintained and for reporting on the performance of the system may 
mean that it may be possible to develop a regulatory framework around broadly agreed 
management structures although even this type of approach may lead to overly 
restrictive constraints on organisational structures. As a consequence, it is generally 
agreed that regulations should avoid prescribing exact forms of management for 
t firms t7. 
A further issue with making EMSs a mandatory requirement is that there are no 
minimum performance standards specified in IS014001. It is, as a consequence, not 
possible to differentiate between good and bad performers solely on the basis of 
certification. Therefore, EMSs should only form part of overall regulatory 
requirements, others of which could include measurable improvements in 
environmental performance, independent third party oversight, public participation and 
115 Gunningham (1999) at 205; Honkasalo (1998) at 127-128; Sullivan, R. (2001) at 602. 
116 Sullivan and Wyndham (2001) at 229-230. 
117 Rehbinder (1995) at 265; Gunningham (1999) at 212-213; Sullivan (2001) at 602. 
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public reporting, government oversight underpinned by credible sanctions118. In this 
context, it may be that the best approach is to specify the environmental outcomes that 
are required and to then allow firms the freedom to achieve these outcomes in the most 
. appropriate manner' 
19 
Finally, it is important to consider the issues associated with small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Many SMEs do not have the capacity or interest to go beyond 
compliance, as the costs of developing and implementing such systems may be 
prohibitive and may not be appropriate to the issues that need to be managed. In 
practice, such firms tend to prefer defined requirements (e. g. the use of specific 
technologies) rather than flexible approaches. Even though it has been argued that 
many firms could do much more if encouraged to go beyond compliance, the reality is 
that the majority of SMEs will continue to prefer compliance-oriented approaches (i. e. 
specific rules) rather than regulatory flexibility'20. 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
EMSs do appear to have provided significant benefits to many Australian firms, 
through enabling them to assure regulatory compliance, to achieve cost-effective 
environmental improvements and to ensure that environmental issues are integrated into 
business decision-making processes. These outcomes have represented significant step 
changes for many firms. It is, however, a point of debate whether these outcomes have 
resulted as a consequence of the implementation of EMSs or whether they should, in 
fact, be attributed to the regulatory changes that have made environmental management 
a business priority. To date, there is limited evidence to suggest that EMSs (at least of 
themselves) have created greater pressures for sustainability within Australian 
businesses. 
118 Gunningham (1999) at 18; Gouldston and Murphy (1998) at 94-95; Gunningham and Sinclair 
(1999b) at 18. 
119 More explicitly, some degree of compliance or performance assessment is important to ensure 
standards are maintained, even though this may fly in the face of the theory or of those who argue for 
deregulated approaches 
120 Altham and Guerin (1999) at 67; Sullivan (2001) at 602-603; Gunningham (1999) at 198. Not all 
SMEs fall into this category and there are examples where innovative approaches to obtaining 
certification have been adopted, allowing SMEs can achieve many of the benefits of IS014001 at a 
reasonable cost (see, for example, Ammenberg, J., Borjesson, B. and Hjelm, 0. (2000), 'Joint EMS and 
Group Certification: A Cost-Effective Route for SMEs to Achieve IS014001', in Hillary, R. (ed. ) 
(2000), pp. 58-66). 
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The evaluation of performance is limited by weaknesses in firms' environmental 
information collection systems, in particular in relation to the economic aspects of 
environmental decisions. That is, while EMSs do appear (e. g. from interviews with 
environmental managers) to have provided a range of environmental and economic 
benefits, the data to confirm these performance improvements is limited. In the specific 
context of this research, the consequence is that it is not possible to draw firm 
conclusions on whether EMSs are inherently more efficient or have lower transaction 
costs than alternative approaches to regulation. 
The question is, then, where to from here? At the moment, there is still a wide 
spectrum of environmental performance and many firms are still moving towards 
establishing systems and assuring regulatory compliance. IS014001 is likely to provide 
the framework for many companies in these endeavours 121. EMSs (once established) 
are seen as a cost-effective management tool and there is no evidence that, once 
implemented, companies will then remove the EMS. Furthermore, it appears that the 
greatest value of EMSs is seen as their ability to assure regulatory compliance. While 
continual improvement is one of the underpinning principles of EMSs, there is limited 
evidence that firms see this as a strong requirement or as a principle that should 
override other factors that influence business decision-making processes. That is, 
regulation seems likely to have a key role to play in defining how far firms move 
towards the goals of sustainability. 
121 For example, a review of the JAS-ANZ register of certified companies in September 2002 
indicated that approximately 400 companies had been added to the register since November 2001. 
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7. THE AUSTRALIAN GREENHOUSE CHALLENGE 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Australian Greenhouse Challenge, established in 1995, is one of the Australian 
government's key policy initiatives for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. This 
chapter reviews the manner in which the Greenhouse Challenge has operated to date 
and assesses its contribution to Australia's overall greenhouse policy. 
This chapter is the second of the three case-studies that are assessed in this 
dissertation. The Greenhouse Challenge is similar to IS014001 as it is essentially a 
management process programme (i. e. the focus is on establishing management 
processes to meet self-defined targets). However, it differs from IS014001 as the 
focus is on a specific environmental issue (i. e. greenhouse gas emissions) and is a 
public voluntary programme rather than a private programme. 
The structure of the chapter is similar to that of the evaluation of EMSs. The first 
part (Sections 7.2 and Section 7.3) provides an overview of the context and driving 
forces for the Greenhouse Challenge. Section 7.2 provides an overview of the 
science and potential impacts of global warming, while Section 7.3 discusses the 
international and Australian policy debates on global warming. The second part 
(Section 7.4) is a description of the Greenhouse Challenge. The third part (Section 
7.5) is a detailed evaluation of the Greenhouse Challenge. The evaluation 
framework (as for EMSs) is based on the assessment framework developed in 
Chapter 2. 
7.2 GREENHOUSE SCIENCE AND POLITICS 
7.2.1 Climate Change Science 
The greenhouse effect is a natural phenomenon where naturally occurring gases 
(including carbon dioxide and water vapour) in the earth's atmosphere trap heat that 
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would otherwise escape into space'. Without the greenhouse effect, the earth would 
be, on average, some 33 degrees Celsius colder than it is today2. Human activities 
have most impact on atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
nitrous oxide (N20), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs)3. The major source of carbon dioxide is the burning of 
fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas), while methane is produced from the digestive 
processes of cattle, rice cultivation, natural gas venting and waste decomposition in 
landfills. Nitrous oxide is produced primarily from vegetation burning, industrial 
emissions and the effects of agriculture on soil processes. It is estimated that 
present-day atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are about 30 per cent 
higher than in pre-industrial times and are increasing by about 0.4 per cent per year4. 
The increased concentrations of these greenhouse gases alter radiative balances and 
tend to warm the atmosphere, thereby creating the prospect of global climate change 
(frequently refered to as the `enhanced greenhouse effect'). `Climate change' is 
defined as a change of climate, attributable either directly or indirectly to human 
activity, that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is additional 
to natural climate variability over comparable time periods5. It is estimated that a 
warming of about 0.6 degrees Celsius has occurred since the late 1800s6. Carbon 
dioxide is estimated to contribute about 70 per cent of the enhanced greenhouse 
effect, with methane contributing a further 20 per cent7. The different greenhouse 
gases have different potentials to enhance the ability of the earth's atmosphere to trap 
heat. In most policy discussions, greenhouse gas emissions are expressed in terms of 
1 Schneider, S. (1996), Laboratory Earth (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, UK) at 44-100. 
2 Schneider (1996) at 82-84. 
3 See further Section 7.3.3. 
4 The present concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is approximately 370 parts per 
million, compared to an average level of 330 parts per million in the early 1970s and a reasonably 
constant average of 280 parts per million in the 1000 years before the industrial revolution (Pearman, 
G. (2001), 'The Greenhouse Effect: Progress with the Underlying Science', Clean Air, Vol. 35, No. 4, 
pp. 32-36 at 32-33). 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] 1992, ILM, Vol. 31, p. 849, 
Article 1(2). 
6 Pearman (2001) at 32-33. 7 Human activities also release sulphate particles (or 'aerosols'). In some locations, the cooling effect 
of these aerosols may be large enough to offset the warming due to greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, aerosols do not remain long in the atmosphere and, therefore, are unlikely to offset the 
global long-term effects of greenhouse gases (Gelbspan, R. (1998), The Heat is On (Perseus Books, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA) at 20; Watson et al (1998) at 3). 
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the equivalent quantity of CO2 that would need to be emitted to cause the same 
amount of global warming8. 
Based on the likely changes in emissions of greenhouse gases, climate models 
predict that mean annual global surface temperatures will increase by between 1.4 
and 5.8 degrees Celsius by 2100, global mean sea levels will rise by between 15 and 
95 cm and the spatial and temporal patterns of precipitation will change 
significantly9. The average rate of warming associated with the enhanced 
greenhouse effect is expected to be greater than at any stage in the past 10,000 
years1°. While there are significant uncertainties regarding the magnitude of the 
predicted temperature rise, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
has concluded that observations of the world's climate show convincingly that the 
climate is changing1 I. 
Human health, ecological systems and agriculture are all sensitive to changes in 
climate, either as a direct consequence of climate change (e. g. floods, thermal stress) 
or due to indirect effects associated with climate change (e. g. spread of diseases, 
ecosystem failure, malaria)12. Climate change is likely to represent an additional 
stress on these systems already affected by increasing resource demands, 
unsustainable management practices and pollution, potentially reducing the ability of 
some environmental systems to provide key goods and services such as adequate 
13 food, clean air, clean water, energy, safe shelter and low levels of disease. 
8 Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) are used to describe the potential of different gases to contribute 
to global warming to be expressed relative to that of carbon dioxide (C02). The GWPs of the major 
greenhouse gases are 21 for methane, 310 for nitrous oxide, 23,900 for sulphur hexafluoride, 140- 
11,700 for hydrofluorocarbons and 6,500-9,200 for perfluorocarbons. As greenhouse gases have 
different lifetimes in the atmosphere and their GWPs differ depending on the specific time horizon 
that is of concern, a 100 year time horizon is generally taken as the standard period (Houghton, J., 
Ding, Y., Griggs, D., Noguer, M., van der Linden, P. and Xiaosu, D. (eds. ) (2001), Climate Change 
2001: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group Ito the Third Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK)). 
9 Watson, R., Zinyowera, M. and Moss, R. (eds. ) (1998), Australasian Impacts of Climate Change: An 
Assessment of Vulnerability: A Special Report for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(AGO, Canberra, Australia) at 3. 
10 Watson et al (1998) at 3. 
"Houghton et al (2001). 
12 McCarthy, J., Canziani, 0., Leary, N., Dokken, D. and White, K. (eds. ) (2001), Climate Change 
2001: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group 11 to the Third 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK). 
13 Renner, M. (1997), Fighting for Survival (Earthscan, London, UK) at 47-51,108-109; Elliott, L. 
(1998), The Global Politics of the Environment (Macmillan Press, London, UK) at 170-173,228-230. 
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7.2.2 The Economic Implications of Global Warming 
The IPCC has estimated that the costs associated with the impacts of global climate 
change will be of the order of two per cent of world gross domestic product, although 
there are significant uncertainties associated with these estimates 14. The burning of 
coal, oil and natural gas and the clearing and burning of vegetation are the main 
contributors to the enhanced greenhouse effect. Therefore, efforts to control these 
emissions potentially have enormous implications for industrial, agricultural, energy 
and transport policies and practices. 
Greenhouse gases are extremely long-lived, and their concentration in the 
atmosphere is determined by emissions of greenhouse gases in the preceding 300 
years or so. Therefore, to stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations would 
require that global emissions are much less than they are now. While specific targets 
have not been defined, a stabilisation target of 550 parts per million by volume of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (i. e. a doubling of the pre-industrial level) is a 
widely used benchmark15. The IPCC has estimated that achieving this target would 
require an overall reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 60 per cent16. It has been 
suggested that, to allow for economic growth and development in the less developed 
countries, the developed countries should reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases 
to about 20 per cent of present emission levels'7. 
Climate change is predicted to have significant impacts on the Australian natural 
environment. It has been predicted that temperatures in Australia will rise by 
between one and two degrees Celsius by 2030 and between one and six degrees 
Celsius by 2070, with significant changes in patterns of rainfall (with a likely 
14 Metz, B., Davidson, 0., Swart, R. and Pan, J. (eds. ) (2001), Climate Change 2001: Mitigation. 
Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK). 
15 Janssen, M. and De Vries, B. (2000), `Climate Policy Targets and the Role of Technological 
Change', Climatic Change, Vol. 46, pp. 1-28 at 1. 
16 Houghton et al (2001) at 69-124. 17 Lowe, I. (1998), 'Science, Technology and the Future', in Bridgstock, M., Burch, D., Forge, J., Laurent, 
J. and Lowe, I. (1998), Science, Technology and Society (Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 
Australia), pp. 232-256. 
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decrease over much of the country)18. Australia's relatively low latitude makes it 
particularly vulnerable through impacts on its scarce water resources and on crops 
presently growing near or above their optimum temperatures19. Coastal ecosystems, 
forestry, infrastructure, human health, tourism, biodiversity and the insurance 
industry could also be significantly affected. It has been estimated that the overall 
impacts on Australian GDP could be substantial, possibly of the order of several per 
2° cent per annum, based on a doubling of atmospheric concentrations of CO2. 
7.2.3 The International Policy Context 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
The first report of the IPCC21, released in 1990, provided the major catalyst for 
international policy development on climate change. The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)22 was signed by 154 countries at the Rio 
Summit in June 1992 and has, subsequently, formed the centrepiece of international 
efforts to address climate change. The parties to the UNFCCC committed 
themselves to stabilising greenhouse gas emissions at a level that would prevent 
`dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system', through limiting 
emissions, enhancing sinks and protecting reservoirs23. The countries listed in 
Annexe 1 to the UNFCCC (the `developed' countries) agreed to work towards 
stabilising their greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels and to demonstrate a 
reversal in the trend towards growing emissions before 200024. However, the 
UNFCCC is a framework agreement that requires supplementary protocols and 
agreements for implementation. 
18 Commonwealth of Australia (2002), Australia's Third National Report Under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (AGO, Canberra, Australia) at 19. 
"Commonwealth of Australia (2002) at 92-104. 20 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000), The Heat is On: Australia's Greenhouse 
Future. Report of the Senate Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts 
Committee (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia) at 33. 21 Houghton, J., Jenkins, G. and Ephraums, J. (eds. ) (1990), Climatic Change: The IPCC Scientific 
Assessment (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK). 
22 Note 5. 
23 UNFCCC, Articles 2 and 4. 
24 UNFCCC, Articles 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b). 
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The Kyoto Protocol 
The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the governing body of the UNFCCC and 
meets annually to address issues relating to the UNFCCC25. The third Conference of 
the Parties (COP-3) at Kyoto marked a significant step forward in the UNFCCC 
process, with the signing of the Kyoto Protocol26. The parties to the Protocol are 
required to (a) formulate cost-effective national and regional programmes to improve 
emission factors, data and models, (b) formulate, implement and update national and, 
where applicable, regional programmes to mitigate climate change and facilitate 
adequate adaptation to climate change, and (c) cooperate in the development, 
diffusion and application of environmentally sound technologies, know-how, 
practices and processes pertinent to climate change27. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Annexe I countries to the UNFCCC agreed to greenhouse gas emission targets 
(amounting to an average reduction of 5.2 per cent from a base year of 1990) to be 
met by the years 2008-201228. The Protocol applies to six greenhouse gases (C02, 
CH4, N20, SF6, CFCs and PFCs)29. 
The Kyoto Protocol permits the use of `flexible mechanisms' (Joint Implementation 
(JI), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and emissions trading) to enable 
countries to achieve their targets. JI allows Annexe I Countries to trade emission 
reduction units among themselves, either through the removal of sources or the 
addition or enhancement of sinks, beyond that which would have otherwise 
occurred30. A greenhouse sink is any process, activity or mechanism that removes a 
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere, 
while a source is any process or activity that releases a greenhouse gas, aerosol or a 
precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere31. The CDM allows Annexe I 
countries to obtain greenhouse gas credits for sponsoring greenhouse gas emission 
u UNFCCC, Articles 7(2) and 7(4). 26 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1997, ILM 
(1998), Vol. 37, p. 22. 
27 Kyoto Protocol, Articles 10(a), 10(b) and 10(c). 
28 Kyoto Protocol, Article 3(1) and Annexe B. 
29 Kyoto Protocol, Article 3. 
30 Kyoto Protocol, Articles 6 and 12(5)(c). 
31 UNFCCC, Articles 1(8) and 1(9). For a more detailed description of carbon sinks see AGO 
(1999b), National Emissions Trading: Crediting the Carbon, Discussion Paper No. 3 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia) at 12-21. 
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offset projects or other technology transfer in a developing country32. The 
participating countries at Kyoto agreed that the rules governing the flexible 
mechanisms would be developed further at later CON 33 
The other key debates at COP-3 were (a) the role of developing countries in limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions, and (b) the use of forests as sinks to offset the emissions 
from fossil fuels34. Since 1991, developing countries have accounted for more than 
50 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions and it appears likely that the growth 
in their greenhouse gas emissions will swamp the emission reductions that result 
from actions taken by the countries covered by the Kyoto Protocol35. The allocation 
of responsibility is contentious as it depends on the specific greenhouse gases that are 
considered, the measure of output (e. g. total, per capita), current levels of greenhouse 
gas emissions, historical contribution to greenhouse gas emissions and projected 
future emissions. To illustrate the point, if emissions are calculated on a total output 
basis, then China is the fourth largest emitter in the world but, if calculated on a per 
capita basis, then China's emissions are only one tenth of the OECD average36. 
In April 2001, the United States announced that it did not intend pursuing the Kyoto 
Protocol and, in mid 2001, the Australian government announced that while it would 
move towards meeting the Kyoto Protocol targets, it too would not ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol37. Prior to COP-6.5 (held in Bonn in mid 2001), it was generally agreed 
that as the country with the highest greenhouse gas emissions, the active participation 
of the United States was critical to the success of the Kyoto Protocol38. The Kyoto 
Protocol (Articles 25(1) and 25(2)) states that ratification by developed countries 
representing at least 55 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions from Annexe 1 
countries is required for the Protocol to enter into force. The United States currently 
32 Kyoto Protocol, Article 12. 
33 Kyoto Protocol, Article 3(4). 
34 Cameron, P. (2000), 'From Principles to Practice: The Kyoto Protocol', Journal of Energy and 
Natural Resource Law, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 1-18 at 9-11; Barrett, S. (1998), 'Political Economy of the 
Kyoto Protocol', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 20-39 at 21-23; Hill, R. 
(2000a), 'Working it Out: Australia's Approach to the Hague Climate Change Conference'. Address 
to the Queensland Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Brisbane, Australia, 14 November 2000. 
33 Gelbspan (1998) at 112-114. 36 Elliott (1998) at 177. 37 Jehl, D. and Revkin, A. (2001), `Bush Dumps Poll Pledge on Carbon Emissions', Sydney Morning 
Herald, 15 March 2001, p. 8; Commonwealth of Australia (2002) at 42. 38 Barrett (1998) at 23; Thompson, B. (2000), 'Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the 
Commons', Environmental Law, Vol. 30, pp. 241-278 at 254. 
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represents approximately 38 per cent of the emissions from Annexe 1 countries. 
However, at COP-6.5 the other parties to the Kyoto Protocol decided to proceed with 
the ratification of the Protocol and the development of the rules (JI, CDM, sinks) for 
the operation of the Protocol. 
Industry Attitudes 
Many industry sectors (in particular those that produce or consume large quantities 
of energy) stand to be significantly affected by international greenhouse policy. The 
automobile, mining and energy industries have consistently opposed climate change 
policy through highlighting the uncertainties in the science of climate change and the 
potential impacts of climate change policy on jobs, economic growth, and 
agriculture39. Even though some companies are moving away from arguing about 
the science towards considering what and how much has to be done40, most of the 
US oil and energy companies have retained a strong lobbying stance against 
mandatory greenhouse gas emission reductions. 
International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Profile 
Despite the policy commitments and actions of governments and companies, 
international greenhouse gas emissions are continuing to rise. To indicate the 
magnitude of the problem, it has been predicted that world primary energy demand 
will be 57 per cent higher in 2010 compared to 1997 and that global greenhouse gas 
emissions will grow faster than energy demand due to the increased proportion of 
fossil fuels in the energy mix41. 
39 Beder, S. (1999), `Corporate Hijacking of the Greenhouse Debate', The Ecologist, Vol. 29, No. 2, 
pp. 119-122; Karliner, J. (1997), The Corporate Planet: Ecology and Politics in the Age of 
Globalization (Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, USA) at 15,94; Levy, D. and Egan, D. (1998), 
`Capital Contests: National and Transnational Channels of Corporate Influence on the Climate 
Change Negotiations', Politics and Society, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 337-361 at 350-353; Greenpeace 
(1998), `The Oil Industry and Climate Change - Australia's Agenda of Deception (Greenpeace, 
Sydney, Australia); Gelbspan (1998) at 41-55; Hecht, A. and Tirpak, D. (1995), 'Framework 
Agreement on Climate Change: A Scientific and Policy History', Climatic Change, Vol. 29, pp. 371- 
402. 
40 Flannery, B. (2000), 'The Kyoto Mechanisms: A Business Perspective', in Opportunities, Issues 
and Barriers to the Practical Application of the Kyoto Mechanisms: Report of the Milan Workshop, 
April 2000 (IPIECA, London, UK), pp. 11-12. 
41 International Energy Agency [lEA] (2000), World Energy Outlook 2000 (IEA, Paris, France) at 27. 
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7.3 THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT 
7.3.1 The Australian Economy 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 provided a general overview of the Australian economy, 
national strategies for sustainable development and some of the barriers to 
sustainable development. However, some further information on the Australian 
economy is provided here as a necessary prelude to the discussion of Australian 
greenhouse policy. 
Australia is the fourteenth largest industrial economy in the world with a gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2000/2001 of around A$670 billion42. The Australian 
population of just over 19 million people is expected to grow by 32.2% between 
1990 and 202043. The Australian economy is highly dependent on fossil fuels as low 
cost fossil fuels are abundant, hydroelectric resources are limited and nuclear power 
is not utilised. Fossil fuels account for 94 per cent of Australia's energy inputs with 
renewable energy accounting for the remaining six per cent44. Australia has one of 
the fastest growing export sectors of OECD countries, reflecting its proximity to the 
Asia-Pacific region, with particular growth in agriculture, energy and minerals45. 
Australia is the world's largest exporter of coal, bauxite, alumina, lead, titanium and 
zircon and one of the world's leading exporters of gold, iron ore, aluminium, nickel, 
zinc and uranium46. 
7.3.2 Australia's International Negotiating Position 
The energy intensity of the Australian economy has strongly influenced the 
international negotiating positions adopted by the Australian government. At COP- 
3, Australia was among a small minority of states that opposed to strong action on 
42 Commonwealth of Australia (2002) at 2. 
43 Commonwealth of Australia (2002) at 2. 
44 Dovers, S. (ed. ) (1994), Sustainable Energy Systems (Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 
Australia) at 27; Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at 67,108-109. 
as See, further, the discussion in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. 
46 It is estimated that over 70 per cent of Australia's total energy production is destined for overseas 
markets (Commonwealth of Australia (2002) at 2). 
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greenhouse emissions47. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Australia is one of the few 
Annexe 1 countries with an increased emission limit, being required to cap its 
greenhouse gas emissions at 108 per cent of its 1990 emissions, to be achieved on an 
annual basis over the five years from 2008 to 201248. 
The Australian government delegation at COP-3 argued that, in the absence of any 
policy measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Australian greenhouse gas 
emissions were projected to rise by 43 per cent between 1990 and 2010. Therefore, 
the Australian government argued that the eight per cent increase Australia was 
allowed under the Kyoto Protocol represented a substantial real reduction in 
Australian greenhouse has emissions49. Since COP-3, the Australian government has 
emphasised the importance of rules for flexibility mechanisms, methodologies for 
sinks and the engagement of developing countries as necessary preconditions for 
Australia's ratification of the Kyoto Protocolso. 
The negotiating position adopted by the Australian government was welcomed by 
Australian industry51. Australian industry has argued that `carbon leakage' (i. e. 
where investment may shift to the non-Annexe 1 countries) may become a 
significant economic issue for Australia. Carbon leakage could occur as a 
consequence of (a) Australian exporters becoming uncompetitive in international 
markets, and/or (b) Australian producers becoming uncompetitive against imports 
. The from countries where there are no constraints on greenhouse gas emissions 
S2 
47 McCathie, A. (1997), 'Australia Heating Up Over Trade Threat', The Australian Financial Review, 
14 November 1997, p. 3; Gordon, M. (1997), 'PM Finds Greenhouse Allies in Capitol Hill', The 
Weekend Australian, 28-29 June 1997, p. 2. 
48 Kyoto Protocol, Annexe B. 
49 Hill, R. (2000b), 'Beyond Kyoto - Australia's Efforts to Combat Global Warming'. A speech to the 
Pew Centre on Global Climate Change, Washington DC, USA, 25 April 2000; Commonwealth of 
Australia (2000a), National Greenhouse Strategy 2000 Progress Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, Australia) at vi. 
50 Commonwealth of Australia (2001), Government June 2001 Response to 'The Heat is On: 
Australia's Greenhouse Future' (AGO, Canberra, Australia); Hill, R. (2000c), 'Statement to the Sixth 
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change', The 
Hague, The Netherlands, 21 November 2000. 
sl Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at 73-74. 
52 Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (1999), `A Submission to the Senate Inquiry into 
Australia's Response to Global Warming - October 1999' (Australian Industry Greenhouse Network), 
25 pp at 5-6,17. The Australian Industry Greenhouse Network represents the broad views of 
Australian industry on greenhouse issues. Its members are Australian Aluminium Council, Australian 
Automobile Association, Australian Coal Association, Australian Gas Association, Australian 
Institute of Petroleum, Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association, Business 
Council of Australia, Cement Industry Federation, Electricity Supply Association of Australia, 
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Australian exports that are thought to be at particular risk are aluminium and LNG 
while those at risk from imports are the energy intensive sectors of petroleum 
refining, pulp and paper, cement, plastics and chemicals, non-ferrous metals and 
steel53. Australian industry has argued that the Australian government should pursue 
policies that are (a) flexible and cost-effective in their own right, (b) provide the 
foundations for further reductions if and when this is necessary, and (c) have the least 
negative impact on competitiveness, investment, regional development and jobs 54 
Furthermore, industry groups have argued that Australia should only ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol if unfettered use of flexibility mechanisms is allowed, if full credit for land 
clearing and sinks is provided and if there is a clear path for the inclusion of non- 
Annexe 1 countries in international greenhouse gas abatement programmes55. 
7.3.3 National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Profile 
As noted in Section 7.3.2, Australia is allowed to increase its greenhouse gas 
emissions by 8 per cent between 1990 and the period 2008-2012. This Section 
reviews the progress made to date in meeting this target. 
The 1999 National Greenhouse Gas Inventory was released in 200156, together with 
an analysis of greenhouse trends and indicators57 and an assessment of emissions 
from land use change and forestry58. As shown in Table 7.1, Australia's net annual 
greenhouse gas emissions in 1999 totalled 458.2 million tonnes of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (MT C02(eq)). This represented an increase of 17.4 per cent over the 
Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries, Minerals Council of Australia, Plastics and Chemical 
Industries Association and Pulp and Paper Manufacturers Federation of Australia. 
53 Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (1999) at 5-6,17-18; Cribb, B. (1998), 'Framework for 
the National Carbon Accounting System: Business Issues'. Presented at AGO National Carbon 
Accounting System Expert Workshop, Canberra, Australia, 23-25 June 1998; Coutts, D. (2000), 
'Investment in the Australian Aluminium Industry and the Greenhouse Debate'. Presented at the 
Aluminium and Alumina Summit, Sydney, Australia, 31 May -1 June 2000,7 pp. at 3-5; Beresford, 
R. and Waller, S. (2000), 'The Kyoto Protocol: Threats and Opportunities', The APPEA Journal, Vol. 
40, Part 1, pp. 645-653 at 646. 
54 Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (1999) at 2-6,10; Business Council of Australia [BCA] 
(2000a), `Statement of Climate Change Policy Principles' (BCA, Canberra, Australia). 
55 Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (1999) at 10; BCA (2000b), 'Greenhouse Sinks and the 
Kyoto Protocol: Submission to the Australian Greenhouse Office - April 2000' (BCA, Canberra, 
Australia). 
56 AGO (2001 a), National Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1999 (AGO, Canberra, Australia). 
57 AGO (2001b), National Greenhouse Gas Inventory: Analysis of Trends and Greenhouse Indicators 
1990-1999 (AGO, Canberra, Australia). 
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1990 levels of 390.3 MT C02(eq). Emissions from stationary sources (electricity 
generation, petroleum refining, gas processing, solid fuel manufacturing, 
manufacturing industries, construction) contributed 56.7 per cent of total national 
emissions, transport contributed 16.1 per cent and agriculture contributed 20.5 per 
cent. Forestry and other removals provided a sink of 25.9 MT C02(eq). 
Table 7.1: Australian Greenhouse Gas Emissions 1990-199959 
Sector 1990 
MT C02(eq) 
1999 
MT C02(eq) 
Change (1990- 
1999) 
MT CO (e) 
Change (1990- 
1999) 
% 
Energy 
Stationary Energy 
Transport 
Fugitive 
299.5 
208.5 
61.5 
29.5 
364.6 
259.8 
73.9 
30.8 
65.1 
51.3 
12.4 
1.3 
21.7% 
24.6% 
20.3% 
4.4% 
Industrial Processes 12.0 9.7 -2.4 -19.8% 
Agriculture 91.2 93.8 2.7 2.9% 
Forestry and Other -27.3 -25.9 -1.4 -5.1% 
Waste 14.9 16.0 1.1 7.6% 
Gross Emissions 417.6 484.1 66.5 15.9% 
Net Emissions 390.3 458.2 67.9 17.4% 
It is useful to look at these data in some further detail as the statistics presented in 
Table 7.1 obscure some important features of Australia's greenhouse performance. 
While national greenhouse gas emissions per capita increased by 11.1 per cent 
between 1990 and 1999, emissions per dollar of GDP declined by 13 per cent in the 
same period60. The fall in emissions per unit of GDP was due to a number of 
different factors. These were (a) reductions in emissions from industrial processes, 
(b) relatively small increases in other non-energy emissions, (c) the growth in the 
services sector of the economy (which significantly outstripped growth in 
manufacturing and primary production), (d) a 1.5 per reduction in the average carbon 
dioxide emission factor of coal, which slightly offset the increasing amount of coal in 
the fuel mix, (e) increases in the efficiency of power stations, and (f) improvements 
in the average efficiency of power use61. Some of these factors are of direct 
relevance to the performance of participants in the Greenhouse Challenge and are 
discussed further below. 
58 AGO (2001c), National Greenhouse Gas Inventory: Land Use Change and Forestry Sector 1990- 
1999 (AGO, Canberra, Australia). 
39 AGO (2001b) at 10. 60 AGO (2001b) at vii, 17-19. 
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The data quoted in Table 7.1 exclude the contribution of greenhouse gas emissions 
from land clearing (i. e. the removal of tree cover and vegetation to enable land to be 
used for productive agricultural purposes). There are significant uncertainties in 
these data and there is ongoing discussion regarding how land clearing and sinks are 
to be accounted for under the Kyoto Protocol. The current estimate is that, if 
emissions from land clearing are included, Australia's total greenhouse gas emissions 
would have been 529.9 MT C02(eq) in 1999 and 493.8 MT C02(eq) in 1990 (i. e. an 
increase of 7.3 per cent between 1990 and 1999)62. The inclusion of credits for land 
clearing reductions has the potential to considerably reduce the amount of emissions 
reduction that would be required for Australia to meet its Kyoto Protocol targets. 
However, without these windfall gains, it is clear that Australia's greenhouse gas 
emissions are growing well ahead of what is allowed under the Kyoto Protocol. 
7.3.4 Overview of Policy Responses to Greenhouse 
National Policy Overview 
To date, the Australian government's greenhouse policy has focused on `no regrets 
measures', where a no regrets measure is defined as `a measure that has other net 
benefits (or, at least, no net costs) besides limiting greenhouse gas emissions or 
conserving or enhancing greenhouse gas sinks'63. That is, the emphasis of policy is 
on encouraging Australian industry to contribute to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions while not threatening Australia's international competitiveness64. It has 
been argued that the concept of no regrets (i. e. those measures that are worthwhile, 
even in the absence of any concerns regarding global warming) means that global 
warming is not a consideration in decision-making and so is effectively discounted or 
eliminated from decision-making processes65. 
61 AGO (2001b) at viii, 19-20. 62 AGO (2001b) at v, 16-17. For the derivation of these estimates see AGO (2001c). 
63 AGO (1998b), The National Greenhouse Strategy (AGO, Canberra, Australia). 
64 Howard (1997), 'Safeguarding the Future: Australia's Response to Climate Change'. Statement by 
The Prime Minister of Australia, 20 November 1997; Hill, R. (2000d), 'Warming to the Challenge: 
The Role of Australian Business in Combating Global Warming'. Address to the World Business 
Council on Sustainable Development and the Australian Business Council Forum, Melbourne, 
Australia, 5 May 2000. 
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The Australian government's major policy initiatives on greenhouse have been: 
" The 1992 National Greenhouse Response Strategy which established the 
initial principles and actions on greenhouse, with particular emphasis on 
information gathering and research 66 
The establishment of the Greenhouse Challenge programme in 1995, to 
encourage and support voluntary greenhouse gas emission reductions by large 
corporations 67. 
" The 1997 Safeguarding the Future package of measures, worth A$180m68. 
The measures adopted included accelerating energy market reform, 
developing and implementing efficiency standards for power generation, 
establishing mandatory targets for the uptake of renewable energy in power 
supply, improving the fuel efficiency of the car fleet, implementing national 
energy efficiency codes and standards, fostering growth in plantation forestry 
and native revegetation, establishing the National Carbon Accounting System 
(NCAS) to develop the accounting framework for Australia's emission 
reduction and sink enhancement activities and extending the Greenhouse 
Challenge. In addition, the Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO) was 
established to provide advice to the Commonwealth on greenhouse issues, to 
administer specific greenhouse programmes, to contribute to the development 
of Australia's position on greenhouse issues and to act as a central contact 
point for industry and other stakeholders. 
" The 1998 National Greenhouse Strategy which elaborated on the 
implementation plans in the 1997 Safeguarding the Future measures69. 
65 Hamilton, C. (1996), `Thinking About the Future: Equity and Sustainability', in DEST (1996a), 
Equity and the Environment (DEST, Canberra, Australia), pp. 16-21. 
66 Commonwealth of Australia (1992b), National Greenhouse Response Strategy (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, Australia). 
67 Commonwealth of Australia (1995), National Greenhouse Response Strategy, Greenhouse 21C 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, Australia). 
68 Howard (1997). 
69 AGO (1998b). 
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" The 1999 Measures for a Better Environment which included A$400m for 
initiatives such as encouraging the adoption of renewable energy and energy 
efficient technologies 70. The Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program (GGAP), 
the centrepiece of the Measures for a Better Environment, focuses on 
measures that will deliver maximum carbon abatement or sink enhancement, 
have long lasting effects that translate into sustained emissions reduction for 
the period 2008-2012 and/or beyond, be cost-effective and have least cost 
impact on economic activity71. 
In total, the Commonwealth government has committed almost one billion dollars 
(Australian) to greenhouse issues72. It has been estimated that the policy measures 
adopted to date (excluding the effect of the Measures for a Better Environment and 
the potential contribution of sinks) will save between 58 and 64 MT C02(eq)73. That 
is, greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 are expected to be 121-123 per cent of 1990 
emission levels, compared to a projected increase of 43 per cent if no measures had 
been adopted74. However, even allowing for the effects of the Measures for a Better 
Environment, Australia is unlikely to achieve its Kyoto Protocol target75. 
The Sustainable Energy Development Authority 
The States and Territories have adopted a range of initiatives to complement the 
Australian government's efforts on greenhouse76. In the specific context of the 
Greenhouse Challenge, it is useful to briefly look at the activities of the New South 
Wales Sustainable Energy Development Authority (SEDA). SEDA's initiatives are 
relevant to this case-study on the Greenhouse Challenge because of the manner in 
which participating firms are supported to achieve energy savings and the rates of 
return that are achieved through energy saving. 
70 These measures were agreed between the Commonwealth government and the Australian 
Democrats as part of the negotiations around the introduction of a goods and services tax in 1999. 
71 Further information on GGAP can be found at 'Greenhouse Gas Abatement Programme, 
http: //www. greenhouse. gov. au/ggap (last visited 25 October 2001). 72 Commonwealth of Australia (2002) at 4. 
73 Commonwealth of Australia (2000a) at vi, 3,6. 74 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at 109; Commonwealth of Australia (2000a) 
at vi, 6 
75 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at xxvii. 
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SEDA manages a range of programmes that focus on improving energy efficiency in 
all sectors, including the government, commercial, industrial and residential 
sectors77. One of SEDA's key initiatives is the Energy Smart Business (ESB) 
programme78. Participants ('Partners') in the ESB programme sign a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) with SEDA. The Partners range from small retail shops to 
large industrial corporations79. As part of the MOU, SEDA provides technical and 
implementation advice to Partners on energy efficiency. In return, the Partners agree 
to implement cost-effective upgrades (where cost-effective is defined as projects that 
provide an internal rate of return of greater than 20 per cent) across at least 75 per 
cent of their facilities within 5 years80. At the end of January 1999, the average 
81 identified savings for Partners was 18.8 per cent of their energy consumption. 
7.3.5 Policy Uncertainty 
There are significant policy uncertainties around if/when Australia will ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol (discussed in Section 7.3.2 above), the specific targets that need to be 
met and if/when further policy measures will be adopted. 
The specific targets that need to be met are uncertain because of (a) the difficulties 
involved in quantifying greenhouse gas emissions from land clearing activities, and 
(b) the ongoing debate regarding how these are to be treated for the purposes of the 
Kyoto Protocol82. As discussed above, if the current estimates of greenhouse gas 
emissions from land clearing are incorporated into the National Greenhouse Gas 
76 Commonwealth of Australia (2000a) at 7-28. 
r Dunstan, C. (1997), 'Discussant's Report', in Environment Australia (1997a), Environmental 
Economics Round Table Proceedings 10 July 1997 (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 
Australia), pp. 76-79. 
78 Cooper, D., Duncan, R, Precious, B., Williamson, A. and Workum, N. (1999), 'Creating Demand 
for Energy Efficiency in Australian Industry' (SEDA, Sydney, Australia), 13 pp. 
79 Cooper et al (1999). 
80 Cooper et al (1999). 
81 Further information on the ESB programme (including details of annual savings, expenditures, 
greenhouse gas savings and actions taken) can be found at the SEDA website, 
http: //www. seda. nsw. gov. au (last visited 8 July 2001). SEDA has estimated that most businesses can 
save over 20 per cent of their energy consumption at internal rates of return of at least 20 per cent 
(Durran, A. (2000), 'Lessons in Renewable Resources: The Inevitable Energy Solution'. Presented at 
Greenpeace Conference Business and the Environment: Solutions for the New Millennium, Sydney, 
Australia, 20-21 July 2000). 
82 This is the subject of an ongoing research programme and it is expected that sufficient data to 
enable a revised baseline to be determined will be available in 2002 (AGO (1999h), National Carbon 
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Inventory, Australia's total greenhouse gas emissions have increased by 7.3 per cent 
between 1990 and 1999, rather than the 17.4 per cent reported in the inventory. 
Assuming that these revised numbers are correct, the Commonwealth government 
expects that the policy measures that have been adopted, when taken in conjunction 
with the flexibility mechanisms provided under the Kyoto Protocol, will enable 
Australia to meet its Kyoto Protocol targets83. While industry groups have supported 
the policy emphasis on greenhouse sinks84, environmental NGOs have argued that 
this emphasis has diverted attention and resources away from the issues of energy 
efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions reductions"S. 
There is ongoing discussion regarding the most appropriate policy measures that can 
be adopted to enable Australia to meet its targets under the Kyoto Protocol while not 
adversely affecting Australia's economic interests. The AGO has issued discussion 
papers on emissions trading and how such a scheme could be implemented in 
Australia86. While Australian industry has indicated its support in principle for a 
national emissions trading system, it does not support unilateral implementation of 
such a system because of the potential cost to Australian business87. 
7.4 THE GREENHOUSE CHALLENGE 
Overview of the Greenhouse Challenge 
Australian industry approached the Commonwealth government in 1995 with a 
proposal for a voluntary greenhouse gas abatement programme. The primary 
motivation was the threat that the government would introduce a carbon tax to enable 
Accounting Strategy Strategic Plan 1999-2001 (AGO, Canberra, Australia); AGO (2000d), 
Greenhouse Sinks and the Kyoto Protocol: An Issues Paper (AGO, Canberra, Australia)). 
83 Commonwealth of Australia (2000a) at 6. 
84 Cribb (1998); Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (1999) at 3,8; BCA (2000b). 
$s Australian Conservation Foundation [ACF] (1999a), 'Australian Conservation Foundation 
Submission to the Senate Inquiry into Global Warming' (ACF, Sydney, Australia). 
86 AGO (1999g), National Emissions Trading: Establishing the Boundaries, Discussion Paper No. I 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia); AGO (1999d), National Emissions Trading: 
Issuing the Permits, Discussion Paper No. 2 (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia); AGO 
(1999b); AGO (1999f), National Emissions Trading: Designing the Market, Discussion Paper No. 4 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia). 
87 Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (1999) at 14-15; Cribb (1998). 
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Australia to meet its commitments under the UNFCCC88. In response, the 
Greenhouse Challenge was established in 1995 as a voluntary programme for 
organisations (both public and private sector) to undertake and report on their actions 
to abate greenhouse gas emissions. 
In line with the government's no regrets approach to greenhouse policy, the overall 
aim of the Greenhouse Challenge programme is to achieve the maximum 
practicable greenhouse gas emissions abatement, while not compromising business 
objectives such as development and growth89. Organisations wishing to participate 
in the Greenhouse Challenge must work through a six-step process, namely (a) 
establish an inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, (b) develop an action plan to 
minimise emissions or enhance sinks, (c) forecast expected reductions in emissions, 
(d) sign a Cooperative Agreement with the Commonwealth government, (e) monitor 
and regularly report greenhouse gas emissions against targets, and (f) be open to 
independent verification90. Each of these steps is discussed briefly below. The 
following material is based on the AGO's guidance on the Greenhouse Challenge91, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
Organisations joining the Greenhouse Challenge must prepare an inventory of their 
greenhouse gas emissions, using the last complete accounting year as the base year. 
The inventory should have sufficient detail to identify all significant sources of 
emissions. Thereafter, emissions inventories should normally be prepared annually. 
The inventories should detail the benefits arising from previously reported measures 
and describe the factors that influenced changes in emissions from previous 
inventories. 
The action plan to reduce emissions can include capital and operating projects to 
improve energy and process efficiencies and/or abate emissions, management 
initiatives, improvement programmes, the enhancement of sinks, the use of renewable 
88 Parker, C. (1999), `The Greenhouse Challenge: Trivial Pursuit? ', Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 63-74 at 67-68; AGO (1999e), Greenhouse Challenge Evaluation Report 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia) at 51. 
89 Howard (1997). 
90 AGO (2000g), Guidelines for the Cooperative Agreements Program (AGO, Canberra, Australia). 
91 AGO (2000g). 
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energy technologies, research and development projects and participation in other 
domestic and international joint projects. 
Each organisation is required to forecast its greenhouse gas emissions in the year 
2000 and 2005. The forecasts should include an assessment of factors that could 
influence change in total emissions. 
These three steps (i. e. inventory, action plan and forecasts) are formalised in a 
Cooperative Agreement, which is developed in liaison with the AGO. The agreement 
is signed by the chief executive of the participating organisation and by Ministers or 
senior government officials on behalf of the Commonwealth 92. The Greenhouse 
Challenge does not involve the imposition of specific abatement targets on 
organisations but rather works to maximise economically viable abatement actions 
with each company93. Organisations negotiate their planned actions and expected 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions with the AGO. The objective of Cooperative 
Agreements is `... to ensure industries and firms seek continuous improvements in 
energy and process efficiency, achieve maximum practicable greenhouse abatement 
performance, and at the same time, enhance their competitive advantage. ' 
Cooperative Agreements should include an appropriate emissions inventory, an 
assessment of opportunities for abating greenhouse gas emissions, greenhouse action 
plans, a commitment to regular monitoring and reporting of performance against 
action plans and provision for performance verification. In addition to Cooperative 
Agreements with individual organisations, facilitative agreements (with bodies such 
as industry associations, where the association agrees to support and actively 
encourage its members to join the Challenge94) and aggregate agreements (generally 
92 Cooperative Agreements can be viewed at www. greenhouse. gov. au/agreements 
93 Commonwealth of Australia (2001). 
94 The Minerals Council of Australia's (MCA's) Cooperative Agreement is a typical facilitative 
agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the MCA undertakes to (a) encourage and facilitate 
participation by its members in the Greenhouse Challenge, (b) encourage its members to improve 
energy efficiency, process efficiency and resource conservation, and to reduce emissions per unit of 
activity or production, (c) facilitate communications between the Government and the minerals 
industry, (d) provide advice and assistance to members, to communicate the minerals industry's 
activities and achievements to the public, (e) develop performance indicators for the minerals sector, 
(f) co-ordinate minerals industry policy positions, (g) liase with other industry associations on 
industry-wide policy and approaches to greenhouse, and (h) report annually on progress in 
implementing the facilitative agreement and on the outcomes of the activities that have been 
undertaken (Commonwealth of Australia (1998), Greenhouse Challenge: Cool Solutions for 
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made by an industry sector with an industry association, which then enters into an 
agreement on behalf of its members) can also be agreed under the Greenhouse 
Challenge. 
Each organisation participating in the Greenhouse Challenge is expected to report 
annually, detailing progress and changes in greenhouse gas emissions as well as 
detailing the effectiveness of policies and measures to improve energy and process 
efficiencies, abate emissions and enhance sinks. 
Participants in the Greenhouse Challenge are allowed to use the Greenhouse 
Challenge logo to advertise their participation in the programme95. Organisations 
may withdraw from the Greenhouse Challenge, without sanction, at any time96. The 
AGO has stated that forecasts of emissions abatement will not be interpreted as, or 
used to, set targets, and no penalty will apply where forecasts are not achieved. 
The AGO's responsibilities under the Greenhouse Challenge include consulting with 
industry during the development of Cooperative Agreements, promoting the 
Greenhouse Challenge programme and the achievements of participants in the 
Greenhouse Challenge, providing technical support, monitoring and reporting on the 
implementation of the programme, publicising the achievements of individual 
enterprises and promoting the Greenhouse Challenge logo97. 
Independent Verification 
The organisations participating in the Greenhouse Challenge must be open to 
independent verification, to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in 
Greenhouse Challenge progress reports98. Australian industry has strongly supported 
Australian Business. 1998 Report on Australia's Greenhouse Challenge Program (Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, Australia) at 247-248). 
95 AGO (2000b), Greenhouse Challenge Members' Logo Guidelines (AGO, Canberra, Australia). 
96 Parker (1999) at 66; AGO (2000g). 
97 See the AGO's webpages 'Workbooks' (http: //www. greenhouse. gov. au/challenge/html/workbook) 
and 'Resources' (http: //www. greenhouse. gov. au/challenge/html/whats_involved/resources. html) (last 
visited 15 March 2002) for details of the workbooks and other documentation available. For case- 
studies, see 'Success Stories', http: //www. greenhouse. gov. au/html/network/success_stories. html (last 
visited 15 March 2002). 
98 The AGO has established a panel of independent verifiers (AGO (2001d), Independent Verification 
Under the Greenhouse Challenge - 2000. Findings and Discussion Report: February 2001 (AGO, 
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independent verification, seeing it as critical to the credibility of the Greenhouse 
Challenge". The verification process focuses on those aspects that can be 
objectively verified (i. e. emissions inventories, the actions that have been reported as 
undertaken and the accuracy of the claimed greenhouse gas emission reductions)100. 
The verification process does not consider either whether all practicable actions have 
been undertaken or whether the reasons provided for not undertaking actions 
specified in action plans are robusti0i 
An inventory can be verified as materially accurate if the verifier can determine that 
the reported and actual inventories (baseline, projections and planned abatement 
actions) are within a ten per cent materiality threshold' 02. Because of industry 
concerns regarding confidentiality, the verification reports simply report whether the 
reported inventory and actions undertaken were materially accurate or not103. The 
AGO allows firms a period of up to three months to respond to and rectify any 
identified material deficiencies before the verification report is finalised104. A full 
verification programme was conducted in 2000. Thirty-one companies were 
assessed and, in all but four organisations, the inventories and action plans were 
los verified as being materially correct. 
Canberra, Australia) at 9-10). The AGO has set a target of 25 to 35 verification audits per year. The 
AGO expects that an average verification will cost between A$10,000 and A$15,000 and the proposed 
budget for independent verification is A$300,000 to A$400,000 per year (AGO (1999c), 'Independent 
Verification Implementation Plan: Summary of Recommendations' (AGO, Canberra, Australia)). 
99 AGO (2000c), Greenhouse Challenge Independent Verification Program: Verification and 
Reporting Guidelines 1: Verification Information (AGO, Canberra, Australia) at 3; AGO (2001d) at 4. 
10° AGO (1999c). The AGO recommended that the verification process should also involve the 
assessment of the management system that has been implemented to manage greenhouse gas 
emissions, and that the principles of IS014001 should guide this part of the assessment to provide a 
'... consistent and internationally recognised framework' for the management system assessment 
process (AGO (2000c) at 3-4). In practice, the adequacy of management systems has not been 
assessed. 
101 AGO (2000a), Greenhouse Challenge Independent Verification Program: Verification and 
Reporting Guidelines 2: Verification Guidelines (AGO, Canberra, Australia). 
102 AGO (2000c) at 5-9. 103 See AGO (2001d) at 25-28 for the verification statements from the 2000 verification programme 
104 AGO (1999c). 
105 AGO (2001d) at 2. 
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Related Programmes 
To maximise participation in the Greenhouse Challenge, the Commonwealth has also 
introduced the Managing Energy for Profits and Greenhouse Allies programmes 106. 
Managing Energy for Profits is intended to help medium-sized firms reduce energy 
consumption, improve their bottom line and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In 
most instances, energy consultants are appointed to assist firms in mapping their 
energy use and workshops are held detailing how to join the Greenhouse Challenge. 
This programme is aimed at firms that would typically spend approximately 
107 $500,000 to $2 million a year on energy and fuels. 
The Greenhouse Allies programme takes advantage of the relationships and networks 
between existing Greenhouse Challenge members and small businesses. In this 
programme, Greenhouse Challenge participants assist smaller businesses to improve 
energy management and implement sound greenhouse practices without undue time, 
financial or expertise costs to their company. Greenhouse Allies do not sign 
cooperative agreements, but, rather, are supported and mentored by Greenhouse 
Challenge participants. 
7.5 ASSESSMENT OF THE GREENHOUSE CHALLENGE 
The evaluation of the Greenhouse Challenge uses the eight evaluation criteria 
developed in Chapter 2, namely, environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, 
administration and compliance costs, competitiveness, soft effects, dynamic effects 
and innovation, viability and feasibility, and law and public policy issues. For certain 
of the criteria, the indicators and data used in the evaluation are also assessed. 
106 AGO (1999e) at 14; AGO (1998a), 'Greenhouse Allies Program Guidelines' (AGO, Canberra, 
Australia). 
107 An example is a project conducted by the Plastics and Chemicals Industry Association (PACIA) to 
identify greenhouse gas emission reduction opportunities in the chemical industry. The AGO 
provided funding for a technical consultant to visit sites, advise on opportunities to save energy and 
provide assistance in the development of inventories and action plans. The project is reported as 
identifying opportunities to save an average (across the twelve participating organisations) of 13.5 per 
cent on their energy consumption (representing a potential saving of A$3m of a total energy bill of 
A$24m). These were opportunities with a payback period of two years or less (Rex, L. (2000), 
`Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Energy Efficiency in the Australian Plastics and Chemicals 
Industries', in Proceedings of the 15`h International Clean Air and Environment Conference, Sydney, 
Australia, 27-30 November 2000. Volume 2 (CASANZ, Mitcham, Victoria, Australia)). 
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7.5.1 Environmental Effectiveness 
The assessment of the effectiveness of the Greenhouse Challenge is divided into 
three parts. The first is an assessment of the performance of the Greenhouse 
Challenge against the targets that have been set by the Australian government. The 
second is a discussion of whether or not the Greenhouse Challenge has actually 
changed the greenhouse gas emissions profile of Australian industry. This includes a 
discussion of the meaning of terms such as `business as usual', as the answer to the 
question necessitates developing an understanding of what would have occurred in 
the absence of the Greenhouse Challenge. The third part of the assessment is an 
analysis of some of the other factors that influence the assessment of the 
effectiveness of the Greenhouse Challenge and a discussion of the implications of 
these factors for the conclusions that can be drawn. 
Performance against Specified Targets 
The targets specified by the Australian government for the Greenhouse Challenge 
relate to (a) the number of participating organisations, (b) the coverage of Australia's 
greenhouse gas emissions, and (c) the emissions abatement expected as a result of 
the Greenhouse Challenge. 
The National Greenhouse Strategy envisaged that 500 companies would have signed 
Cooperative Agreements by the end of 2000 and that 1000 companies would have 
signed by the end of 2005108. The target for the end of 2000 was met and, as of 15 
February 2002, a total of 701 companies had joined the Greenhouse Challenge109. In 
addition, over 400 small businesses have participated in the Greenhouse Allies 
programme' lo, 
The Greenhouse Challenge aims to cover 55 per cent of national greenhouse gas 
emissions and, at present, the Greenhouse Challenge participants account for 
108 Howard (1997). 
109 AGO (2002), 'Greenhouse Challengers. 15 February 2002' (AGO, Canberra, Australia). 
110 AGO (2000e), Australian Greenhouse Office Annual Report 1999-2000 (AGO, Canberra, 
Australia) at 14-15. 
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approximately 47 per cent of national emissions". The Greenhouse Challenge has 
almost total coverage in a number of major industrial sectors. These include 98 per 
cent of greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation and distribution, 98 per 
cent of oil and gas extraction, 89 per cent of machinery and metals manufacturing 
(including 100 per cent from iron and steel and aluminium, and 91 per cent from coal 
mining)' 12. 
The actions taken under Greenhouse Challenge action plans are expected to achieve 
23.5 MT C02(eq) abatement in 2000, compared to an original projection of 15 MT 
C02(eq)l13. Without the Greenhouse Challenge, annual emissions from the 
participating organisations were predicted to have grown between 1995 and 2000 by 
25.6 MT C02(eq) or 20.8 per cent whereas greenhouse gas emissions from 
participating organisations are, in fact, expected to grow by only 2.1 MT C02(eq) or 
1.6 per cent. In many sectors (including oil and gas extraction, coal mining, food 
processing, textiles, petroleum refining, cement manufacturing and iron and steel 
production), participants expected to achieve absolute net reductions over the 1995- 
2000 period. However, these reductions were offset by projected increases in 
emissions from the aluminium and other (non-coal) mining sectors114. For electricity 
generators and distributors, the actions taken under the Greenhouse Challenge were 
expected to achieve an annual abatement of 5 MT C02(eq) in 2000. The net effect is 
expected to be a reduction in the growth in annual emissions from 36.4 MT C02(eq) 
to 31.4 MT C02(eq). The actions taken by participants in the Greenhouse Challenge 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have included fuel switching, the purchase of 
new equipment, process changes, changes to lighting, recycling, employee training 
and improved maintenance 115. 
However, many participating organisations have not implemented all of their planned 
actions. Of the 76 Greenhouse Challenge participants that had submitted progress 
reports by mid 2000, only eight had met their original forecasts for emissions 
111 AGO (1999e) at 19-20. 
112 AGO (2000e) at 14. 113 AGO (1999e) at 12,24-28. 
114 For further details on the performance of specific industry sectors, see AGO (2001 a) at A-15-A-19. 
113 AGO (1999e) at 30; Commonwealth of Australia (1998). 
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abatement' 16" A complete collation of the proposed emissions abatement compared 
to that actually achieved will not be available until 2002. That is, while the 
predictions are that the Greenhouse Challenge is predicted to achieve greenhouse gas 
emissions abatement significantly in excess of that originally envisaged, (a) the 
initial indications are that not all of the predicted emissions abatement will be 
achieved, and (b) the data to make this assessment are not yet available. 
Overall, therefore, the Greenhouse Challenge has been quite successful in meeting its 
specified targets. The Greenhouse Challenge has exceeded its targets for the number 
of participating companies and appears on track to cover most of the significant 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions. It also appears that the Greenhouse Challenge 
will exceed the original expectations on the amount of greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions that are achieved. As discussed above, a number of major industrial 
sectors (which 'are also major energy consumers or greenhouse gas emitters) have 
stabilised or even reduced their greenhouse gas emissions. In most cases, these 
outcomes have been achieved against a backdrop of significant growth in production. 
Even in the electricity industry, the effect of the greenhouse gas management 
measures adopted has been to reduce the rate of growth in greenhouse gas emissions. 
Beyond Business as Usual? 
While the Greenhouse Challenge has been effective in terms of meeting its specified 
targets, this fact is of limited relevance if such targets would have been met even 
without the Greenhouse Challenge being in place. That is, the question that needs to 
be asked is whether or not the Greenhouse Challenge has resulted in the abatement of 
greenhouse gas emissions beyond those reductions that would have been achieved 
anyway? 
Before addressing this question, it is first of all necessary to consider how emissions 
abatement is assessed. In broad terms, emissions abatement efforts can be 
characterised against a historical baseline (i. e. by comparing absolute emission levels 
116 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at 340. The independent verification 
programme does not investigate the reasons why organisations did not achieve their forecast 
emissions abatement. 
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at different points in time) or against alternative future scenarios (i. e. by comparing 
expected emissions at a given point in time with what emissions might have been at 
the same point in time without actions to abate emissions). Alternative future 
scenarios can be defined either in terms of static efficiency measures or `business as 
usual'. The static efficiency approach assumes that there will be no changes in 
efficiency and, therefore, future estimates are based on the organisation's forecast 
activity (e. g. production rate, changes in business activities). That is, it is assumed 
that greenhouse gas emissions are directly proportional to production rates or other 
measures of business activity (e. g. profit). In contrast, the business as usual approach 
takes into account the efficiency changes that would have occurred in the normal 
course of business' 17. The business as usual approach is often used for economy- 
wide projections of emission levels that incorporate broad based assessments of 
changes in efficiency. However, defining the business as usual scenario is extremely 
difficult118. Furthermore, broad assessments of changes in energy efficiency cannot 
readily be extrapolated from the macro (or economy wide) level to the micro level 
(i. e. the individual facility or the specific industry sector)119. The consequence is that 
the Greenhouse Challenge relies on the static efficiency approach to -predict 
greenhouse gas emissions 120. As energy efficiency generally improves over time, the 
static efficiency approach tends to generate higher baselines than the business as 
usual approach. That is, the emissions reductions that are claimed are likely to 
overestimate the outcomes that have been achieved. Furthermore, given that the task 
of describing the baseline path is the responsibility of the participating companies, 
there is a clear incentive for firms to overstate their expected emissions growth as 
this will mean that they will appear to have achieved even greater reductions in 
emissions 121. These issues regarding the difficulties in assessing performance were 
highlighted by some of the interviewees for this research122: 
117 AGO (1999e) at 22-23. Large scale economic models typically assume a rate of improvement of 
1.0-1.5 per cent per annum (Australia Institute (2000), 'Assessment of Policies: The Greenhouse 
Challenge Program. Submission to Senate Environment References Committee Inquiry into 
Australia's Response to Global Warming' (Australia Institute, Canberra, Australia), 9 pp at 3). 
18 Krarup, S. and Ramesohl, S. (2000), Voluntary Agreements in Energy Policy - Implementation and 
Eciency (AKF Institute of Local Government Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark) at 36. 
" Krarup and Ramesohl (2000) at 37. 
120 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at 333. 
121 Sullivan, R. and Ormerod, R. (2002), 'The Australian Greenhouse Challenge: Lessons Learned and 
Future Directions for Climate Policy', in Albrecht, J. (ed. ) (2002), Instruments for Climate Policy 
(Edward Elgar, London, UK), pp. 170-191 at 184-187. 
122 Interviews on 24 March 2000,2 August 2000 and 19 March 2001 respectively. 
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`I must admit to a degree of cynicism regarding efforts to predict the future, 
let alone to take account of technological changes and their influence on 
greenhouse gas emissions. It seems to me that all one can really say is what 
one's plans are. Of course, even these can change in response to changes in 
the business climate. ' 
`Under the Greenhouse Challenge, companies set their own targets. There is 
a real question if these targets represent anything beyond business as usual. ' 
`Defining the baseline is difficult. The question is how do you project what 
improvements in efficiency will be? ' 
While over half of the participants surveyed in a 1999 evaluation of the Greenhouse 
Challenge indicated that the Greenhouse Challenge had played an important role in 
stimulating abatement action, many of the actions reported under the Challenge 
would probably have occurred in any event 123. Anecdotally, the Greenhouse 
Challenge does appear to have had the effect of encouraging some firms to bring 
forward planned energy saving or greenhouse gas emission reduction projects. 
Beyond those initiatives with clear short-term financial benefits, there is limited 
evidence that the Greenhouse Challenge has actually led to firms changing the 
manner in which they operate or make decisions on greenhouse or energy issues. As 
noted by one interviewee for this research (reflecting a widely held view) 124: 
`The reality is that companies join the Greenhouse Challenge so as to avoid 
regulation or energy taxes. While progress against the targets has been quite 
good, companies would have been doing most or all of these things anyway. 
Joining the Greenhouse Challenge is seen as better than being forced to take 
action or being pointed out as a company that has not joined the challenge. ' 
There two programmes which do appear to have changed firms' greenhouse 
performance, are SEDA's ESB programme (which, while not strictly part of the 
Greenhouse Challenge, does have many obvious synergies 125) and some of the 
projects implemented as part of the Managing Energy for Profits programme. From 
discussions with industry, it appears that, despite the range of publicity materials that 
have been prepared on the economic benefits of energy management, there is 
in AGO (1999e) at 46. 124 Interview, 24 March 2000. 
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scepticism about the actual reductions that can be achieved. This is reflected by 
comments from some of the environmental managers interviewed for this 
research126: 
`Energy is a key business issue for us and we have continuously optimised 
energy efficiency here. If there were more easy wins, we would certainly 
have found them by now. ' 
`Our energy consumption is such a small cost that it seems like a huge 
amount of effort for little or no return to reduce it even further. ' 
This is compounded by the cost associated with energy audits to identify 
opportunities for energy savings. While the experience with the ESB and Managing 
Energy for Profits programmes indicates that there are many cost-effective 
opportunities for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, it is clear that there are barriers 
(e. g. the cost of auditing, scepticism regarding the benefits likely to eventuate) to 
companies actually taking action on these issues. Section 7.4.2 considers these 
issues from an economic perspective and seeks to define the point at which energy 
saving or greenhouse gas emission projects become viable (or where the barriers are 
overcome). 
Issues in Assessing Performance 
There are a number of specific issues associated with the measurement of 
performance under the Greenhouse Challenge that make the assessment of the 
effectiveness of the Greenhouse Challenge difficult. These are (a) the timing of data 
availability, (b) the reliance on static efficiency measures to assess the effectiveness 
of the Greenhouse Challenge (discussed above), (c) the manner in which the 
outcomes from the Greenhouse Challenge are described (in terms of emissions 
abatement), (d) the targets against which performance is assessed, and (e) the 
relationship between emissions and impact. Each of these is discussed below. 
125 Many of the organisations participating in the ESB programme have identified their participation in 
the Greenhouse Challenge and the need to prepare action plans as a key driver for participation in the 
ESB programme. 
126 Interviews on 14 March 2000 and 11 February 2000 respectively. 
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The National Greenhouse Gas Inventory is released some 15-18 months after the 
year to which it applies (for example, the 1999 inventory was released in 2001). One 
of the consequences is that the effects of the various policy measures that have been 
adopted will not necessarily be reflected in the inventory (given both the inevitable 
lag in the implementation of policy and the retrospective nature of the reporting 
process). To an extent, the requirements on companies participating in the 
Greenhouse Challenge to predict their greenhouse gas emissions abatement is 
intended to overcome this limitation. However, as noted above, data on the actual 
emissions abatement achieved will not be available until later in 2002. The 
consequence is that while there is growing evidence that (at the macro level) 
Australia will not meet its Kyoto Protocol targets, it is not possible to (a) say this 
definitively, or (b) to draw firm conclusions on the effectiveness of the Greenhouse 
Challenge (as one of the policy instruments adopted) in the context of Australia's 
overall greenhouse performance. 
While emissions abatement is an important measure of the effectiveness of action 
plans, the critical issue for greenhouse policy is the absolute value of emissions. 
That is, while industries may have had success in abating emissions, this may be of 
little relevance if (e. g. as a consequence of growth in the business) the overall effect 
has been an increase in total emissions. This is illustrated by the example of 
greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generators and distributors, where the 
actions taken under the Greenhouse Challenge were expected to achieve an annual 
abatement of 5 MT C02(eq) in 2000, with the net effect expected to be a reduction in 
the growth in annual emissions from 36.4 MT C02(eq) to 31.4 MT C02(eq). That is, 
while the emissions abatement may be important, it is clear that it has a marginal 
effect on the overall greenhouse performance of the industry. 
One of the specific difficulties with assessing the performance of the Greenhosue 
Challenge is to define the targets against which performance is to be assessed. There 
is no agreement on these targets. Three different approaches could be considered. 
The first is to look at the targets that have been set for the Greenhouse Challenge by 
the Australian government. As discussed above, by these measures, the Greenhouse 
Challenge can, in broad terms, be said to have been successful (despite the 
uncertainties around the actual level of emissions abatement that have been 
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achieved). The second approach is to look at the Kyoto Protocol targets (i. e. an 
allowable 8 per cent increase between 1998 and the period 2008-2012), the 
Greenhouse Challenge can be seen as an important contribution to this target. That 
is, the efforts of companies to abate emissions (with the exception of certain sectors 
such as electricity generation) have broadly resulted in companies stabilising their 
greenhouse gas emissions. If such progress is maintained, it appears that Greenhouse 
Challenge participants should ensure that their growth in greenhouse gas emissions 
substantially meets the targets allowed under the Kyoto Protocol. The third approach 
is to look at the targets that would need to be met in order to stabilise atmospheric 
greenhouse gas emissions at an acceptable level. From the discussion in Section 
7.2.1 (and also in Section 3.1), this would require greenhouse gas emissions to be 
reduced by between 60 and 80 per cent. If this is the benchmark chosen, it is clear 
that the Greenhouse Challenge has not had anything like the desired effect on 
greenhouse gas emissions from participating organisations. 
Finally, the advantage of using greenhouse gas emissions as a basis for policy 
evaluation is that greenhouse gas emissions can be readily measured or calculated127. 
Even though there are uncertainties in areas (e. g. in the treatment of sinks), the use of 
greenhouse gas emissions represents a reasonably sound and agreed basis for policy 
evaluation. At the international level, the concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere represents a measure of the overall effectiveness of international efforts 
to control greenhouse gas emissions. However, there are considerable uncertainties 
regarding the effect of sinks on the short-term and long-term atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases (for example, carbon sequestration in trees may 
provide some short-term benefits but may not affect longer-term atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases). The consequence is that atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases, while providing a broad measure of the 
effectiveness of policy are subject to significant uncertainties. While the reports of 
the IPCC are getting stronger in terms of the predicted consequences of climate 
change, there remain great uncertainties regarding the consequences of climate 
change. The consequence of these uncertainties is that while greenhouse gas 
127 There are various levels of uncertainty associated with the emission estimates. For some sectors 
and gases (e. g. CO2 emissions from stationary energy), the level of uncertainty is relatively low (less 
than plus or minus 5 per cent) whereas for others the uncertainty is much higher (AGO (2001b) at v). 
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emissions provide an accepted measure of policy performance, the significance of 
the impacts of these emissions (or the targets that need to be met) remains subject to 
debate. 
Conclusions 
Overall, the evidence regarding the environmental effectiveness of the Greenhouse 
Challenge is mixed. The Greenhouse Challenge has been effective against its stated 
objectives and the fact that greenhouse gas emissions have stabilised or even reduced 
in certain industry sectors represents an important outcome. If it is accepted that 
significant reductions are required in national greenhouse gas emissions (e. g. the 60 
per cent reduction envisaged by the IPCC), then the Greenhouse Challenge may be 
seen as ineffective given that there are no signs that these stronger targets are, or will 
be, achieved. 
7.5.2 Economic Efficiency 
Data Availability 
There are limited published data on the costs and benefits of energy or greenhouse 
expenditures 128. To an extent this reflects the reluctance of firms to release 
potentially confidential information into the public domain. Apart from this factor, 
there appear to be two other significant reasons for the lack of data. The first is that 
the cost-benefit assessments conducted on energy or greenhouse projects tend to be 
extremely limited, and tend to focus on initial (or capital) costs only rather than on 
overall (i. e. capital and operating) life-cycle costs 129. That is, it appears that the 
evaluation process for many energy projects does not account for the financial 
benefits that that are likely to accrue. The second reason is that, for many 
companies, energy is a fixed or minor cost130 and, therefore, not a management 
priority. 
"s This was also noted for EMSs in Chapter 6. 
'29 Cooper et al (1999); Sullivan et al (2000). 130 For most organisations, energy is typically between two and four per cent of total costs (AGO 
(1999e) at 41). 
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The limitations in the available data make it difficult to draw firm conclusions on the 
costs and benefits of the greenhouse or energy management initiatives. From 
discussions with companies, it appears that the Greenhouse Challenge has not 
substantially enhanced the acquisition of financial data relating to environmental 
initiatives. This is an important conclusion as one of the critical debates around 
voluntary approaches (as discussed in Chapter 5) is that voluntary approaches can 
offer significant financial benefits over other approaches to regulation (in particular, 
command and control approaches). The paucity of information from the Greenhouse 
Challenge (which is also a feature of the Australian experience with EMSs) means 
that it not possible to draw firm conclusions about the economic efficiency of the 
Greenhouse Challenge relative to other policy instruments targeted at the same issue. 
Expected Rates of Return on Energy/Greenhouse Investments 
The emphasis of the Greenhouse Challenge is on `no regrets' measures131 There is 
limited evidence that participating firms have gone beyond a narrowly defined 
interpretation of the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emission reduction 
measures. The majority appear to have only taken those actions that have provided 
clear financial benefits132. In this context, the Greenhouse Challenge can be said to 
have been economically efficient in that it has not required firms to take measures 
beyond those that can be clearly justified in economic terms. This, however, raises 
the question of the investment thresholds that energy or greenhouse investments are 
required to meet. 
In Australia, over the past ten years (where inflation has generally been between two 
and four per cent), firms have typically expected environmental or energy 
investments to repay the capital investment within two years 133. This represents an 
expected rate of return of 50 per cent. By way of comparison, this expected rate of 
131 See, for example, the case-studies described in Commonwealth of Australia (1998). The majority 
of the projects are low (or no) cost initiatives, provide very short payback periods or are actions that 
would have been taken anyway. 
132 Even though broader business benefits such as an improved 'social licence to operate'. early 
capture of low cost abatement options and the adoption of structured approaches to greenhouse gas 
emissions abatement have also been reported (e. g. see Beresford and Waller (2000) at 648,650-651), 
there is limited evidence that these have actually influenced the decisions on specific projects. 
133 See, generally, Sullivan, R., Sullivan, J., Kolominskas, C. and Ormerod, R. (2000), `Where Are the 
Engineers? ', The Environmental Engineer, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 23-24; Sullivan and Ormerod (2002). 
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return is significantly greater than the investment requirements in industries such as 
energy, oil, gas and mining, which typically expect large capital investments (e. g. 
new power generating equipment) to provide a rate of return of between 15 and 20 
per cent. The SEDA programme indicates that an investment rate of return of 20 per 
cent is a viable investment threshold (and the participants in the ESB programme are 
required to implement those projects with an annual rate of return of 20 per cent or 
greater). SEDA's experience has been that many of these `economically justified' 
projects would not have been implemented without the ESB programme. 
Could Other Energy/Greenhouse Projects be Implemented? 
While the measures that have been adopted by Greenhouse Challenge participants 
appear to have been economically efficient (i. e. the benefits have exceeded the costs 
or, expressed another way, companies are only required to implement those measures 
that they see as economically justified), other opportunities that may be economically 
viable are not being taken by companies. As the Greenhouse Challenge allows 
companies themselves to decide what are `no regrets' measures, this makes the 
evaluation of economic efficiency difficult because the distinction between 
reductions that may have been achieved from normal business efficiency measures 
cannot be distinguished from those measures resulting from the Greenhouse 
Challenge 134. The Greenhouse Challenge appears to have had little impact on 
investment criteria and planning and, apart from some isolated cases, a broader shift 
of investment attitude (e. g. relaxation of payback requirements) could not be 
observed 135. This was acknowledged by some of the interviewees for this 
research136: 
'Of course, the reality is that action plans tend to get put to one side in 
situations where there are other pressures on the company. When costs are 
cut, environmental and energy programmes tend to be the first to go, even 
where there are real cost-saving opportunities. ' 
134 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at 325. 135 A similar finding was reported in a European Union sponsored review of energy-related voluntary 
agreements in Germany, Sweden, France, the Netherlands and Denmark (Krarup and Ramesohl 
(2000)). 
136 Interviews on 24 March 2000 and 26 February 2001 respectively. 
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'The fundamental differences between different industry sectors need to be 
recognised. Some are in a position where they can absorb costs or pass them 
on to their customers. However, we are competing against international 
companies and we do not have the luxury of being able to afford to pay more 
for energy. We are price-takers. Furthermore, we are constrained by the 
available electricity sources. If brown coal is the cheapest source of 
electricity, then that is what we will take. ' 
7.5.3 Administration and Compliance Costs 
Data Availability 
The Greenhouse Challenge programme has a total budget of A$36 million for the 
period 1995-2003137. However, there is limited information available on the costs of 
participation and compliance by participating firms or industry associations. 
Furthermore, data are not available for the actions taken by companies in developing 
inventories, preparing action plans or otherwise participating in the Greenhouse 
Challenge. From interviews with company environmental managers, the Greenhouse 
Challenge is seen as another task that they are required to complete. Apart from 
specific costs associated with participation (e. g. if consultants are required to assist 
with inventory preparation), other activities tend to absorbed within existing 
workloads. This is similar to the situation with EMSs (as discussed in Section 6.4.3). 
One of the important consequences is that the data necessary to determine the 
transaction costs of a voluntary greenhouse programme (such as the Greenhouse 
Challenge) relative to other possible policy approaches (e. g. emissions trading, 
carbon taxes) is not available. 
Assessment of Greenhouse Challenge Administrative Costs 
As discussed above, administrative and compliance costs are difficult to assess 
directly. Therefore, the approach used in this dissertation is to look at how the 
requirements of the voluntary approach compares to the requirements that would be 
imposed if it were a mandatory programme (or a regulatory requirement). In broad 
terms, the Greenhouse Challenge requires a negotiation process (to agree the 
Cooperative Agreement), annual reporting, verification, publicity and the 
137 AGO (1998b) at 34. 
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development of technical guidance and provision of support to participating firms. 
The implementation effort is divided between the AGO and industry. Apart from 
enforcement (given that participation in the programme is voluntary), the programme 
contains all of the elements that one would expect to see in programmes of this type. 
Of course, this says nothing of the specific outcomes that are achieved from the 
Greenhouse Challenge. 
The Relationship between Greenhouse and Energy Issues 
Another way of looking at the administrative and compliance costs is to ask how 
many of these costs would have been incurred anyway. While there is a broad 
consensus that Australian companies do not use energy as efficiently as they could, 
firms appear reluctant to commit resources to energy auditing (even though the cost 
of acquiring such information is a necessary prerequisite for achieving energy 
savings). In this context, the division between administrative costs and economic 
efficiency is somewhat clouded. Those firms that wish to achieve energy savings 
would have to gather at least some of the information required under the Greenhouse 
Challenge anyway (to develop inventories, gather information on abatement costs, 
develop action plans, and conduct verification) 138. Therefore, it is not clear whether 
the costs associated with participation in the Greenhouse Challenge should be 
described as administrative or compliance costs or whether these could be described 
as `necessary business improvement costs'. 
It is important to recognise that there are important differences between the data that 
are collected for greenhouse inventories and the data required for energy 
management. For example, for energy management, the issue of cost-benefit 
assessment can be assessed directly in terms of the costs of action and the reductions 
in energy consumption achieved, whereas, for greenhouse, the test may be cost per 
tonne of carbon dioxide saved or abated. Furthermore, actions to save on energy 
costs may be very different (or even conflict with) those required for greenhouse. As 
an illustration, it may be possible to save on energy costs by purchasing electricity at 
138 Centre for International Economics (1999a) at 21-22. 
178 
night rather than during the day, and such savings may be made without any change 
in the energy consumption of the facility139 
One of the issues in the implementation of Australian greenhouse policy has been 
that the AGO has focussed primarily on broad policy objectives and the international 
dimension of greenhouse policy. For many firms, there is a need for much more 
direct technical support to supplement the broad policy emphasis of the AGO to 
ensure that the benefits of energy efficiency (and, thereby, greenhouse gas emission 
reduction) are maximised. Initiatives such as the ESB and the Managing Energy for 
Profits programmes represent important steps forward in bridging this gap between 
macro and micro policy initiatives. 
Linking the Greenhouse Challenge to Other Policy Initiatives 
The Australian government has recently canvassed whether membership of the 
Greenhouse Challenge and commitment to independent verification and monitoring 
should be a necessary precondition to accessing credit arrangements under a 
greenhouse gas emissions trading programme14°. The government concluded that 
building on the reporting and verification processes of the Greenhouse Challenge 
would minimise duplication and, hence, minimise the administration and compliance 
costs associated with an emissions trading scheme'41. 
The Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering in its inquiry 
into urban air pollution in Australia noted that the Greenhouse Challenge should be 
reinforced as one option for the improvement of air quality in urban areas. The 
reason was that the incremental costs associated with such a measure were be minor 
(as firms already participate in the Greenhouse Challenge) or even negative (when 
139 This is a somewhat simplified example as it does not account for the daytime and night-time fuel 
mix or the potential advantages of smoothing energy demand over the day. The key issue is that, at 
the level of the individual firm, energy cost savings do not necessarily translate into improved 
greenhouse performance or reduced energy consumption. 
40 Commonwealth of Australia (2000b) at 19-20. 
141 The Greenhouse Challenge verification process is unlikely to be sufficiently robust for an 
emissions trading programme. Specific issues that would need to be considered are the materiality 
threshold (it is likely that emissions estimates would need to be accurate to one per cent, rather than 
the ten per cent that is presently used to certify inventories as materially accurate) and the timing of 
reporting (i. e. emissions abatement and emissions trades may need to be recorded in real time rather 
than retrospectively as is presently the case). 
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account is taken of the cost savings that can be achieved from improved energy 
management) 142. That is, the Greenhouse Challenge can be seen as facilitating the 
implementation of future environmental or greenhouse policy, as many of the 
administrative and compliance costs have already been incurred. 
7.5.4 Competitiveness Implications 
Because of the energy dependence and structure of the Australian economy 
(discussed in Section 7.3), the potential economic effects of imposing greenhouse gas 
emission limits are a major concern for Australian industry. The Greenhouse 
Challenge is seen by government and by industry as a means of ensuring that 
Australian companies are not disadvantaged by policy measures on greenhouse. 
Other than administrative and compliance costs, the Greenhouse Challenge does not 
impose additional costs on companies. Furthermore, the Greenhouse Challenge has 
been used by Australian industry and the Australian government to argue that 
additional policy measures such as taxes or quotas are not required. 
It could be argued that the Greenhouse Challenge, as a government funded 
programme, is effectively a subsidy to Australian companies. That is, it could be 
argued that the Greenhouse Challenge enhanced the international competitiveness of 
Australian industry. This argument could, in particular, be levelled at aspects of the 
Managing Energy for Profits programme, where the government has paid for 
consultancy or other support for companies. However, the sums of money involved 
are relatively small and the reality is that many other countries run similar 
programmes. The consequence is that the significance of the Greenhouse Challenge 
to international competitiveness (either in absolute or relative terms) is minor. 
Furthermore, the ready access to information and support materials mean that the 
knowledge and learning outcomes are available to all interested parties, irrespective 
of their country of operation or origin. 
142 Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering (1997), Urban Air Pollution in 
Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia) at 196-197. A further dimension to this 
debate is that it has been argued that, regardless of whether or not the Kyoto Protocol is ever 
implemented, national pressures for sustainable development, protection of public health and the 
environment will create further pressure for greenhouse gas emission reduction programmes 
(Cameron (2000); McMichael, A. and Smith, K. (1999), 'Seeking a Global Perspective on Air 
Pollution and Health', Epidemiology, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 1-3). 
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Given that the Greenhouse Challenge is open to any firm that wishes to participate, 
there is no evidence that membership of the Greenhouse Challenge has impacts on 
competitiveness at the domestic level. While there may be financial benefits such as 
energy saving or marketing associated with membership, non-participants also may 
benefit from avoiding the administrative and compliance costs associated with the 
Greenhouse Challenge. The active involvement of many industry associations has 
helped ensure that a `level playing field' is maintained, both within industry sectors 
and across industry as a whole. 
7.5.5 Soft Effects 
Perhaps the most important feature of the Greenhouse Challenge is that it has put the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions explicitly onto business decision-making 
agendas. Many firms have reported management and cultural changes, in particular 
in the processes and practices influencing the way decisions are made and placing 
greenhouse emissions in a broader business context143. The requirement for CEOs to 
sign off on cooperative agreements is seen as creating the organisational impetus to 
ensure that the commitments in such agreement are met'«. Participating 
organisations have also reported a range of other changes such as the appointment of 
staff with responsibility for greenhouse issues, the provision of greenhouse 
abatement related training for staff, the provision of awards for staff to recognise 
excellence in greenhouse abatement activities, and skills development in relation to 
the development of action plans and emissions inventorieslas. Some of the industry 
representatives interviewed for this research made similar commentsl46: 
'Greenhouse is now a specific area of management focus with its own 
budgets, resources and responsibilities. Our board takes an active interest in 
the issue and greenhouse performance is one of those things, along with 
health and safety, that this a part of our regular reports to the board. ' 
143 Parker (1999); AGO (1999e) at 40-43; Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at 
347-351. 
'" Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at 348-349. 145 AGO (1999e) at 42-43. 
146 Interviews on 27 February 2001,20 November 2000 and 3 February 2000 respectively. 
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`The Greenhouse Challenge has raised the profile of greenhouse gas 
emissions and has helped improve knowledge of greenhouse issues in 
organisations that have joined the Challenge. It has helped ensure that 
greenhouse issues are explicitly included in business decision-making. ' 
`We have various initiatives to encourage our employees to make suggestions 
for new projects or to improve the way we do things now. ' 
The Greenhouse Challenge has led to the development of expertise within 
government and within industry on how to identify, monitor, manage and report 
greenhouse gas emissions 147. The emphasis on consultation with industry has meant 
that industry opinions and perspectives have been extremely influential on 
government policy 148. Industry has suggested that its active involvement has 
improved the government's understanding of how more efficient and effective 
policies and measures can be developed. Industry associations have played a leading 
role in encouraging companies to participate in the Challenge and in progressing 
specific aspects of the Challenge such as verification and the development of 
reporting materials and guidance for participating firms 149. The views expressed by 
industry association representatives about the consultative process that has 
underpinned the Greenhouse Challenge include'50: 
'The great strength of the Greenhouse Challenge is that the door is always 
open. It allows us to discuss issues and find solutions that are good for our 
members and for the environment. ' 
'The reality is that the AGO lacks the hard technical expertise that industry 
has. We see our role as being to ensure that policy not only meets 
environmental objectives but also our members' business needs. ' 
The AGO has provided firms with access to information about cost-effective 
abatement actions for organisations of their size and nature in the form of public 
profiles, case-studies and workbooks about the types of actions that participants have 
undertakenlsl. While this information is widely available, it is unclear whether it, of 
itself, stimulates any significant changes in energy management (other than, perhaps, 
at the very basic level of switching off lights and equipment at night). Many firms 
147 AGO (1999e) at 42-43; Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (1999) at 12. 
148 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at 347. 
149 Parker (1999) at 67; Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (1999) at 7. 1S0 Interviews on 26 February 2001 and 20 April 2000 respectively. 
151 Note 97. 
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have not joined the Greenhouse Challenge because they do not see that their emissions 
are significant 152 and many are unaware of emissions, in particular as they relate to 
indirect emissions from electricity production 153. For example, as noted by one energy 
consultant'54: 
`My experience has been that many companies do not draw the link between 
energy and greenhouse. Some do not count the electricity they purchase in 
their evaluation of their greenhouse gas emissions. Others just assume that 
all of the electricity is from hydroelectricity and so there are no greenhouse 
gas emissions to be accounted for. There is still a great need for basic 
education on energy and greenhouse issues. ' 
There are some signs that Greenhouse Challenge members are taking action to 
influence parties outside their organisation. It has been reported that approximately 
five per cent of Greenhouse Challenge participants have designated other Challenge 
participants as preferred suppliers, five per cent have specifically included 
greenhouse gas emissions as a consideration in tender documents, 23 per cent have 
marketed the benefits of the Challenge to suppliers and ten per cent have undertaken 
actions to influence customerslss. While such external efforts are important, it is also 
important to recognise that the majority of firms are not taking such actions. 
Furthermore, at least some firms would have taken action anyway, for commercial 
reasons or as part of their broader corporate citizenship activities. 
7.5.6 Innovation 
Under the Greenhouse Challenge, firms define their own targets and, as discussed 
above, it appears that many of the actions that have been proposed would have been 
carried out anyway. That is, the Greenhouse Challenge does not appear to be acting 
as a driver for change or creating an impetus for dynamic effects or for innovation 156. 
This lack of impetus is reinforced by the limited focus of the Greenhouse Challenge 
verification process. The focus of the verification process is on emissions 
inventories and the actions that have been reported as undertaken, not on whether all 
's2 Note 130. 
's; AGO (1999e) at 41. 
1S4 Interview, 2 August 2000. 
us AGO (1999e) at 44. 156 Sullivan et al (2000). 
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practicable actions have been undertaken or the reasons for not taking action. This 
emphasis means that the incentive that the verification process could provide (i. e. to 
ensure that at least the agreed actions are implemented or, if not, that suitable reasons 
and explanations are provided) is missing. 
7.5.7 Viability and Feasibility 
Industry Perspectives 
The Greenhouse Challenge has enabled Australian industry to demonstrate its 
concern about climate change while, at the same time, deflecting demands to take 
more serious action to cut emissions 157. Australian industry has argued that the 
advantages of the Greenhouse Challenge (flexibility, good risk management, reduced 
costs and improved management practices, establishing processes for measuring, 
reporting and forecasting emissions at the enterprise level) provide the direction for 
greenhouse policy in the medium-term158. Industry has, however, expressed concern 
regarding the lack of public recognition for the efforts of firms participating in the 
Greenhouse Challenge'59. That is, the emphasis of the Greenhouse Challenge on no 
regrets measures has been interpreted by the public as primarily being aimed at 
companies to ensure their competitive advantage, where the environmental benefits 
are of secondary importance. To quote one industry association representative 160: 
'The public wants us to hurt and to see us hurting. They want to see us going 
beyond those activities that are justifiable in economic terms. Their 
argument is that the things we are doing now should have been done years 
ago. The problem is compounded by the lack of benefits associated with 
participation in the Greenhouse Challenge. We have had real problems in 
encouraging our members to join and, once joined, to stay. ' 
A further concern for industry is that possible future policies such as emissions 
trading may disadvantage companies that take early action to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. It has been argued that this uncertainty is a barrier to exploring further 
157 Australia Institute (2000) at 9; Parker (1999) at 68; Australian Industry Greenhouse Network 
(1999) at 3-4. 
158 Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (1999) at 5-14; Cribb (1998). 
159 AGO (1999e) at 58-59. 
160 Interview, 26 February 2001. 
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emission abatement opportunities under the Greenhouse Challenge161. Interestingly 
(although this may reflect the evolution of industry policy positions on greenhouse 
rather than any specific change in the science or economics of greenhouse), recent 
industry research has noted that the potential for voluntary measures to enable 
Australia to meet the Kyoto Protocol targets is limited and has had moderate success 
to date 162. It has been argued that many of the `easy wins' and no regrets measures 
will be achieved soon, and that the further reductions that can be made without 
economic penalty are likely to become progressively more difficult to find. It is 
unclear how this will affect industry's attitude to the Greenhouse Challenge. It may 
be that industry's support for the Greenhouse Challenge will be undermined or it 
may be that such statements are part of industry's negotiating strategy for the period 
beyond 2005 (i. e. where the likelihood is that Australian industry will want to 
increase its greenhouse gas emissions). Despite the public statements of support for 
the Greenhouse Challenge, it also appears that industry itself is sceptical of the actual 
performance improvements being claimed by industry. Some of the comments made 
by the industry association representatives interviewed for this research were 163: 
`The Greenhouse Challenge is really a bit of a joke. Lots of people have 
done the easy stuff. The only effect of the Challenge is to bring these 
forwards a bit. Our industry is struggling with the next generation of 
performance improvements as the easy wins are gone. ' 
`Basically, all the Greenhouse Challenge does is to codify what companies 
would be doing as part of their EMSs anyway. It's a bit more paperwork but 
if it helps us avoid carbon taxes or more regulations, its worthwhile. ' 
Government/Political Perspectives 
As the primary sponsor of the Greenhouse Challenge, the Commonwealth 
government has consistently praised the Greenhouse Challenge's role in enabling 
Australia to meet its international greenhouse obligations'TM. There have been two 
formal evaluations of the Greenhouse Challenge, one a government funded 
161 Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (1999) at 3 
162 Allen Consulting Group (2000), Meeting the Kyoto Target: Impact on Regional Australia. Report 
by the Allen Consulting Group for the Minerals Council of Australia (Allen Consulting Group, 
Melbourne, Australia) at 8. 
163 Interviews on 19 May 2000 and 27 February 2001. 
164 AGO (1999e) at 45; Parker (1999) at 68. 
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evaluation (in 1999) and the other as a part of a broader Parliamentary Inquiry (in 
1999-2000) into Australia's greenhouse performance. The 1999 evaluation of the 
Greenhouse Challenge recommended that the Challenge be maintained as a key 
element of the government's greenhouse policy and that participation in the 
Challenge should remain voluntary165. As the evaluation was conducted by a 
steering group made up of representatives from the Australian Industry Greenhouse 
Network, the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association, the 
Cement Industry Federation, the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, the 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the AGO, it is not 
unsurprising that the findings supported the continuation of the Greenhouse 
Challenge as a voluntary programme166 
In contrast, the Parliamentary Inquiry was extremely critical of the effectiveness of 
the policy responses to date on greenhouse (although, as government members were 
in the minority on the committee, it is not surprising that the report was so 
critical) 167. The inquiry concluded that there were significant limitations in the 
government's industry partnership programmes, in particular that (a) the Greenhouse 
Challenge did not distinguish between the reduction of emissions from normal 
business improvements and emissions reductions as a result of government 
investment in specific programmes, (b) there were no penalties for companies that 
did not meet agreed targets, (c) sector-specific abatement targets or benchmarks were 
not specified, (d) only a small number of companies appeared to be meeting their 
forecast emissions abatement, and (e) there were no incentives for `beyond no 
regrets' measures168. It was recognised that (as discussed in Section 7.5.5 regarding 
soft effects) the Greenhouse Challenge had raised expertise in emissions abatement, 
created CEO support for improving energy efficiency, stimulated the development 
and implementation of practical efficiency measures, prompted the development of 
methodologies for greenhouse gas abatement and provided a forum for discussions 
regarding the implementation of an emissions trading programme 169. The 
government rejected the criticisms of the Greenhouse Challenge, emphasising that 
165 AGO (1999e) at 78-79. 
166 AGO (1999e) at 81. 
167 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000). 
168 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at xxx-xxxi. 
169 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at xxxi. 
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the Greenhouse Challenge was seen as an international role model for the inclusion 
of business in greenhouse abatement 170. 
Environmental Groups 
Environmental groups have been critical of the Greenhouse Challenge, arguing that it 
is simply a public relations campaign for activities that would have happened 
anyway 171. These groups have argued that the growth in emissions from Australian 
industry means that the government must move beyond voluntary approaches to 
address greenhouse gas emissions172. Concern has been expressed about the `closed 
shop' and `cosy relationship between government and industry' nature of the 
Greenhouse Challenge. It has also been argued that the emphasis of the Greenhouse 
Challenge on confidentiality, the closed nature of discussions around Cooperative 
Agreements and the general form of information distribution (i. e. `we will tell you' 
rather than dialogue or discussion) have all undermined the credibility of the 
Greenhouse Challenge173. 
Overall Assessment 
Overall, the perspectives on the Greenhouse Challenge are mixed. The political 
utility of the Greenhouse Challenge (i. e. as a means of enabling commitment to be 
demonstrated and, thereby, avoiding the need for stronger regulatory measures) is 
recognised by both government and industry. However, there is also a significant 
degree of scepticism about the actual contribution of the Greenhouse Challenge to 
reducing Australia's greenhouse gas emissions. In the short-term it is likely that the 
strong political and industry support for a voluntary approach will mean that the 
Greenhouse Challenge will remain as the centrepiece of government policy in this 
area. Longer-term the picture is less clear. It is not possible to say whether the lack 
of support among the opposition political parties will be translated into action (e. g. 
carbon taxes) if these parties attain power. Despite the industry scepticism, it is 
170 Commonwealth of Australia (2001). 
'71 Australia Institute (2000) at 7; ACF (1999a). 
172 ACF (1999a). 
173 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at 367. 
187 
likely that support for the voluntary nature of the Greenhouse Challenge will remain 
strong for so long as climate change remains an important environmental issue. 
7.5.8 Law and Public Policy Issues 
Economic Modelling: Informing the Policy Debate 
One of the issues with the climate change debate is the difficulty in assessing the 
economic consequences of climate change and of climate change policy. In 
Australia, the Commonwealth government has relied on figures produced by the 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) whose model 
(MEGABARE) predicted huge costs for Australia (both in terms of jobs and income) 
if the emission targets specified under the Kyoto Protocol were to be met174. 
However, the credibility of the modelling has been undermined because ABARE 
raised over A$1 million by offering companies the opportunity to sit on the steering 
committee for the development of the MEGABARE model. The firms that took 
advantage of this offer included Mobil, Exxon, BHP, Rio Tinto, the Business 
Council of Australia, the Australian Aluminium Council and Statoil175. Furthermore, 
the modelling results were criticised for overestimating the costs and underestimating 
the benefits of emissions reductions 176. 
The Broader Role of Voluntary Approaches in Energy Policy 
To date, the Greenhouse Challenge has been the primary policy tool used by the 
Australian government to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from Australian industry. 
As discussed above, the outcomes that have been achieved from the Greenhouse 
Challenge appear relatively minor compared to the magnitude of the changes that the 
IPCC has suggested are required to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases at an acceptable level. 
174 Beder (1999) at 122. 
175 Beder (1999) at 122; Greenpeace (1998); ACF (1999b), `ABARE and the Problems with 
Australia's Climate Change Policy: Information about the Australian Conservation Foundation's 
Complaint to the Commonwealth Ombudsman' (ACF, Sydney, Australia). 
176 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at 74-79. 
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There is growing evidence that the contribution of voluntary approaches to achieving 
such strong outcomes is limited. A recent evaluation of different voluntary 
programmes for reducing greenhouse gas emissions concluded that the potential 
contribution of voluntary approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions was 
relatively minor177. This research (see Table 7.2) identified seven broad categories 
of greenhouse policy measures, and assessed the impact of voluntary approaches on 
each of these. 
Table 7.2: The Impact of Voluntary Approaches on Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions178 
Policy Option Requirements Timeframe Impact of voluntary 
programmes 
Changes in product Strategic commitment and Long term Minor 
design, composition of long-term decisions with 
processed materials, regard to a change of 
resource use. technical paradigms, process 
technologies and resource 
structures. 
Change of energy Strategic commitment and Mid/long term Some effects but 
supply structure. long term decisions with depend on the policy 
regard to energy mix. 
infrastructure and fuel input. 
Increased technology Strategic commitment and Long term Minor 
innovation long term RandD investment 
Enhanced investment Change in strategic and Short/medium Some, depending on 
operative business goals as term policy mix 
well as altered decision 
criteria and procurement 
processes 
Enhanced technology Increased communication, Medium term Some, depending on 
diffusion exchange of practical existing cooperation 
experience, dissemination of and competition 
best practice, new network 
links, energy related 
cooperation. 
Improved energy Integrated approach and Medium term Some depending on 
management systematic search for the design of the 
improvement options, scheme 
changes in organisational 
routines, staff empowerment. 
Awareness and Mobilisation of firm actors, Short/medium Some effects 
motivation provision of information, term 
know-how and expertise, 
continuous discussion of the 
issue. 
177 Krarup and Ramesohl (2000). 
178 Krarup and Ramesohl (2000) at 39. 
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Table 7.2 raises some important questions about greenhouse policy in Australia. The 
first is that the major policy options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions all 
require significant investments (capital and operating costs, political support, 
cooperation) over the medium to long term. Secondly, the impact of voluntary 
approaches on the major policy options appears minor. That is, while voluntary 
approaches may assist in progressing some of the policy measures (in particular 
those that require communications, cooperation or support), the real needs appear to 
be financial and regulatory drivers for change. Ultimately, the effectiveness of 
voluntary programmes is strongly dependent on the accompanying policy mix and 
the supporting framework. Thirdly, in basic industries (e. g. mining, minerals 
processing), measures to change material composition, close resource cycles and 
reduce material flows play the primary role in reducing energy consumption and 
greenhouse gas emissions. These measures are mainly triggered by cost reduction 
pressures or by distinct environmental regulations and voluntary measures are 
unlikely to induce significant achievements on their own179. As noted by various 
industry representatives 180: 
'Strategic investments are decided on a 'higher' [senior management] level. 
Commitments made in a voluntary programme such as the Greenhouse 
Challenge are unlikely to influence these investment decisions. The 
exceptions would be where the international industry had signed up (or was 
forced to sign up) to an international standard. ' 
`The Greenhouse Challenge does not have a major influence on our strategic 
management decisions, such as whether or not to build a new plant. ' 
`The reality is that our major capital investments are intended to last for 20- 
30 years, if not longer. The Greenhouse Challenge is a very minor influence 
on such decisions. However, the broader debate around climate change and 
the potential for emissions trading and energy taxes are major influences. 
We see that new plant is the opportunity for us to make a step change in 
performance, due to installing more efficient and more modem equipment'. 
`We look closely at greenhouse issues on all new developments. We, as a 
matter of policy, take greenhouse conservative decisions in situations where 
it is feasible to do so. ' 
179 Krarup and Ramesohl (2000) at 40. 
180 Interviews on 27 February 2001,27 November 2000,9 February 2000 and 20 May 2000 
respectively. 
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In most energy intensive industries, core processes have been continuously optimised 
and any significant changes in energy efficiency will depend on innovation in 
process technologies and ongoing research and development activities. The 
consequence is that while voluntary programmes may foster single projects or 
research initiatives, they are unlikely to change underlying strategies and pressures 
for energy efficiency. The lack of strong incentives for innovation in the Greenhouse 
Challenge is discussed in Section 7.5.6 (above). This is of particular relevance in the 
Australian context given the major contribution of primary industry and power 
generation to Australia's greenhouse gas emissions, and given that technological 
change in such industries is driven both by technological developments and by the 
rate of retirement of existing plant and equipment (which, for many such industries, 
can be over a period of 20-30 years). 
The Energy Supply Structure 
Changes in the energy supply structure represent an important option to reduce total 
greenhouse gas emissions. In Australia, the effect of the recent reforms of the energy 
market to introduce a wholesale electricity market across Australia has been to lead 
to an excess supply of electricity in the market'81. The Commonwealth government 
has argued that energy market reform has reduced some barriers to the penetration of 
new energy supply technologies 182. However, the data that are available indicate that 
the primary effect of these reforms has been to increase the carbon intensity of 
electricity generation (through favouring low cost brown coal power producers)183. 
The deregulation of the electricity market has also enabled many large customers to 
negotiate extremely low electricity prices. It was recently reported that an electricity 
tariff of less than A$0.03 per kilowatt-hour has been agreed to enable a proposed 
184 aluminium smelter project in Queensland to progress. 
The relatively low price of electricity in Australia has been a barrier to effective 
demand side management (as the economic benefits of energy saving are not 
1$1 Commonwealth of Australia (2000a) at 47; Stanford, J. (1997), 'Australian Energy Sector: 
Structure and Sustainability', in Environment Australia (1997a), pp. 57-75. 
182 Commonwealth of Australia (2002) at 46-48. 
183 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at 152-162; Commonwealth of Australia 
(2000a) at 47; Stanford (1997) at 61. 
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sufficiently clear cut to encourage energy saving measures) and it has been suggested 
that, in Australia, the rate of improvement in end use energy efficiency in Australia 
over the past decade has been about half the OECD average 185. Energy supply in 
Australia is not only driven by economic pressures but also by State and Territory 
perspectives on security of energy supply and demands for local employment and 
local development. For example, three coal-fired power stations, with a total 
generating capacity of approximately 2000 MW, have recently been approved for 
Queensland. These power stations will not only increase overall greenhouse gas 
emissions but also lead to the price of electricity falling further and, therefore, acting 
as a further barrier to the development of renewables and alternative sources of 
86 energy'. 
The Commonwealth government has acted to address (at least partially) this market 
failure by requiring electricity suppliers and large purchasers to increase the quantity 
of renewable energy purchased by 2 per cent by 2010187, as well as providing 
funding for the commercialisation of renewable energy technologies' 88. The 
mandatory purchasing requirements for renewables may involve net economic costs 
for companies (as the costs of renewables may be higher than conventional 
electricity sources) and hence goes beyond the no-regrets approach. 
7.6 CONCLUSIONS 
By its own measures, the Greenhouse Challenge has been successful. The measures 
that have been adopted have enabled many companies and industry sectors to 
stabilise their greenhouse gas emissions. The flexibility provisions in the 
Greenhouse Challenge have been welcomed by industry as enabling cost-effective 
184 Wilson, N. (2001), '3c Tariff Sparks Aldoga', The Weekend Australian, 3-4 February 2001, p. 30. 
185 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at 183-184; Stanford (1997) at 61 
186 For example, as noted by Paul Flanagan of Pacific Power in his submission to the Parliamentary 
Inquiry, Pacific Power's plans to build a 400 MW gas-fired power station had been shelved as a 
consequence of the low market prices for electricity and the increased coal generating capacity in 
Queensland (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2000) at 157). 
187 AGO (2000f), `Overview of the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target' (AGO, Canberra, 
Australia). Wholesale purchasers of electricity are required to proportionately contribute towards the 
generation of an additional 9,500GWh of renewable energy by 2010. The measure will be 
implemented through the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 and the Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) (Charge) Act 2000, supported by the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Regulations 2000. 
188 Commonwealth of Australia (2002) at 51-53. 
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approaches to greenhouse gas emissions abatement to be implemented. The 
Greenhouse Challenge also appears to have provided a range of important soft 
effects, in particular making greenhouse and climate issues a part of management 
decision-making processes. 
Despite these positive outcomes, the overall effectiveness of the Greenhouse 
Challenge is questionable. It appears that the primary effects have been to bring 
forward some projects and to enable firms to identify "easy wins' or projects with 
very short payback periods. It is clear that ambitious targets to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions are not being set at the organisational level, nor is the Greenhouse 
Challenge leading to innovation or significant step changes in the manner in which 
Australian companies use energy. While industry has supported the Greenhouse 
Challenge (as a voluntary programme and as a programme where participating 
companies set their own targets), even Australian industry appears to recognise the 
limitations of the Greenhouse Challenge as a tool for significantly improving 
corporate environmental performance. 
The Greenhouse Challenge can be seen as a reasonable response to the UNFCCC'89. 
However, the significant increases in Australia's greenhouse gas emissions since 
1990 mean that, short of a dramatic change in the way in which Australia uses 
energy, Australia will either not meet its Kyoto target or will rely on the credits from 
the land use and forestry change clause to enable it to meet its specified targets. 
Ultimately, to effect significant changes in Australia's greenhouse gas emissions 
profile will require that the broader greenhouse policy is significantly strengthened. 
There are some signs that such a change may occur (e. g. the Commonwealth 
government has recently canvassed opinion on whether membership of the 
Greenhouse Challenge and commitment to independent verification and monitoring 
should be a necessary precondition to participating in an emissions trading 
programme'90). That is, on a very optimistic reading of the likely greenhouse policy 
direction, the Greenhouse Challenge may be seen as a transitional measure in 
preparing for emissions trading. However, there is limited evidence that there is 
189 Sullivan and Ormerod (2002) at 189-190. 
190 Commonwealth of Australia (2000b) at 19-20. 
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political or industry support for emissions trading or for stronger greenhouse policy 
measures. 
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8. AUSTRALIAN MINERALS INDUSTRY CODE FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Australian Minerals Industry Code for Environmental Management (`the Code') 
was launched in 1996 and, since then, over forty companies, representing 
approximately 85 per cent of total production in Australia, have become signatories 
to the Code. 
This chapter is the third of the three case-studies that are assessed in this dissertation. 
The Code is similar to both IS014001 and the Greenhouse Challenge as it is 
essentially a management process specification (i. e. the focus is on establishing 
management and reporting processes to meet self-defined targets). The Code differs 
from IS014001 and the Greenhouse Challenge because it is an industry-specific 
initiative focused on a range of environmental issues, rather than (as with ISO14001) 
an industry-wide initiative or (as with the Greenhouse Challenge) an issue-specific 
initiative. The other major difference is that the mediating institution for the Code is 
an industry association, whereas JAS-ANZ (a government body authorised to set 
operating criteria for the operation of private-sector certification bodies) and the 
Australian Greenhouse Office (a government agency) are the lead agencies for 
ISO14001 and the Greenhouse Challenge respectively. 
As in the preceding case-studies, the chapter is divided into three main sections. 
Section 8.2 provides an overview of the driving forces (international and national) 
that have created the pressure for the mining industry to seek to regulate its own 
performance. Section 8.3 describes the Code, while Section 8.4 is a detailed 
assessment of the Code. 
8.2 BACKGROUND AND DRIVING FORCES 
The discussion of the driving forces for the development of Code requires that the 
broader concerns about the impacts of the mining industry on the environment are 
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understood. These issues are discussed in Section 8.2.1. Section 8.2.2 then discusses 
the specific driving forces that led to the development and implementation of the 
Code. 
8.2.1 The International Political Economy of Mining 
The discussion of the international political economy of mining is divided into three 
parts, as follows: (a) a description of the environmental impacts of mining, (b) a 
discussion of the changing perspectives on mining, in particular the growing 
pressures on the industry from NGOs and other stakeholders, and (c) responses from 
the international mining industry. 
The Impacts of Mining 
Mining is the world's fifth largest industry and a quarter of all `developing' or `post- 
communist' countries can now be described as `mineral economies' (i. e. where at 
least ten per cent of national income or forty per cent of export earnings are derived 
from mining)'. Although the mining industry is an important economic sector in 
many countries, it has been heavily criticised for its impacts on the environment, 
human rights and social protection. These criticisms have been exacerbated by the 
fact that many countries have removed or weakened legislation to protect local 
resources, employment, environments and cultures in order to create greater appeal 
to potential investors3. 
Mining operations are usually twenty to forty years in duration (which means that the 
impacts associated with mining are also long-term), and environmental impacts such as 
acid mine drainage and land contamination frequently continue long after mining 
operations have ceased. The environmental impacts of mining can include massive 
1 For a general overview of the size and scale of the mining industry, see Mining Minerals and 
Sustainable Development [MMSD] (2002), Breaking New Ground (Earthscan, London, UK) at 34-56. 
2 Oxfam Community Aid Abroad (2001), Mining Ombudsman Annual Report 2000-2001 (Oxfam 
Community Aid Abroad, Melbourne, Australia); Atkinson, J. (1998) Undermined: The Impact of 
Australian Mining Companies in Developing Countries (Community Aid Abroad/Oxfam, Melbourne, 
Australia); Evans, G., Goodman, J. and Lansbury, N. (eds. ) (2001), Moving Mountains: Communities 
Confront Mining and Globalisation (Otford Press, Sydney, Australia). 
3 Rosenfeld Sweeting, A. and Clark, A. (2000), Lightening the Lode: A Guide to Responsible Large- 
Scale Mining (Conservation International, Washington DC, USA) at 10). 
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land disturbance, the removal of vegetation, siltation, increased demand for water, 
physical pressures on the environment, soil and water contamination 4. The impacts 
associated with specific mining operations are, however, highly dependent on site- 
specific factors such as the size of the mine, the method of mining5, mineral 
characteristics 6, geography and climate7, and environmental management practices 
and processes8. 
Changing Opinions on Mining 
Until recent times, mining was seen as a preferential land use, where external effects 
(e. g. environmental impacts) were assumed to be a natural and unavoidable 
consequence of the extraction and processing of needed supplies9. As the 
environmental damage associated with mining has become clearer, there has been 
increasing controversy regarding whether mining projects should be allowed to 
proceed and under what conditions. For example, the mining industry has been the 
subject of a range of campaigns by NGOs and other stakeholders, including campaigns 
(a) to prevent the World Bank investing in extractive industries, (b) to prevent sub- 
marine tailings disposal, (c) to ban the use of cyanide, (d) against specific companies 
° World Bank (1998), Environmental Assessment of Mining Projects. Environmental Assessment 
Sourcebook Update No. 22 (World Bank Environment Department, Washington DC, USA); 
Rosenfeld Sweeting and Clark (2000) at 6-18; Mineral Policy Centre [MPC] (2001a), 'Discussion 
Paper: The Impacts of Hardrock Mining on the Environment and Human Health' (MPC, Washington 
DC, USA); Mercer, D. (1991), A Question of Balance - Natural Resources Conflict Issues in 
Australia (Federation Press, Sydney, Australia); Ecologically Sustainable Development Working 
Group Chairs (1991), Final Report - Mining (Australian Government Publishing Services, Canberra, 
Australia) at 22-30; MMSD (2002) at 232-267; DaRosa, C. and Lyon, J. (1997), Golden Dreams, 
Poisoned Streams (MPC, Washington DC, USA), pp. 29-92; DaRosa, C. (1999), Overburdened. MPC 
Issue Paper No 2 (MPC, Washington DC, USA). 
s Surface mining tends to have greater impacts on ecosystems and soil erosion than underground 
mining because of the extensive surface clearing and disturbance involved. Underground mining is 
more frequently associated with adverse impacts on groundwater, increased risks of subsidence and 
increased risks to workers. 
6 For example, industrial minerals such as stone, clay and sand require little processing and so the 
major environmental concerns are those associated with the actual scale of production. In contrast, 
metals mining operations frequently involve some processing of the ore, which can be a source of 
emissions to the environment and may also lead to the chemical form of metals changing so that their 
toxicity changes. 
7 For example, tropical areas create problems due to high rainfall and the potential run off of 
hazardous materials. In contrast, in dry areas, the consumption of water may lead to the depletion of 
surface or groundwater bodies. 
8 For an assessment of the contribution of management processes and systems to shareholder value, 
see Innovest Strategic Value Advisors (2001), The Global Metals and Mining Sector (Innovest 
Strategic Value Advisors, New York, USA). 
9 Cordes, J. (1997), 'Mining and the Environment: Driving Forces for Change', UNEP Energy and the 
Environment, December 1997, pp. 25-28 at 26. 
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(e. g. Rio Tinto, Newmont), and (e) against specific mined products (e. g. lead, 
diamonds)1°. 
From the mining industry's perspective, there are both individual and collective 
dimensions to these debates. Mining companies compete mainly on the basis of 
costs (as prices are set by the world markets). These costs are, to a large extent, 
determined by the specific characteristics of mining sites. Hence, average production 
costs depend on the quality of a company's deposits portfolio and mining companies 
compete globally for the most productive deposits. These deposits are attributed in 
the form of operation licences by public authorities, and environmental performance 
has become an increasingly important factor in the allocation of these licenses, 
1. The 
following case is an example of how a poor environmental or social record can affect 
access to resources. In mid-2000, BHP wished to reassure indigenous communities 
at its diamond project Ekati in Canada that it was well regarded by people at Ok Tedi 
in Papua New Guinea. This claim was disputed when, according to the lawyer acting 
for the Ok Tedi landowners, his clients had stated that BHP ought to `... piss off out 
of the country never to be seen again... '12. That is, environmental performance is a 
strategic issue for individual mining companies and mining companies do not 
necessary gain from collective action. 
Environmental performance is also a collective issue for the industry, as the public 
tends to judge the performance of the industry by the performance of its weakest 
members13. It is frequently the failures of the industry rather than the successes that 
generate the greatest media coverage and the reputation of the industry as a whole 
has been marred by the highly publicised poor performance of individual operators14 
Furthermore, public attitudes have changed so that these `external effects', which 
10 (MPC (2001b), 'Discussion Paper: A Survey of the Mining Landscape: Situation Analysis' (MPC, 
Washington DC, USA)). 
11 Bomsel, 0., Borkey, P., Glachant, M. and Leveque, F. (1996), 'Is there Room for Environmental Self- 
Regulation in the Mining Sector? ', Resource Policy, Vol. 22. 
12 Styant-Browne, N. (2000), Media Release: `Use Record Profits To Fix Ok Tedi' PNG Landowners 
Tell BHP. 28 July 2000 (Slater and Gordon, Melbourne, Australia). 
13 Kilani, J. (1998), `The Salient Aspects of Environmental Codes of Practice', in Proceedings of the 
Minerals Council 23rd Annual Environmental Workshop (Minerals Council of Australia, Canberra, 
Australia), pp. 46-50 at 48; MMSD Australia (2002), Facing the Future: The Report of the Mining, 
Minerals and Sustainable Development Australia Project (MMSD, London, UK) at 53. 
14 Sullivan, R. and Frankental, P. (2002), `Corporate Citizenship and the Mining Industry: Defining 
and Implementing Human Rights Norms', Journal of Corporate Citizenship, No. 7, pp. 79-91 at 87- 
88. 
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were once seen as natural and avoidable consequences of mining operations, are 
now, increasingly, regarded as unacceptable15 
The consequence of these debates around the environmental performance of the 
mining industry has been that there is growing pressure for the tighter regulation of 
mining developments. This is seen as affecting the mining industry in two ways. 
The first is that regulation may impose additional costs on the industry, e. g. through 
reducing operational flexibility or through the imposition of additional performance 
or operational requirements 16. The second is that regulation may be a threat to the 
long term well-being of the industry through affecting the demand for the industry's 
products or through restricting access to specific markets'7. 
Industry Responses 
The mining industry has recognised that it needs to develop world-wide strategies to 
respond to these pressures, and to enable the industry to have an increased influence 
on the policy development process, at all levels of government18. In 1998, some of 
the world's largest mining companies established the Global Mining Initiative to 
`identify how mining and the minerals industry can best contribute to the global 
transition to sustainable development' 19. In 1999, the International Institute for 
Environment and Development, was commissioned to conduct a two-year study (the 
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) Project) to understand how 
the mining sector, as a whole, could make the transition to sustainable 
development20. 
15 Hinde, C. (2000), 'The Global Mining Industry', UNEP Industry and Environment, Special Issue 2000, 
7-12. ýýCordes 
(1997) at 27. 
17 For example, the regulatory requirements that apply to the metals industry's product life cycles 
include the environmental assessment ofexploration and development, occupational health and safety 
requirements, regulations covering new chemicals and products, poison control, air, water, soil 
standards, public reporting on releases, transport, product standards, storage and disposal of wastes, 
national targets for recycling/reuse, labelling, risk reduction programmes, export controls, accident 
prevention and environmental management and reporting requirements (MCA (1997), Minerals: The 
Marketing Challenge Ahead. The Widening Net of International Agreements (MCA, Canberra, 
Australia) at 7-10). 
'8 MCA (1997) at 11. 
19 For further information see the website of the Global Mining Initiative, 
http: //www. globalmining. com (last visited 24 May 2002). 
20 The sponsors of MMSD included most of the world's major mining companies, many of whom 
(e. g. Alcoa, BHP-Billiton, MIM, Normandy, Pasminco, Placer Dome, Rio Tinto, Western Mining 
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The findings of the MMSD Project were released in 200221. Nine key challenges 
were identified for the international mining industry, namely (a) the overall viability 
of the industry, (b) the control, use and management of land, (c) the potential 
contribution of the mining industry to economic development, (d), providing benefits 
at the local level, (e) the environment, (f) the adoption of an integrated approach to 
using minerals, (g) access to information, (h) artisanal and small scale mining, and (i) 
governance. Recommendations were made on how to address each of these 
challenges. However, the majority of the measures proposed were process-type 
activities (e. g. encouraging the industry to work together, to form associations, to 
develop and implement systems, and to establish initiatives on issues such as product 
stewardship, sustainable development, and reporting). Specific performance 
measures were not proposed for the industry. At the time of writing, it is too early to 
say how the results of the MMSD Project will contribute to or influence the manner 
in which the international mining industry will operate in the future. 
8.2.2 Mining in Australia 
Economic Significance 
Mining is one of the most important sectors of the Australian economy, representing 
approximately nine per cent of GDP and providing about five per cent of 
employment22. Australia is the world's largest exporter of coal, bauxite, alumina, 
lead, titanium and zircon and one of the world's leading exporters of gold, iron ore, 
aluminium, nickel, zinc and uranium23. 
Corporation) are also signatories to the Australian Minerals Industry Code for Environmental 
Management. The other sponsors of MMSD included the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), the World Bank and the Australian government. 
21 MMSD (2002). 
22 MMSD Australia (2002) at 41. 
23 Centre for International Economics (1999b), Minerals: Our Wealth Down Under (Centre for 
International Economics, Sydney, Australia); PriceWaterhouseCoopers (1999), Minerals Industry '99: 
Survey Report (MCA, Canberra, Australia). The mining industry accounts for between fifteen and 
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Driving Forces for the Code 
In 1995, the Commonwealth Environment Protection Agency indicated that it was 
considering developing a code of conduct for Australian companies operating 
abroad. This proposal was driven by the heavy criticisms of the behaviour of the 
Australian mining industry, in particular in less developed countries24. In response, 
the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) announced that it would develop its own 
voluntary code of conduct. In December 1996, the MCA launched the Australian 
Minerals Industry Code for Environmental Management ('the Code')25. Describing 
the background to the development of the Code, a mining industry representative 
noted26: 
`The Code evolved out of the controversies around the Australian mining 
industry in the early to mid 1990s, in particular as a consequence of Ok Tedi. 
The Australian Conservation Foundation put together a code of practice for 
mining companies in Papua New Guinea, but did not involve the industry in 
the development of the code. The mining industry said 'No' to ACF's code. 
However, at around the same time, the Australian government expressed its 
interest in a code of conduct for the mining industry. As a consequence of 
these pressures, the industry decided to be proactive and to develop its own 
code, in consultation with stakeholders. ' 
The Code was seen as a means for the mining industry to demonstrate its 
commitment to excellence in managing the environmental aspects of its operations27. 
The long-term benefits of developing and implementing the Code were seen as 
improving the industry's environmental performance, enabling the industry to earn 
the public's trust, maintaining the industry's `licence to operate' and contributing to 
shareholder value. The short-term benefits were seen as enabling the minerals 
industry to demonstrate a consistent approach to environmental management, helping 
establish benchmarks of excellence within the industry, promoting industry 
achievements, stimulating community consultation, demonstrating due diligence in 
twenty per cent of the market share value of the top-300 listed companies on the Australian stock 
exchange. See also Sections 3.1.2,3.1.3 and 7.3.1 of this dissertation. 
24 See, for example, Atkinson (1998). There were also concerns about the industry's environmental 
record in Australia, in particular the historic legacy of past mining operations (MMSD Australia 
(2002) at 58). 
u MCA (1996a), `Australian Minerals Industry Code for Environmental Management' (MCA, 
Canberra, Australia). 
26 Interview, 20 May 2000. 
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environmental management and increasing stakeholder confidence28. The Code was 
subsequently reviewed in 1999 and a revised Code was issued in February 200029. 
8.3 DESCRIPTION OF CODE 
Code Objectives 
The stated aim of the Code is to achieve continual improvement in the environmental 
performance and accountability of the Australian minerals industry through the 
implementation of the Code30. The Code contains seven principles (see Table 8.1) 
that provide a framework for the industry's environmental management efforts. 
However, the Code does not prescribe specific environmental practices or set 
minimum standards, with the exception that signatories commit to compliance with 
all statutory requirements as a minimum and to continual improvement by 
progressively implementing the Code's principles (where the rate of continual 
improvement is defined by the individual companies)31. The implementation of the 
Code is not seen as an end in itself but as a tool for achieving the objectives of 
improving environmental performance and communicating that improved 
performance to stakeholders 32. 
27 MCA (1999a), 'First Progress Report: Code for Environmental Management' (MCA, Canberra, 
Australia). 
28 MCA (1999a). 
29 MCA (2000a), 'Australian Minerals Industry Code for Environmental Management 2000' (MCA, 
Canberra, Australia). 
30 MCA (2000a) at 4. 
31 MCA (2000a) at 5,10. 32 MCA (1999a). 
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Table 8.1: Principles of the Australian Minerals Industry Code33 
Element To be achieved through 
Accept " Demonstrating management commitment. 
environmental " Allocating clear roles, responsibilities, accountabilities and resources. 
responsibility Providing necessary information, performance targets, training, resources and 
support. 
Strengthen the " Fostering openness and dialogue with employees and the community. 
industry's " Respecting cultural and heritage values and facilitating cross-cultural awareness 
relationships and understanding. 
with the " Consulting with the community on the environmental consequences of the 
community industry's activities. 
" Anticipating and responding to community concerns, aspirations and values 
regarding the industry's activities. 
Integrate " Establishing environmental management systems consistent with current 
environmental standards. 
management " Incorporating environmental and related social considerations into the business 
into the way planning process along with conventional economic factors. 
the industry " Applying risk management techniques on a site-specific basis to achieve sound 
works environmental outcomes over the life of the project. 
" Developing contingency plans to address any residual risk. 
" Ensuring resources are adequate to implement the environmental plans during 
operations and closure. 
Minimise " Assessing environmental and related community effects before and during 
environmental exploration and project development. 
impacts " Evaluating risks and alternative exploration and mining project concepts, taking 
into account community views and subsequent land use options. 
" Adopting a proactive and cautious approach to environmental risks throughout 
the life of each operation. 
" Applying ecological principles that recognise the importance of biodiversity 
conservation. 
" Planning for closure in the feasibility and design phases of a project and 
regularly reviewing plans to consider changes in site conditions, technology and 
community expectations. 
Encourage the " Employing production processes that are efficient in their consumption of 
responsible energy, materials and natural resources. 
production " Minimising wastes through recycling, and by reusing process residues. 
and use of the " Safely disposing of any residual wastes and process residues. 
industry's . Promoting the safe use, handling, recycling and disposal of the industry's 
products products through an understanding of their life-cycle. 
Continually " Setting and regularly reviewing environmental performance objectives and 
improve targets that build upon regulatory requirements and reinforce policy 
environmental commitments. 
performance " Monitoring and verifying environmental performance against established criteria 
so that progress can be measured. 
" Benchmarking against industry performance and addressing changing external 
expectations. 
" Researching the environmental aspects of the industry's processes and products 
and developing better practices and innovative technologies. 
Communicate " Identifying interested parties and their information needs. 
environmental " Providing timely and relevant information including publication of annual public 
performance environment reports on the industry's activities and environmental performance. 
" Encouraging external involvement in monitoring, reviewing and verifying the 
industry's environmental performance. 
" Continually reviewing and evaluating the effectiveness of the industry's 
communications. 
33 MCA (2000a) at 6-9. 
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Code Requirements 
Companies that commit to the Code are required to (a) progressively implement the 
Code, (b) produce an annual public report within two years of registration, (c) 
complete an annual Code Implementation Survey to assess progress against the 
implementation of the Code principles, and (d) verify the survey results by an 
accredited auditor at least once every three years34. Each year, the Code secretariat 
(the MCA) issues an industry-wide analysis of performance against the Code 
principles, based on the Code Implementation Survey returns3s 
When the Code was first established, public environmental reporting was seen as 
critical to establishing the credibility of the Code and to demonstrating the industry's 
commitment to community consultation 36. The industry expected that these reports 
would be used proactively to provide information on issues of concern to 
stakeholders, to promote the reporting companies' achievements and to provide a 
benchmark for demonstrating continual improvement towards excellence in 
environmental management37. The reporting process and outcomes (both in terms of 
environmental performance and industry credibility) are considered further in 
Section 8.4. 
All exploration, mining and minerals processing companies and contractors are 
eligible to become signatories to the Code. Membership of the MCA is not a 
prerequisite for signing the Code, nor is being a signatory a prerequisite for 
membership of the MCA or other industry association38. Signatories may withdraw 
34 MCA (2000a) at 3,10-11; MCA (2001a), 'Code Implementation Survey. July 2001' (MCA, 
Canberra, Australia); MCA (2001b), 'Code Implementation Survey Guidance Note. May 2001' 
(MCA, Canberra, Australia). The surveys are to be completed and returned to the Minerals Council 
V the end of February of each year. 
MCA (2001e), 'Third Code Progress Report' (MCA, Canberra, Australia), 9 pp. Many of the Code 
signatories also include their Code Implementation Survey results as part of their annual reports (see, 
for example, Consolidated Rutile Limited [CRL] (2000), Public Environmental Report 2000 (CRL, 
Brisbane, Australia) at 20; Thiess (2000), Working Together: Health, Safety, Environment and 
Community Relations Report 1999/00 (Thiess, Brisbane, Queensland) at 16). 
36 MCA (1996b). 
37 MCA (1998a), `Interim Guidance Note on Environmental Reporting August 1998' (MCA, 
Canberra, Australia). The public environmental report should identify the nature of the organisation's 
environmental impacts and major issues, include benchmarks against which continual improvement 
can be measured, provide an assessment of regulatory compliance performance, including 
prosecutions and associated significant environmental incidents, and provide information on relevant 
performance parameters. 
8 MCA (2000a) at 10. 
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their commitment to the Code at any stage. The companies committing to the Code 
are recorded on a public register maintained by the MCA39. 
Enforcement 
There are no formal enforcement procedures under the Code. Industry peer pressure 
is seen as the primary means of enforcement40. However, the industry has 
recognised that it needs to explore options to address poor performers and non- 
compliance with the Code41. 
The MMSD Australia Project noted that the MCA is dependent on the fees paid by 
its members. The consequence is that there is a general perception that the MCA's 
ability to provide leadership and influence change in the industry is extremely 
constrained42. This issue was raised by some of the regulatory bodies interviewed 
for this research43: 
'The mining industry associations can't really act as effective enforcement 
agencies as they are subject to their members' expectations and demands. 
There is always going to be a need for effective regulation that is 
implemented and enforced by an independent agency. ' 
`The critical issue with self-regulation is who actually does the checking and 
review of performance, and who ensures compliance. ' 
`We know that when push comes to shove, the industry will act to protect 
itself and its members. There is no way that the Minerals Council would ever 
do anything that was against the interests of one of its members. The industry 
sees itself as being under siege from environmentalists and greenies. The last 
thing they want is the [Minerals] Council on their case as well. ' 
One of the major changes in the revised Code was the establishment of an External 
Environmental Advisory Group to provide advice on progress towards implementing 
the Code, to identify issues of concern and to prepare an annual report detailing the 
39 The register of signatory companies can be found at the MCA's website, 
http: //www. minerals. org. au At 3 October 2001, there were 41 signatories to Code. 
40 Burton, B. (1999c), 'Revised Code Omits Human Rights and Enforcement', Mining Monitor, Vol. 
4, No. 4, pp. 3-4. 
41 MCA (2001e). 
42 MMSD Australia (2002) at 93. 
43 Interviews on 3 May 2000,10 May 2000 and 3 May 2000 respectively. 
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progress towards implementation of the Code". The Group includes representatives 
from government, community and environmental NGOs, and academia45. The Group 
issued its first report in 200146. 
However, this Group does not have the power to hear complaints or to take action 
against companies that do not meet their Code obligations. This limitation was 
recognised by the MMSD Project which stated that the establishment of an independent 
complaints mechanism would send `... a powerful message of the industry's 
commitment to play a positive role in society and to respect the rights of stakeholders 
and host communities'47. 
Geographic Scope of Code 
The Code is intended to apply to all of a signatory company's activities, wherever 
they operate, as well as to the relevant activities of contractors engaged by the 
signatories48. That is, the Code is seen as having extra-territorial effect, applying to 
signatories' operations outside Australia, as well as within Australia. Signatory 
companies are also required to `strongly encourage' the application of the Code 
principles to operations in which they hold a non-controlling interest49. 
Supporting Information and Guidance 
The Code is supplemented by industry specific guidance and other documents. 
Specific guidance on environmental management in the industry is provided in 
44 MCA (2000a) at 10-11; Burton, B. (2001b), 'Miners Unveil "Independent" Audit Committee', Mining 
Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 5. 
45 Details of the current membership of the committee can be obtained from the MCA's website, 
http: //www. minerals. org. au (last visited 20 May 2002). 
46 External Environmental Advisory Group (2001), 'Annual Report 2000-01' (MCA, Canberra, 
Australia), 8 pp. 
47 MMSD Australia (2002) at 65. 
48 MCA (2000a) at 10. The 'Australian mining industry' (i. e those companies listed on the Australian 
stock-exchange or with their corporate headquarters in Australia) has an increasing quantity of 
overseas investments. In 1996 some fifteen per cent of the total assets of Australian mining 
companies were held overseas and in 1996-1997, some 43 per cent of the industry's total expenditure 
on exploration was spent overseas (Atkinson (1998) at 6-9). 
49 MCA (2000a) at 10. 
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documents such as Code Guidance NotesSO, MCA policy statements51, the series of 
Best Practice Environmental Management in Mining modules52, environmental 
management standards such as the ISO 14000 series and technical guidance and 
other information from the Australian Centre for Mining Environmental Research 
(ACMER)53. 
8.4 ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE 
The evaluation of the Code uses the eight evaluation criteria developed in Chapter 2, 
namely, environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, administration and 
compliance costs, competitiveness, soft effects, dynamic effects and innovation, 
viability and feasibility, and law and public policy issues. The evaluation (under 
each of specific criteria) also includes a discussion of the indicators and data used. 
8.4.1 Environmental Effectiveness 
This section is divided into five parts. The first part is an assessment of the data that 
are available to enable environmental performance to be assessed. This is an 
important issue as it not only relates to the question of environmental effectiveness 
but because of the centrality of reporting processes to the Code and the importance 
assigned by the industry to these reporting processes. The second part is a discussion 
of the Code against (a) the targets set by the industry for itself, (b) the specific 
requirements contained in regulations. Environmental accidents and incidents 
represent a particular issue for the industry, as such incidents are frequently used as a 
measure of whether the industry is able to regulate itself. Accidents and incidents are 
considered in the third part of this section. The fourth and fifth parts consider the 
environmental performance of the industry against NGO expectations and the 
so MCA (1998b), 'Interim Guidance Note: Auditing Code Conformance. August 1998' (MCA, 
Canberra, Australia); MCA (1998c), 'Interim Guidance Note: Auditing the Environmental 
Management System. August 1998' (MCA, Canberra, Australia); MCA (1998a); MCA (1999c), 
'Interim Guidance Note on Options for Accreditation of Environmental Auditors. February 1999' 
(MCA, Canberra, Australia). 
52 MCA website, http: //www. minerals. org. au (last visited 20 May 2002). 
Australian Minerals Energy and Environmental Foundation (AMEEF) website, 
http: //www. ameef. com. au (last visited 26 June 2001). 
53 ACMER website, http: //www. acmer. com. au (last visited 26 June 2001). 
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requirements of sustainability respectively. The focus of these two parts is on targets 
that go beyond or challenge those specified for the industry for itself. 
Data Availability 
As discussed in Section 8.2.1, the environmental performance of individual 
companies and of different mine sites is highly dependent on site and operating 
characteristics. The consequence has been that the development of formal general 
rules regarding mine operations or the development of effective and valid 
comparative indicators is widely considered'to be extremely difficult54. This has had 
two consequences. The first has been that specific targets for individual facilities or 
for the industry as a whole have not been developed by the industry. Individual 
companies have, therefore, developed their own, company-specific performance 
indicators and performance targets, making it difficult to compare companies' social 
and environmental performance". The second has been that the focus of collective 
reporting (the Code Implementation Survey) is on measures related to the industry's 
performance against the Code, rather than against specific environmental 
indicators56. From the 2000-2001 survey, the industry has indicated that the 
principles relating to accepting environmental responsibility, minimising 
environmental impact and communicating performance to the public are the most 
advanced, with the highest scores being reported for systems-type aspects (possibly 
reflecting the growing adoption of IS014001 by the industry)57. The External 
Environmental Advisory Group has noted that the Survey may be limited because the 
participating companies are allowed to assess their own performance, the Survey 
does not allow the reasons for differences between companies to be assessed, and the 
Survey does not explicitly measure environmental performanceSB. The Group did 
note that these issues should be addressed over time as the Survey evolves. 
54 Bomsel et at (1996) at 13. 
55 MMSD Australia (2002) at 52. 
56 MCA (2001a). 
57 MCA (2001e). 
58 External Environmental Advisory Group (2001). 
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The mining industry has been criticised for not assessing the quality of the reports 
produced59. World Wildlife Fund (WWF) annually reviews the public environmental 
reports produced by individual companies to assess their usefulness to enable 
stakeholders wishing to assess a company's social and environmental performance60. 
The assessment process relates to the reports themselves rather than to the 
environmental performance of the industry or of individual companies. In an 
interview, a WWF representative commented61: 
'While we are able to assess the reports, we simply do not have the capacity or 
resources to look at the industry's impacts in a systematic manner. We (along 
with all of the other NGOs) rely on identifying poor performers and using this to 
argue that the industry as a whole needs to raise its game. ' 
WWF's assessment is that, of the thirty-two reports produced by Code signatories in 
2000, fifteen could be considered as scoring a `pass' or better62. WWF was of the 
view that there had been very little improvement in the quality of the reports since its 
first scorecard in 1999. However, it is important to recognise that there were only 
eleven reports available in 1999 (of which five were considered as scoring. a pass). 
Therefore, a more positive conclusion could be that ten companies had improved 
their reporting from `inadequate' to `pass', reflecting the growing industry 
knowledge and expertise in reporting. Furthermore, given that twenty-one of the 
reports considered in 2001 were from companies had not previously reported, these 
limitations may be considered as part of the evolution of reporting processes within 
individual companies. Despite the criticisms of the industry's public environmental 
reports, it is pertinent to note that, in Australia, the mining industry is regarded as the 
leader in environmental reporting, both in terms of the numbers of reports produced 
and the quality of reporting63. 
WWF identified a number of common themes across the reports": 
59 Rae, M. (1999), 'Ore or Overburden? ', Groundwork, June 1999,4 pp. 60 WWF (2000), `Ore or Overburden II. WWF's 2nd Annual Scorecard on Mining Company 
Environmental Reports, September 2000' (WWF, Melbourne, Australia). 
61 Interview, 18 April 2001. 
62 WWF (2000) at 7. 63 Baird, R. (2000), 'The Inglorious Existence of s299(1)(f) - Is This the End of Mandatory 
Environmental Reporting? ', Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 81-88 at 
86). 
64 W WF (2000) at 6-7. 
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" None of the reports received a `pass mark' for external verification. WWF noted 
that, while many of the reports contained statements from an external auditor, few 
of these statements provided sufficient commentary on the company's 
environmental or social performance65. The mining industry has recognised the 
importance of verification to enable the industry to develop its credibility and one 
of the MCA's priority actions for 2002 is to progress the issue of verification66. 
9 Few of the reports could demonstrate that organisations had a strategic approach 
to stakeholder and community relations. 
" Many companies seemed to ignore the importance of setting and reporting on 
environmental targets. Thirteen of the thirty-two reports had no targets at all. 
However, WWF did note that those companies that scored well for environmental 
targets also received a high score for data and environmental management67. 
9 Most of the reports contained sufficient detail to enable an assessment to be made 
of current levels of compliance and the environmental and social objectives that 
the company had set for itself. 
Environmental Performance: Compliance and Industry-Defined Targets 
The majority of the industry's environmental reports explicitly assess performance 
against regulatory requirements. While many of the companies report improved 
performance, it is also clear that the industry has ongoing issues with regulatory 
65 External auditors or verifiers have been criticised for the limited scope of their reviews and for 
having a tendency to draw conclusions that go beyond the subject of the report (Deegan, C. (1998), 
'Environmental Reporting in Australia: We're Moving Along the Road but There's Still a Long Way 
to Go', Environmental and Planning Law Journal Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 246-260 at 249-250). 
66 Solomon, F. (2000), `External Verification of the Australian Minerals Industry Code for 
Environmental Management: A Case Study', Australian Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 
7, No. 2, pp. 91-98 at 92; Atkinson, J. (1999), 'An NGO View of the Code', Groundwork, September 
1999,2 pp; MCA (2001e); External Environmental Advisory Group (2001); MMSD Australia (2002). 
One possible solution to some of these issues could be to develop an independent process for the 
certification of the social and environmental performance of individual mines (see WWF (2001), 
'Discussion Paper: Mining Certification Evaluation Project' (WWF, Melbourne, Australia)). 
67 This reflects the links between the process of setting targets and the need to assess performance 
against these targets. 
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compliance. For example, BHP was fined for sixteen non-compliances in 1999/200068. 
In contrast, MIM reported that it had had no fines or prosecutions in 1999/200069. 
This raises broader questions regarding whether prosecution represents a valid 
measure of regulatory compliance, as MIM reported that it had 1053 `incidents' over 
the same period70. MIM noted that 25 per cent of these were minor non- 
conformances with no environmental impact, 63 per cent were minor incidents with 
minimal potential for environmental impacts outside the immediate area, 11 per cent 
were moderate localised environmental impacts (possibly off MIM managed areas) 
and one per cent could have led to significant medium term effects, possibly off 
MIM managed areas71. In a similar manner, Consolidated Rutile Limited (CRL) 
reported that it had received one order to comply and one fine (i. e. two regulatory 
compliance issues) but had one incident that led to environmental impact of state or 
national significant, three incidents that may or could have led to impacts of regional 
significance and six incidents that may or could have led to impacts of local72. 
Apart from the question of whether prosecutions are a complete measure of 
regulatory performance, it is clear is that the mining industry has not reached a 
situation where regulatory compliance can be assured. However, the fact that most 
of the companies reporting are explicitly communicating their regulatory 
performance and, in most cases, describing the measures taken to ensure compliance, 
is a sign that the industry sees regulatory compliance as a necessary part of its overall 
environmental management efforts. As argued by one mining industry association 
representative 73: 
`The Code is not intended in any way to replace regulation. Rather the Code 
is complementary to legislation and, through the reporting process, provides 
another incentive for ensuring regulatory compliance. ' 
From the information provided in the industry's public environmental reports, the Code 
signatories appear to have had a reasonable degree of success in meeting the targets that 
68 Details of incidents and fines imposed are provided in BHP (2000), BHP Environment and 
Community Report 2000 (BHP, Melbourne, Australia) at 56. BHP argued that, even though the number 
of fines was greater than in 1997/1998, the number of significant incidents had reduced. 
69 MIM (2000), 2000 Environmental Report (MIM Holdings Ltd, Brisbane, Australia) at 9. 
70 MIM (2000) at 10. 
71 MIM (2000) at 10. 
72 CRL (2000) at 18-19. 
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they have defined for themselves. For example, BHP reported that it had met its targets 
on reducing hazardous waste, general waste and oil and fuel spills, but had not met its 
targets on eliminating emissions of ozone depleting substances or on regulatory 
compliance74. BHP also provided a discussion of the reasons why its various targets 
had or had not been met75. In contrast, CRL reported that it had only met 42 per cent of 
its targets, but did not provide a detailed explanation of the reasons why the targets had 
not been met or of the significance of the targets that had not been met76. CRL argued 
that the remaining targets had simply been deferred until 2001 and noted that it 
intended improving `... employees' awareness of their responsibilities for meeting 
77 environmental targets and setting realistic completion dates'. 
In terms of environmental performance, the industry does appear to have been 
successful at decoupling greenhouse gas emissions and energy from productions. 
However, even though the efficiency with which the industry has used energy 
appears to be improving, overall energy consumption has continued to increase as a 
consequence of increases in the industry's rate of production. 
While the industry's environmental reports provide a substantial amount of information 
(in particular on regulatory compliance and site environmental performance), making 
an overall assessment of environmental performance based on the information in public 
environmental reports is difficult. In part, as discussed above, this is due to the 
limitations in the reports that have been produced to date. The difficulties also reflect 
the complexities of comparing different sites (as discussed in Section 8.2.1, 
environmental impacts are a very site-specific issue) or different companies. While 
the reports produced by Code signatories do include site-specific and overall targets79, 
there is no assessment of how challenging these targets are or whether these targets 
represent a significant change from business as usual. A further issue is that Code 
73 Interview, 30 April 2000. 
74 BHP (2000) at 4. 
75 BHP (2000), BHP Environment and Community Report 2000 (BHP, Melbourne, Australia) at 47- 
53. 
76 CRL (2000) at 4. 
77 CRL (2000) at 4. 
7$ See, for example, MIM (2000) at 8-9; Alcoa (2000), 2000 Annual Review (Alcoa of Australia, 
Perth, Australia); Nabalco (2000), Safety, Health and Environment Report 2000 (Nabalco, 
Nhulunbuy, Northern Territory, Australia) at 27; BHP (2000) at 30-31. 
79 See, for example, Pasminco (2000), Pasminco Limited Environment Report 2000 (Pasminco, 
Melbourne, Australia); BHP (2000). 
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signatories are not required to report on all of the issues that are relevant to their 
operations (or to identify those issues that are not relevant or have not been considered). 
These issues are further complicated by the inevitable sales and purchases that make 
year-on-year comparisons difficult. For example, while BHP has met its targets for 
reductions in greenhouse gas and energy intensity, these targets have been met, at least 
in part through the sale and disposal of sites or operations with higher greenhouse gas 
and energy intensities80. As noted by industry representatives81: 
`The Code does not impose specific performance requirements. While, the 
implementation of the Code within companies does raise awareness of 
environmental issues, it is not possible to point to specific outcomes that have 
been achieved as a direct consequence of the Code. ' 
`Even though we lobbied against the National Pollutant Inventory [a public 
register of emissions to air, water and land of pollutants and wastes from 
industry], it does have the great advantage of requiring all companies to report 
on a consistent basis and allowing direct comparisons to be made between 
companies. ' 
Environmental Performance: Accidents and Incidents 
By its own performance measures the Code has been successful as over forty 
companies, representing 85 per cent of the Australian mining and minerals industry 
have signed the Code, and all companies that have been signatories for two years or 
more have published public reports on their environmental performance82. However, 
these data, of themselves, do not provide any indication of the effectiveness of the 
Code or the influence of the Code on the performance of the industry. 
The Australian mining industry has been criticised because of the industry's 
involvement in a series of major environmental incidents. Some of the reported 
incidents involving Australian companies (or their joint ventures and/or partner 
companies) are detailed in Tables 8.2 (Code signatories) and 8.3 (non-signatories)83. 
so BHP (2000) at 4. 
81 Interviews on 30 April 2000 and 13 March 2001. 
82 MCA (2001e). 
83 The information in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 is based on the following: ACF (2000), 'Submission to the 
Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities Inquiry into the Corporate 
Code of Conduct Bill' (ACF, Melbourne, Australia); Mineral Policy Institute [MPI] (2000), 
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Table 8.2: Examples of Incidents and Accidents Involving Code Signatories 
" Aurora Gold (1998-present): Human rights abuses and environmental pollution in Kalimantan, 
Indonesia84. 
BHP (1984-present): Long-term impacts on livelihoods and the environment of over 30,000 
landowners at Ok Tedi85. The consequences of mining activities (in particular, the direct disposal 
of the mine's waste rock and tailings into the Fly and Ok Tedi river system) have included a 
reduction in baseline fish numbers in the river system of up to 90 per cent, causing 470 square 
kilometres of forest die back (expected to increase to at least 1,350 square kilometres), and 
increasing the risk of acid rock drainage which could have serious consequences for the down 
stream ecosystem86 
" BHP Diamond Inc (2000): Charged with eight violations of the Canadian Fisheries Act for 
disturbing fish habitat in the vicinity of its Ekati diamond mine in Canada's North West 
Tenritories87. 
" ERA/North Limited [now Rio Tinto] (1997-present): Uranium mining in Kakadu against the 
wishes of the traditional landowners88. 
" Rio Tinto: River and ocean dumping of tailings and human rights abuses at Freeport and Lihir89. 
" Ross Mining [now Delta Gold] (1997 - present): Ross Mining refused to publicly release its 
environmental impact assessment, despite concerns regarding contamination threats to rivers in the 
Solomon Islands 90 
. 
`Corporate Code of Conduct Bill: Mineral Policy Institute Submission to Senate Inquiry. December 
2000' (MPI, Sydney, Australia); Atkinson (1998); various issues of Mining Monitor (1998-2001); 
reports in The Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald newspapers. 
" It has been suggested that Aurora Gold urged the Indonesian government to remove illegal miners 
and opponents of the mine (Burton, B. (1999a), "'Take Control" Aurora Tells Indonesian Government', 
Mining Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 1-2; Oxfam Community Aid Abroad (2001)). Aurora Gold argued 
that the environmental impacts were worsened as a consequence of difficulties in accessing the site 
due to the occupation of the site by illegal mining (Aurora Gold (2000), Annual Environmental Report 
2000 (Aurora Gold, Perth, Australia) at 7-18). 
85 This has probably been the most high profile dispute involving an Australian mining company, in 
part because of the legal actions that have accompanied BHP's involvement with the mine. Litigation 
commenced in 1994 and was settled out of court in 1996 (Burton, B. (1999b), 'BHP Offloads Ok Tedi 
Problems to PNG Govt', Mining Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 4-5; Evans, G. (1999a), 'Will BHP Cut and 
Run? ', Mining Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 11). In April 2001, further legal proceedings were initiated 
against BHP, alleging that BHP had not implemented all of the terms of the 1996 agreement. In early 
2002, BHP withdrew from the mine. The Ok Tedi mine is now controlled by a trust for the people of 
the area. BHP has written off its shareholding and has provided the new operating company with a 
US$100 million interest-free loan. 
86 BHP (1999), BHP and Ok Tedi: Discussion Paper October 1999 (BHP, Melbourne, Australia). 87 BHP has pleaded not guilty to the charges (BHP (2000) at 19). 88 The concerns have related to the present mining operations at Jabiru and proposed uranium mining 
at Jabiluka. The Jabiluka mine has been the subject of significant protest by the aboriginal people, 
supported by national and international environmental and human rights NGOs (see, generally, 
Katona, J. (2001), `Mining Uranium and Indigenous Australians: The Fight for Jabiluka', in Evans et 
al (eds. ) (2001), pp. 195-206). Rio Tinto recently announced that it does not expect to open the 
Jabiluka mine (for financial (in particular, the low international price for uranium), social and 
environmental reasons). 
89 International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions [ICEM] (1998), 
Rio Tinto: Behind the Facade (ICEM, Brussels, Belgium) at 27-28; Atkinson (1998) at 46-56; Abrash, 
A. and Kennedy, D. (2001), 'Repressive Mining in West Papua', in Evans et al (eds. ) (2001), pp. 59- 
74; Handelsman, S. (2001), Report on Human Rights and the Minerals Industry (MMSD, London, 
UK), pp. 39-47. 
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" RTZ-CRA (now Rio Tinto): Environmental and social dislocation caused as a consequence of the 
operations of Bougainville Copper Ltd91. 
Table 8.3: Examples of Incidents and Accidents Involving Non-Signatories to 
the Code 
" Dome Resources [now Durban Roodeport Deep] (2000): Helicopter dropped one tonne of cyanide 
pellets into PNG forest92. Although much of the cyanide was recovered, the company admitted 
that up to 150kg had been dissolved by rain into the local river system. 
" Esmeralda Exploration (2000): Cyanide spill into rivers of Hungary, Romania and Serbia, killing 
one million kilogrammes of fish. 
" Highlands Pacific (1999 - present): Plan to dump mine waste into the coral reef-rich Astrolabe 
Bay. 
In addition to the high profile incidents listed above, the industry has acknowledged 
a range of other incidents. For example, BHP reported six significant incidents in 
1999/2000 and seventeen significant incidents in 1998/199993. While some of these 
may be `normal accidents' (or necessary consequences of mining developments)94, 
they have been seen by NGOs as failings of the industry's self-regulatory initiatives. 
As noted by Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, there is `... an increasing incidence of 
reports of problems caused by Australian mining companies in developing countries. 
An increasing number of complaints and requests for assistance are being received 
by Oxfam Community Aid Abroad from mine-affected communities who feel that 
their grievances are not being properly dealt with by the Australian mining company 
concerned... '95. The examples presented in Table 8.3 also highlight the issue of free- 
riders for the Code. The issue was illustrated most starkly by the response of the 
Australian mining industry to the Esmeralda cyanide spill. In January 2000, a gold 
mine, which was half owned by the Perth based company Esmeralda Exploration 
90 Burton, B. (2001c), `Gold Ridge Documents Shed Light on Pollution', Mining Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 
3, p. 6. 
91 Havini, M. and John, V. (2001), 'Mining, Self-determination and Bougainville', in Evans et al 
(eds. ) (2001), pp. 125-146. 
92 Divecha, S. (2000), `Chopper Drops Tonne of Cyanide into Jungle', Mining Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 
3. 
93 BHP (2000) at 57. See also Note 70. 94 For example, the International Commission on Dams has noted that there has been a reported failure 
of tailings dams almost every year for the past twenty years and that many more accidents have 
occurred but have not been reported (as quoted in Tayles, K. (2000), 'Baia Mare: Consequential 
Initiatives and Other Spillovers'. Presented at the Minerals Council of Australia 25`s Annual 
Environmental Workshop, Australia, October 2000). 
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Ltd, spilt 100,000 cubic metres of cyanide-polluted water into the Tisza river in 
Romania96. The discharge poisoned the water supply of 2.5 million Hungarians and 
devastated the ecology of the local river system. The outcome was described by a 
Hungarian government official as the `first environmental catastrophe of the 21" 
century'97. The industry was at pains to point out that Esmeralda was not a signatory 
to the Code, nor was Esmeralda a member of the MCA98. That is, the industry's 
primary response appeared to be aimed at protecting the reputation of the Code 
signatories rather than acting to either help remedy the damage caused". The 
industry's response reinforced NGOs criticisms of the Code, who highlighted that (a) 
the Code did not ensure the performance of those companies that were not 
signatories to the Code (one form of free-riding), and (b) the Code did not provide a 
means for the industry to respond to help remedy the damage caused, and (c) the fact 
that the mining industry had signed up to the Code did not seem to have resulted in a 
change of attitude towards the environment or a greater willingness to take 
responsibility for the industry's environmental impacts10°. 
As noted in Section 8.3, the mining industry has no formal mechanism to receive 
complaints from individuals or communities affected by the activities of Australian 
mining companies. In February 2000, Oxfam Community Aid Abroad established a 
mining ombudsman, to (a) assist communities in developing countries whose human 
rights are being threatened by the activities of Australian based mining companies to 
get a fair, negotiated resolution, (b) assist communities that are, or might be, affected 
by a mining operation to understand their rights as established by international 
human rights instruments and industry best practice, (c) help ensure that the 
95 Oxfam Community Aid Abroad (2001). 
96 `Baie Mare Spill: Final Report', httpd/europa. eu. int/comm/environment/enlarg/home. htm (last 
visited 3 February 2001). See, also, Moran, R. (2001), More Cyanide Uncertainties: Lessons from the 
Baie Mare, Romania, Spill - Water Quality and Politics. MPC Issue Paper No. 3 (MPC, Washington 
DC, USA). 
97 As quoted in ACF (2000). 
98 Burton (2000d), `EU Backs Stricter Law After Romanian Disaster', Mining Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 
1-2. 
" Sullivan and Frankental (2002) at 86. Similar comments were made by Bomsel et al regarding the 
Omai mine spill suffered by Golden Star Resources Ltd. in Guyana in 1995, where the press reported 
on the disaster in some detail but neither the larger mining companies nor national or international 
confederations publicly commented on the event (Bomsel et al (1996)). 
1°° Environmental Defender's Office (2000), 'Submission To The Parliamentary Joint Standing 
Committee On Corporations And Securities Inquiry into the Provisions of the Corporate Code of 
Conduct Bill 2000' (Environmental Defender's Office, Sydney, Australia); MPI (2000). Similar 
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Australian mining industry operates in a way so that the basic rights of landowners 
and affected communities are better protected, and (d) encourage the Australian 
mining industry to establish an official complaints mechanism1°'. Seven cases are 
presently under detailed investigation, although Oxfam Community Aid Abroad has 
noted that many others could also have been investigated. The cases under 
investigation are the Kelian and Indo Muro gold mines in Kalimantan (Indonesia), 
the Barisan gold and silver mine in South Sumatra (Indonesia), the Porgera gold and 
silver mine and the Tolukuma mine in Papua New Guinea, the Tintaya copper and 
gold mine in Peru and the Gag Island Nickel Project in West Papua 102. While each 
case is unique, Oxfam Community Aid Abroad has noted that the grievances can be 
loosely grouped into four areas, namely loss of land, loss of individual and collective 
sustainable livelihoods, degradation of the environment and natural resources and 
human rights abuses103. In the context of the discussion regarding free-riders, it is 
pertinent to note that of the six companies documented in the Oxfam Community Aid 
Abroad report, four are signatories to the Code and two are non-signatories. 
Setting Performance Targets for the Industry? 
As noted above, the mining industry has been reluctant to define performance targets 
for itself. Australian NGOs have sought to define some key performance measures 
for the industry (see Table 8.4). These performance measures represent fundamental 
challenges to the industry as it is presently constituted. They also indicate the major 
gap between the industry's performance and the expectations of the industry from 
civil society. 
criticisms have been made about the industry's silence on other incidents involving Code signatories 
and non-signatories (Evans, G. (2000), 'The Telling Silence', Mining Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 11). 
101 Oxfam Community Aid Abroad (2001). 
102 Oxfam Community Aid Abroad (2001). 
103 Oxfam Community Aid Abroad (2001). 
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Table 8.4: NGO-Defined Performance Measures for the Mining Industry'04 
The mining industry should: 
" Cease riverine tailings disposal'os 
" Cease developing mines requiring the ocean disposal of wastes. 
" Cease mining and exploration in national parks and other protected areas. 
" Design mining projects to minimise their impact on the physical environment and to ensure that 
people who rely on that environment for their livelihood or well-being do not have that livelihood 
or well-being endangered. 
" Ensure that Australian companies operating overseas operate to at least the equivalent of 
Australian practices and standards of environmental management. 
" Only mine high sulphur ore bodies if adequate steps have been taken to prevent acid mine 
drainage'06 
" Ensure that environmental monitoring systems are maintained around mine sites and have 
systems in place to ensure that corrective action is taken when the monitoring reveals a problem. 
" If rivers or streams used by communities downstream are inadvertently polluted by the 
company's operations, take responsibility for stopping the source of pollution as soon as possible, 
repairing any damage caused and providing compensation for those affected. 
" Ensure that decommissioned mines are left in a safe and stable condition and that landforms, flora 
and fauna are restored as near as possible to the pre-mine state. 
" Cease advocating the weakening of environmental regulations, labour rights and indigenous 
rights; 
" Commit to mineral use efficiency and resource conservation measures rather than promoting 
increased production and resource consumption. 
There are, however, some signs that the industry is beginning to accept at least some 
of these conditions. For example, in 2000, BHP announced that it will no longer 
invest in new projects that involve the disposal of tailings into rivers and that it will 
consider dialogue on issues such as greenhouse gas emissions, deep-sea tailing 
104 MPI (1998), The Buck's Gotta Stop Somewhere: Social and Environmental Accountability in the 
Financing of Mining (MPI, Sydney, Australia) at 13-14; Oxfam Community Aid Abroad (1999), 
Benchmarks for the Mining Industry (Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, Melbourne, Australia). NGOs 
see environmental impacts as just one component of the industry's overall performance and have also 
emphasised the importance of addressing issues such as negotiating with traditional landowners, 
resettlement and rehabilitation of communities, compensation of those who suffer loss as a 
consequence of mining, human rights, the provision of jobs and services, protecting the rights of 
women and minimising social impacts. 
105 Tailings are the coarse and finely ground waste from the mined rock remaining after the target 
minerals have been removed from the ore. Tailings are potentially highly toxic and the leakage from 
tailings dams may lead to toxic chemicals and metals being transported to surface water bodies or to 
groundwater (MPC (2001a)). 
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placement and external verification of performance 107. Furthermore, at least some 
companies have refrained from investments for reasons such as local, national or 
global community opposition, human rights issues, NGO/activist opposition and 
biodiversity'°8, although these decisions are highly case and project specific and 
there is no evidence that the industry is moving to a situation where environmental 
factors outweigh economic considerations. As noted by one mining industry 
representative'09: 
`Some costs are an integral part of mine planning. They are those that are 
imposed on us by regulators and those that are required by communities. Beyond 
that, environmental options are treated in a similar manner to other options - will 
they work, what are the costs and benefits, are these the best places to invest our 
time and effort? ' 
As a final comment on Table 8.4, these performance measures relate almost 
exclusively to new developments. On existing projects, these conditions are unlikely 
to be accepted or seen as relevant. That is, the reality is that for the foreseeable 
future (which could be for the next 30-40 years, given the planned lifetimes for many 
mines), there will continue to be many mines that do not meet these conditions. 
Sustainability 
Sustainable development presents a specific issue for the mining industry as, while the 
concept does not preclude the use of non-renewable resources to generate human well- 
being, it does suggest that their substitution by renewables is encouraged and that their 
environmental effects are fully accounted for' 10. In its stronger conceptions, sustainable 
development could be interpreted as requiring that the industry reduces its rate of 
production and, rather than developing new mines and new prospects, focuses on 
consolidating existing developments and on the reuse, recovery and recycling of its 
106 See further MMSD (2002) at 238-239. 107 BHP (2000) at 3. It was subsequently reported that BHP was considering the possibility of deep- 
sea disposal of tailings as one option for its Gag Island nickel mine project in Irian Jaya (West Papua) 
(Burton, B. (2000a), 'BHP Investigates Ocean Dumping for Nickel Mine', Mining Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 3, 
101). 
8 Price WaterhouseCoopers (2001), Mining and Minerals Sustainability Survey 2001 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, London, UK) at 19. 
109 Interview, 27 February 2001. 
110 Pearce, D. (1993), Blueprint 3: Measuring Sustainable Development (Earthscan, London, UK) at 4. 
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products"'. Expressed another way, it has been argued that: `To date, too much of 
industry discussion and debate with regard to sustainability and responsible mining 
practices has focused in the technical issues of how to mine rather than the larger 
issue of whether, and where, to mine' 112. 
In a recent survey of 32 international mining and minerals companies, over 80 per 
cent said they had taken steps to embed the principles of sustainable development 
throughout their organisation, mainly through considering these principles in their 
corporate strategies' The international mining industry has argued that the 
pressures of sustainable development can primarily be defined as requiring the 
industry to significantly improve its efficiency (e. g. through eco efficiency, waste 
reduction and recycling, improving production processes, prolonging the life of 
metals and minerals, eliminating or recycling wastes, conserving energy, pursuing 
greater use of renewable resources and adopting life-cycle thinking)114. This 
definition of sustainable development has been seen by many NGOs as a weak 
interpretation of sustainability. The reasons are (a) that the industry's focus on 
efficiency is seen as obscuring or reducing the importance of broader questions 
around sustainability and the role of materials in society, and (b) the growing 
evidence that the environmental benefits associated with improved efficiency will be 
outweighed by increases in production115 . 
Despite these views (the mining industry associations in Australia have adopted a far 
narrower interpretation of sustainable development, arguing that the principles of 
sustainable development require (a) enhanced clarity, certainty and accountability in 
the processes for land-use planning and decision-making, (b) achieving a high 
standard of environmental and health and safety performance, (c) optimising the 
economic returns to the community from mining, (d) improving consultative 
111 Cain, D. (2000), 'Sustainable Development and the Minerals Industry', The Australian Coal 
Review, October 2000, pp. 13-15 at 13; MMSD Australia (2002) at 29. The lack of vertical 
integration in the industry (i. e. the major mining companies tend not to have substantial interests in 
reprocessing/recycling facilities) means that there are limited incentives for mining companies to 
reduce the quantity of mined materials. 
112 D'Esposito, S. (2000), 'Is Mining Sustainable? ', The Corporate Ethics Monitor, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 
1-3 at 1. 
113 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2001) at 15-16. 
114 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2001) at 35. 
115 See, further, Gardner, G. and Sampat, P. (1998), Mind Over Matter: Recasting the Role of 
Materials in Our Lives (Worldwatch Institute, Washington DC, USA). 
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mechanisms, (e) nature conservation, (f) promoting multiple and sequential land use, 
and (f) integrating non-economic considerations into decision-making processes116. 
The industry's current efforts seem aimed at defining sustainable development in a 
manner that enables the industry to `... clearly illustrate that industry's contribution to 
society far exceed its implied environmental and social costs'll7. This is reflected in 
the most recent Code implementation Survey where the lowest scores related to 
product stewardship, reflecting the relatively low level of importance assigned to this 
issue by companies 118 . 
The overall assessment of the industry's performance on sustainability is that while 
the industry appears to be improving its environmental performance (as measured by 
emissions and wastes) at the site level, there are no substantial signs of broader 
changes in environmental performance or in addressing issues such as the continuing 
growth in rates of production or on the adoption of complete life-cycle thinking into 
business decision-making processes. It was also recognised by MMSD that the Code 
is, at best, a limited instrument for sustainable development119. However, the Code 
was seen as offering opportunities for institutional learning and continual 
improvement (see further Section 8.4.5). 
8.4.2 Economic Efficiency 
To date, there has been no systematic evaluation of the costs and benefits associated 
with the development and implementation of the Code or of the decisions made as a 
consequence of implementing the Code. The available data from the industry on the 
costs of environmental management are limited as the industry does not generally 
disaggregate environmental expenditure from other capital and operating 
expenditures. Rather, the common view in the industry is that environmental factors 
(frequently driven by licence or planning conditions) are an integral part of virtually 
all projects and that, from the industry's own costing perspectives, it makes limited 
116 See, for example, the discussion of sustainability on the New South Wales (NSW) Minerals 
Council website at http: //www. nswmin. com. au/environmentlenv-performance. html (last reviewed 11 
November 2001). 
117 Brehaut, H. (1998), Towards Sustainability', in Proceedings of the Minerals Council 23rd Annual 
Environmental Workshop (Minerals Council of Australia, Canberra, Australia), pp. 52-63 at 52. 
118 MCA (2001e). 
119 MMSD Australia (2002) at 52. 
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sense to attempt to separate these costs out. For example, Pasminco has highlighted 
difficulties in reporting of environmental expenditures in a meaningful way (e. g. 
capital expenditures aimed at improving efficiency are not a purely environmental 
expenditure, some expenditure may be `environmental' in name but the alternative 
may be to shut the facility)120. In a similar manner, BHP reported that it spent 
approximately A$90 million in 1999/2000 on labour and consultants costs and 
environmental programmes and studies, but this number does not include 
environmental costs such as the treatment of emissions, discharges to water, waste 
management, clean up costs etc, nor does it include the environmental component of 
121 capital projects. 
It is interesting to note that the some of the barriers to the provision of financial 
information that were identified in the assessment of the economic efficiency of the 
Greenhouse Challenge (Section 7.5.2) seem to be much less relevant to the mining 
industry. The first is that, as evidenced by the disclosures provided in public 
environmental reports, the industry appears to have fewer concerns about the release 
of such information (at least in a highly aggregated form) into the public domain. 
The second is that (because of the long lifetimes of mining projects), costs and 
benefits are characterised in significant detail over the entire project life-cycle. 
While, as noted above, environmental costs are not explicitly disaggregated in these 
analyses, interviews with industry representatives indicate that these costs are an 
integral part of such assessments. For the mining industry, costs such as energy, 
pollution control and site rehabilitation are major influences on the economics of 
mining projects and are, therefore, a management priority. 
From interviews with industry representatives, apart from requiring companies to 
explicitly consider environmental issues in their decision-making processes (which 
the majority do anyway, given the importance of environmental factors in planning 
and approval processes and operating practices), the Code has not altered the manner 
in which decisions are made or the investment criteria that are applied to 
environmental expenditures. That is, the Code can be said to be economically 
efficient (in terms of private costs) in that it has not required the Code signatories to 
120 Pasminco (2000) at 47. 
121 BHP (2000) at 47. A similar comment has been made by CRL (CRL (2000) at 24). 
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take any actions beyond those that can be clearly justified in economic terms or that 
would have been required anyway. 
From discussions with companies, there is a general consensus that environmental 
costs (e. g. equipment, pollution controls) are an integral part of project and operating 
costs, and that it is not appropriate to disaggregate these costs out or to describe them 
explicitly as `environmental costs'. The implementation of the Code was not seen as 
altering this treatment of environmental costs. This is an important conclusion as 
one of the critical debates around voluntary approaches (as discussed in Chapter 5) is 
that voluntary approaches can offer significant financial benefits over other 
approaches to regulation (in particular, command and control approaches). The 
paucity of information from the mining industry means that it not possible to draw 
firm conclusions on this issue. 
8.4.3 Administration and Compliance Costs 
Data Availability 
There is limited information available on the costs of participation and compliance 
by participating firms or the MCA. From interviews with company environmental 
managers, the Code is seen as another task that they are required to complete. Apart 
from specific costs associated with participation (e. g. if consultants are required to 
assist with specific tasks such as reporting), other activities tend to absorbed within 
existing workloads. This is similar to the situation with EMSs and Greenhouse 
Challenge (as discussed in Section 6.4.3 and 7.5.3 respectively). One of the 
important consequences is that the data necessary to determine the transaction costs 
of the Code relative to other possible policy approaches (e. g. mandatory reporting) is 
not available. 
Assessment of Administrative Costs 
As discussed above, administrative and compliance costs are difficult to assess 
directly. Therefore, the approach used in this dissertation is to look at how the 
requirements of the voluntary approach compares to the requirements that would be 
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imposed if it were a mandatory programme (or a regulatory requirement). Many of 
the requirements of the Code reflect existing expectations (whether or not explicitly 
required by legislation) and current norms of good practice in the industry (e. g. the 
principles of community consultation and the implementation of EMSs). Even public 
reporting, which is the primary `deliverable' from the Code, could be seen as codifying 
the expectation that the industry will report on its environmental performance (or as 
forestalling demands for mandatory public reporting). The one difference relates to 
enforcement (as the Code is a voluntary programme rather than a regulatory 
requirement). The Code envisages that there is some enforcement (through the 
mechanism of industry peer pressure), although this is qualitatively different from the 
types of enforcement processes that could be envisaged (site inspections, prosecutions) 
in a regulatory programme. 
The industry has also identified a series of benefits that are accruing to the industry 
from the Code (e. g. promoting the industry's environmental achievements, 
increasing public and regulatory body confidence in the industry and enabling the 
industry to demonstrate due diligence). While it is difficult to assign a financial 
value to these benefits, interviews with industry representatives indicate that these 
benefits are seen as significantly outweighing the costs of participation in the Code 
(see further Section 8.4.7). 
8.4.4 Competitiveness Implications 
The competitiveness implications of the Code can be considered in three ways, 
namely the advantages of being a signatory or not, domestic and international 
competitiveness, and the overall viability of the industry. 
At present, around eighty-five per cent (in terms of production) of the Australian 
mining industry is covered by the Code. That is, it can be argued that the Code 
covers the majority of the Australian mining industry (as measured by production). 
The consequence is that the collective benefits (e. g. reputation, improved 
relationships with regulators) of the Code appear to be accruing to the entire 
industry, even though not all of the industry is a signatory to the Code. Even though 
the MCA has encouraged the remainder of the Australian mining industry to sign on 
224 
to the Code, the MCA has also recognised that many of these companies tend not to 
have an active involvement in their State or Territory mining association, let alone 
with a national body such as the MCA. That is, the MCA is of the view that the 
majority of the companies that are not signatories to the Code are unlikely to see the 
benefits (to them) of active engagement in collective action on environmental issues. 
It is difficult to tell whether or not membership of the Code has provided a 
competitive advantage for signatory companies. Most of the signatories highlight 
their membership of the Code in their environmental reports and other promotional 
materials. However, there is no systematic evidence to indicate that membership of 
the Code has been a deciding factor in the award of operations licences, either in 
Australia or overseas. From interviews with industry representatives (in particular 
environmental managers), there is a general recognition that environmental 
management is just one of the many factors that are considered in decision-making. 
However, there is a perception that environmental performance is increasingly seen 
as an `entry requirement' for tendering for new concessions. Or, as expressed by one 
environmental manager 122: 
'A track record on environmental performance is an organisational 
prerequisite. We can't conclusively point to a situation where environmental 
issues were the deal-maker or deal-breaker. However, we never want to be 
in a situation where a lack of environmental performance or management 
systems - EMS, public reporting, etc. - led to us being excluded from a 
tender. The Code is a tangible demonstration of our commitment to 
environmental management. ' 
Despite the existence of the Code, the Australian mining industry (both signatory and 
non-signatory companies) and the international mining industry generally have 
continued to be criticised for their social and environmental performance (see the 
discussion on environmental performance in Section 7.5.1 and on viability and 
feasibility in Section 7.5.7). However, one industry representative argued that123: 
'Since the implementation of the Code, we haven't seen the same level of 
NGO activity as we saw in the mid 1990s. Companies are more prepared to 
engage with NGOs and look to find common solutions to problems. ' 
122 Interview, 27 February 2001. 
123 Interview, 20 May 2000. 
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8.4.5 Soft Effects 
The reporting of environmental performance has been seen as a major driver for 
change within the mining industry, and has led to increased use of tools such as 
EMSs and external auditing procedures 124. The setting of targets is seen as 
benefiting companies through accelerating the development of data collection 
systems, increasing the understanding of technical data and allowing the 
development of new means of measuring performance'25. The publication of targets 
(in public environmental reports) is also seen as a means of stimulating change 
through greater openness and transparency' 26. As noted by industry representatives 
interviewed for this research127: 
`Without the Code, we would have nothing like the same number of 
companies reporting. The Code has accelerated the rate of reporting. ' 
`While there is a perception that the Code and reporting are not related, the 
reality is that the Code has driven public reporting across the industry. ' 
The industry has reported a series of soft effects from the implementation of the 
Code, including fostering consultation in the industry, placing the environment 
explicitly on the corporate agenda, and developing a culture of continuous 
improvement in the industry 128. As noted by one industry association 
representative 129: 
`There is a growing awareness of senior management of the importance of 
the environment and of environmental issues to the mining industry. The 
Code is now an explicit agenda item at many of our meetings. ' 
From discussions with industry representatives, senior managers (even outside those 
with explicit environmental responsibilities) see that industry as a whole must deliver 
'u MCA (1999a). See also Notes 50-53. 
125 Ringwood, K. (1998), `Production Environment Targets as a Driver for Improved Performance', in 
Proceedings of the Minerals Council 23rd Annual Environmental Workshop (MCA, Canberra, Australia), 
rB. 313-321 at 317; Morgan, H. (1998), 'Miner Looks to Green Future', The Age, 6 July 1998, p. B3. 
Ringwood (1998) at 314; MMSD Australia (2002) at 52. 127 Interviews on 12 May 2000 and 30 April 2000 respectively. 128 MMSD Australia (2002) at 52. 
129 Interview, 30 April 2000. 
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on the commitments specified in the Code, as part of demonstrating the industry's 
commitment to environmental performance. That is, being a signatory to the Code is 
recognised as creating an expectation of a certain level of performance. As a 
tangible example of this, Placer Dome has recognised that the manner in which it 
closes its mine at Misima could be seen as an indicator of the effectiveness of the 
Code130. It is difficult to assess the extent to which this attitude has influenced the 
manner in which the industry as a whole addresses environmental issues. As noted 
in Section 8.4.1, the outcomes of the Code (in particular in terms of meeting NGO 
expectations and moving towards sustainability) appear, at least to date, to have been 
minor. 
8.4.6 Innovation 
The industry has argued that the diversity of the industry (from companies with 
multi-faceted operations spread over numerous sites through to small, single-site 
operators) and the range of activities covered by the Code (from exploration to 
decommissioning) have meant that the Code needs to provide a generic set of 
principles that are flexible in their implementation 131. It has been argued that this 
flexibility and focus on principles will encourage creativity amongst companies to 
develop solutions to complex problems 132. While the reported soft effects (e. g. 
culture change) do provide a starting point for innovation, it appears that the Code 
itself (because of the absence of specific targets) is not acting as a stimulus for 
change or innovation133. The industry has argued that the process of continual 
improvement and research into the environmental performance of the industry will 
lead to the industry developing better products and processes and innovative 
technologies. To an extent, this is supported by the evidence of good environmental 
performance within the industry and the various technologies that have been 
developed by or on behalf of the industry although, given the other pressures on the 
industry (e. g. community concerns, regulation, `licence to operate') and the reality 
that most companies have some form of EMS in place, it appears unlikely that the 
130 Misma, A. (1998), `Partnerships for Sustainability', in Proceedings of the Minerals Council 23rd 
Annual Environmental Workshop (MCA, Canberra, Australia), pp. 80-89 at 80. 
131 MCA (1999b) 'Review of the Minerals Industry Code For Environmental Management: Issues 
Paper' (MCA, Canberra, Australia). 
132 MCA (1999b). 
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Code itself has significantly contributed to innovation within the industry. As noted 
by one NGO representative 134: 
`The mining industry only does environmental research because it has to - 
as a government requirement or expectation - or because it is subsidised. If 
the industry was left to its own devices, most of the research currently being 
carried out would not be done. ' 
8.4.7 Viability and Feasibility 
Industry Perspectives 
The MCA has promoted the Code as the centrepiece of its activities on 
environmental management. The industry has argued that there is considerable 
potential for voluntary industry initiatives such as the Code to enable the industry to 
effectively `... manage the threats and exploit the opportunities... ' presented by 
changes in domestic and international environmental legislation and policy. 
While the Code has formed the basis of the industry's lobbying and promotion, the 
Code appears to have had less influence on internal management and performance 
assessment processes than implied by the industry. Most mining companies have a 
range of rating and assessment processes that they use for assessing performance, 
and the specific requirements of the Code appear to be a minor influence on these 
internal processes. Against that, it is also pertinent to note that the Code is explicitly 
intended to provide a framework rather than a detailed prescription for action and, 
therefore, it is not unexpected that other tools and processes are used to define or 
assess performance at the operational level. It is also relevant to note that the public 
reporting processes under the Code provide a means for linking internal and external 
performance reporting. Some of the views expressed by industry representatives on 
this issue were135: 
'33 See also the discussion in Section 8.4.1. 
134 Interview, 23 March 2001. 
135 Interviews on 27 February 2001,30 April 2000 and 27 November 2000 respectively. 
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'We see that the Code has real value. Given that so many companies have 
signed on the Code, it signals a collective support for the Code and 
demonstrates the credibility of self-regulation. ' 
`The Code provides the industry with greater credibility with stakeholders 
and many of the signatories use the Code as part of their discussions with 
government. ' 
`We report on our performance with the Code and with Code compliance. 
But the Code is not the driver for performance improvement within our 
company or within the industry as a whole. ' 
Government Perspectives 
The Commonwealth government and the State and Territory governments have 
welcomed the Code136 The importance of the mining industry to the Australian 
economy has meant that government (at the Commonwealth and at the State and 
Territory levels) has been reluctant to act in a manner that could affect the viability 
of the industry. This is reflected in the National Strategy for Ecologically 
Sustainable Development which states as its aims for the mining industry to promote 
sound environmental practices throughout the mining industry, provide appropriate 
community returns from mineral resource development and improve community 
consultation and development137. Since the release of the Strategy, the focus of 
government action has reflected this approach, with much of the government's efforts 
focused on promotional and educational processes. In this context, the Code fits with 
governments' preferences for non-regulatory approaches. 
However, the industry has been critical of governments' (at the state and 
Commonwealth levels) attitudes to the Code, with one industry representative 
arguing'38: 
`Despite all its rhetoric of support, government does not appear to recognise 
where the Code fits into the overall regulatory process. We have tried to 
encourage government recognition for the Code, such as regulatory relief or 
136 See the Environment Australia website, `Mining', at 
http: //www. ea. gov. au/industry/sustainabletmining/index. html (last reviewed on 12 September 2001). 
137 Commonwealth of Australia (1992a), National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia). 
138 Interview, 30 April 2000. 
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formal benefits for the industry, and to allow signatories to benefit but progress 
on this has been disappointing. ' 
NGO and Civil Society Perspectives 
There is some divergence in NGO attitudes to the Code. WWF has joined the 
External Environmental Advisory Group, whereas other NGOs have stayed outside 
the Code processes. However, it is pertinent to note that WWF has worked more 
closely with the mining industry (e. g. on specific projects) than other Australian 
NGOs139. 
NGOs have criticised the Code because the environmental performance standards 
that are to be met by the industry are not specified140, there are no enforcement 
mechanisms for breaches of the Code, monitoring and verification are seen as 
inadequate14' and there is no means for ensuring the performance of non-signatories 
to the Code142. The scope of the Code has been criticised for focusing on 
environmental issues alone, rather than including some of the broader issues 
associated with the mining industry such as the protection of human rights and 
protection of local economies'43. However, the mining industry has argued that a 
single instrument like the Code, with its clear environmental focus, may not be the 
most effective way to deliver results and the inclusion of social issues would detract 
from the specific purpose of the 144 . 
139 WWF has also entered into a $1.2m research and conservation partnership with Rio Tinto (Rio 
Tinto (2000), The Rio Tinto Business with Communities Program (Rio Tinto, Melbourne, Australia) at 
15; Burton, B. (2000b), 'WWF Signs $1.2m Partnership with Rio Tinto", Mining Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 1, 
pp. 9-10). 
The consequence is that environmental performance improvements cannot be credibly 
communicated (Rae (1999)). 
141 The industry has recognised that the verification of performance represents a key issue for the 
Code and that the reliance on in-house monitoring and verification potentially reduces the credibility 
of the Code (Lansbury, N. (1999), 'MCA Reviews Code of Conduct', Mining Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 
12; Rae (1999)). 
142 ACF (2000); Burton, B. (1999c), 'Revised Code Omits Human Rights and Enforcement', Mining 
Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 3-4 at 4; Evans, G. (1999b), 'Is the Code Anti-Social? ', Mining Monitor, Vol. 
4, No. 4, p. 11; Atkinson (1999); WWF (2000) at 4. 143 Burton (1999c); Evans (1999b); MPI (2000); Oxfam Community Aid Abroad (2001) at 6. 144 MCA (1999b). However, the Code does include reference to community relationships, which are 
one part of the broader debate around social performance. 
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Concern has also been expressed that the primary purpose of the Code is corporate 
PR rather than a tool to change the environmental performance of the industry 145. The 
differences in views between NGOs and the industry reflect the strong divergence of 
views on the industry. While the industry believes that that the economic benefits 
from its activities are of national importance and can be gained while protecting 
environmental and other values (i. e. that impacts can be technically managed), 
environmental groups argue that mining's impact on ecological integrity and 
biodiversity may often be adverse and irreversible 146 The NGO scepticism 
regarding the Code is, in many ways, a reflection of their broader concerns around 
the performance of the mining industry. It is clear that the industry is frustrated with 
the lack of recognition for its environmental management efforts, as illustrated by the 
comments of one mining industry association representative '47. 
`The issue of verification and the constant reference to verification by NGOs 
is frustrating, in light of the huge efforts made by the industry to report, to 
make information widely available, and to communicate with stakeholders. 
Some companies are now making data available in real time, while others are 
even providing money to communities to allow them to do their own 
monitoring. The industry is trying to ensure the quality of its reports through 
the use of credible consultants that are accredited to appropriate 
professional standards. Its hard to see what more can be done. ' 
In 2000, the Australian Democrats proposed a Corporate Code of Conduct Bill. The 
objective of the Bill was to require Australian companies operating overseas to take 
all reasonable measures to prevent material harm to the environment, monitor 
performance, promote health and safety, not benefit from forced labour, pay a living 
wage, not dismiss workers for reasons of illness or accident, allow collective 
bargaining, meet minimum labour standards, and report on performance 148. One of 
the primary motivations for introducing the Bill was the record of the Australian 
mining industry (in particular, the controversy surrounding BHP's Ok Tedi mine in 
Papua New Guinea). The public support for the Bill was increased by the incidents 
involving Esmeralda Exploration and Dome Resources (see Tables 8.2 and 8.3), 
'4' Egan (1998) at 247. 106 Ecologically Sustainable Development Working Groups (1991) at 139; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
(2001). 
147 Interview, 30 April 2000. 
148 Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities (2001), Report on the 
Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000 (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, Australia) at 3-4. 
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which stimulated a high profile public debate around the performance of Australian 
companies (in particular, mining companies) operating overseas. While the inquiry 
into the Bill recommended that the Bill not be adopted, both of the major opposition 
parties in Australia tabled dissenting reports on the conclusions of the Inquiry. The 
Bill was strongly opposed by the mining industry 149. In contrast, many of the NGO 
submissions highlighted the failure of the mining industry's performance and the 
perceived failure of industry self-regulation as primary reasons for their support for 
the Bill150. 
8.4.8 Law and Public Policy Issues 
The Industry's Role in Public Policy 
Despite the environmental commitments stated in the Code, the mining industry has 
adopted what appear to be diametrically opposed positions in public policy debates 
around codifying the industry's responsibility for environmental protection. In many 
recent environmental policy debates, the industry has strongly opposed any efforts to 
define responsibilities for the industry or to include human rights or environmental 
targets into legislation. For example, in Australia, the industry has strongly opposed 
the Corporate Code of Conduct Bill151, mandatory environmental reporting under the 
Corporations Act152, various National Environmental Protection Measures, 
Australian government ratification of the Kyoto Protocol'53 as well as various State 
initiatives (e. g. Load Based Licensing))lsa Overseas, a similar picture emerges' ss. 
149 Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities (2001) at 14,34; Evans, 
G. (2001), 'Where Giants May Tread, Rumblings Will Follow', Sydney Morning Herald, 2 November 
2001. 
150 ACF (2000); MPI (2000); Environmental Defender's Office (2000); Public Interest Advocacy 
Centre (2000), 'Submission from the Public Interest Advocacy Centre to The Parliamentary Joint 
Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities on the Provisions of the Corporate Code of 
Conduct Bill 2000' (Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Sydney, Australia). 
15' MCA (2001c), 'Media Statement: Report Endorses Minerals Industry Opposition to Code of 
Conduct Legislation. 28 June 2001' (MCA, Canberra, Australia), I pp; Burton, B. (2001a), 'Miners 
Rebel Against Corporate Legislation', Mining Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 1-2. 
152 See Section 6.4.1. 
15; MCA (2001d), 'Media Release: Government Must Stand Firm on Kyoto. 24 July 2001' (MCA, 
Canberra, Australia); MCA (2002), Media Release: Greenhouse Strategy on Track - Minerals Council 
(MCA, Canberra, Australia). 
154 Sullivan and Frankental (2002) at 87. 
155 For example, both BHP and Rio Tinto have been criticised for their role in assisting draft 
legislation in Papua New Guinea (to prevents PNG plaintiffs from suing an Australian company in an 
Australian court) and Indonesia respectively (Gordon, J. (1997), 'The Ok Tedi Lawsuit in Retrospect', 
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One of the consequences has been that public trust in the ability of the industry to 
regulate itself has been undermined'56. 
Relationships with other Voluntary Approaches 
The Code is of interest because of the manner in which it interacts with other 
voluntary approaches, in particular the Greenhouse Challenge and ISO14001. While 
not explicitly referencing either of these other voluntary approaches, it is clear that 
the Code has been designed to integrate with these initiatives'57. This is also 
evidenced by the fact that some of the companies that are signatories to the Code 
have also developed and implemented management systems that meet the 
requirements of (or are aligned with) IS014001 and have signed up to the 
Greenhouse Challenge. However, the rate at which the Code signatories are formally 
joining the Greenhouse Challenge or achieving certification is mixed. On the 
Greenhouse Challenge, a number of companies (e. g. BHP, MIM, Rio Tinto, 
Bendigo, Normandy Mining, Placer Dome, WMC) have joined as individual 
members, whereas others have joined as members of their industry association (e. g. 
the Australian Aluminium Council covers Alcoa and Nabalco). Other industry 
associations that have signed up to the Greenhouse Challenge have included the 
Minerals Council of Australia and The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western 
Australia. On EMSs, all of the Code signatories have established and implemented 
systems of environmental management and many reference ISO 14001 (e. g. that the 
EMS has been designed to align with the requirements of ISO14001). Some have 
had their EMSs certified (e. g. Thiess, Illawarra Coal, Alcoa, CRL, Hammersley Iron) 
while others have identified certification as one of their environmental objectives 
(e. g. BHP, Nabalco). 
The integration is addressed through the inclusion of relevant common elements (e. g. 
all three require firms to set objectives and targets), and both the Code and ISO 14001 
in Banks, G. and Ballard, C. (1997) The Ok Tedi Settlement: Issues, Outcomes and Implications. 
Pacific Policy Paper 27 (Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National 
University, Canberra, Australia); Burton, B. (2000c), 'Rio Tinto's Deal with NGO to Write Indonesian 
Laws', Mining Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 7-8). 
'56 Evans, G. (1999c), `Sustainability and Corporate Ethics', Mining Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 9. 
157 For example, the Code Implementation Survey details the relationship between the Code and the 
elements of the ISO 14001 Standard for Environmental Management Systems (MCA (2001a)). 
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require firms to commit to regulatory compliance and to continuous improvement. 
The primary purpose of the Code is to define a broad direction for the industry to 
address planning, implementation and communication of progress in environmental 
management. In contrast, IS014001 is seen as an implementation tool'58 and, under 
the Greenhouse Challenge, firms are required to set specific targets for their 
greenhouse performance. That is, the three voluntary approaches, when combined, 
could be seen as complementary as they define the broad principles for 
environmental management, define specific targets (or create requirements to define 
such targets) and provide an implementation framework. As noted by mining 
industry representatives interviewed for this research'59: 
'IS014001 is simply an implementation tool. The specific targets that are to 
be met are set by legislation, by the company itself and by the programmes, 
e. g. the Greenhouse Challenge, that the company signs up to'. 
`Not every company is thinking about IS014001 certification. IS014001 can 
be seen as a filing cabinet. Of itself, it does not drive performance. The 
Code adds real value to IS014001 by providing a direction to companies 
regarding the outcomes that are to be achieved. ' 
`The development of an EMS was seen as enabling the company to meet some 
of the requirements of the company's environmental policy as well as the 
requirements of the MCA's Code. ' 
Consistency of Performance: Australia and Overseas 
One of the most important features of the Code is that it is intended to apply to all 
operations of signatory companies, irrespective of where the operations are located. 
Even though the Code signatories report on their performance overseas (as well as in 
Australia), it is difficult to tell what the exact impact of the Code has been. This, in 
part, reflects the lack of specificity in the Code, which makes it difficult to make 
direct assessments of the performance of signatory companies. There also appears to 
be a degree of inconsistency in the manner in which companies operate, and concern 
158 Nicholls, F. (1998), `Implementing the Code for Environmental Management: A Rio Tinto Case 
Study'. in Proceedings of the Minerals Council 23rd Annual Environmental Workshop (MCA, Canberra, 
Australia), pp. 27-43 at 30. As noted by WWF; 'While an EMS can enable companies to better 
manage their activities in relation to the environment, it does not necessarily demonstrate that a 
standard of on-ground performance has been achieved because companies are assessed against their 
internally set standards.... Therefore, certification to an EMS cannot be used as an endorsement that 
an acceptable standard of on-ground performance has been achieved' (WWF (2001) at 9). 
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has been expressed that the signatories to the Code are not applying the Code to all 
of their activities, in particular when operating overseas160. In practice, it appears 
that while the majority of companies apply some core elements of corporate 
standards across all operations and comply with national legislation, only a small 
minority apply highest international standards irrespective of location 161. MMSD, 
recommended that `... the veracity of the Code's claim to cover signatories' overseas 
operations needs to be tested, and should be reported unambiguously in reports on 
the Code's operation' 162. 
Stakeholder Consultation 
One of the key elements of the Code is community engagement and dialogue, as a 
part of the processes of developing greater transparency and accountability in the 
industry 163. An increasing number of Australian mining companies have actively 
sought to engage NGOs and communities in monitoring the industry's environmental 
performance. Views on the value of such consultation processes are divided among 
Australian NGOs. Some have argued that 'such consultation can help minimise 
adverse environmental impacts at mine sites, whereas others have argued that the 
overall effects include the winding back of the state as a regulator and increasing the 
success of corporate campaigns against NGO criticsl64. These consultation processes 
have also been criticised for being predicated on the assumption that mining will 
proceed (i. e. so that the discussion is `How should such mining be carried out? ' rather 
than `If such mining should be carried out') and the potential for marginalising certain 
NGOs or community groups, the cooption of NGOs, the divide and conquer of 
NGOs and the potential compromise of NGOs campaigning activities 165. The 
industry has contested these criticisms, with industry representatives arguing 166: 
159 Interviews on 27 February 2001,12 May 2000 and 7 February 2000 respectively. 160 MMSD Australia (2002) at 53; Oxfam Community Aid Abroad (2001). 161 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2001) at 18. '62 MMSD Australia (2002) at 53. 163 MCA (2000a) at 5. 164 Cleary, A. (1999), `Coping with Corporates', Mining Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 5-6. See also the 
case-studies presented in Evans et al (eds. ) (2001). 165 Burton, B. (1998), `After `Engagement" Comes Defeat, Says Journalist', Mining Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 
4, pp. 7-9. 
166 Interviews on 30 April 2000 and 27 February 2001 respectively. 
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The Code has contributed to a change in attitude towards stakeholder 
consultation and has helped spark a new way of doing business. ' 
`The purpose of stakeholder consultation is not to capture stakeholders but to 
provide information, help stakeholders to understand the industry's issues and, 
where appropriate, enable the industry to work with stakeholders. ' 
8.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The major contribution of the Code has been to codify the requirement for the 
industry to report publicly on its environmental performance. This is generally seen 
as a necessary step in institutionalising environmental responsibility within the 
industry. The absence of industry-wide performance measures has meant that it is 
difficult to draw firm conclusions on the overall environmental performance of the 
industry or on the specific contribution of the Code to the industry's environmental 
performance. While there is evidence that the industry's environmental performance 
is improving, these changes appear to reflect the broader pressures on the industry to 
maintain its `licence to operate', rather than the direct influence of the Code. 
The long-term nature of mining operations creates specific problems for the industry. 
Many of the concerns regarding the industry's performance reflect historic decisions 
(and the reality that mining operations run for 20-40 years, which means that many 
existing mines reflect design decisions that were made some years ago) and the 
reality that the expectations of the industry have changed. This history has created 
difficulties for the Code, with the industry's achievements and initiatives being 
subject to critical scrutiny, in particular by NGOs. This distrust has been exacerbated 
both by specific incidents and accidents since the Code was established and by the 
manner in which the industry behaves in public policy debates. These failings have 
led to the Code being criticised for its inadequacy at ensuring performance and for 
not changing the manner in which the industry behaves. There is NGO pressure for 
more regulation to ensure the performance of the industry. The apparent divergence 
between the principles and aims of the Code and the performance of the industry in 
practice has had the effect of increasing this pressure for a regulatory rather than a 
voluntary approach to ensuring the industry's environmental performance. 
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9. DISCUSSION 
This Section is divided into two parts, namely: 
" An assessment of the common themes and features of the case-studies. This 
includes a discussion of specific limitations and issues in the study methodology, 
and the implications of these limitations for the conclusions drawn. 
" An assessment of the contribution of the case studies to the broader literature on 
voluntary approaches. 
9.1 LESSONS FROM THE CASE-STUDIES 
The overall assessment of the lessons from the case-studies uses the criteria 
developed in Chapter 2, namely, environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, 
administration and compliance costs, competitiveness, soft effects, dynamic effects 
and innovation, viability and feasibility, and law and public policy issues. The case- 
study evaluation methodology, including issues such as data availability, is. also 
examined and an assessment made of the effectiveness of the methodology in testing 
voluntary approaches. 
9.1.1 Environmental Effectiveness 
Data Availability 
The assessment of environmental effectiveness was constrained by the limitations in 
the data available. In all three voluntary approaches, organisations are free to specify 
their own targets and to define how these are to be measured. This has two 
consequences. The first is that comparing performance between different 
organisations is extremely difficult. There are signs that this issue is starting to be 
addressed, through initiatives such as the Greenhouse Challenge and the National 
Pollutant Inventory, where government agencies have developed specific reporting 
guidance and implemented verification processes to ensure the accuracy of the 
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reported data. The second consequence is that the performance measures or targets 
may not only be too low but may also not enable performance to be adequately 
assessed by outside parties. A good example is the Greenhouse Challenge with its 
focus on emissions abatement. While emissions abatement is an important measure 
of the effectiveness of actions on greenhouse, a focus on emissions abatement means 
that the real measure of policy performance (i. e. total greenhouse gas emissions) has 
been obscured. 
Specified Targets 
The three case-studies appear to confirm the general concern that the targets 
specified in voluntary approaches are less stringent than the targets that would have 
been established in command and control regimes. All three of the voluntary 
approaches have been criticised because of the freedom given to industry to set its 
own targets (or the absence of targets that apply across industry). However, there is 
evidence that voluntary approaches can be effective against their own performance 
measures (e. g. number of participating organisations) and that participating 
organisations will implement the requirements (e. g. implementing management 
systems, reporting) of voluntary approaches. The success of the voluntary 
approaches has been used by industry to argue against mandatory regulation or 
tighter regulatory requirements. For example, the mining industry has used the 
existence of the mining Code to argue against mandatory reporting requirements and 
the Greenhouse Challenge has been used as an argument against more prescriptive 
regulatory approaches for the control of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Free-Riders 
While each of the voluntary approaches has sought to limit the benefits to free-riders 
through providing some form of external recognition to participants, some collective 
benefits (e. g. the avoidance of regulation) have accrued to industry as a whole. 
Furthermore, there is an absence of mechanisms to ensure the performance of those 
organisations that have not joined the voluntary approach. This has been a particular 
issue in the mining industry where there have been major incidents involving non- 
signatories to the Code but there is no means for the industry as a whole to ensure the 
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performance of these organisations. For the other two case studies (EMSs and the 
Greenhouse Challenge), ensuring the performance of non-participants appears to 
have been less of a concern given that EMSs are primarily used to enable 
organisations to achieve regulatory compliance or other goals (i. e. there is an 
underpinning of regulation to ensure performance) and the broad application of the 
Greenhouse Challenge (i. e. the Challenge has achieved a high coverage of the major 
industrial sources of greenhouse gas emissions)'. 
Two other forms of free-riding have also been identified. The first is where 
organisations have joined the voluntary approach but have only had part of their 
operations covered by voluntary approach. This has been seen in the cases of both 
EMSs (where some organisations have just had some parts of their operations 
certified but then used the logo in their advertising) and in mining (where there are 
questions regarding the extent to which companies apply the Code requirements to 
all of their operations, in particular overseas operations and joint ventures). The 
second is that the general absence of performance requirements in each of the 
voluntary approaches has meant that organisations set their own performance targets 
which tend not to differ significantly from business as usual. That is, so long as 
organisations comply with the process elements of the voluntary approach, the 
organisation can benefit from the reputation and other benefits that accrue from 
participation in the voluntary approach2. 
Outcomes Achieved 
Apart from the issues around regulatory capture and free-riding, the three voluntary 
approaches do appear to have assisted organisations to improve their regulatory 
compliance performance and to adopt cost-effective (or `no regrets') environmental 
improvement measures. These represent substantial outcomes for many Australian 
firms. That is, while the various voluntary approaches considered may not have 
1 It is also relevant to note that the issue of greenhouse gas emissions is a qualitatively different policy 
issue as the primary measure of success of policy is bulk totals of emissions and, from an 
environmental perspective, individual non-compliance may be of less concern so long as overall 
targets are met. 
2 It could be argued that this is not strictly free-riding as the definition of free-riding presented in 
Chapter 5 does not say anything about broader performance issues outside those specified by the 
voluntary approach. 
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provided the key initial impetus for the introduction of environmental improvements, 
they do appear to have provided a focus for management efforts on environment 
more generally. However, a common theme in the case-studies is that there is 
limited evidence that the voluntary approaches have led to organisations departing 
from a narrowly focussed compliance and cost-recovery approach to environmental 
management. 
The absence of an agreed definition for `sustainable development' means that while 
it may be possible to make some broad comments on the direction of an 
organisation's environmental performance (i. e. getting `better' or `worse'), it is not 
generally possible to make stronger comments on the rate of change or the rate of 
progress compared to that which is necessary. As an example, on greenhouse gas 
emissions, the proposed targets range from no regrets (i. e. to only do that which is 
economically efficient in the absence of any concerns regarding greenhouse), to 
meeting the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol (broadly the stabilisation of 
greenhouse gas emissions) through to meeting the requirements of the IPCC (which 
envisages reductions of the order of sixty per cent). Depending on which of these is 
taken as the reference point, the Greenhouse Challenge may be seen as a cost- 
effective policy tool, a useful tool as part of the overall policy response to the Kyoto 
Protocol (although questions remain regarding whether Australia will actually 
achieve its targets under the Kyoto Protocol), or a totally ineffective policy approach. 
It is also relevant to note that the relatively low targets defined in policy and 
legislation may run counter to the needs of a `sustainable society'. While sustainable 
development is accepted as the guiding principle for environmental policy in 
Australia, the definition that has been adopted emphasises the need for a strong, 
growing and diversified economy, the need to maintain and enhance international 
competitiveness and the importance of growth as the engine for environmental 
protection. That is, the exploitation of resources and maintaining consumption are 
seen as the primary vehicles for economic growth and environmental protection. 
Given the weakness of the Australian policy framework, it may be unrealistic to 
expect better outcomes to be achieved from voluntary approaches, although it is also 
important to recognise that various elements of the voluntary approaches considered 
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in this dissertation (e. g. public reporting, continual improvement) are recognised as 
necessary building blocks towards the goals of sustainability. Furthermore, 
voluntary approaches (as illustrated by the case studies) do appear to be successful at 
enabling organisations to get into and remain in compliance and to take advantage of 
those opportunities that provide clear financial returns. This raises the important role 
that regulation (or the threat of regulation) plays. That is, the stronger the drivers to 
take action, the greater the likelihood that a voluntary approach will achieve 
significant environmental outcomes. 
9.1.2 Economic Efficiency 
It appears that, apart from regulatory compliance (which is seen as a `cost of doing 
business'), organisations are only adopting those measures that can be considered `no 
regrets' (i. e. where the decision makes economic sense, irrespective of the specific 
environmental issues involved). The three voluntary approaches have not altered the 
investment tests that need to be met for environmental projects or investments to be 
approved. It is also relevant to note that the data that are available on the costs and 
benefits of environmental expenditures are extremely limited, reflecting the 
limitations in cost-benefit assessments, the difficulties in disaggregating 
environmental expenditures from other business costs and concerns about the release 
of commercially confidential information into the public domain. 
The major efficiency benefit of the three voluntary approaches is that they do require 
firms to identify and assess opportunities for cost-effective environmental 
improvements. It could be argued that many of these cost-effective improvements 
are really `low hanging fruit' where the only reason that they had not been addressed 
was because they had not previously been identified. For example, on greenhouse, it 
is increasingly argued that all of the cost-effective opportunities for improving 
greenhouse performance have now been exhausted. However, as discussed in the 
case-studies on EMS and the Greenhouse Challenge, there is evidence that 
companies are not implementing economically justifiable environmental 
improvement projects. The reasons include the lack of management focus on 
environmental performance (although this appears to be changing) and the 
perception of environmental issues as an `add on' to core business activities. 
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Finally, the focus of organisation's assessment of economic efficiency is on 
optimising private costs through the assessment of the direct costs and benefits to the 
individual organisation, rather than on optimising societal costs. The consequence is 
that the environment is effectively excluded as a factor in decision-making, except in 
situations where certain standards of environmental performance are mandated by 
regulation or where there are costs associated with pollutant releases. 
9.1.3 Administration and Compliance Costs 
As discussed in Section 2, administrative and compliance costs are frequently 
difficult to assess. The analysis of the three case-studies confirmed this, and 
therefore the approach adopted to assess these costs was to compare the requirements 
of the voluntary approach with the requirements that would be expected in a 
command and control regime targeted at the same issue. In all three case-studies, 
with the exception of enforcement processes, the requirements of the voluntary 
approach (in terms of issue identification, reporting, record-keeping) are broadly 
similar to those that would be expected in a command and control regime targeted at 
the same issue or at the same industry sector. The question then becomes whether or 
not private actors can implement such regulations more efficiently than government 
agencies? The evidence for this is mixed. In practice, most regulatory requirements 
involve a significant degree of industry reporting and activity and voluntary 
approaches frequently rely on existing reporting requirements. Furthermore, 
government agencies often subcontract part of the regulatory functions (e. g. 
monitoring) to the private sector. These are generally the same organisations used by 
industry to conduct these specialist functions. Voluntary approaches also rely on 
elements of the regulatory apparatus (e. g. standard monitoring and quality assurance 
processes). Overall, therefore, the debate over the efficiency of the public versus 
private sector (in terms of administration and compliance costs) remains unclear and 
it is not possible to draw specific conclusions on this issue. 
There are three important caveats to this argument. The first is that the aims of 
regulation (e. g. to correct market failures, to address externalities) may conflict with 
the primary purposes of business (to make profit). Therefore, arguments regarding 
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administrative and compliance costs may be a lower priority for government than for 
industry. The second is that it may not be appropriate to compare voluntary 
approaches with command and control regulations. For government programmes, 
the aim is to minimise total costs (to government and industry) and to simplify the 
task of government (to ensure that data are reported in a standard manner across a 
range of industry sectors). In contrast, in voluntary approaches, the objective is, 
generally, to minimise the overall costs to the participants. Because voluntary 
approaches tend to have a limited number of participants and/or involve a specific 
industry sector, it may be the case that it is easier to optimise the administrative and 
reporting costs. The third is that many of the administrative and compliance costs 
would be incurred anyway (either as part of existing regulatory requirements or 
would have been implemented in the absence of the voluntary approach). That is, 
the incremental costs associated with each of the voluntary approaches are relatively 
minor. 
9.1.4 Competitiveness Effects 
The impacts of the three voluntary approaches on competitiveness appear minor. 
While there are economic benefits for participating firms (e. g. through enabling 
organisations to make better decisions on environmental expenditures), the freedom 
for organisations to join or withdraw from each of the programmes and the wide 
availability of information on each of the programmes means that the benefits of the 
voluntary approaches are available to all organisations. There was no evidence of 
collusion or cartels in the three case-studies, but this does not enable a more general 
conclusion on this issue to be drawn. 
9.1.5 Soft Effects 
All three of the case studies confirm the importance of soft effects as an outcome 
from voluntary approaches. The soft effects that have been reported have included 
the adoption of formal processes for considering environmental issues in decision- 
making processes, education and capacity building. It is probably an overstatement 
to attribute these outcomes exclusively to the voluntary approaches as at least some 
of the effects would have been seen anyway. For example, greenhouse is such an 
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important issue that it is likely that it would be a high priority for energy intensive 
industries anyway, and the changes in the regulatory framework in Australia would 
probably have resulted in many organisations taking a more structured approach to 
regulatory compliance, irrespective of whether or not IS014001 had been released. 
The case-studies have highlighted the potential for voluntary approaches to 
overcome, or help overcome, some of the organisational barriers to improved 
environmental performance. The specific barriers that have been addressed by 
voluntary approaches are (a) the emphasis of most organisations on short-term 
profitability, (b) the general lack of senior management commitment to 
environmental protection, (c) the lack of awareness of environmental issues, and (d) 
policy uncertainty. There are a number of different ways in which voluntary 
approaches act to address these barriers. The first is that voluntary approaches can, 
when there is appropriate political and regulatory support, provide longer-term policy 
certainty. For example, all three of the voluntary approaches assessed ave been in 
place since 1995 or 1996 and have remained relatively unchanged over this period of 
time. This policy certainty can enable organisations to plan their environmental 
investments in a more strategic manner and to consider longer-term benefits as well 
as short-term costs. The second is that voluntary approaches may increase senior 
management commitment to environmental protection. For example, if the approach 
is `owned' by industry, there is a greater likelihood that the approach will be 
accepted and supported by industry. Furthermore, through requiring firms to commit 
to a voluntary approach, there is likely to be pressure on the participating firms to 
deliver on these commitments. That is, the commitment creates both an 
organisational impetus to comply and a framework for accountability (e. g. through 
reporting, industry peer pressure). Voluntary approaches may also help develop 
skills and capacity (e. g. through education, training and support for participating 
organisations). 
However, the broader institutional barriers to environmental performance (in 
particular, the emphasis on short term financial performance and the reality that is 
frequently easier to externalise pollution impacts) have not been addressed in any of 
the three voluntary approaches that have been studied. Overcoming these issues 
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would require substantial changes in public policy and these changes are likely to be 
far greater than what can be achieved through specific policy instruments. 
9.1.6 Innovation 
While one of the key outcomes from each of the voluntary approaches was placing 
environmental issues on the corporate agenda and providing learning processes (both 
of which are recognised as necessary precursors to innovation), there is limited 
evidence to suggest that this has led to innovative approaches to environmental 
management. In all three case studies, the absence of specific targets has provided 
limited incentive for firms to innovate. While it may be the case that the continual 
improvement and target-setting philosophies that underpin many voluntary 
approaches enable organisations to adopt innovative approaches to environmental 
issues, this cannot be stated conclusively for any of the voluntary approaches 
considered. 
9.1.7 Viability and Feasibility 
Voluntary approaches are an established part of the Australian regulatory framework. 
That is, there is an understanding of how such voluntary approaches can function in 
the regulatory space and the use of voluntary approaches by government (the 
Greenhouse Challenge) and industry (EMS certification and the mining Code) 
indicates that many of the potential political and institutional barriers have been 
overcome. That is not to say that voluntary approaches are the preferred approach to 
all environmental problems or that there are not political or institutional barriers that 
may limit their application in certain situations, but rather that voluntary approaches 
are seen as a viable alternative to other approaches to regulation. 
The case-studies demonstrate the practical difficulties in ensuring the viability of 
voluntary approaches. Industry has supported or established each of the three 
voluntary approaches but has also expressed concern regarding the potential for 
voluntary approaches to be precursors of regulation or to ratchet up the performance 
expectations of companies and industry. 
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The Commonwealth government has supported the three voluntary approaches. This 
support reflects more general trends in Australia towards reducing the regulatory 
burden on firms, as well as strong government support for trade liberalisation and the 
removal of trade barriers. Despite this support, it is also the case that changes in the 
Australian political context (e. g. the election of a new government) may undermine 
the benefits of voluntary approaches. For example, the November 2001 Federal 
elections (which resulted in the Liberal/National government being returned to 
power) could have significantly changed the policy context for greenhouse (as the 
Labour party had made election pledges regarding Australia's commitment to the 
Kyoto Protocol) and mining (given the dissenting report of the Labour members on 
the Corporate Code of Conduct Bill discussed in Chapter 8). 
In addition, all three voluntary approaches have been criticised by NGOs who see 
them as containing, weak, if any, targets, lacking credibility and transparency, 
providing limited environmental performance improvements, and having the 
potential to weaken or undermine the regulatory framework. One common feature is 
that none of the three voluntary approaches has strongly empowered potential third 
party regulators3 and many of the NGO criticisms reflect the fact that there has been 
no significant change in the ability of NGOs to `regulate' the activities of industry. 
Expressed another way, while it can be argued that the three voluntary approaches 
considered have delivered on transparency (at least to an extent), they do not yet 
appear to have delivered on accountability. 
9.1.8 Law and Public Policy Issues 
Industry's Role in Public Policy 
There appears to be a fundamental difference between the principles outlined in the 
voluntary programmes studied in this research and the lobbying positions adopted by 
industry. For example, despite the commitments to sustainable development in the 
mining Code, the mining industry has strongly opposed efforts to define 
responsibilities for the industry or to include environmental targets into legislation. 
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In a similar manner, industry has used the existence of the Greenhouse Challenge as 
an argument against stronger regulatory approaches on greenhouse issues. The 
inconsistency between stated commitments and lobbying positions has undermined 
trust in the ability of industry to regulate itself. These inconsistencies have been used 
by NGOs to support their arguments for stronger regulation of industry (see, in 
particular, the analysis of the mining industry in Chapter 8). 
Changing the Terms of the Debate? 
One of the unspoken objectives of the three voluntary approaches has been to change 
the terms of the debate around the environmental performance of industry. The three 
voluntary approaches considered in this dissertation focus on pollution control and 
emissions reduction. This approach is based on the argument that the limits to 
growth are not those imposed by resource constraints but by the limits of sinks or 
systems that can safely absorb wastes. While waste and pollution issues are critical 
dimensions of the environmental debate, an exclusive focus on these issues also 
means that the broader debates around sustainability can be lost or obscured in the 
debate around efficiency and performance. 
That is, the fact that a product was produced efficiently says nothing about whether 
or not the product should be produced in the first place or about the overall 
environmental impacts of the product. In the three voluntary approaches considered 
in this dissertation, industry has used the minimisation of emissions per unit of 
production of consumption as the primary measure of success rather than absolute 
levels of emissions. If efficiency is accepted as the primary goal of public policy, 
this will mean that radical change in the manner in which organisations operate or in 
the structure of the Australian economy are unlikely to occur. That is, the radical 
changes required to achieve sustainability (as discussed in Section 3.1) are unlikely to 
occur. 
3 The Greenhouse Challenge is essentially an industry-government process, the EMS certification 
process is a certification body-client process and the mining industry's Code is an industry 
association-industry programme. 
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A further consequence is that a public policy focus on emissions may divert attention 
from broader issues such as whether or not specific products should be produced or the 
manner in which resources are consumed. Despite these criticisms, it is also necessary 
to recognise that if a product is to be produced or a specific process or activity to be 
carried out, it is clearly in the interests of both business and the environment that 
resource consumption and pollution be minimised. 
Future Directions 
The three voluntary approaches have been in place for between five and six years, 
have a reasonable coverage of their specific target sectors or issue and have a 
reasonable degree of political and institutional support. Predicting the future is 
inevitably fraught with uncertainty but a number of general comments can be made. 
At the political level, the re-election of the Liberal/National coalition government in 
November 2001 means that there are unlikely to be significant policy shifts on the 
environment for the next three years. That is, the Commonwealth government will 
continue to support voluntary approaches for greenhouse (and rely on sinks to enable 
Australia to meet its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol), the Code of Conduct 
Bill (or other efforts to regulate Australian companies operating overseas) is unlikely 
to be revisited, and economic growth and trade liberalisation will continue to be the 
primary goals of economic policy. 
At the State and Territory level, the position is slightly less clear as the 
environmental or `green' vote tends to be a greater influence on the outcomes of 
elections. However, the States and Territories appear likely to retain their strong pro- 
development philosophies. The likely consequence is that the three voluntary 
approaches appear likely to remain as important features of the policy landscape. 
There are two foreseeable changes in this 'imagined future'. The first is that a major 
catastrophe or accident could change perspectives on one or more of the voluntary 
approaches. For example, the pressure for regulation that followed the Esmerclda 
tailings dam failure could have led to regulation supplanting the mining Code. The 
second relates to the implications of the international policy debate on greenhouse. 
These may apply in three ways. The first is that if Australia is unable to meet its 
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Kyoto commitments (e. g. due to unfavourable decisions on sinks or because the 
credits from sinks do not cancel out the growth in emissions from other sources), 
stronger regulatory approaches may be required. The second is if an international 
greenhouse gas trading system is implemented, the need for the voluntary 
Greenhouse Challenge may be eliminated. The third is that the post-Kyoto period 
commitments (i. e. after 2012) may in result in significant transition costs for 
Australia, potentially requiring that the government takes early action to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions to minimise economic dislocation. 
9.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR VOLUNTARY APPROACHES 
The selection of three Australian case-studies has enabled variables such as political 
and administrative structures and broader policy contexts to be `held constant'. The 
manner in which the voluntary approaches have functioned reflects issues such as 
Australia's geography, demographic trends, resource base, political and institutional 
structure, economic composition, trading relationships, energy production and 
consumption profile. The most important features are that (a) Australia is a resource 
and energy dependent economy, (b) there is political consensus that Australian 
industry should not be disadvantaged by environmental regulations, (c) Australia is a 
Federation of States, where regulatory and environmental policy functions are 
divided between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories, and (d) there are 
strong industry associations who often act as a brake on changes in regulation or 
environmental policy generally. Having noted these features, a number of 
conclusions can be drawn from the Australian experience with voluntary approaches. 
9.2.1 Design of Voluntary Approaches 
The experience with the three voluntary approaches considered in this dissertation 
enables some broad comments to be made on the manner in which voluntary 
approaches should be designed. 
249 
Specificity of Goals 
Many of the criticisms of the voluntary approaches relate to the limitations in the 
goals that have been defined. All three of the voluntary approaches are characterised 
by vague wording (e. g. the term 'continual improvement' is not defined), poorly 
defined criteria (see the discussion above regarding the performance targets that are 
set by organisations) and double-counting (see, for example, the discussion in 
Chapter 7 regarding the difficulties in defining a suitable baseline for greenhouse 
policy measures). Furthermore, even where the process measures are met, this does 
not necessarily mean that satisfactory environmental outcomes are achieved. These 
limitations have meant that all three of the voluntary approaches have been criticised 
for not providing a suitable framework for accountability and transparency to enable 
external stakeholders to evaluate and verify the voluntary approach. 
While the broad recommendation is that voluntary approaches should provide much 
more specific targets or performance outcomes, there is another dimension to this 
debate. That is, defining more specific targets may mean that some of the soft effects 
associated with voluntary approaches (e. g. improved decision-making processes, 
information sharing) may be sacrificed for greater verifiability. Therefore, care is 
required to ensure that there is a balance between the measurable or performance 
outcomes and the soft effects that may also accrue from voluntary approaches. 
As discussed in the various case studies, the definition of business as usual remains 
problematic and it is likely that, irrespective of which approach is chosen, there will 
continue to be debate. Perhaps the key requirements are that the baseline (or starting 
point) and endpoint be clearly defined, that the basis on which these have been 
calculated be clearly defined and that alternative scenarios (e. g. static efficiency, 
dynamic efficiency, changes in business activities) be considered and documented. 
While such an approach will involve additional work as part of the ex ante 
assessment of the specific voluntary approach, it should also ensure that the 
evaluation and assessment of voluntary approaches can be made more transparent 
and should reduce the difficulties in assessing the performance of voluntary 
approaches. 
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Ensuring Performance 
The credibility of all three voluntary approaches has been weakened by the absence 
of mechanisms for ensuring the performance of the voluntary approach. There are 
two dimensions to this. First of all, the absence of substantive sanctions for failing to 
meet the requirements of the voluntary approach (other than withdrawal of the logo 
or certification) is seen as weakening the effectiveness of voluntary approaches. 
Secondly, the fact that an organisation meets the process requirements of the 
voluntary approach says nothing about the environmental performance outcomes that 
are achieved. In the three case-studies, there is limited evidence that organisations 
have gone beyond regulatory compliance or taken actions that are not justified in 
cost-benefit terms. 
It could be argued that all of the voluntary approaches are underpinned by regulation 
(or that regulation defines a minimum performance standard), although the limited 
environmental outcomes that appear to have been achieved have been used by NGOs 
to argue that stronger approaches are required to ensure performance. For example, 
it has been argued that credible regulatory threats must underpin the negotiation and 
implementation of the voluntary approach. While the fact that a regime is mandatory 
(or perceived to be mandatory) may make firms reluctant to commit to the regime 
and may also undermine some of the claimed benefits of voluntary approaches (e. g. 
flexibility, better relationships with regulatory bodies), the case studies confirm that 
there is a need for some means of ensuring the effectiveness of voluntary approaches. 
Monitoring Performance 
Credible and reliable monitoring is necessary to enable performance to be tracked 
over time. That is, apart from the need for clearly defined objectives and targets, 
there is also a need for monitoring, reporting and verification to enable performance 
to be assured. Because of the distrust of voluntary approaches among environmental 
groups, the legitimacy and credibility of such schemes is critically dependent on the 
provision of independent performance information. From the experience with public 
environmental reporting, it appears that many of the barriers to improved 
transparency are slowly being overcome as the fear that self-reported data will be 
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used to support prosecutions has not eventuated and many of the costs associated 
with data acquisition and monitoring are already being incurred. However, there are 
concerns regarding the quality of the data reported and it has been argued that more 
structured and robust approaches to monitoring and data acquisition should be 
adopted. These could include the involvement of third parties, independent auditing 
of performance, auditor certification, formal verification processes and procedures 
that define the actions to be taken in the event of violations. It is interesting that 
these elements are all starting to be adopted (although not necessarily consistently or 
completely) in the three voluntary approaches studied in this dissertation. It is also 
pertinent to note that industry has emphasised the importance of credible data to 
ensuring the viability of voluntary approaches (and much of the recent work on the 
mining Code and the Greenhouse Challenge have focussed on these specific issues. ) 
The Involvement of Third-Parties 
Third-party participation in the process of setting objectives and monitoring 
performance is regarded as an essential part of ensuring the credibility of voluntary 
approaches. This reflects the distrust of voluntary approaches by NGOs. It has been 
suggested that, to ensure that this participation is effective, there should be 
reasonable notice that the voluntary approach is being developed, and there should be 
opportunities for participation, consideration of minority views and objections, rights 
of appeal and publicly available records of deliberation, decision and performance. 
9.2.2 Voluntary Approaches in the Regulatory Space 
Functions of Voluntary Approaches 
The three voluntary approaches studied can be seen in a number of different ways. If 
they are considered purely in terms of their ability to achieve high standards of 
performance (i. e. significantly beyond the standards specified in legislation), then it 
is clear that none has enabled this goal to be achieved. However, if voluntary 
approaches are seen as facilitating or initiating change then the terms of the debate 
change. The case studies indicate two separate functions for voluntary approaches in 
the policy mix. The first is as providing a transitional function, for example where 
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legislation is planned or being contemplated and where it is in industry's interest to 
take early action or to prepare for the introduction of legislation. As an example the 
Greenhouse Challenge can be seen as enabling industry to establish the systems, 
processes and capacity necessary to respond to current and future requirements on 
greenhouse and the greenhouse inventory, action planning, reporting and verification 
processes could all be readily adapted to a stronger regulatory regime or to an 
emissions trading scheme. The second way of looking at voluntary approaches is as 
an implementation mechanism or tool. This appears to have been the case with both 
EMSs and the mining Code, where both programmes have emphasised regulatory 
compliance. In the case of EMSs, this is through explicit requirements to identify 
and address legislative requirements and, in the case of the Code, by requiring 
organisations to commit to regulatory compliance and to report on regulatory 
compliance. 
Deepening the Regulatory Space 
If the multiple regulatory pyramids model is revisited, it can be seen that voluntary 
approaches may also deepen the regulatory space. Each of the three voluntary 
approaches has added to the levels of enforcement that are available. In the case of 
EMSs, the need to be in compliance to obtain certification provides an additional 
incentive to organisations to comply. Certification also adds a pyramid to the 
regulatory space, where the pressures are demands for certification (eg as a condition 
of market access) and where the tiers are certification (i. e. a reward), dialogue on the 
actions required to achieve certification and, ultimately, the withdrawal of 
certification. Furthermore, the auditing and management processes that are an 
integral part of EMSs add internal pressure to ensure compliance and create a system 
of accountability for ensuring performance. 
In the Greenhouse Challenge, the situation is slightly different as greenhouse gas 
emissions are not presently regulated, although there is significant concern about 
greenhouse gas emissions. The Greenhouse Challenge adds to the regulatory space 
through introducing new regulators (i. e. the Australian Greenhouse Office as well as 
internal stakeholders, through requiring CEOs to sign Greenhouse Challenge 
Cooperative Agreements), a new regulatory requirement (i. e. the Greenhouse 
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Challenge logo and the other benefits that accrue to members of the Greenhouse 
Challenge) and empowering parties such as NGOs through providing them with 
information on organisations' performance. 
The mining Code introduces industry peer pressure to ensure conformance with the 
Code as well as providing information to enable other stakeholders assess the 
industry's performance. A further important feature of the mining industry Code is 
that the Code is intended to apply to all of a signatory company's operations, both in 
Australia and overseas. However, to date, there is limited evidence that this has 
occurred, although it is recognised by the industry as a necessary step in developing 
the credibility of the Code. 
While there are weaknesses and limitations in each of the voluntary approaches 
considered, they have all had the effect of broadening the regulatory space (through 
introducing new issues that are the subject of regulation), through introducing new 
regulators and empowering existing stakeholders. That is, the three voluntary 
approaches considered have added new regulatory pyramids to the regulatory space, 
added to the tiers in existing regulatory pyramids and potentially increased the 
pressures that can be brought to bear on organisations. 
Adding to the Range of Environmental Policy Instruments? 
The three case-studies also raise a number of broader issues for environmental policy 
in Australia. The first is that it has been argued that Australia has tended to rely on 
too few instruments and that the Australian regulatory space could be improved by 
improving the range of instruments, improving instrument selection to reflect 
environmental problems, the characteristics of the actors involved and the technology 
available and improving the way in which instruments fit together. The three 
voluntary approaches have enabled all of these outcomes to be achieved, through 
adding voluntary approaches to the regulatory mix, being tailored to the specific 
needs of the industry sector or issue in question and, as discussed above, broadening 
and deepening the regulatory space. However, it is also pertinent to note that there 
are concerns regarding the actual environmental performance of the voluntary 
approaches. 
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The second is that the effectiveness of voluntary approaches has been driven by the 
presence or threat of regulation or economic instruments. That is, each of the 
voluntary approaches has achieved outcomes as a part of the overall policy mix. 
Furthermore, voluntary approaches need to be seen in the light of the interaction 
between voluntarism and regulation as some element of regulation (or the threat of 
regulation) is likely to coexist alongside voluntary approaches. For example, if 
regulatory requirements had not tightened significantly over the past decade, it is 
unlikely that EMSs would have been as widely adopted, while the primary reason for 
the introduction of the Greenhouse Challenge was the threat of a carbon tax. 
The third is that, in each case, a voluntary approach (while supported by industry) 
was only one of a number of policy options that could have been adopted and 
mandatory regulation or economic instruments were also viable (even if less 
preferred) policy options. An interesting feature is that the three case-studies have 
all been applied to new problems (or to issues that were not being directly regulated). 
That is, the decision to develop and implement a voluntary approach was driven not 
only by the economic or other advantages of voluntary approaches over other forms 
of regulation, but by the reality that, once a command and control regime is in place, 
it can be difficult to supplant. 'A related issue is that the Australian regulatory space 
is crowded and there may be limited room for the introduction of new policy 
instruments. It is unlikely that there will be radical changes in the regulatory 
framework given the likely public opposition to the weakening of the regulatory state 
and industry's preferences for regulation in situations where such regulation protects 
existing markets. The consequence is that further changes in the Australian 
regulatory space are likely to be slow and the further use of voluntary approaches 
appears more likely in areas where there is no regulation, rather than as an alternative 
to existing regulatory frameworks. 
Finally, the case studies indicate that multiple voluntary approaches can exist in the 
same regulatory space. For example, the mining Code has been designed to integrate 
with IS014001 and with the Greenhouse Challenge. The integration is addressed 
through the inclusion of relevant common elements (e. g. the Code requires 
organisations to set targets and organisations are also required to set targets under the 
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Greenhouse Challenge and ISO14001) and also through requiring organisations to 
commit to regulatory compliance (which aligns the Code with one of the key 
requirements of IS014001). One of the interesting features of the experience with 
voluntary approaches in Australia has been that, in parallel with industry interest in 
voluntary approaches, there have been ongoing complaints regarding regulatory 
overload. It has been argued that regulatory overload has made the addition of 
further complex legislation to the regulatory space difficult. In this context, industry 
interest in voluntary approaches could be seen as somewhat contradictory. However, 
there may be some explanations. The first is that the complexity of environmental 
issues and the growing knowledge regarding environmental issues has meant that the 
scope of public policy has needed to broaden to address these issues. That is, the 
debate reflects the reality that some action will be required on a range of issues and 
therefore the debate is less `if (there will be regulation)' and more `what (regulatory 
approach will be adopted)'. The second issue is that voluntary approaches can 
simplify the task of managing environmental issues. This is particularly the case for 
EMSs and, to a lesser extent, the mining Code and the Greenhouse Challenge, where 
the effect is to provide a systematic approach to managing environmental issues and 
enabling structured decision-making processes to be adopted for environmental 
issues. 
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10. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
Voluntary Approaches in the Policy Mix 
1. Voluntary approaches can make an important contribution to the implementation 
of environmental policy. While this contribution is likely to be limited in 
situations where voluntary approaches are adopted as the sole policy instrument, 
voluntary approaches can make a significant contribution in situations where they 
provide a transitional function (e. g. helping industry to take early action or to 
prepare for the introduction of legislation) or where the voluntary approach is 
used as an implementation mechanism (or to assist organisations meet the goals 
specified in policy or regulations). Voluntary approaches also offer the potential 
to broaden and deepen the regulatory space through empowering other parties to 
ensure performance and through increasing the enforcement tiers available to 
regulatory bodies. 
2. While voluntary approaches offer the potential for economic efficiency, reduced 
administration costs, competitive advantage and innovation, there is limited 
evidence to suggest that these benefits are achieved in practice. 
3. Soft effects (e. g. education, placing environmental issues on the business 
decision-making agenda, improving relationships between business and 
regulatory authorities) appear to be the most important direct outcomes from 
successful voluntary approaches. Voluntary approaches also offer the potential 
to overcome some of the organisational barriers (e. g. focus on short term profits 
rather than long term sustainability, lack of senior management commitment to 
environmental issues) to improved environmental performance. 
Design of Voluntary Approaches 
4. For voluntary approaches to be effective policy instruments, they should (a) 
contain clear objectives and targets, (b) clearly define the business as usual 
scenario (to enable the performance changes that have been made to be assessed 
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against what would have happened in the absence of the voluntary approach), (c) 
include credible monitoring and measuring processes, and (d) be underpinned by 
suitable enforcement mechanisms. 
Australian Environmental Policy Issues 
5. Regulation has played the key role in improving Australian corporate 
environmental performance and it is likely that regulation will continue to be the 
primary tool for effecting change in the environmental performance of Australian 
organisations. 
6. Voluntary approaches are viable additions to the Australian regulatory space and 
may have a role to play in addressing other environmental issues in Australia. 
However,. the voluntary approaches that have been effectively implemented do 
not seem to offer the necessary incentives or pressure for organisations to go 
substantially beyond business as usual (or those actions that can be justified in 
narrow cost-benefit terms). Furthermore, regulatory capture and difficulties in 
dealing with free-riders are common problems. It is also important to recognise 
that improved regulatory performance and the adoption of cost-effective 
environmental improvement measures have represented substantial outcomes for 
many Australian firms. While the three voluntary approaches considered may 
not have provided the key initial impetus for the introduction of environmental 
improvements, they do appear to have provided a focus for management efforts 
on environment more generally. 
7. The manner in which companies assess and measure environmental costs and 
benefits needs to be improved. That is, it is desirable that companies include the 
environment in their decision-making processes by explicitly considering the 
costs and benefits of their actions. This requires that consideration be given to 
different options (including the `do nothing' option), that longer-term benefits as 
well as short-term costs be explicitly considered, that the discount rates and other 
assumptions used in evaluation processes be made clear, and that environmental 
goods and services be explicitly costed and included in decision-making. These 
requirements should be integrated into environmental impact assessment 
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processes (for new developments) and into public environmental reports (or other 
reporting processes) for projects or developments for which environmental 
impact statements are not required. 
8. The absence of an agreed definition for `sustainable development' means that 
while it may be possible to make some broad comments on the direction of an 
organisation's environmental performance (e. g. getting `better' or `worse'), it is 
not generally possible to make stronger comments on the rate of change or the 
rate of progress compared to that which is necessary. It is recommended that 
Australian policy makers develop numerical targets or measures for 
sustainability. This process will enable the performance of individual 
organisations to be assessed as well as enabling society as a whole's progress 
towards sustainability to be assessed. 
9. There is no consolidated location for reporting on all of the various environmental 
initiatives (voluntary and mandatory) in Australia. The consequence is that it is 
difficult to compare different reporting requirements or to synthesise these data 
into a single overall assessment of environmental performance. It is 
recommended that consideration be given to providing a consolidated set of 
reported data for each company (possibly through the Environment Australia 
website). 
Research Needs 
10. Techniques for assessing business as usual and beyond business as usual 
environmental performance are required to enable the contribution of voluntary 
approaches to corporate environmental performance to be assessed. 
11. While soft effects have been cited as an important outcome from each of the 
voluntary approaches that have been considered, there is limited information on 
how these effects can affect environmental outcomes. It is recommended that 
further research be conducted into soft effects to understand how these effects 
can contribute to innovation and to longer-term environmental improvements. 
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12. The evaluation of the case studies has concluded at August 2001. However, each 
of the voluntary approaches looks likely to run for a number of years. It is 
recommended that each of the voluntary approaches be reviewed on an ongoing 
basis (possibly every two years) to evaluate their ongoing effectiveness and 
contribution. In addition, a comprehensive review of each voluntary approach 
should be conducted at the end of its life-cycle to enable a final overall 
assessment to be made of its contribution to the environmental policy process. 
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APPENDIX I: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
As part of the data acquisition process (see further Chapter 2 of this dissertation), 
interviews and discussions were held with individuals in academia, industry, 
government and regulatory bodies and non-governmental organisations. Table 1.1 
details the interviewees and discussants and their positions and organisations at the 
time of the interview. 
Table 1.1: Interviewees 
Name Position & Organisation Country 
Alexander, John Manager, Quality & Environment Australia 
ABB Engineering Construction 
Amis, Lucy Human Rights Researcher United Kingdom 
International Business Leaders Forum 
Anderson, Michael Head of Socially Responsible Funds Australia Australia 
AMP Henderson 
Arora, Bela Research Fellow United Kingdom 
Corporate Citizenship Unit 
University of Warwick 
Arvanitakis, James Campaign Director Australia 
AidWatch 
Atkinson, David Director - Industrial Ecology Unit Australia 
Sustainable Industries Branch 
Environment Australia 
Atkinson, Jeff Advocacy Coordinator Australia 
Oxfam Community Aid Abroad 
Avery, Chris Director United Kingdom 
Business and Human Rights Website 
Ball, David Lecturer United Kingdom 
University of Middlesex 
Barde, Jean-Philippe Principal Administrator France 
Environment Directorate 
OECD 
Betts, Kelly Strategic Activism Coordinator Australia 
Amnesty International (Australia) 
Beudeker, Bryan Environmental Policy Adviser Australia 
Ansett Australia 
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Boele, Nicolette Principal Greenhouse Consultant Australia 
Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation (SMEC) 
Boele, Richard Director Australia 
Australian Institute of Corporate Citizenship 
Borkey, Peter Environmental Management Team Coordinator France 
Environment Directorate 
OECD 
Bowman, David Senior Environment Advisor (Asia-Pacific) Australia 
Shell Services International 
Boyle, Rhonda Atmospheric and Energy Policy Researcher Australia 
Victorian Environment Protection Authority 
Bradley, Rob Climate Change Specialist Belgium 
Climate Network Europe 
Brady, Katy Senior Environmental Analyst Australia 
Economics and Environmental Reporting 
New South Wales Environment Protection Authority 
Bridge, Ian Senior Environmental Scientist Australia 
Pacific Air & Environment 
Brooks, Martin Economic Relations Researcher United Kingdom 
Amnesty International (International Secretariat) 
Burton, Bob Editor Australia 
Mining Monitor 
Butler, Brian Environment Manager Australia 
BHP Steel Products 
Carolin, Micheal Environment Advisor Australia 
Australian Business Chamber 
Carter, Assheton Consultant, Energy & Mining United States 
Center for Environmental Leadership in Business 
Conservation International 
Challenger, Barry Manager, Engineering, Health, Safety and Environment Australia 
Australian Institute of Petroleum 
Chandler, Geoffrey Chair United Kingdom 
Amnesty International (UK) Business Group 
Chapman, John Manager (Strategy & Environment) Australia 
Strategy & Environment Section 
Land Transport & Safety Division 
Queensland Transport 
Cody, Anna Program Coordinator United States 
Centre for Economic & Social Rights 
Coffey, Patrick Senior Environmental Engineer Australia 
Alcoa of Australia 
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Colley, Peter National Research Director Australia 
Mining and Energy Division 
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 
Collins, Dave Lecturer Australia 
University of Melbourne 
Court, John Director Australia 
JD Court & Associates 
Courtney, Jacqui Project Manager, Marketing and Communications Australia 
SEDA 
Coutts, David Executive Director Australia 
Australian Aluminium Council 
Davidson, Neil Manager Sustainable Technology Australia 
Built Environment Research Unit 
Queensland Department of Public Works 
Davis, Durham General Manager Environmental Policy and Planning Australia 
BHP 
Deed, Michael Director Australia 
Sustainability 
KPMG 
Devinney, Timothy Director, Centre for Corporate Change Australia 
Australian Graduate School of Management 
University of New South Wales 
Digby, Caroline Project Coordinator United Kingdom 
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development 
Dworjanyn, Paul Director Australia 
Air Toxics 
Environment Australia 
Ereaut, Geoff Senior Specialist - Environment Australia 
Huntsman Chemical Company 
Ernst-Russell, Peter Policy & Research Officer Australia 
The Australian Gas Association 
Evans, Geoff Director Australia 
Minerals Policy Institute 
Evans, Robert Botany Site Environmental Engineer Australia 
Orica Australia 
Evers, Chris Directorate General XI Belgium 
European Commission 
Feiler, Jozsef Policy Co-ordinator Hungary 
CEE Bankwatch Network 
Fenerol, Claudia Coordinator Pollutant Release & Transfer Register France 
Environment Directorate 
OECD 
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Finten, Edward General Manager Australia 
Clean Plant Engineering Solutions 
Flanagan, Paul Assistant General Manager (Environmental Services) Australia 
Pacific Power 
Flood, Jeff Manager Canada 
Business and Human Rights Program 
Amnesty International (Canada) 
Frankental, Peter Business Group Project Manager United Kingdom 
Amnesty International (UK) 
Freeman, Bennett Consultant United States 
Gladki, Aaron Senior Policy Officer Australia 
Environment Section 
Petroleum and Electricity 
Department of Industry, Science and Resources 
Glen, Stuart Marketing Manager - Australia Australia 
AgriQuality New Zealand 
Gould, Richard Environmental Policy Adviser Australia 
Queensland Mining Council 
Graham, Tasman Senior Environmental Engineer Australia 
Hyder Environmental 
Handelsman, Simon Advisor Global Issues (Natural Resources & Finance) United States 
Harris, Pamela Director, International Chemicals Australia 
Environment Protection Group 
Environment Australia 
Hatty, John Manager Environmental Services Australia 
BHP Minerals 
Holmes, Natasha National Research Officer Australia 
Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union 
Howen, Nicholas Freelance Consultant United Kingdom 
Isbister, James Manager Overseas Projects Australia 
National Council of Churches 
Jenkinson, David Services Manager Australia 
Northern Region 
Abigroup 
Jennings, Frank Campaigns Coordinator Ireland 
Amnesty International (Ireland) 
Kilcline Cody, Mary Acting Director Australia 
Environment Industries Focus Unit 
Environment Protection Group 
Environment Australia 
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Kinley, David Director Australia 
Castan Centre for Human Rights Law 
Monash University 
Knol, Rebecca Senior Environmental Specialist Australia 
Golder Associates 
Kunzer, Mark Senior Environmental Scientist Australia 
PPK Environment & Infrastructure 
Lee, Bernice Assistant Project Coordinator United Kingdom 
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development 
Lake, Rob Assistant Project Coordinator United Kingdom 
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development 
Litvin, Daniel Writer and Consultant United Kingdom 
Lloyd-Smith, Co-ordinator Community Information Systems Australia 
Mariann Bio-Region Computer Mapping & Research 
Loughran, Jim Campaigner Ireland 
Amnesty International (Ireland) 
Lowe, Ian Professor of Environmental Science Australia 
Griffith University 
Luscombe, Darryl Campaigner Australia 
Greenpeace 
MacDonald, Ingrid Advocacy Coordinator (Mining) Australia 
Oxfam Community Aid Abroad 
MacPherson, Ewen Manager, Government and Public Policy Australia 
Australian Institute of Petroleum 
Maitland, John President Australia 
International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and 
General Workers Union 
Malfroy, Hugh Principal Environmental Consultant Australia 
Pacific Power International 
Manning, Paddy Editor, Ethical Investor Australia 
Marsden, Chair United Kingdom 
Christopher Amnesty International (UK) Business Group 
Matthews, Margaret Director, Business Development Australia 
PACIA 
McBurnie, Craig Senior Manager Australia 
KPMG 
McDonald, Gary Director of Social Development United States 
Newmont Mining Corporation 
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McGlynn, Gene Economist France 
Pollution Prevention and Control Division 
Environment Directorate 
OECD 
McGuire, Nicola Senior Associate Australia 
Allen, Allen & Hemsley 
McIntosh, Bridget Project Leader Australia 
Sustainable Energy Development Authority 
McLaughlin, Consultant United States 
Timothy 
McRae, Simon UK Corporate Policy and Investment Coordinator United Kingdom 
Friends of the Earth 
McShane, Frank Assistant Project Coordinator United Kingdom 
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development 
McSorley, Jean Nuclear & Energy Campaigner Australia 
Greenpeace 
Moulder, Stuart Energy and Environmental Consultant Australia 
Energetics 
Nette, Andrew Policy Officer Australia 
Australian Council for Overseas Aid 
Newson, Marc Business Strategy Advisor Australia 
PriceWaterhouse Coopers 
Niepold, Mil General Program Director United States 
Verite 
Nolan, Justine Director, Labor Program United States 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
O'Brien, Barclay Director Australia 
Baring Brothers Burrows & Co 
Patterson, Belinda Environment, Health and Safety Services Coordinator Australia 
Ampol 
Photinos, Gary Manager, Policy & Legislation Australia 
Redland Shire Council 
Porto, Santiago Programme Manager United Kingdom 
Business Partners for Development 
CARE International UK 
Precious, Bruce Manager Australia 
Business Energy Efficiency 
Sustainable Energy Development Authority 
Puclin, Tony Technical/Research Officer Australia 
Australian Aluminium Council 
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Rae, Michael Policy Adviser Australia 
World Wildlife Fund 
Ramesohl, Stephan Environmental Researcher Germany 
Wuppertal Institute 
Redden, Jim Policy Director Australia 
Australian Council for Overseas Aid 
Richter, Monica Corporate Campaigner Australia 
Greenpeace 
Roche, Mick Manager Australia 
Safety, Environment & External Affairs 
BHP Cannington 
Roper, Anita Global Mining Initiative United Kingdom 
Ruchel, Matt Campaign Co-ordinator Australia 
Greenpeace 
Russell, Gabrielle Foreign Affairs Adviser Australia 
Office of Senator Vicki Bourne 
Shirley, David Director United Kingdom 
Sustainability Advisory Services 
KPMG 
Shulkins, Carolyn Environmental Policy Advisor Australia 
Queensland Mining Council 
Sinanian, Arek Principal Consultant Australia 
Enproc 
Smith, Peter Assistant Director - Environment Australia 
New South Wales Minerals Council 
Smit, Robin Senior Air Quality Specialist Australia 
Pacific Air & Environment 
Smith, Simon Manager, Regulatory Innovation Australia 
Economics and Environmental Reporting 
New South Wales Environment Protection Authority 
Squire, Melanie Industry Liaison Officer Australia 
National Pollutant Inventory Project 
Department of Primary Industries, Water and 
Environment 
Tasmania 
Stoll, Wayne Group Manager, Environment & Yield Australia 
Bonlac Foods 
Storrier, Greg Manager NPI Australia 
New South Wales Environment Protection Authority 
Swann, Ian General Manager Australia 
PACIA 
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Sweeney, Stuart SRI Specialist United Kingdom 
Amnesty International (UK) 
ten Brink, Patrick Environmental Consultant Belgium 
Ecotec 
Terrens, Greg Environmental Advisor Australia 
Corporate and External Affairs Department 
Esso Australia 
Thompson, Carl Corporate Quality Manager Australia 
ACTEW Corporation 
Thorning, Peter National Pollutant Inventory (NPI) Manager Australia 
Queensland Department of Environment & Heritage 
Todd, Geoff General Manager, Safety, Health and Environment Australia 
BHP Steel Products 
Tripathi, Salil Campaign Coordinator United Kingdom 
Economic Relations and Human Rights 
Amnesty International (International Secretariat) 
Ullman, John Regional Director Australia 
VP Projects Australasia 
BP Solar 
van der Poel, Paul Senior Research Assistant The Netherlands 
Laboratory for Waste Materials and Emissions 
National Institute of Public Health and the Environment 
van Krieken, Ashley Commercial Affairs Manager Australia 
PACIA 
van Ruijven, Co-ordinator Business Relations The Netherlands 
Marleen Amnesty International (The Netherlands) 
Vine, Mark Environmental Consultant United Kingdom 
DNV Technica 
Ward, Halina Senior Research Fellow United Kingdom 
Energy and Environmental Programme 
Royal Institute of International Affairs 
Warner, Michael Coordinator United Kingdom 
Natural Resources Cluster 
Business Partners for Development 
White, Debbie Policy Adviser Australia 
Environmental Defender's Office 
Wickham, Louise Senior Environmental Engineer Australia 
URS 
Williams, Steve Principal Consultant Australia 
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Wood, Elisabeth Assistant Project Coordinator United Kingdom 
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development 
Wood, Ian Environmental Policy Advisor Australia 
BBP 
Woods, Ian Principal Consultant Australia 
URS Group 
Wyndham, Hugh Principal Consultant Australia 
Golder Associates 
Zeise, Kristin Principal Consultant Australia 
Pacific Air & Environment 
BQ. ` 
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